Date of Award
Bachelor of Arts
Iraq War, special interests, public agenda, reconstruction
This thesis explores the causation for entrance and failure of the American intervention in Iraq. While it is commonly understood that President Bush’s insistence on preventing further atrocities after September 11th was a major motivation for launching the war, there exist many more players hidden from the public eye that contributed to the decision. Collaborating as collected special interests, these individuals often manipulated the public agenda, bent factual evidence to their favor, and sold the war to an ignorant American public. As a result, proper planning for post-war reconstruction and the assurance of stable democratic growth after the fall of Saddam was supplanted by a biased effort to launch a quick public war. Without a proper plan to serve as the foundation for a successful operation, little was achieved after Saddam was removed from power. Research for this thesis was collected from a plethora of primary and secondary sources. The thesis itself is broken up into chronological chapters. Within each chapter are sections that address a particular special interest and its involvement in the stage of the war being discussed. Section order runs parallel in each chapter for increased readability. This thesis sheds light on a dynamic of foreign policy in which the motivations for action must be stringently monitored and, without fear of political whiplash, be denied by representatives until proven absolutely necessary.
Butler, Gordon D., "Iraqs Post-war Failure: A Result of Special Interests" (2011). Honors Theses. 952.