Ephemeris, the Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy


In this paper, I focus on a third type of response, which holds that the demandingness objection is ill-conceived. In particular, I examine the argument put forward by David Sobel in “the Impotence of the Demandingness Objection.” In Section 2, I lay out Sobel’s argument and clarify its force. I then examine and reject a response to Sobel (Section 3), before defending a different response (Section 4 & 5).

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