The Incidence of Intra-State Violence:
An Empirical Study on Ethnicity and Values

By

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Abstract

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What best explains conflict? Why do societies engage in violence, or better yet, why are some societies more likely to fall victim towards internal instability and civil war? This paper seeks to better understand what factors offer the most explanatory power for intra-state violence. Utilizing Geert Hofstede's 6-D model of cultural dimensions, I construct a data set incorporating intra-state data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo to determine which factors offer the best account for understanding the incidence of intra-state conflict and war. In doing so, the objective is to demonstrate whether certain national cultural values are more likely to indicate the proclivity of a state to succumb towards civil war, rather than ethnic, cultural, or religious diversity. All in all, this paper finds that both Hofstede's power distance index and uncertainty avoidance index exhibit statistically significant results. While these findings are meaningful for reconsidering the role that ethnicity plays in intra-state conflict, there are some notable limitations of this analysis. In particular, quantifying a culture or ethnicity is far from simple, and remains contentious. Subsequently, while the first segment of this paper will focus predominately on the quantitative study, the second part of this paper will introduce a meta-analysis on the techniques used throughout. In doing so, this paper recognizes much of the quantitative limitations in aggregating the gap between proxies and reality, and consequently, seeks to discuss why more qualitative analysis will be needed in order to substantiate the legitimacy and robustness of this paper's findings.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why are certain states more likely to fall victim towards internal instability and ethnic war? Indeed, numerous theories across an array of social sciences have endeavored to answer this question. While some theories purport that its preponderance lies in "ancient animosity" others outright deny such assertions. Whereas some theories focus on rational actors, elites, resource opportunities, and security dilemmas, others pay closer attention towards a qualitative assessment of a state's history and politics. When it comes to conflict theory, no one theory is able to capture the entire picture. Instead, each theory can allow for a more nuanced understanding of why ethnic conflicts might transpire. With that said, some theories may offer more legitimacy and explanatory power than others, and it is this idea that drives the motivation behind this study.

In general, three main theories dominate the ethnic conflict debate: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. Each of these theories sets out to explain a difference in ethnic phenomena. This includes fundamental differences in how ethnic identity is formulated as well as differences in its implications. In other words, ethnicity is a hotly contested topic. At its most basic definition, it can be simply understood as "designating a sense of collective belonging" (Varshney, 277, 2009). The term can prove challenging to capture once ethnicity becomes overlapped with different combinations for language, religion, or even other cultural practices. For instance, there could be multiple ethnic groups that speak the same language, just as there could be different religious identities within the same ethnic group. Thus, distinguishing the salience of the bonds between ethnicities has become an increasingly important aspect in which to study our social world.

As the oldest of the three main ethnic conflict theories, primordialism is thought to have first started in the 1960s when observers noticed that many newly decolonized states struggled between the push and pull of harnessing civic ties and ethnic ties. In general, primordialism derives ethnic salience from the idea that ethnicities are inherited naturally at birth and remain static throughout a person's lifetime. As a result, primordial understandings of conflict often then point to a hostile society organized by in-groups and out-groups. Defined by low levels of societal trust, many primordial theorists then further assert that it is this lack of trust that may very well lead to a security dilemma. Therefore, scholars of primordialism have come to argue that ethnic violence is oftentimes natural, predictable, or at times, even unavoidable.

While primordialism is considered largely debunked in many academic circles, there has been a certain renaissance around its ideology since the fall of Communism. For example, the academic work of scholars such as Donald Horowitz (1985), Richard Kaplan (1993), and Samuel Huntington (1996) all formulate texts on subjects that readers may consider, in essence, primordial. For instance, in *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, Kaplan helped propagate primordialism by accentuating that it was in fact the deep ethnic cleavages between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs that could be used to help rationalize the sudden and tumultuous outbreak of violence following the breakup of Yugoslavia. Soon afterwards, Samuel Huntington's famous *Clash of Civilizations* thesis sparked controversy over this possible future, and detailed an inevitable coming together between Islam and the West. Nonetheless, while many political commentators continue to espouse some of the more hardline axioms of primordialism, it would be hard-pressed to find any hard-nosed prescribers of primordialism in the academic academy. Now more commonly

understood in a slightly modified formulation, many primordial academics only contend that ethnic identities and past grievances carry salience. In other words, it does not necessarily matter whether these identities were socially constructed or 'natural', but instead, whether these identities persist and are tangibly felt. What then matters is the perception of identities, and the emotions they carry. In this way, past grievances, emotions, and cultural symbols can become an important instrument for understanding the occurrence of ethnic tension and ethnic civil war.

Unlike primordialism, instrumentalism does not make any claims surrounding the formation ethnic identity. Instead, instrumentalism only offers the idea that ethnic identities exist. Oftentimes considered to have really began with the arguments of Abner Cohen (1969) *Custom and Politics of Urban Africa* and Robert Bates (1974) *Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa*, instrumentalism often understands ethnicity in terms of rational actor theory, or in terms of focal points, as branded by Thomas Schelling (1963). Although many instrumentalists often contend that identity is horizontally constructed, their main understanding of ethnic conflict is that identity is used as a tool or instrument to mobilize group violence. Therefore, instrumentalist theory frequently concentrates its focus on resource driven conflicts, or conflicts driven by a political elite for the sole purpose of economic or political power. Thus, as identities become politicized, it becomes a device or vehicle for further exploitation. In this way, instrumentalism can at times overlap with a primordial understanding of security dilemmas to the extent that there may be a resource race. However, this is not to be conflated with primordialism. The difference is that instrumentalism suggests that violence emanates from

economic or political incentives of elites, even if these incentives are carried out along ethnic or religious cleavages.

To understand this logic further, rational choice theory suggests that in heterogeneous societies, it may be more efficient to organize society and coalitions along ethnic lines. Of course, the robustness of these coalitions may differ by how ethnic groups are determined. For instance, ethnic identifiability by language or religion may be a weaker and a more porous indicator than by some other ascriptive marker, like skin color. However, regardless of how ethnic cleavages are constructed, instrumentalism maintains that these coalitions rely off manipulated symbols and myths. Yet, there are significant questions that instrumentalism still struggles to answer. Particularly, why is ethnicity a more important organizer or focal point for political elites to mobilize their bases, rather than an economic or ideological framework? What is so special about this formulation over others? Thus, it is this inability to rely too much on a structuralist or materialist narrative that instrumentalism often fails to explain what drives the emotive and ethnic group response.

Lastly, constructivism differentiates from primordialism and instrumentalism by utilizing a more sociological perspective. Formulated originally as a wide-ranging opposition to the tenets of primordialism and under the lens of critical theory and postmodern philosophy, constructivists consider ethnic identity as something that is fashioned, rather than innate. Hence, constructivists maintain that people could have heterogeneous levels of identity, and that these identities change over time and are even frequently crosscutting. In this sense, constructivists offer a more complex and refined understanding of identity. While instrumentalism and primordialism struggled to explain

ethnic or identity switching, constructivism is able to capture this observation without a problem. Commonly associated with ideas championed by Fredrik Barth (1969), Benedict Anderson (1983), and Charles Taylor (1993), constructivist thought has become the leading theory in understanding identity construction. It seeks to deconstruct how identities are created and what makes them salient. It tries to comprehend what makes some identities sticky, and others fluid. Given the nature of constructivist investigation, however, it becomes apparent that a quantitative approach towards ethnicity is significantly challenging. If identity is impressionable and able to change, how can you code and quantify it? Relying instead on rigorous sociological, historical, and political frameworks, constructivist theory strongly favors qualitative analysis.

Yet, when it comes to defining and understanding a theory of ethnic conflict, constructivism does not appear to have a single or refined answer. While answers oftentimes dwell into power dynamics and the influences of migration, colonialism, and institutional design, constructivism is a much more decentralized or loose theory. While this flexibility has allowed it to capture fascinating case studies, which can be understood to help separate endogenous variables from exogenous ones, this lack of a more concrete theory can make policy implications more difficult to build off of.

Nonetheless, the academic literatures concentration of ethnic civil war in terms of ethnic identity misses the opportunity to examine whether the real issue concerning ethnic violence is not in the construction of identity or in the past grievances of ethnicities, but in the actual cultural values they practice. In other words, it is also important to consider whether certain cultural values may be more likely to lead towards conflict, in addition to considering overall ethnic tension. It is crucial to recognize, however, that this is not to

argue that certain ethnic groups' values are more ordained towards violence. What this means to imply is that perhaps when two ethnic groups who both share a similar intolerance for uncertainty come into a dilemma, then the outcomes of a subsequent security dilemma that may develop can now be understood from a new angle. As a result, by shifting some of the analysis towards values over identity, this study hopes to bridge the gap between the ubiquity of ethnic groups and the infrequency of widespread ethnic violence.

Moving forward, this paper will be broken up into two distinct sections. The first segment of this paper will primarily concentrate on the economic literature concerning ethnic conflict. Following a review of the relevant literature, this part of the paper will then introduce an econometric model and study that attempts to understand the role that values, determined at the national level, may have in explaining ethnic civil war. Although there is a certain measurement problem when one considers that national cultural values may not be able to really represent all ethnic or minority cultures, it still stands that testing these values may in turn say something about the relationship between the state and its institutions ability to allow or act as a buffer against violence. Furthermore, while ethnic conflict is certainly not limited to violence and civil war, this paper will only focus on its most extreme form. In the future, more analysis will be needed in order to understand how cultural values may impact smaller scale conflicts or even nonviolent tensions.

Consequently, the second part of this paper will then consist of a meta-analysis of the quantitative literature, with this study included. While quantitative analysis is certainly useful in understanding patterns and the impact that differing variables can have in comprehending macro related and time series conflict, it cannot adequately capture specific case studies or explain why one country may have fallen victim towards ethnic civil war.

In this way, this meta-analysis strives to spark more interest in framing the relationship that both quantitative and qualitative analysis can have at drawing a more accurate conflict theory.

Chapter 2

Relevant Background

By and large, the academic literature surrounding the salience of ethnic identities within intrastate conflicts is quite mixed. While the majority of the research finds a lack of a significance attached to proxies such as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, other studies have found positive relationships between violence and ethnic polarization. Ultimately, it goes without saying that much of the empirical analysis and dialogue between different scholars and models focuses its attention on the finesse of the coding as well as the appropriate proxy for measuring ethnicity.

Within the quantitative literature, few studies have found robust evidence for a primordial argument. In one of the most influential studies in the field, Fearon and Laitin (2003) set up numerous hypotheses in order to test the viability of ethnic war and polarization on the onset of civil war. While they utilize a basic ethnolinguistic fractionalization index constructed primarily from the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) to test the impact of ethnic diversity on the onset of civil war, they also test the polarization argument by constructing dummy variables between the percentage of each country's two largest ethnic groups. In short, Fearon and Laitin report that ethnic and religious composition had little effect in determining the likelihood of a civil war. Instead, they repeatedly found that when their models accounted for per capita income, the results on ethnic or religious diversity were substantively weak. Consequently, Fearon and Laitin then asserted that what explains the onset of civil wars following the post-Cold War system can be better understood as a rise of insurgency networks in weak states; and moreover, this movement has its beginnings in the anticolonial movements of the 1950s and 1970s.

Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also find a lack of evidence associated between ethnic fractionalization and ethnic conflict. In *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Collier and Hoeffler attempt to examine which theory holds more explanatory power in understanding the onset of civil war. They underscore that while the political science literature oftentimes focuses more on what they term the grievance argument, the economics literature tends to favor a more instrumentalist or opportunity model. Testing their greed model mainly through a primary commodity export data and a rebel's access to financing, the authors report significant results. In other words, they find that commodity exports are highly associated with civil war. However, critics may question the meaningfulness of this channel for insurgent financing. Moreover, if their looting hypothesis is correct, the authors missed an opportunity to run a secondary OLS model in which to interact oil or other important commodities with ethnicity on the incidence of civil war. At the end of their analysis, Collier and Hoeffler find that only ethnic dominance offers a significant grievance explanation for the occurrence of ethnic war. In conjunction with the lack of violence associated with highly diverse societies, the authors then conclude that while it may be more likely for a relatively homogenous society to fall victim to a civil war as it slowly diversifies, once it reaches a certain level of diversity this probability drops significantly.

Unlike the works of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004), however, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) deviate by conducting their study with a different source for their ethnic data. Instead of relying on the NVM (1964) as many other scholars have done, the authors argue that World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) provides a better measurement of ethnicity, as it includes more diverse classification levels.

However, noting the weakness that the WCE has for religious groups, the authors then decided to use data from L'Etat des religions dans le monde (ET) for this grouping, primarily because it offers information on Animist groups as well. Regardless, in terms of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol find comparable results to the rest of the literature. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization does not appear to account for the incidence of civil war. However, while the two former studies discussed did not find any significance concerning ethnic polarization, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol did find evidence on the contrary. Overall, they report highly robust coefficients for ethnic polarization on the incidence of civil war, while religious polarization was less consistent depending on the model. These findings corroborated their initial claim, as influenced by Horowitz (1985), that ethnic violence is not monotonic.

Analogously, Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray (2012) find similar results to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, in that polarization does appear to have some say in the incidence of civil war. However, Esteban *et al.* introduce a much more nuanced model based off the theory applied in Esteban and Ray (2011). Setting out an attempt to explain the differences between conflict over public goods and private goods, the authors posit that perhaps the salience of ethnicity on the incidence of civil war depends on the type of rewards that are at stake. In other words, there should be a distinction between a conflict centered on a public payoff versus a private one. Working with a data set of 138 countries from 1960-2008, the authors utilize much of the data curated by Fearon and Laitin, while also using the PRIO data set on intrastate conflict. Incorporating ethnologue distance within their model as well as accounting for group cohesiveness, the authors report significant results for polarization, fractionalization, and their Gini-Greenberg distance

coefficients. While both polarization and fractionalization reported positive signs, the authors found that the Gini-Greenberg distance was negatively related with civil conflict. They emphasize that, "our estimated coefficients imply that if we move from the 20th percentile of polarization to the 80th percentile, holding all other variables at their means, the probability of conflict rises from approximately 13 percent to 29 percent. Performing the same exercise for fractionalization takes us from 12 percent to 25 percent" (Esteban *et al.* 2012). All in all, the authors find that polarization increases with public goods, while fractionalization increases with private ones; yet, the extent of this influence is dependent on the degree of within-group cohesion. Ultimately, in the eyes of the authors, conflict is not necessarily noneconomic. An instrumental theory appears to carry some significance.

On the other hand, however, perhaps the explanatory variable in explaining the relationship between ethnicity and civil war is not so much found in the concept of ethnic diversity as it is cultural diversity. This new avenue of research is explored by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2017), in which the authors find several striking results. Firstly, while the authors report that ethnic identity has some positive relationship with cultural values, cultural fractionalization and ethnolinguistic fractionalization share virtually no correlation within their study. As a result, ethnicity cannot necessarily be understood to explain the differences between cultural fractionalization. This suggests that cultural fractionalization can vary significantly within a group. Ultimately, Desmet *et al.* report that not only is ethnolinguistic fractionalization consistently insignificant throughout, but cultural fractionalization reliably carried a negative sign. What this means to say is that more cultural diversity is associated with less social antagonisms and war. However, when culture and ethnicity become overlapped with each other, the authors

report a robust and significant relationship for the onset and incidence of civil war. In other words, ethnic divisions do matter when they correspond to cultural cleavages. With this said, the authors levy some notable caveats. In particular, ethnicities small role in the large variation of culture within the sample, especially across different regions may imply that ethnic identities rigidness is regionally dependent as well as economically and politically dependent. This may explain why there is a weak relationship between ethnic identity and cultural identity in Latin America, while Sub-Sahara Africa and Asia feature a much stronger relationship.

On the contrary to all the previous works, Chandra and Wilkinson (2007) *Measuring the Effect of Ethnicity* pivots the dialogue on how to empirically measure ethnic conflict entirely. Crucially criticizing the empirical literature for a lack of development between a representative proxy and theory, Chandra and Wilkinson take issue with the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index. Instead, the authors draw a vital distinction between what they consider ethnic structure and ethnic practice. While structure, they argue, refers to descent-based traits, practice can refer to set of activated identities. Subsequently, a measurement of ethnic structure is understood to be theoretically stickier, whereas practice is considered to be more fluid depending on the set of activated categories. It is with this conceptual framework in mind that Chandra and Wilkinson then proceed to construct two new ethnic indexes, in which they argue the academic literature should consider. Primarily, their Ethnic Concentration Index (ECI) measures the disparity between ethnic group representation in the military at the time of a state's independence, specifically from a colonial power. As such, it measures the long-term impact of colonialism and ethnic imbalance, irrespective of whether this concentration is reflected at the time of the onset of

a civil war. Secondly, their EVOTE index is a time sensitive measurement of the aggregate vote acquired by ethnic parties in a certain year. Thus, according to Chandra and Wilkinson, both ECI and EVOTE provide a better conceptual approximation for ethnic practice and activation. That being said, although the authors did report a positive association for both their measurements in the onset of civil war, they too underscore potential bias and measurement issues with their own proxies. Consequently, they conclude that there remains plenty of room for improvement in constructing proper proxies to measure identity. As resolute constructivists, they are fully aware of the empirical challenge that coding identity can entail, and disapprove of most of the measurements that attempt to quantify ethnicity as something fixed.

That said, while the literature on ethnic conflict is filled with different proxies for understanding how ethnicity impacts growth, violence, and public goods provisions; there is also a vast literature that attempts to examine cross-cultural values and dimensions. For instance, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) constructed a model to determine the extent to which individualism and collectivism might impact the likelihood of whether a state may adopt democracy. Intending to challenge the modernization hypothesis that assumes democracy will increase in correspondence with worldwide convergence, the authors find that levels of individualism and collectivism are a much stronger predictor of democracy than any measure of economic development. And although the authors did test several other of the Hofstede cultural dimensions, they found them to be inconsistent and insignificant. Ultimately, in understanding whether an autocratic state will transition to democracy or remain autocratic, individualism appears to play an important role. Nonetheless, one could make the case that it is perhaps democracy that is influencing levels

of individuals, rather than the other way around. Foreseeing this potential issue of reverse causality, the authors then decidedly introduce two separate instrumental variables in genetic distance and historical pathogen prevalence in order to minimize any influence of endogeneity. Again, the authors report robust results. As a result, the authors suggest that modernization may not lead all countries down the path towards democracy. And furthermore, it is this cultural dimension of individualism and collectivism that might help shed some light on why countries such as China, Vietnam, or Singapore have reluctantly held onto their autocratic regimes.

Furthermore, the linkage between violence and cultural values has also been evaluated in political and cross-cultural psychology. For instance, Gelfand *et al.* (2013) examined the relationship between a host of cultural constructs on terrorism and extremism. In short, the authors found that societies with strong fatalist beliefs, high cultural tightness, and low gender egalitarianism experienced higher rates of terrorism than those countries who had scored lower on these scales. Moreover, given the compatibility of these three cultural predictors, the authors postulated that perhaps it is these rigid norms that lead to a "collapse of complexity," and an all-or-nothing approach (511). It is also interesting to point out that the authors found that each of these cultural factors were significant independent of each other, suggesting that each dimension helps explain a particular facet of the extremist phenomena. Whereas gender egalitarianism and fatalism were linked to the overall occurrence of terrorism, a societies tightness was associated with the magnitude of fatalities. Interestingly enough, however, the authors were surprised to report that collectivism remained insignificant and weakly associated with terrorism throughout. Likewise, Ross (1997) finds similar results to the extent that, "violent conflict

is much more likely in societies in which socialization lacks warmth and affection, is harsh, and where male gender identity conflict is high" (316). On the flip side, Caprioli (2005) found evidence that gender equality, as measured by fertility rates and female labor force participation, has been found to be significantly associated with the likelihood of intrastate conflict. Thus, it appears that not only are societies in which gender values are rigid and hierarchal are associated with an increase the likelihood of violence, but also the practice of gender inequality is correlated with a heightened risk as well.

Conversely, Triandis (2000) argued that the prevalence of collectivism was a crucial factor in understanding the prevalence of ethnic conflict. While Triandis finds that this type of conflict is quite rare for a collectivist society, he notes that "when a particular combination of cultural syndromes is found, namely active, universalistic, diffuse, instrumental, vertical collectivism, inhuman treatment of out-groups is likely to occur" (151). In general, Triandis finds that collectivist societies tend to reject out-groups more, especially as more pressure is brought upon a specific in-group.

Chapter 3

Cultural Premises

Given the economic and political science literature on the salience of ethnic conflict and in conjunction with the literature on the salience of cross-cultural psychological dimensions, this thesis attempts to question the relationship between these two subjects. Stated otherwise, the ubiquity of ethnic groups or even the polarization of ethnic groups may not be the main determinant in understanding civil conflict. Instead, the likelihood of civil war may be better understood from a culture's values, or even institutions. While there are several different cross-cultural psychological dimensions, the Hofstede data set stands out for its widespread use. Originally constructed as a questionnaire to understand differences in cultural values across IBM employees, Hofstede's cultural dimensions and data set has been expanded considerably since the late 1960s. These dimensions are as follow: power distance index, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance index, long-term orientation versus short-term orientation, and indulgence-restraint. Thus, the following chapter sets out to define and explain the foundation behind each dimension, and how these dimensions may help give insight into the likelihood of ethnic civil war.

Hofstede's power distance index is measurement of a country's tolerance towards hierarchy. Strictly defined, Hofstede (2010) asserts that power distance index is, "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally" (61). In other words, a high power distance signifies a state in which hierarchy is the norm, while a lower score signifies the opposite. States that score highly on the power distance index are associated

with traditional values, a small middle class, a weak political center, and strong political extremes as well as an increased chance of political violence. As a result, power distance is conceptually believed to carry a positive sign. In other words, the rationale is simply that a country with a higher power distance index is believed to be more likely to engage in intrastate conflict. And moreover, countries that score low on the power distance index are expected to be unlikelier to fall into the perils of civil war.

Crucially, Hofstede's individualism-collectivism index is not necessarily a measurement of self-interest, but instead, a measurement of how integrated a society is. As a result, a low score of individualism reflects a culture that is highly interdependent, or collectivist, while a high score reflects a state that is more loosely bound together (Hofstede 2010). Individualist states are characterized by personal freedoms and an emphasis on autonomy. They are strongly associated with higher wealth and economic growth and even faster walkers. Whereas individualist cultures are often thought of as guilt cultures, collectivist cultures are often characterized as shame cultures. It is also interesting to highlight that countries who score highly on the power distance index are also more likely to be collectivist, while countries who score lower on the power distance index are associated with more individualistic countries. However, there are exceptions to this negative correlation. All in all, conceptually it is hypothesized that the likelihood of ethnic conflict may be associated with collectivism, in part because the in-group and out-group distinction is more prevalent as well as due to its relationship with a higher power distance index. Moreover, the fact that collectivist countries are typically economically weaker also suggests that collectivist societies may be more likely to experience civil war.

Subsequently, the next cultural premise concerns Hofstede's dimension of masculinity and femininity in a state. However, it is important to emphasize that this is not a measurement of an individual's personal feelings towards gender norms and gender roles. Rather, it is a measurement of a state's perceived societal values in terms of either what is understood to be masculine traits or feminine traits. For instance, a masculine society would be defined as a society that rewards advancement, competition, and assertiveness; while, a feminine society would be defined as a society that values cooperation, modesty, and care (Hofstede 2010). Therefore, the higher the country's score, the more feminine their society values are perceived. In general, former Anglo colonies like Ireland, South Africa, Australia, and Trinidad all tend to fall within the lower third, thus being described as more masculine societies; whereas, Scandinavian countries like Norway, Sweden, and Denmark typically fall within the upper third, thus falling under the perception of valuing feminine societal traits. In short, masculine societies are more publicly gendered than feminine societies. As a result, it is hypothesized that highly gendered and masculine states will be more likely to engage in a civil war. The basis for this logic is quite simple. States that value assertiveness and competition are believed to be more prone to violence than societies that value cooperation. Furthermore, previous scholarship in linking the relationship between highly gendered states and violence upholds the logic behind this hypothesis.

Uncertainty avoidance index can be understood as society's demand for predictability. According to Hofstede (2010), "Uncertainty avoidance can therefore be defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations." Consequently, it is vital to underscore that uncertainty avoidance is

not a measurement of a society's risk aversion. On the contrary, it is a measure of a society's understood public and tacit rules. In other words, a low score on the uncertainty avoidance index implies that a state's society is quite tolerant towards unpredictability and arguably more carefree; whereas, a high score indicates a society that is hesitant or experiences stress and anxiety towards ambiguity. In other words, uncertainty avoiding countries consider truth under more absolutist terms, while uncertainty-accepting countries hold a more subjective and relativistic stance on what is truth. Conceptually, it is hypothesized that states with stronger uncertainty avoidance indexes will be more likely to experience a civil war. The logic behind this assumption rests on several associations. Strong uncertainty avoidance at the state level is associated with repressed citizen protests, conservative law and order, extremism and repression as well as precise laws and rules. Uncertainty avoidance has also been connected with ethnic intolerance, xenophobia, religious fundamentalism and aggressive nationalism (231).

Long-term orientation is understood as being symbiotic with values such as patience, thrift, and perseverance for future rewards. It has been found to be correlated with national savings rates and investment in real estate. On the other hand, short term orientation is often connected with ideas concerning desire for instant gratification, upholding time-honored traditions, and on the very extreme side, religious fundamentalism. Short-term orientation has also been associated with nationalism and for wealthy countries is negatively correlated with gross national income per capita. Yet, for poor countries, this relationship was found to be positively correlated with long-term orientation. Regionally, much of East Asia falls within the top tier of long-term orientation, continental Europe in the middle of the index, Anglosphere countries in the

lower to middle range, and African and Middle Eastern countries occupying the lowest range. Theoretically, it is hypothesized that countries who fall within a culture of short-term orientation are more likely to experience civil and ethnic war. In part, this is because war is believed to be a revolutionized or even short-term response. Given that war is destructive, it is considered the antithesis of long-term pragmaticism and investment that is associated with the long-term orientation.

Finally, Hofstede's indulgence versus restraint dimension is a measurement of how members of a society feel towards subjective concepts such as happiness and the importance of leisure. It shares some correlational relationship between other cross-cultural dimensions such as the distinctions between a loose versus tight society. Hofstede defines this dimension as, "Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms" (281). This dimension has been found to be slightly and negatively correlated with power distance, suggesting that highly hierarchal societies tend to favor a more restrained culture. Likewise, long-term oriented countries share a significantly negative correlation with indulgence. At the state level, highly indulgent societies have been found to support freedom of speech and human rights as one of the most important qualities about a country. In restrained societies, this is not the case. Instead, restrained societies are typically be more concerned with order. Additionally, indulgent countries were found to participate in sports at higher rates, have a higher consumption of alcohol and soft drinks, and have looser sexual norms.

Ultimately, it is hypothesized that indulgent countries are less likely to experience an ethnic conflict; insofar as war is conflictual with notions of happiness and leisure.

Chapter 4

Methodology

Given the dichotomous nature of examining civil war, this paper utilizes a binary logit model in which the dependent variable receives a value of "1" for all country years that a civil war was in effect and a "0" for all other remaining years. In general, the two basic models are reported as:

$$(1)\ Prio1000a_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Hof_i + +\beta_2 ELP + \beta_3 ELF + \beta_4 Gini + \sum_{k=2}^{K} \beta_k X_k + \varepsilon_1$$

$$(2)\ Prio1000a_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Hof_i + +\beta_2 CF + \beta_3 ELF + \beta_4 \chi 2 + \sum_{k=2}^{K} \beta_k X_k + \varepsilon_1$$

Essentially, the main difference between the two models is that model one prioritizes controlling for the variables of interest from Esteban *et al.*, while model two controls for the variables of interest from Desmet *et al.* In total, the base data set is an extracted and merged set of both of these authors data files. In total, the quantitative analysis spans from 1960-2007, and is divided into ten periods, in which each period represents a five-year average.

Chapter 5

Data Description

Dependent Variable

Data on intrastate conflict is acquired from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute of Oslo. While it would be advantageous to have a data set that listed the total deaths per year in order to really grasp the intensity of the conflict, this type of data does not accurately exist given the nature of war statistics. Instead, data sets are typically binary and are divided by stages of conflict. The UCDP/PRIO separates its data on intrastate conflict by three levels: small, intermediate, and large. Prio25 reports all intrastate conflicts in which there are 25 battle-related deaths in a year, while Prio1000 reports all intrastate conflicts in which there are at least 1,000 combat-related deaths in a year.

This analysis sets Prio1000 as its baseline for the reason that this paper is most interested in understanding how culture may impact civil war. Stated otherwise, this paper is concerned with questioning the relationship between ethnicity and national cultural values with the most extreme form of violence within the database. This is not to say that analyzing the impact of smaller-scale violence or even nonviolence does not have its place within the framework of this study. In fact, to some extent, studying smaller-scale conflicts may contain better information concerning intra-state resistance movements and rebellions. However, a smaller-scale analysis or a study on nonviolent ethnic conflict would require a slightly more modified theory, and does not fall within the purview and aim of this paper.

It is also important to mention that this higher threshold for conflict removes all smaller-scale conflicts from the data. It is also of equal importance to stress that this paper only tests for the incidence of civil war, rather than the onset of civil war. This distinction is necessary to point out, as some theories and studies focus on the onset of war, which describes the start of an entirely new conflict. Whereas focusing on the onset of civil war is a better marker for measuring the intensity of a new conflict, this paper chooses to concentrate its analysis on only understanding what helps explain the occurrence of civil war.

Independent Cultural Variables

This paper's main variables of interest take form in the use of Hofstede's six different cultural dimensions on national culture. This includes indexes on a societies power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation versus short-term orientation, and indulgence-restraint. Each of these variables have already been discussed in the aforementioned chapter on cultural premises. Within the model, each of these variables are tested individually. However, in order to later substantiate their robustness, some of these variables are later ran independent of one another within the same model.

Independent Control Variables

This paper utilizes a host of independent control variables. The first model is primarily concerned with controlling for Esteban *et al.* (2012) variables on ethnic

polarization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and its Gini-Greenberg index. Esteban *et al.* derive their ethnolinguistic fractionalization, denoted in this study as *ELF_Fear*, unchanged from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Ethnolinguistic polarization, denoted as *ELP*, is a measure of ethnolinguistic polarization with a delta value of 0.05, or δ = 0.05. Rather than follow the distance parameter utilized by Fearon, which assigned a distance parameter of δ = 0.5, Esteban *et al.* follows the smaller distance parameters as outlined by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Wacziarg (2012). The justification for a smaller parameter is that it better demonstrates the salience of smaller changes for language groupings that have few branches in common. Furthermore, ELP separates itself from the ethnic polarization measurement that was constructed in Montalvo *et al.* (2005), as it does not treat the delta parameter as a limit to infinity, or as binary. Although Montalvo *et al.'s* and Esteban *et al.'s* polarization variables seem to mimic each other quite well across a number of tests, Esteban *et al.'s* polarization proxy demonstrates its superiority once the authors account for ungrouped linguistic criteria. It is for this reason that this paper chooses to control for polarization with Esteban *et al.'s* approximation. Lastly, the first model utilizes a Gini-Greenberg coefficient, denoted as *Gini*, which also accounts for the ethnic difference.

The second model as influenced by Desmet *et al.* (2017) attempts to introduce control variables in the form of cultural fractionalization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and their overlap variable, chi-squared (χ^2). Cultural fractionalization, denoted as *CF*, measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals give different answers to a question from the World Values Survey. Ethnic fractionalization, denoted as *ELF*, follows a similar construction from the rest of the literature. And χ^2 measures the average distance

between the answers of each ethnic group and the answers in the overall population. These variables remain unchanged from Desmet *et al*.

Additional Control Variables

Additional control variables take shape in the form of accounting for lagged conflict, civil liberties, political rights, democracy, GDP, population changes, and regional controls. These variables are borrowed from both Esteban *et al*. and Desmet *et al*.

The first column of testing only includes control variables for logged GDP, logged population, and lagged conflict. These variables are all extracted from Esteban *et al*. Denoted as lgdpc2a, this variable is the natural log of GDP per capita in 1990 and was originally sourced from Angus Maddison *Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD*. The variable for logged population, denoted as *lpop2a*, is the natural log of population and has been obtained from the same source as lgdpc2a. And *Prio1000lag* is constructed and sourced from Esteban *et al*.

Subsequently, the second and third columns introduce control variables for topography and relevant resources. Given the literature on oil and diamonds as a rent-seeking commodity, this paper uses the dummy variable *oildiamond*. This variable takes a value of 1 if a country has produced any diamonds over the 5-year period, or if the average value of oil production in 2000 dollars over the 5-year period and divided by its average population is greater than 100. Esteban *et al*. sources both oil and diamond production from Ross (2011). The third column introduces a control variable for mountainous terrain. Denoted as *mountainsa*, this variable accounts for the proportion of a country that is covered in mountains. The original source of the data is derived from Fearon and Laitin.

The next set of columns introduce political controls for the multivariate analysis. Democracy, denoted as *Democracya*, is a dummy variable for democratic countries. It is borrowed from Esteban *et al.*, who sourced the original data from the Polity IV Project *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009* data set. Political rights, designated as *polrti3*, is a time-invariant index of political rights. Originally sourced from the Freedom House data set that measures political rights on a scale from 1 to 7, Esteban *et al.* transformed this index to better deal with the endogeneity issues that could occur if a sample country tightens or loosens political rights following a conflict. A country receives a value of 1 if its political rights percentage is greater than 0.4, and receives a value of 0 if otherwise. The same source and process is followed for assigning scores on civil liberties. A country receives a value of 1 if its civil liberties is greater than 0.4, and a value of 0 if otherwise. Lastly, column 6 introduces regional dummies sourced from Desmet *et al*. These dummy regions are denoted as: *Subsaharan*, *MiddleEastNothAfrica, EuropeCentralAsia, South Asia, EastAsiaPacific*, and *NorthAmerica*.

Chapter 7

Empirical Results and Analysis

Table 1 is a description of the summary statistics found in the appendix. Some notable observations include that the power distance mean for the countries sampled is 63.1, which is a little bit on the higher end of the scale. In contrast, the mean for individualism within the sample is quite low at 38.8. Cultural variables in the way of long-term orientation, masculinity-femininity, and indulgence-restraint all appear to share relatively even means.

Overall, most of the Hofstede cultural dimensions exhibited insignificant explanatory power for the incidence of civil war. Dimensions such as individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, long-term versus short-term orientation, and indulgence-restraint all lacked robustness. Tables on these regressions can be found in the appendix. On the converse, Hofstede's cultural dimensions for power distance index and uncertainty avoidance index were both found to present consistent and robust results. The following sections analyze these findings.

Model 1: Power Distance Index

As found in the appendix, Table 3 examines the determinants of civil conflict with the power distance index (PDI) as the main variable of interest. Column one displays the most basic baseline model in which power distance is ran alongside logged GDP per capita, logged population, and a lagged variable on large scale civil war. In short, PDI is found to be positive and significant at the five percent level. As more variables are

introduced throughout the columns, PDI continues to remain positive and significant, and even increases its significance to the one percent level. Columns two and three introduce topography and commodity controls in the form of mountains and oil/diamonds, while columns four and five introduce political controls in the way of democracy and political rights. More importantly, PDI continues to retain its significance as variables for ethnolinguistic polarization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and Gini-Greenberg distances are introduced. These variables are at first ran independently, and then later jointly. It is noteworthy to highlight that PDI preserves its significance, while these variables derived from Esteban *et al.* lose theirs.

Whereas columns one through ten depict the logit coefficients, column eleven expresses column ten's marginal effects. Simply put, the logit marginal effect of PDI is 0.0015. In other words, a one standard deviation change in the power distance index is associated with an increase in the probability of large-scale conflict exceeding 1,000 deaths by 0.03 percentage points, ceteris paribus.

Model 2: Power Distance Index

Correspondingly, Table 4 utilizes the same model as Table 3 with the exception that Esteban *et al.*'s control variables are exchanged for Desmet *et al.*'s control variables. Again, PDI is found to be extremely significant and consistent throughout. Other than cultural fractionalization, which retains its expected negative coefficient at the 5% level, PDI outperforms both ethnolinguistic fractionalization and Desmet *et al.'s* chi-squared overlap variable.

The logit marginal effect of PDI is robust at the one percent level. Its average marginal effect is 0.00305. Holding all other variables constant, a one standard deviation change in PDI is associated with an increase in the probability of large-scale civil war by 0.064 percentage points.

Model 1: Uncertainty Avoidance Index

Table 5 examines the determinants of civil conflict with uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) as the main variable of interest. Analogous to the previous regressions, column one displays the most basic baseline model for uncertainty avoidance. Interestingly enough, UAI was found to be insignificant; and furthermore, this lack of statistical significance continued throughout columns one through six. However, once regional controls are entered into the models, UAI maintained its positive robustness at the one percent threshold. The rationale behind this is that until regional controls were incorporated, UAI was essentially controlling for too much. It was attempting to explain both itself and the geographic regions.

Subsequently, the logit marginal effect of UAI is equal to 0.00228. Simply put, a one standard deviation change in UAI is associated with an increased probability of large-scale civil war by 0.05 percentage points, ceteris paribus. It is also worth mentioning that uncertainty avoidance appears to be a better indicator of civil war than ethnolinguistic polarization and fractionalization, suggesting that ethnicity is not necessarily the explanatory variable in understanding the incidence of civil war.

Model 2: Uncertainty Avoidance Index

Table 6 reports similar results to Table 5. The logit marginal effect of UAI is significant at the one percent level. Its average marginal effect at the mean is 0.00389. Holding all else constant, a one standard deviation change in UAI is associated with an increase in the probability of large-scale civil war by 0.086 percentage points. Once again, UAI seems to outperform cultural fractionalization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and the chi-squared overlap variable. Indeed, only ethnolinguistic fractionalization remained loosely significant at the ten percent level.

Robustness Checks

Robustness checks are carried out in Tables 7-10. Table 7 and Table 8 display robustness checks on power distance for the first and second models, respectively. Columns one through seven feature an array of combinations testing how PDI holds up independently, as individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation are introduced into the regressions. All in all, it is quite clear that power distance maintains its robustness throughout both models. This suggests that highly hierarchal societies help predict and are associated with the incidence of civil war.

Likewise, Tables 9 and 10 represent robustness checks for uncertainty avoidance. Once again, UAI is found to be extremely robust at the one percent threshold. Given this sustained significance as other Hofstede cultural dimensions are introduced into the model, it can be understood that UAI holds its own independent explanation for the incidence of civil war. Statistically, Table 10 demonstrates that the marginal effect of UAI is 0.00856. This means that a one unit increase in the standard deviation of UAI is

associated with an increased probability of large-scale civil war by 0.186 percentage points, ceteris paribus.

Discussion

It is rather apparent that Hofstede's power distance and uncertainty avoidance indexes each offer their own insights in explaining some phenomena attached to the incidence of civil war. While the academic literature has long debated different theories concerning the makeup of identity and ethnicity, the results presented in this paper open up a whole new line of questioning and theory. Perhaps, the diversity of ethnicity within a given state or the perception of grievances between in-groups and out-groups are not as significant as many commentators make them out to be. Instead, the results from this analysis suggests that academics and other researchers should include the impact of cultural values within their overall framework.

As far as the four Hofstede cultural dimensions that were found to be unrelated to the incidence of civil war, it was relatively surprising that both the individualism and the masculinity dimensions were found to not carry any significance. As referenced in chapter 2, previous cross-cultural psychology studies have found links between highly gendered societies and violence (Ross (1997), Caprioli (2005), Gelfand *et al*. (2013)). Consequently, this lack of comparable findings raises further questions concerning the role that gendered societies may play in predicting the frequency of conflict. For instance, it is imperative to note that Hofstede's measure of gender is not necessarily a measurement of a society's feelings or responses to gender norms. Instead, it is a score that measures the perception of whether a societies values can be understood as falling under the umbrella as more masculine or more feminine terminology. Perhaps, if this

dimension was better able to account for current gender inequalities and values towards women, then this variable would serve as a better predictor of violence.

However, the significance of power distance and uncertainty avoidance are not to be underestimated. Indeed, it appears that societies that are more tolerant of hierarchy, also tend to experience more civil and ethnic unrest. It is also crucial to recall that high power distance countries have been found to hold more traditionalist beliefs. They tend to be associated with countries that have a smaller middle class, more acceptance of inequality, and are frequently defined by radical politics. Separately, countries that score higher on the uncertainty avoidance index tend to be more hesitant. People view ambiguity unfavorably. As a result, oftentimes these societies are defined by strict formal or informal rules and laws. Likewise, truth is more often than not understood in absolutist terms.

Nonetheless, it is essential to consider how these two cultural variables work with each other in order to create a more complete picture and theory concerning cultural values and the incidence of civil war. When overlapped with each other, societies that are defined by high power distances and high uncertainty avoidance are commonly assumed to be structured as a pyramid. Conversely, states that receive low score on both indexes, such as Nordic countries and Anglosphere countries, are usually envisioned as a marketplace. Hierarchy is limited and tolerance for risk is high. It is also interesting to point out that Asian and African countries tend to score highly on power distance, but lower on uncertainty avoidance. Given that these are regions that are most often credited with the highest rate of ethnic civil wars, investigating the balance between these cultural

dimensions is important for creating a clearer understanding of when civil war may be more likely to occur and where.

Chapter 8

Caveats and Areas of Future Analysis

The fundamental question set out at the beginning of this paper was to question whether certain cultural values might be a better predictor for the incidence of civil war. In the past, the academic debate has been concerned particularly with ethnolinguistic fractionalization or ethnolinguistic polarization. However, both these estimates theorize to some extent that there must be something exclusive at best and pernicious at worst about identity that lends itself to be a more likely predictor of ethnic war. In truth, from a conceptual framework, it makes more sense if one can draw a theory based on cultural values and practices, rather than make assumptions about competing or "rigid" identities. Indeed, while previous work has focused on the fractionalization or diversity of a country, studies may gain more if they can pivot their analysis to values. By connecting cultural values to countries or even specific ethnic groups, scholars can create a more precise model in which to further understand ethnically driven civil war. With this said, however, quantifying cultural values is not an easy task. Not only does there need to be a wide array of sampling with very precise questions that can be easily interpreted; but more importantly, the essence of each question must be able to withstand language barriers and translations. While the Hofstede dimensions have generally stood the test of time, there are notable shortcomings and limitations. In the future, this is why qualitative supplementation is necessary in order to corroborate the robustness of this empirical analysis.

Additionally, as a caveat, this paper was not able to adequately dismiss the possibility of an important endogeneity issue. Indeed, the models presented in this study

could suffer from reverse causality to the extent that it is not national cultural values that are predicting the incidence of civil war; but instead, it is civil war that is shaping the national cultural values. While it appears more logical to assume that national culture values flow in the direction of civil war, rather than vice versa; a country's past historical record could leave such an indelible mark that it transforms its national culture. In the future, studies could work around this potential problem by introducing an instrumental variable to help determine which way this relationship really flows. On the converse, however, given that this study is not limited only to countries that have engaged in an ethnic civil war, it seems more likely that national culture is the preeminent driver.

Finally, with regards to this study's findings, only two of the six cultural dimensions tested proved significant. Nonetheless, this is an important stepping stone for further research in the relationship between values and civil war, rather than ethnicity and civil war. Not only did this study find that power distance and uncertainty avoidance were both strongly associated with the incidence of civil war, but more importantly, these variables outperformed the literature's variables on ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ethnolinguistic polarization, and cultural fractionalization. While the magnitude of the coefficients presented in this paper were marginal, the fact that they remained highly significant does warrant itself to further research. Moving forward, improvements in coding and finessing of variables will be important for continually testing this analysis. Correspondingly, it would also be incredibly beneficial if future studies were able to measure cultural values at the ethnic group level, rather than national level. While the national level provides an interesting analysis to the degree that it informs us of the culture of a state, its people, and its institutions, it does lack the nuance that is really

needed in order to get to the heart of the ethnic conflict debate. As a result, future work in determining these cultural values at the ethnic group level could be fruitful for shedding greater light on the relationship between values and the incidence of civil war.

Part II: A Meta-Analysis of The Quantitative and Qualitative Literature on Ethnic Conflict

Chapter 9

Introduction

The initial motivation behind this study was to first investigate more deeply why certain states are more likely to fall into the perils of ethnically driven civil war than others. While the previous chapters decided to evaluate this question by using an aggregated and at large econometric study, in which the central claim was to examine whether it would be more practical to measure the likelihood of conflict by a states' cultural values rather than by its ethnic diversity, the following sections will deviate by instead focusing its attention on how the quantitative and qualitative literature within the field of racial and ethnic politics differs in their assumptions, models, and findings.

It goes almost without saying that expanding our understanding of the drivers and causal mechanisms of civil war, and in particular, ethnic civil war is of vital importance. Indeed, since the aftermath of the Second World War, it has been intrastate violence that wreaked more havoc, chaos, and destruction. Moreover, as Tang rightly points out, "more than half the intrastate wars have been ethnic based rather than related to class or ideology" (Tang, 256, 2015). And while many scholars have highlighted the fact that the incidence of ethnically driven war has been on the decline since the mid-1990s, rising ethnic nationalism, in opposition to globalization and multiculturalism, in addition to the increasing potential for large scale resource races as global climate change makes its presence felt, could all possibly change this. Yet, when it comes to extracting a theory on the drivers and predictors of ethnic civil war, the academic field has become quite fragmented. While quantitative studies have successfully linked many correlational

factors to the onset of ethnic civil war, qualitative research have attempted to focus more

on its causal mechanisms through highly specific case studies and ethnographic research

(Tang, 256, 2015). Although these are not necessarily poor approaches to the study of

ethnic conflict on their own, too often the academic conversation has come to mistake the

forest for the trees. In other words, all too frequently has the academic debate fallen

victim to the noise and semantics of hardline ideologies and axioms. Just as extreme

positions on the theories of primordialism and constructivism do exist, this does not have

to negate the potential for a softer interpretation on either side of the aisle from which a

more inclusive and universal theory can be built. As Motyl accentuated nearly twenty

years ago, "Only as monoliths must primordialism involve undifferentiated notions of

immutability, objectiveness, timelessness, and naturalness, and constructivism, its polar

opposite, must involve similarly undifferentiated notional of mutability, subjectiveness,

temporal boundedness, and artificiality" (Motyl, 83, 1999). Stated otherwise, the focus on

the extremes of these hardlines theories only helps propel a laundry list of strawman

fallacies, nullifying any furtherance of a workable theory.

Nonetheless, this academic divide is still very much apparent, and more

importantly, directly influences how studies are conducted. For instance, Motyl

underscores how under the banner of extreme primordialism, the theories of perennialism

and naturality theory presumes the immutability of the nation (84, 1999). And

furthermore, the psychological angle of essentialism, as propped by Donald Horowitz and

Pierre van den Berghe, "approximates extreme primordialism by ultimately deriving

national identity from evolutionary process intrinsic to human beings, thereby removing

the nation from history, rooting its existence in life itself, and endowing it with natural

properties" (85, 1999). Put differently, Motyl argues that from the perspective of these authors, extreme primordialism is essentially dismissed as a social science and replaced as a natural one (87, 1999).

On the flipside, strong constructivists and instrumentalists, and in specific, rational choice theorists, will ostensibly deny the salience of ethnicity, no matter which dimension it is drawn across. In its place, these scholars decidedly focus their analysis almost entirely on the impact of elites, interests, and power dynamics. Yet, this idea has its own shaky foundations. For instance, where do nationalist elites then originate from? In other words, the stronger constructivists try to explain these nationalist elites historically, the more their antiprimordialist logic falls into circularity. As Motyl argues, "Consistency demands that, if elites are assumed to be capable of inventing, imagining, and whipping up at time t, in the face of presumably recalcitrant culture, institutions, preferences, and norms, they must be assumed no less able to reconstruct or deconstruct their creations at time $t+n$" (91, 1999). However, this has not been evident historically. In addition, how are these theorists then able to account for "real, heart-felt resonance of kinship, religious symbols, languages, flags, anthems, and homelands" (Salehyan, 61, 2017). Why do hundreds revolt and die when there is at times little material gain to be made? And finally, there is a certain level of theoreatical inconsistency when strong constructivists fallback and widely discuss the role of "potential communities" within the age of nationalism, as to follow this logical thought of potential communities is to instinctively presume some primordial account to begin with (Motyl, 91, 1999).

Stated otherwise, too much attention has been focused on these theoretical and methodological extremes, with little leeway gained in the formation of a general theory

on which scholars can attempt to test empirically and qualitatively. As a result, this meta-analysis will attempt to focus its attention on how these differing methodologies and assumptions can come to work together.

Thus, the organization of this paper will first begin by outlining a few qualitatively driven studies, where the goal is to frame a more holistic and inclusive theory. To be specific, the objective is to discuss a few potentially different causeways and factors that to can culminate in establishing the right environment for the incidence of an ethnically driven civil war. As a caveat, however, it should be underscored that this study will disregard providing an overview of any qualitative case studies and ethnographic research to the extent that they are highly specialized accounts of detailed ethnic civil wars, and do not fall within the exact purview of this study. Nonetheless, this is not to undermine their significance nor downplay their role in providing an outline for a general theory.

Moving forward, the next section of this meta-analysis will then provide a brief criticism of the previous quantitative study as outlined throughout the first eight chapters. Discussing some of the theoretical weak points as well as noting some of its strengths, this section will focus primarily on explaining why the proxies for ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization are poor fit to any political theory. Consequently, this analysis will then offer reasoning on why measuring cultural values may open up a new avenue for understanding the likelihood and prevalence of ethnic civil war.

And finally, this analysis will then conclude by examining the growing quantitative literature, in which the purpose is demonstrate how new research and data collection are striving to better address the criticisms throughout the qualitative literature.

In particular, this section will focus on how new data sets are being created in the hopes of disaggregating the large-N studies conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ultimately, this meta-analysis strives to provide an overview of where new quantitative and qualitative research can come together, in the hopes of bridging the current gap between the two methodologies.

Formation of a General Theory

When it comes to formulating an integrative and inclusive theory regarding the incidence of ethnic civil war, it is almost compulsory to see past the hardline theoretical positions that one is often accustomed to hearing. For discussion and critical analysis to be effective, critics must first begin with a liberal scope. Too often do discussions within the academic debate fall into the perils of pitting and rank-ordering different drivers and factors against each other, before actually understanding and constructing how all these pieces fit together.

Having said that, where I would like to begin with constructing this general outlook is by temporarily examining Rogers Brubaker's *Ethnicity Without Groups*. Falling within what many would term the cognitive side of ethnicity, Brubaker attempts to emphasize a necessary twist on constructivist thought. While constructivism has generally won the academic debate on addressing the complexities that go along with identity construction, Brubaker asserts that certain elements of constructivism has fallen into what he terms groupism. Arguing that scholars and observers alike must rethink how we understand ethnicity, nationalism, and race, Brubaker proposes that we must neglect framing these socially constructed categories as standalone entities in which agency can

be attributed. In short, he proposes that these categories be understood as, "…cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events" (Brubaker, 2002, 166). In other words, Brubaker attempts to highlight that oftentimes events and theories are framed from the perspective that these constructions are definite. However, when it comes to conflict theory, rarely are these groups, cultures, and communities actually homogenous actors. And it is with this in mind that Brubaker asserts that it is organizations that we must study. He writes, "Although participants' rhetoric and commonsense accounts treat ethnic groups as the protagonists of ethnic conflict, in fact the chief protagonists of most ethnic conflict—and a fortiori of most ethnic violence—are not ethnic groups as such but various kinds of organizations, broadly understood and their empowered and authorized incumbents" (Brubaker, 2002, 172). On top of that, Brubaker underscores that while organizations are almost always the protagonists when it comes to conflict, the targets can be more indiscriminate (Brubaker, 2002, 173). All in all, Brubaker strives to challenge the status quo of how we come to perceive ethnic conflict. Indeed, ethnicity, race, and nationhood are only perspectives, which exist through our perceptions and categorizations.

Nonetheless, while Brubaker's analysis serves as an important reminder that we must not treat ethnic groups and group actors as rigid and homogenous, his analysis falls short of attributing any emphasis on the state and history. As such, his ideas become difficult to substantively build off on their own. Moving forward, however, Stuart Kaufman deviates from Brubaker to the extent that he actually attempts to formulate an early integrative and workable theory concerning the incidence of ethnic civil war. Simply put, Kaufman asserts that there are three main factors that are necessary for ethnic

war to result: hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas (Kaufman, 2001, 109). Moreover, in order for each of these factors to be present, Kaufman emphasizes the need for several preconditions.

In order for mass hostility to take form, Kaufman argues that there must at least be, "ethnically defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes of ethnic symbols" (Kaufman, 2001, 109). While these preconditions seem quite logical, it is important to underscore that seldom few scholars have sought to integrate multiple disciplines and theories together. In fact, in many ways all three of these preconditions transcend the often-rigid categories of primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism to the extent that all three conditions can fit within these theories. For instance, those scholars who fall more on the primordialist side of the spectrum will often focus on the role that long-standing grievances and symbols can impart on the debate, while constructivists will often point to the manipulation of symbols or discuss when certain grievances can become emotionally salient.

Subsequently, Kaufman then moves on to attribute the role of belligerent elites towards a process he calls outbidding. However, in order for there to be a successful environment for outbidding, Kaufman accentuates the need primary for mass hostility. In this way, mass hostility can be understood as the initial condition for ethnic civil war. In short, outbidding is largely the idea that elites compete with each other for their own interests, and consequently, this can lead to the furtherance of increasingly disparate ethnonationalist positions.

And finally, Kaufman's highlights that the preconditions needed for an inter-ethnic security dilemma relies on legitimate fears of mutual extinction. In this way, fears

can be so powerful as to initiate pre-emptive attacks. And furthermore, these fears can be manipulated and driven by political elites or by the mass public. As such, Kaufman highlights two patterns in which these factors can be aroused. Whereas the mass-led pattern is initiated by mass hostility, the elite-led pattern is initiated by belligerent elites (Kaufman, 2001, 109). More explicitly, Kaufman then goes on to provide a two-level analysis of how these factors and their preconditions can arise from either side of the dominant or subordinate groups. While he terms mass-led conflicts by the dominant group as popular chauvinism, he terms elite-led conflicts by the dominant group as a case of government jingoism. In contrast, mass-led conflict initiated by the subordinate group are termed as mass insurgencies, while elite-led conflicts initiated by the subordinate group are called elite conspiracy (Kaufman, 2001, 110). And finally, Kaufman then attempts to discuss how both rational choice theories and psychological theories can come together to illuminate the how symbols can be manipulated and how tangible emotions of fear and hostility must be necessary for large scale conflict to really sprout.

With that in mind, however, Shiping Tang highlights several weaknesses in Kaufman's attempt to build an integrative theory. First, Tang stresses that while Kaufmans's three main factors may be sufficient for the onset of an ethnically driven war, he is not entirely convinced whether this is a holistic enough approach. Indeed, Tang argues that Kaufman's subsequent addendums for other preconditions ends up falling into the "sin of commission," or in other words, an ad hoc theory that is not sufficiently thought out and organized (Tang, 2015, 261). Secondly, Tang asserts that Kaufman's security dilemma scenario was underdeveloped to the extent that he did not fully realize its potential. Simply put, by assuming in his model that one side has already attacked,

Tang points out that this very assumption contradicts the very essence of what a security dilemma is. And moreover, by later equating his security dilemma with rational choice theory, Tang charges that Kaufman then neglects to adequately include the psychological aspect of it (Tang, 2015, 262). Other criticisms offered by Tang include Kaufman's lack of emphasis on the mobilization of mass media as well as failing to acknowledge that the precondition for belligerent elites in the form of outbidding, is a process that can oftentimes be regulated.

As a result, Tang begins to construct his own integrative theory by emphasizing four main master drivers. These drivers consist of emotion, interest, capability, and opportunity. Subsequently, Tang highlights that there are four main emotions that make-up this larger master driver. The first emotion is fear. In particular, fear of extinction is a powerful driver that has been highlighted by Horowitz, Petersen, and Kaufman. In addition, it also fits in well the two-level security dilemma model. The second emotion that Tang highlights is honor, while the third and fourth emotions are hatred and rage, respectively. Tang argues that honor oftentimes comes into play when dominant and subordinate groups harbor historical grievances, while emotions like rage are more important in understanding any spontaneous outbreak of violence (Tang, 2015, 267). Keeping this mind, Tang then moves on to discuss how territorial interests, natural resource interests, and political and economic interests have all come to be associated with ethnic war. And lastly, Tang then sums up the master drivers of opportunity and capability by stressing the strength and weakness of either the state or rebel organization.

However, in order to really understand these master drivers, Tang then demonstrates how they fit within a security dilemma situation before discussing how

intergroup-intragroup interactions become necessary to fully encapsulate his general theory. Building off the two-stage analysis of Kaufman and the criticisms of Brubaker, Tang asserts, "To understand ethnic war, however, depicting ethnic groups as unitary actors is wrong even as a first cut, because intragroup interactions between elites and the masses is key, and this intragroup interaction is constantly influenced by the dynamics of intergroup interactions" (2015, 264). However, depicting elites as the causal tipping point for ethnic war cannot explain everything. For Tang, ethnic mobilization is the most important factor to study in order to understand the likelihood of an ethnic civil war. For instance, he cites that while elite mobilization is a necessary precondition, for an ethnic war to occur the masses must follow; and more importantly, this is not always the case (Tang, 2015, 272). As such, Tang conclude, "In terms of policy, because ethnic mobilization is the key process leading to ethnic war, a key measure for preventing ethnic war is to prevent radical ethnic elites—especially elites who already have substantial power bases—from successfully mobilizing the masses for violence" (2015, 273).

Ultimately, when it comes to building a substantive and integrative theory it is necessary to first consider the role of the ethnic mobilization. However, in order to really understand this phenomenon, our theories must be able to account differences in power distributions within a state. This is where fruitful research should attempt to connect the qualitative research with the quantitative analysis. By modeling for differences in power distributions as well as beginning to focus analysis on politicization of ethnic groups, rather than ethnic diversity, scholars can bridge together a tighter theory that can be substantiated both qualitatively and quantitatively.

A Theoretical Critique

As briefly noted in the previous chapters, my original model and its theoretical underpinnings do suffer from a few glaring assumptions that must be expanded upon. Principally, the focus of my econometric model was to find a way to shift the discussion of ethnic civil war from the ascriptive and rigid categorizations of ethnic diversity and polarization, and in its place, shift the current range of political theory to concentrate more on a measure of a state's cultural values. The logic behind this shift was simple. When it comes to ethnic civil war, it is incredibly difficult to predict the circumstances in which one may arise. Simply put, there are hundreds and thousands of ethnic groups, however, not all these groups are in conflict with each other; and furthermore, for those groups that have come in conflict with each other, understanding the cloudy circumstances of when they come into conflict is even more unclear.

Even more so, the underlying assumptions associated with either ethnic, language, and religious fractionalization indexes throughout the quantitative literature are substantively weak. Given that many countries' levels of ethnic salience fluctuate across numerous and at times crosscutting dimensions, choosing which grouping to plug into a Herfindahl concentration formula is undoubtedly ambiguous. For instance, as Posner highlights, "defined by its religious divisions, India's index of ethnic diversity is 0.31; determined by language, it rises to 0.79. The former value suggests a fairly homogeneous social landscape; the latter implies a very heterogeneous one" (Posner, 2004, 2). However, as Posner then highlights later, for a country like Northern Ireland, the salience of conflict is neither drawn along an ethnic nor language dimension, but instead, usually

presumed to be a religious divide. Yet, even then, Northern Ireland is not necessarily religiously diverse. Subsequently, it is thus not surprising that the overwhelming majority of the quantitative literature has found little to weak evidence to support the idea of fractionalization as a predictor of ethnic conflict. Indeed, the situation dependence and multidimensionality of ethnic salience makes choosing a fractionalization index substantively problematic. And more importantly, as Salehyan underscores, if quantitative analysis is to be expanded upon, it must rely more on "theoretically meaningful indicators of inter-group relations" (64, 2017).

However, the theoretical implications for understanding the usage of testing the incidence of civil war against the six Hofstede dimensions is also in many ways lacking. Indeed, there is seldom literature that points to national culture values as a predictor of violence. However, this does not mean a theory cannot be developed around its empirical usage. As Beugelsdijk and Welzel underscore, the Hofstede's dimensions have been more relevant in the fields of cross-cultural psychology and international management, while Inglehart's World Value Survey has been more relevant in the political science and economics field. Yet, this does not mean either data sets are mutually exclusive of each other. Indeed, Beugelsdijk and Welzel underscore that both should be synthesized together (2018). Nonetheless, as referenced in chapter two, Desmet *et al.* provide robust evidence for testing and turning the field's attention towards cultural values, rather than purely ethnic determinants. Indeed, through their cultural fractionalization index, the authors demonstrate that civil conflict is better understood through the overlap between cultural and ethnic channels. In other words, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is not a proxy for the cultural values held within a country. In fact, the authors accentuate that the

correlation between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and cultural fractionalization is only
-0.030, which is essentially zero (Desmet *et al.*, 2017). Put simply, in many countries
ethnic identity is not able to predict the variation in sampling responses towards cultural
values. And although Desmet *et al.'s* findings are significant to the extent that their chi-
squared overlap variable was found to be robust, there are some limitations to focusing
one's theory on when cultural values predict ethnic identity. Nonetheless, it is fascinating
to note that the authors found that predicting a person's cultural values based off their
ethnicity was more difficult in highly developed western and Latin American countries,
while poorer societies in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa had a stronger relationship
between ethnicity and culture values (Desmet *et al.*, 2017). To an extent, this then offers
some evidence towards a modernization theory in which the salience of ethnic identity
within civil conflict is likely to be reduced as countries develop economically and
institutionally.

Principally though, when it comes to large-scale ethnic civil war, there needs to
be further attention to the role of that the government, elites, rebel groups, and symbols
play within these quantitative models. In other words, even though Desmet *et al.'s*
findings that cultural diversity can be a predictor of civil conflict when overlapped with
hard ethnic differences, it negates the ability to account for the role that a government
may have in initiating this violence. As a result, this is where Hofstede's national culture
may provide a better linkage. While the basis for the idea of a national culture has been
widely disputed as one of limiting facets of the Hofstede dimensions, perhaps one can
draw a link between the aggregated national culture with the culture of the institutions,
governance, and general economic culture of a country. In this way, Hofstede's

dimensions may prove useful, and in fact, within the previous chapters, has been found to

be significant in comparison to Desmet *et al.'s* cultural fractionalization and chi-squared

variables, and Esteban *et al..'s* ethnolinguistic polarization variable.

While the significant variables of uncertainty avoidance and power distance

within the previous study cannot account for a holistic picture of ethnically driven civil

war, it does help illuminate perhaps some deeper and singular portion of a much larger

issue. As Soeters underscores, "In general, the way political elites maneuver within a

society is culturally embedded. More specifically, population groups must be susceptible

to elite manipulations. There must be fruitful soil for these seeds, sown by political elites"

(1996, 240-241)." In this way, understanding a countries national culture may give more

insight into how susceptible a society may be towards elite manipulations; and, it is

important to underscore that this does not occur irrespective of history, symbols, and

myths. For instance, it is not necessarily surprising to some extent that many of the

countries that make up the former Yugoslavia all appear to score highly off Hofstede's

measures for power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and collectivism. Noting this

correlation, Soeters emphasizes that countries who score highly on these three

dimensions, tend to deal with intergroup conflicts in an inflexible manner. He writes,

> Intergroup conflicts in these societies soon become violent, because the different
>
> cultural (minority) groups show the same combination of uncertainty avoidance
>
> and collectivism. They respond to hostile approaches in a similarly negative and
>
> violent way. If this combination is accompanied by a high level of power
>
> distance, the political elites experience fewer impediments in their actions than

elites in more egalitarian societies. (Soeters, 1996, 239)

In addition, Soeters accentuates that countries that score higher on uncertainty avoidance index are often associated with fertile ground for pro-nationalist and even racist policies. Indeed, he argues that in many ways it is not surprising that Greece tops Hofstede's list of uncertainty avoiding countries; and furthermore, from this perspective, one can draw a parallel between this ranking with Greece's acrimoniously geo-political discord with the status of Northern Macedonia's former name. By the same token, Iannia Carras makes note of these Greek characteristics within a historical framework of migration and immigration. He asserts, "The nature of this migration explains some of the weaknesses that are endemic to the Greek polity: the lack of trust between groups, and the lack of allegiance and non-payment of taxes to a state that is almost universally viewed as the fiefdom of a kleptocratic elite" (2012).

Nonetheless, even if one accepts the idea that Hofstede's national culture data can serve as a useful proxy for the culture of a government and its people, this still does not reveal anything particular about ethnicity per se. And moreover, it still neglects the inclusion of other important indicators such as elites, rebel groups, symbols, and grievances. This is unquestionably the direction where new quantitative research is starting to expand, and where the analysis conducted in the previous chapters fell short.

A New Direction in Quantitative Research

There is little doubt that as technology and the finessing of ethnic coding has improved, the opportunities to fit a quantitative model to the findings and criticisms offered within the qualitative literature has expanded. Indeed, one of the earliest political science data sets to incorporate ethnic minorities was initiated by Ted Gurr in the 1980s. Called the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set, Gurr and his colleagues tracked approximately 300 politically active ethnic groups. Assembling and codifying information on political and economic discriminatory policies against these groups as well as information on their representation in government and even settlement patterns, Gurr's MAR project has grown to be an indispensable quantitative resource for studying ethnic politics. Having said that, there are a few obvious shortcomings to such a tedious and well-research data set. In particular, to limit a quantitative study to only those minorities deemed "at-risk" would be to overestimate the likelihood of violence. As Salehyan asserts, "By only selecting ethnic groups that are discriminated against or who have expressed political demands—and failing to include the hundreds of groups that remain quiet—the data have a built-in bias toward violence" (62, 2017). While this limited sample of politically relevant and marginalized ethnic groups does pose an issue of selection bias, current and future work has gone off to successfully expand this project.

Emphasizing the fact that states are rarely ethnically neutral institutions, Cederman and Wimmer set out to develop the MAR data further by operationalizing the state and its ethnic makeup as a variable within their Ethnic Power Relations data set. Pointing out that one of MAR's weaknesses comes from the fact that it, "hardwires the degree of power access into the sample definition by excluding groups in power from

systematic consideration," the authors highlight the need for a data set to be able to incorporate those state's that could have dramatic shifts in power arrangements (Cederman *et al*., 91 2010). For instance, the authors highlight how the power demographics of countries such as Chad, Nigeria, Liberia and Afghanistan can all shift from one period to the next, and finding a way to account for changes between excluded and included groups is essential for understanding the causal mechanisms towards conflict. In this way, the authors are able to account for fluctuations and abrupt changes in ethnic power sharing as certain countries shift from majority to minority led governments and vice versa. However, one limitation of their initial data set is that the authors have thus far restricted their power-access coding to executive power only (Cederman *et al*. 2010, 99). While executive power does account for the cabinet and the military, it is not able to fully capture any smaller local government or representational government where marginal and regional groups may be better representative. Conversely, if it is already assumed within the model that it is the central government that really chooses to engage in ethnic civil war, then this may not necessarily pose an issue.

Nonetheless, to be considered politically relevant, a group must have at least one political organization. This characterization generally provides a much more liberal definition than the MAR's data set, which helps expand the number of ethnic groups within their study to 700. More importantly, however, by including the objectives of these politically defined ethnic groups within their data, and distinguishing whether the groups goals are ethnonationalist or secessionist in nature, the authors are then able to test models that are more suitable towards political theory. By considering different groups' organizational capacity as well as their motives, the EPR data set allows for a better fit

for scholars to build off this body of work. In essence, as new quantitative trends and data collection are beginning to move away from the highly aggregated country-level data sets, new research and finessing has allowed for scholars to begin focusing more on local and regional codification that coalesces closer with the qualitative literature, oftentimes in conjunction with anthropological and sociological work. In fact, Salehyan underscores the potential of the EPR data, especially once it has been geocoded and merged with GIS software. He emphasizes, "Combined with emerging geospatial data on conflict, protest, and human rights abuse, scholars can answer questions about the processes of ethnic conflict at the local level, rather than relying on highly aggregate data sets, which cannot capture the day-to-day, micro-foundations of violence" (Salehyan, 2017, 63).

Building off the basic EPR data set, Bormann *et al.* construct their study around the Ethnic Power Relations-Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) data set. In contrast to the standard EPR data set, the EPR-ED data set allows the authors to test for the multidimensionality between religion and language, as it codes both religious and language dimensions, rather than one or the other. In doing so, this allows the authors to overcome the endogeneity problem that can plague data sets that attempt to code the relevant cleavage ex post facto (Bormann *et al.*, 2017, 751). Simply put, by neglecting to code a conflict as either a religious or a linguistic divide, the authors avoid the risk of attributing a false positive outcome. More importantly, however, by including multiple linguistic and religious segments within the data, the authors are able to produce an overlap variable that allows for them to better test and account for any crosscutting cleavages. In short, their data comprises of 629 unique languages and 67 religious creeds within 793 ethnic groups.

Challenging the idea that religion is a more salient predictor for ethnic conflict, the authors construct a three-step theoretical and empirical analysis that sets out to demonstrate how linguistic differences may be as salient if not more significant than religious ones. By initially focusing on the perception of group grievances, the authors argue that religious grievances are rarely expressed even when these differences exist within a particular society (Bormann *et al*., 2017, 747). More importantly then, grievances alone cannot explain the onset of conflict. Indeed, many groups hold grievances; yet, few actually ever mobilize around them. As a result, the authors then pivot to their next theoretical platform, which concentrates on the influence of rebel groups. Rebel groups and elites are absolutely necessary to address the collective action dilemma (Bormann *et al*., 2017, 748). While it seems logical to assume that religious categorized elites and rebel groups may find it easier to maintain their organization along religious cleavages, the authors express some doubt. Noting that vernacular languages are more likely to connect the masses and elites, the authors emphasize that if there is a lack of a unified language, then mobilization can stall. Put differently, language differences may be the first order of importance for necessary mobilization. With that said, however, the authors assert that, "Even in the presence of widespread grievances and mobilization, the occurrence of intrastate war depends on the government's decision to either escalate the conflict or to accommodate the demands of the ethnically defined opposition" (Bormann *et al*., 2017, 749). As such, the primacy of ethnic civil war then does not necessarily lie within religious or linguistic cleavages per se, but whether a government is willing to find common ground with religious and/or linguistic dissimilar groups.

Ultimately, after running several sensitivity and robustness tests, Bormann and co. report that civil wars are actually more likely to occur across linguistic differences than religious ones. Admittedly, however, this result should not be perceived as too surprising. Not only are there far more linguistic cleavages than religious ones, but also, there is space to hypothesize that linguistic cleavages may be more deeply connected to tighter kinship networks than religious ones.

On the other hand, there are two particular caveats that should be addressed. Primarily, as a result of the authors admittance to not determine the salience between each dyad linguistically or religiously a priori, they are then not able to ascertain the political interpretation between the two. Put simply, while linguistic differences reported stronger and more significant results in comparison to religious differences, their data cannot disclose which dimension actually ever serves as the basis of identification within their sample (Bormann *et al.*, 2017, 756). And secondly, while the authors were able to measure the overlap between linguistic and religious dimensions, it is difficult to narrow down where this cross-section occurs. For instance, while the authors highlighted that linguistic cleavages were predictably robust in highly literate and industrialized countries, the results were not able to shed light on the weakened effect of linguistic differences in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Differentiating slightly in their approach, Cunningham *et al.* (2009) decide to focus their analysis solely on testing the salience of ethnic civil war by non-state actors and rebel organizations. Constructing ethnic and rebel group dyads based off the UCDP/PRIO dyadic data set, the authors set out to disaggregate country-level analysis in favor of studying the relationship between civil war and the organizational capacity of

these marginal groups. In this way, the authors are better equipped to analyze how certain actors can influence the onset of a civil war. Through primary and secondary sources, the authors construct the NSA data set off several distinguishing indicators. While the first set of indicators focuses on the relative power of rebel groups, the second set concentrates more on their transnational dimensions.

In essence, the first set of indicators establishes multiple measurements in which rebel groups are compared with their relative government. For instance, *Rebstrength* designates the extent to which a rebel group is relationally much weaker, weaker, at parity, stronger or much stronger than the government (Cunningham *et al.* 2009, 522). Other measures such as *Armsproc* measure the ordinal level in which groups are able to procure arms, while *Fightcap* is a measure of a rebel groups fighting effectiveness relative to the government. In addition, the authors also constructed measures for rebel groups organizational structures as well as the level of territory they control. For instance, *Strengthcent* is an ordinal variable that measures the centrality of a group's leadership as low, medium, and high. In contrast, *Terrcont* is a measure of the rebel organizations territorial control, which can then be further broken down into three separate levels (Cunningham *et al.* 2009, 523).

Subsequently, the next grouping of measurements set out to codify a rebel groups transnational strength. *Transconstsupp* is an ordinal gauge that determines whether a group frames their appeals as ideological, ethnic, or religious, while *Rebextpart* measures the level of support a group receives from external non-state actors. Likewise, it is also important to consider whether a group receives outside state support, and how this support takes shape. Whereas the variable *Rebsuport* measures the degree to which a

group receives foreign state funding, *Rtypesuport* assesses the extent to which this support is understood as "none", "endorsement", "non-military", "military", or "troops" (Cunningham *et al.* 2009, 524). In total, "The NSA data contains information on 477 state–rebel group dyads over 578 distinct observation periods or spells" (Cunningham *et al.* 2009, 525).

All in all, these new measurements will be able to make way for innovative empirical analysis that is able to really begin testing several theoretical premises more acutely. For instance, it is often assumed that a distinctive and culturally different ethnic group with strong ties to a specific territorial region is more likely to find themselves mobilized by elites and rebel groups, than an ethnic group that is dispersed widely throughout a country and shares more homogenous cultural values. With codified information that now includes information from territorial dispersion to the structure and organization of a group's leadership, scholars can now better test this hypothesis empirically. And notably, scholars can even begin to start constructing models that begin to interact these components. In short, expansion of the NSA and EPR data sets hold a promising future for further empirical analysis.

For example, taking advantage of Cunningham *et al.'s* NSA data set, Wucherpfennig *et al.* attempt to determine the extent to which ethnicity impacts the longevity of a civil war. Merging the NSA data with that of the EPR, the authors ACD2EPR data set is able to focus on the relationship that politically relevant ethnic groups and their associated rebel organizations can impart on the longevity and magnitude of a civil conflict. They emphasize that while much of the literature either upholds or rejects the standard assumption that ethnic identity facilitates collective action

through a set of sticky markers, the authors accentuate that this binary outlook is too simplistic. On the contrary, Wucherpfennig *et al.* deviate from this binary norm by directing their analysis on the political implications of ethnicity. They state, "whether ethnicity prolongs conflict depends on its relationship to political institutions" (Wucherpfennig *et al.*, 2012, 80). As such, it is through the politicization of ethnicity that government or nonstate actors can attempt to capitalize on overcoming the collective action barrier from politically induced grievances.

Given this modified and centrist approach, the authors assert that, "Our core argument is that the combination of ascriptive ethnicity and political exclusion makes it difficult both for rebels fighting on behalf of excluded ethnic groups and for incumbent governments to reach settlements that would allow for effective conflict resolution, thus leading to protracted conflicts" (Wucherpfennig *et al*., 2012, 87). In other words, the authors deny the essentialist position that there is something uniquely inherent about ethnicity, which damns conflicts to be bloodier and longer-lasting. Instead, the authors approach this topic by connecting a structural account that emphasizes the relationship between rebel groups and politically included and excluded ethnic groups. Their logic is straightforward. Exclusionary policies can solidify state power for those groups and organizations within the included framework. Consequently, if this structural sorting leads to positive discrimination for those groups and organizations that hold power, it is likely that those groups that fall outside the ethnonationalist narrative could propagate and mobilize their own collective grievances. Thus, as grievances build from these exclusionary policies and as collective action is mobilized through political elites and associated rebel organizations, the likelihood for a quick resolution between the

government and the rebel group becomes more improbable, as to give in is to weaken the included groups share of power and resources.

Taking note of Kalyvas's (2008) sharp criticisms of many of the assumptions undertaken within the quantitative literature, the authors choose not to take for granted the relationship between ethnicity and ethnically excluded rebel groups. On the contrary, rather than choosing to focus their study on one or the other, the authors analyze its relationship directly (Wucherpfennig *et al.*, 2012, 88). Hypothesizing that ethnically exclusionary policies operationalized along categorical cleavages are difficult to subdue at the individual level, the authors assert that rebel groups associated with an exclusionary ethnic group are more likely to continue fighting longer than those nonethnic conflicts, in which the excluded group is defined by ideology or class (Wucherpfennig *et al.*, 2012, 90-91). Indeed, both models 1 and 2 demonstrate that the average duration of a conflict is extended when it is associated with an excluded ethnic group and its relevant rebel organization. Noting the results within Model 2, the authors write, "…50 percent of rebel organizations with a link to excluded ethnic groups end their fighting efforts after 1650 days, while the half-life of organizations that are affiliated with included ethnic groups is 550 days" (Wucherpfennig *et al.*, 2012, 102).

While Wucherpfennig *et al.*'s results emphasized the role that ethnonationalist and exclusionary policies can have on the duration of a rebel group recruitment and fighting, Gubler and Selway shift their analysis away by focusing on how the level of multidimensionality and crosscutting identities within a society could limit that mobilization efforts of these rebel leaders and organizations. The logic behind their theory is pretty standard within constructivist theory. Simply put, it is hypothesized that

the more crosscutting cleavages a society has, the harder it is for elites and rebel organizations to overcome the collective action dilemma. On the converse, however, rebel organizations may be more successful in recruiting and justifying their goals when ethnicity becomes reinforced along a host of socially salient cleavages. Utilizing a three different data sets to back up their analysis, the authors "focus on three social cleavages that are salient in most societies over time and space: geography, socioeconomic status, and religion" (Gubler and Selway, 2012, 212). Testing each of these social cleavages independently before constructing a principal component analysis variable, the authors report highly robust results. With all things considered, they conclude, "the probability of civil war onset is an average of nearly twelve times greater in societies with low ethnic crosscuttingness than in societies with high ethnic crosscuttingness, even when accounting for the impact of other common factors linked to civil war" (Gubler and Selway, 2012, 227). However, if there is one caveat to really draw attention towards, it's the fact that the authors data set was rather limited. With many Sub-Saharan African countries missing from the data for geographic, socioeconomic, and religious crosscuttingess, Gubler and Selway note that this is an unfortunate shortcoming to the extent that Sub-Saharan Africa consists of some of the most ethnically diverse societies as well as some of the highest incidence of civil conflict. Consequently, the inability to really capture this region within their study does offer room for further testing in the future.

Looking Forward

All in all, future research should continue on its path of disaggregating large-N proxies that do not necessarily fit within any political theory. For instance, former fractionalization indexes have limited the effectiveness of the quantitative field for years, as it was a lousy proxy that did not correspond to any previous theory. Instead, future work must coincide by first establishing which theoretical premises it seeks to examine, before testing for any type of proxy. Indeed, this is something that my very own study suffered in part from. While the idea to measure the incidence of ethnic civil war off social psychological cultural values was an attempt to work around the ascriptive and rigid nature fractionalization proxies, this was not necessarily in correspondence to any developed theory. However, this does not mean that a workable theory could not or should not be developed. Nonetheless, as emphasized within this meta-analysis, my previous study was also plagued by the fact that it essentially assumed state neutrality. In other words, the argument that national culture is reflective of a state's institutional culture is a bit of a stretch, and could rely on further robustness tests that attempt to link cultural values with the makeup of ethnic power within government and marginalized groups. In this way, future research would benefit if a model and data set was able to connect cultural values at the ethnic level. Indeed, by linking the cultural values of ethnic groups with the values and organizational capacity of either the dominant or subordinate actors, one can draw a more well-rounded model and analysis. Ultimately, when it comes to discerning a general theory on the incidence of ethnic civil war, it is absolutely necessary to emphasize the multidimensionality that differing levels of societal salience can transcend based off historical, political, and sociological research. While quantitative

studies remain useful to test empirically the strength of the relationship and correlation

between different variables, qualitative research should serve as the backbone from which

to build models off of.

Appendix

Table 1—Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
year	1454	5.775103	2.82544	1	10
prio1000a	1454	.0900963	.2864182	0	1
countryid	1454	81.28404	47.1599	1	300
pdi	893	63.10302	20.99158	11	100
idv	893	38.79955	22.65621	6	91
mas	893	48.20605	18.1535	5	100
uai	893	64.7794	21.7337	8	100
ltowvs	837	42.44803	22.8553	4	100
ivr	823	48.45443	22.03398	0	100
CF	643	.5307431	.0370715	.427346	.602385
ELF	643	.396847	.2644166	0	.85169
$\chi 2$	643	.0298698	.0264824	0	.128132
ELP	1290	.04627	.0541715	0	.2464
ELF_Fear	1290	.4166597	.2445546	0	.84232
Gini	1289	.0442292	.1290408	0	1.77451
prio1000alag	1293	.0935808	.2913573	0	1
oildiamond	1367	.3160205	.4650911	0	1
mountains	1437	15.51585	19.85345	0	82.2
democracya	1309	.4721161	.4994127	0	1
polrti3	1189	.4592094	.498543	0	1
civlti3	1189	.4751892	.4995942	0	1
SubSaharan	776	.1404639	.3476918	0	1
MiddleEastNorthAfrica	776	.1043814	.3059519	0	1
EuropeCentralAsia	776	.3994845	.4901083	0	1
SouthAsia	776	.0360825	.1866157	0	1
EastAsiaPacific	776	.1404639	.3476918	0	1
NorthAmerica	776	.0257732	.1585602	0	1

Table 2—Correlates

	prio1000a	pdi	idv	mas	uai	ltowvs	ivr	ELP	ELF_Fear	Gini	CF	ELF	χ2
prio1000a	1												
pdi	0.201***	1											
idv	-0.0751	-0.688***	1										
mas	0.0805	0.190***	0.0541	1									
uai	0.00262	0.220***	-0.180***	0.0167	1								
ltowvs	-0.0769	-0.0430	0.0650	0.0482	0.00427	1							
ivr	-0.130**	-0.325***	0.265***	0.0701	-0.209***	-0.398***	1						
ELP	0.176***	0.126**	-0.0509	-0.0700	-0.129**	-0.0913*	0.0503	1					
ELF_Fear	0.141***	0.184***	-0.262***	-0.00407	-0.102*	-0.435***	0.170***	0.226***	1				
Gini	-0.0294	-0.101*	0.00841	-0.0600	-0.245***	0.0832	0.00470	0.520***	0.107*	1			
CF	-0.0981*	-0.254***	0.426***	-0.00803	0.0637	0.139**	0.365***	0.0201	-0.0120	-0.0516	1		
ELF	0.169***	0.240***	-0.312***	0.00999	-0.271***	-0.353***	0.137**	0.229***	0.721***	0.122**	-0.115**	1	
χ2	0.205***	0.233***	-0.173***	-0.0384	-0.419***	-0.123**	-0.0730	0.339***	0.396***	0.164***	0.157***	0.635***	1

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 3—PDI Model 1

Prio1000a on Power Distance Index with Esteban et al

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
pdi	0.0275**	0.0255**	0.0307***	0.0331***	0.0315***	0.0383**	0.0354**	0.0382**	0.0368**	0.0361**	0.00150**
	(2.36)	(2.23)	(2.61)	(2.79)	(2.60)	(2.49)	(2.22)	(2.41)	(2.41)	(2.24)	(2.19)
lgdpc2a	-0.414***	-0.436***	-0.425***	-0.506***	-0.621***	-0.814*	-0.798*	-0.843*	-0.846**	-0.855**	-0.0356**
	(-3.03)	(-3.21)	(-3.37)	(-3.64)	(-4.36)	(-1.88)	(-1.87)	(-1.94)	(-1.96)	(-1.98)	(-1.98)
lpop2a	0.283***	0.260**	0.208*	0.183	0.224**	0.101	0.131	0.141	0.172	0.197	0.00820
	(2.66)	(2.49)	(1.85)	(1.63)	(2.06)	(0.49)	(0.61)	(0.71)	(0.74)	(0.91)	(0.91)
prio1000alag	3.182***	3.140***	3.104***	3.079***	3.091***	2.899***	2.817***	2.848***	2.858***	2.805***	0.117***
	(8.66)	(8.77)	(8.50)	(8.52)	(8.36)	(6.48)	(6.44)	(6.24)	(6.51)	(6.32)	(9.46)
oildiamond		0.314	0.558	0.616	0.836**	1.542***	1.497***	1.256**	1.565***	1.307***	0.0544***
		(0.86)	(1.25)	(1.42)	(2.02)	(2.95)	(2.75)	(2.85)	(2.97)	(2.87)	(2.63)
mountains			0.0183**	0.0191**	0.0170**	0.0522***	0.0501***	0.0471***	0.0529***	0.0478***	0.00199***
			(2.25)	(2.51)	(2.10)	(4.00)	(3.78)	(4.05)	(4.24)	(4.28)	(4.28)
democracya				0.401	-0.331	-0.264	-0.213	-0.277	-0.216	-0.223	-0.00928
				(0.82)	(-0.58)	(-0.27)	(-0.22)	(-0.29)	(-0.22)	(-0.22)	(-0.22)
polrti3					-1.109**	-0.616	-0.244	-0.552	-0.456	-0.327	-0.0136
					(-2.50)	(-0.76)	(-0.27)	(-0.69)	(-0.55)	(-0.36)	(-0.36)
civlti3						-1.302**	-1.580**	-1.344**	-1.465**	-1.541**	-0.0642**
						(-2.04)	(-2.34)	(-1.99)	(-2.20)	(-2.24)	(-2.30)
SubSaharan						0.209	0.304	-0.234	0.260	-0.0872	-0.00363
						(0.21)	(0.30)	(-0.24)	(0.27)	(-0.09)	(-0.09)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica						1.752*	1.644*	1.777*	1.797*	1.763*	0.0735*
						(1.86)	(1.70)	(1.88)	(1.88)	(1.81)	(1.91)
EuropeCentralAsia						0.357	0.339	0.660	0.450	0.657	0.0273
						(0.60)	(0.57)	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.89)	(0.89)
SouthAsia						1.265	1.290	0.963	1.206	0.975	0.0406
						(0.90)	(0.88)	(0.76)	(0.81)	(0.74)	(0.72)
EastAsiaPacific						0.629	0.747	0.868	0.676	0.894	0.0372
						(0.76)	(0.88)	(0.86)	(0.81)	(0.89)	(0.89)
NorthAmerica						1.678*	1.636	1.837*	1.683*	1.788*	0.0745*
						(1.69)	(1.64)	(1.80)	(1.70)	(1.74)	(1.77)
ELP							3.847			1.285	0.0535
							(1.38)			(0.42)	(0.41)
ELF_Fear								1.539		1.246	0.0519
								(0.94)		(0.67)	(0.69)
Gini									11.69*	8.427	0.351
									(1.82)	(1.24)	(1.22)
_cons	-7.911***	-7.310***	-7.313***	-6.594***	-4.373*	-2.751	-3.420	-3.660	-3.848	-4.529	
	(-3.35)	(-3.09)	(-3.01)	(-2.66)	(-1.83)	(-0.48)	(-0.60)	(-0.61)	(-0.67)	(-0.79)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	527	527	527	527	527	527
pseudo R-sq	0.374	0.374	0.384	0.386	0.396	0.447	0.449	0.450	0.449	0.451	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 4—PDI Model 2

Prio100a on Power Distance Index with Desmet et al

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
pdi	0.0275**	0.0255**	0.0307***	0.0331***	0.0315***	0.0383**	0.0714***	0.0439**	0.0505***	0.0669***	0.00305***
	(2.36)	(2.23)	(2.61)	(2.79)	(2.60)	(2.49)	(4.41)	(2.54)	(2.69)	(3.73)	(3.49)
lgdpc2a	-0.414***	-0.436***	-0.425***	-0.506***	-0.621***	-0.814*	-0.251	-0.662	-0.558	-0.177	-0.00808
	(-3.03)	(-3.21)	(-3.37)	(-3.64)	(-4.36)	(-1.88)	(-0.46)	(-1.27)	(-1.10)	(-0.32)	(-0.32)
lpop2a	0.283***	0.260**	0.208*	0.183	0.224**	0.101	0.281	0.171	0.169	0.286	0.0130
	(2.66)	(2.49)	(1.85)	(1.63)	(2.06)	(0.49)	(1.19)	(0.79)	(0.74)	(1.15)	(1.17)
prio1000alag	3.182***	3.140***	3.104***	3.079***	3.091***	2.899***	2.629***	2.631***	2.723***	2.508***	0.114***
	(8.66)	(8.77)	(8.50)	(8.52)	(8.36)	(6.48)	(5.87)	(5.60)	(6.00)	(5.44)	(9.40)
oildiamond		0.314	0.558	0.616	0.836**	1.542***	2.019***	1.531***	1.681***	2.046***	0.0932***
		(0.86)	(1.25)	(1.42)	(2.02)	(2.95)	(3.48)	(2.62)	(3.17)	(3.84)	(3.44)
mountains			0.0183**	0.0191**	0.0170**	0.0522***	0.0802***	0.0588***	0.0642***	0.0779***	0.00355***
			(2.25)	(2.51)	(2.10)	(4.00)	(5.07)	(4.66)	(5.02)	(5.07)	(5.26)
democracya				0.401	-0.331	-0.264	0.00831	-0.294	-0.120	-0.138	-0.00631
				(0.82)	(-0.58)	(-0.27)	(0.01)	(-0.23)	(-0.09)	(-0.11)	(-0.11)
polrti3					-1.109**	-0.616	-0.888	-0.342	-0.479	-0.421	-0.0192
					(-2.50)	(-0.76)	(-0.83)	(-0.39)	(-0.52)	(-0.40)	(-0.40)
civlti3						-1.302**	-2.215***	-1.235*	-1.507**	-1.931***	-0.0879***
						(-2.04)	(-3.06)	(-1.82)	(-2.10)	(-3.04)	(-2.92)
SubSaharan						0.209	2.424*	0.488	1.451	0.977	0.0445
						(0.21)	(1.79)	(0.39)	(1.03)	(0.58)	(0.57)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica						1.752*	2.793***	2.367**	2.741**	1.313	0.0598
						(1.86)	(2.73)	(2.30)	(2.32)	(1.07)	(1.03)
EuropeCentralAsia						0.357	1.225	1.395	1.040	1.429	0.0651
						(0.60)	(1.51)	(1.64)	(1.27)	(1.56)	(1.46)
SouthAsia						1.265	2.512	1.351	2.509	-0.306	-0.0139
						(0.90)	(1.64)	(0.83)	(1.33)	(-0.12)	(-0.12)
EastAsiaPacific						0.629	1.329	1.098	1.590*	-0.398	-0.0181
						(0.76)	(1.41)	(1.26)	(1.67)	(-0.25)	(-0.26)
NorthAmerica						1.678*	2.521**	2.501*	2.265*	2.805**	0.128**
						(1.69)	(2.02)	(1.90)	(1.95)	(2.11)	(2.08)
CF							-21.74**			-32.68**	-1.488**
							(-2.48)			(-2.50)	(-2.49)
ELF								2.250*		2.433*	0.111
								(1.91)		(1.66)	(1.59)
χ2									-3.605	23.87	1.087
									(-0.37)	(1.14)	(1.17)
_cons	-7.911***	-7.310***	-7.313***	-6.594***	-4.373*	-2.751	-2.867	-7.489	-7.863	0.992	
	(-3.35)	(-3.09)	(-3.01)	(-2.66)	(-1.83)	(-0.48)	(-0.38)	(-1.25)	(-1.27)	(0.12)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	527	428	428	428	428	428
pseudo R-sq	0.374	0.374	0.384	0.386	0.396	0.447	0.461	0.458	0.448	0.476	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 5—UAI Model 1

Prio1000a on Uncertainty Avoidance Index with Esteban et al

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
uai	0.00731	0.00701	0.00571	0.00598	0.00803	0.0475***	0.0469***	0.0523***	0.0512***	0.0547***	0.00228***
	(0.71)	(0.66)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.78)	(2.97)	(2.94)	(3.12)	(3.05)	(3.28)	(3.14)
lgdpc2a	-0.593***	-0.608***	-0.600***	-0.657***	-0.815***	-1.376***	-1.339***	-1.430***	-1.417***	-1.453***	-0.0606***
	(-4.29)	(-4.18)	(-4.14)	(-4.31)	(-5.41)	(-3.92)	(-3.79)	(-4.34)	(-4.01)	(-4.32)	(-3.84)
lpop2a	0.310***	0.277***	0.235**	0.219**	0.261**	0.176	0.217	0.217	0.308	0.336*	0.0140*
	(3.02)	(2.82)	(2.43)	(2.20)	(2.53)	(1.03)	(1.28)	(1.36)	(1.64)	(1.95)	(1.95)
prio1000alag	3.314***	3.246***	3.233***	3.223***	3.216***	3.010***	2.899***	2.924***	2.930***	2.862***	0.119***
	(9.02)	(8.98)	(8.73)	(8.72)	(8.69)	(6.21)	(6.06)	(6.10)	(6.13)	(5.90)	(8.35)
oildiamond		0.444	0.625	0.659	0.881**	2.251***	2.186***	1.913***	2.305***	1.978***	0.0825***
		(1.15)	(1.36)	(1.47)	(2.09)	(4.42)	(4.12)	(4.08)	(4.52)	(4.17)	(3.77)
mountains			0.0128*	0.0131*	0.0113	0.0533***	0.0512***	0.0471***	0.0555***	0.0496***	0.00207***
			(1.72)	(1.82)	(1.49)	(4.58)	(4.38)	(4.41)	(5.10)	(4.95)	(5.14)
democracya				0.225	-0.443	-0.318	-0.266	-0.308	-0.270	-0.261	-0.0109
				(0.45)	(-0.75)	(-0.35)	(-0.29)	(-0.34)	(-0.29)	(-0.28)	(-0.28)
polrti3					-1.121**	-1.081	-0.655	-1.067	-0.886	-0.876	-0.0365
					(-2.46)	(-1.38)	(-0.76)	(-1.42)	(-1.14)	(-0.98)	(-0.97)
civlti3						-1.101**	-1.427**	-1.186**	-1.362**	-1.412***	-0.0589**
						(-2.04)	(-2.56)	(-2.14)	(-2.53)	(-2.58)	(-2.47)
SubSaharan						0.956	1.109	0.563	1.210	0.828	0.0345
						(1.09)	(1.23)	(0.69)	(1.39)	(1.01)	(0.99)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica						2.343***	2.237**	2.508***	2.508***	2.628***	0.110***
						(2.66)	(2.53)	(2.76)	(2.88)	(2.85)	(2.82)
EuropeCentralAsia						0.785	0.781	1.246*	0.957	1.325*	0.0553*
						(1.24)	(1.24)	(1.76)	(1.51)	(1.86)	(1.86)
SouthAsia						2.084**	2.124**	1.832**	2.116**	1.871**	0.0780**
						(2.16)	(2.07)	(2.13)	(2.07)	(2.08)	(1.97)
EastAsiaPacific						2.705***	2.797***	3.239***	2.934***	3.377***	0.141***
						(2.74)	(2.84)	(2.83)	(3.05)	(2.99)	(2.97)
NorthAmerica						2.841***	2.857***	3.226***	3.035***	3.335***	0.139***
						(2.84)	(2.90)	(3.35)	(3.07)	(3.52)	(3.42)
ELP							4.538			0.186	0.00776
							(1.50)			(0.06)	(0.06)
ELF_Fear								2.090		1.855	0.0773
								(1.43)		(1.19)	(1.26)
Gini									17.72***	15.52***	0.647***
									(3.04)	(2.92)	(2.82)
_cons	-5.515**	-4.950**	-4.503**	-3.897	-1.619	-1.199	-2.429	-2.551	-3.834	-4.881	
	(-2.39)	(-2.20)	(-2.08)	(-1.63)	(-0.66)	(-0.24)	(-0.47)	(-0.48)	(-0.71)	(-0.89)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	527	527	527	527	527	527
pseudo R-sq	0.363	0.365	0.370	0.370	0.383	0.449	0.452	0.454	0.454	0.458	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 6—UAI Model 2

Prio1000a on Uncertainty Avoidance Index with Desmet et al

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
uai	0.00731	0.00701	0.00571	0.00598	0.00803	0.0475***	0.0486***	0.0839***	0.0580***	0.0850***	0.00389***
	(0.71)	(0.66)	(0.53)	(0.58)	(0.78)	(2.97)	(2.82)	(5.43)	(3.02)	(4.64)	(3.62)
lgdpc2a	-0.593***	-0.608***	-0.600***	-0.657***	-0.815***	-1.376***	-1.200***	-1.191***	-0.910**	-0.777*	-0.0356*
	(-4.29)	(-4.18)	(-4.14)	(-4.31)	(-5.41)	(-3.92)	(-3.10)	(-3.45)	(-2.08)	(-1.68)	(-1.66)
lpop2a	0.310***	0.277***	0.235**	0.219**	0.261**	0.176	0.250	0.184	0.233	0.262	0.0120
	(3.02)	(2.82)	(2.43)	(2.20)	(2.53)	(1.03)	(1.32)	(0.86)	(1.34)	(1.12)	(1.12)
prio1000alag	3.314***	3.246***	3.233***	3.223***	3.216***	3.010***	2.906***	2.697***	2.812***	2.667***	0.122***
	(9.02)	(8.98)	(8.73)	(8.72)	(8.69)	(6.21)	(5.74)	(4.98)	(5.55)	(5.11)	(8.33)
oildiamond		0.444	0.625	0.659	0.881**	2.251***	2.510***	2.972***	2.396***	3.111***	0.142***
		(1.15)	(1.36)	(1.47)	(2.09)	(4.42)	(5.12)	(5.88)	(4.37)	(5.61)	(4.80)
mountains			0.0128*	0.0131*	0.0113	0.0533***	0.0643***	0.0736***	0.0623***	0.0782***	0.00358***
			(1.72)	(1.82)	(1.49)	(4.58)	(5.74)	(7.06)	(5.65)	(8.21)	(7.73)
democracya				0.225	-0.443	-0.318	-0.230	-0.405	-0.269	-0.326	-0.0149
				(0.45)	(-0.75)	(-0.35)	(-0.20)	(-0.34)	(-0.23)	(-0.27)	(-0.27)
polrti3					-1.121**	-1.081	-0.991	-1.119	-0.304	-0.733	-0.0336
					(-2.46)	(-1.38)	(-0.92)	(-1.22)	(-0.32)	(-0.67)	(-0.66)
civlti3						-1.101**	-1.546**	-1.329**	-1.181*	-1.702***	-0.0780***
						(-2.04)	(-2.18)	(-2.36)	(-1.82)	(-2.95)	(-2.71)
SubSaharan						0.956	2.112**	2.528***	1.680*	2.671***	0.122**
						(1.09)	(2.13)	(2.94)	(1.67)	(2.84)	(2.46)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica						2.343***	3.333***	3.836***	2.562***	2.915***	0.134**
						(2.66)	(3.31)	(4.17)	(2.72)	(2.89)	(2.52)
EuropeCentralAsia						0.785	1.698**	2.384***	1.181	2.100**	0.0962**
						(1.24)	(2.09)	(3.06)	(1.39)	(2.18)	(1.97)
SouthAsia						2.084**	2.943**	3.304***	1.976	1.835	0.0841
						(2.16)	(2.53)	(2.95)	(1.45)	(1.27)	(1.26)
EastAsiaPacific						2.705***	3.639***	5.100***	3.136***	4.014***	0.184***
						(2.74)	(3.75)	(5.38)	(3.49)	(3.22)	(2.89)
NorthAmerica						2.841***	3.226***	4.732***	3.138***	4.298***	0.197***
						(2.84)	(3.00)	(3.98)	(2.90)	(3.54)	(2.98)
CF							-5.007			-16.39	-0.750
							(-0.60)			(-1.59)	(-1.53)
ELF								3.755***		2.833*	0.130*
								(3.02)		(1.83)	(1.72)
χ2									18.17*	24.23	1.110
									(1.91)	(1.38)	(1.34)
_cons	-5.515**	-4.950**	-4.503**	-3.897	-1.619	-1.199	-2.338	-9.254*	-8.135	-5.568	
	(-2.39)	(-2.20)	(-2.08)	(-1.63)	(-0.66)	(-0.24)	(-0.34)	(-1.70)	(-1.53)	(-0.99)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	527	428	428	428	428	428
pseudo R-sq	0.363	0.365	0.370	0.370	0.383	0.449	0.446	0.471	0.454	0.477	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 7—PDI Robustness Model 1

PDI Robustness Checks Model 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
pdi	0.0361**	0.0335*	0.0376**	0.0440**	0.0345**	0.0395**	0.0496***	0.00195***
	(2.24)	(1.90)	(2.08)	(2.50)	(1.98)	(2.38)	(2.76)	(2.81)
idv		-0.0107	-0.00878				0.0270*	0.00106
		(-0.61)	(-0.50)				(1.66)	(1.60)
ltowvs			-0.0126	-0.0237		-0.0134	-0.0267*	-0.00105*
			(-0.73)	(-1.45)		(-0.77)	(-1.65)	(-1.75)
uai				0.0796***	0.0556***		0.0924***	0.00364***
				(3.85)	(3.55)		(4.30)	(4.47)
lgdpc2a	-0.855**	-0.818*	-0.728*	-0.968**	-1.093***	-0.756*	-1.148***	-0.0452**
	(-1.98)	(-1.87)	(-1.80)	(-2.48)	(-2.69)	(-1.87)	(-2.69)	(-2.48)
lpop2a	0.197	0.237	0.319	0.598**	0.325	0.290	0.549**	0.0216**
	(0.91)	(1.11)	(1.58)	(2.42)	(1.64)	(1.45)	(2.17)	(2.33)
prio1000alag	2.805***	2.812***	2.694***	2.515***	2.708***	2.689***	2.463***	0.0970***
	(6.32)	(6.31)	(6.20)	(5.40)	(5.72)	(6.21)	(5.21)	(7.38)
oildiamond	1.307***	1.313***	1.231**	1.855***	1.796***	1.232**	1.881***	0.0741***
	(2.87)	(2.94)	(2.53)	(3.20)	(3.61)	(2.49)	(3.09)	(3.10)
mountains	0.0478***	0.0464***	0.0458***	0.0665***	0.0583***	0.0469***	0.0716***	0.00282***
	(4.28)	(4.17)	(2.77)	(3.02)	(4.19)	(2.87)	(3.02)	(3.26)
democracya	-0.223	-0.210	-0.361	-0.311	-0.147	-0.373	-0.338	-0.0133
	(-0.22)	(-0.21)	(-0.36)	(-0.33)	(-0.15)	(-0.37)	(-0.35)	(-0.35)
polrti3	-0.327	-0.463	-0.497	-0.892	-0.747	-0.385	-0.690	-0.0272
	(-0.36)	(-0.49)	(-0.54)	(-0.96)	(-0.87)	(-0.42)	(-0.73)	(-0.72)
civlti3	-1.541**	-1.604**	-1.299*	-1.444*	-1.733***	-1.249*	-1.302*	-0.0513*
	(-2.24)	(-2.39)	(-1.83)	(-1.83)	(-2.63)	(-1.75)	(-1.71)	(-1.75)
SubSaharan	-0.0872	0.228	0.127	2.463*	1.490	-0.126	2.011	0.0792
	(-0.09)	(0.23)	(0.09)	(1.66)	(1.50)	(-0.09)	(1.45)	(1.47)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica	1.763*	2.104**	1.555	2.654*	2.892***	1.280	2.107*	0.0830*
	(1.81)	(1.97)	(1.30)	(1.95)	(2.84)	(1.13)	(1.80)	(1.86)
EuropeCentralAsia	0.657	0.940	0.904	1.239	1.170	0.712	0.785	0.0309
	(0.89)	(1.06)	(0.79)	(1.18)	(1.50)	(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.78)
SouthAsia	0.975	1.146	1.306	3.414***	2.432**	1.186	3.314**	0.130***
	(0.74)	(0.85)	(0.93)	(2.68)	(2.11)	(0.86)	(2.50)	(2.62)
EastAsiaPacific	0.894	1.015	0.847	4.366**	3.424**	0.768	4.721***	0.186***
	(0.89)	(0.97)	(0.70)	(2.48)	(2.56)	(0.65)	(2.64)	(2.80)
NorthAmerica	1.788*	2.291*	2.075	4.563***	3.910***	1.654	3.836***	0.151***
	(1.74)	(1.70)	(1.53)	(3.42)	(3.48)	(1.64)	(3.01)	(3.27)
ELP	1.285	1.285	2.047	-1.543	-1.581	1.999	-2.344	-0.0923
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.54)	(-0.38)	(-0.55)	(0.52)	(-0.58)	(-0.59)
ELF_Fear	1.246	1.208	0.893	1.644	2.092	0.930	2.142	0.0843
	(0.67)	(0.66)	(0.46)	(0.75)	(1.08)	(0.47)	(0.94)	(0.95)
Gini	8.427	9.094	14.52**	31.30***	17.08***	14.26**	32.36***	1.274***
	(1.24)	(1.42)	(2.41)	(3.63)	(2.77)	(2.44)	(3.80)	(4.06)
_cons	-4.529	-5.048	-6.806	-17.91**	-10.30	-6.456	-18.00**	
	(-0.79)	(-0.88)	(-1.29)	(-2.35)	(-1.58)	(-1.21)	(-2.22)	
N	527	527	511	511	527	511	511	511
pseudo R-sq	0.451	0.452	0.439	0.467	0.469	0.439	0.470	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 8—PDI Robustness Model 2

PDI Robustness Checks Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
pdi	0.0669***	0.100***	0.146***	0.0784***	0.0638***	0.0835***	0.108***	0.00440***
	(3.73)	(3.88)	(4.73)	(3.68)	(3.78)	(3.07)	(5.54)	(5.96)
idv		0.0714**	0.109***				0.168***	0.00687***
		(2.36)	(3.16)				(3.08)	(3.19)
ltowvs			0.0365*	0.0317		0.0300	0.0316	0.00129
			(1.67)	(1.44)		(1.35)	(1.32)	(1.28)
uai				0.136***	0.101***		0.210***	0.00856***
				(4.69)	(4.35)		(3.56)	(3.93)
lgdpc2a	-0.177	-0.0857	-0.328	-0.655	-0.359	-0.392	-0.303	-0.0123
	(-0.32)	(-0.16)	(-0.71)	(-1.39)	(-0.69)	(-0.81)	(-0.62)	(-0.61)
lpop2a	0.286	0.189	0.113	0.632***	0.421*	0.268	0.596	0.0243
	(1.15)	(0.68)	(0.42)	(2.61)	(1.72)	(1.10)	(1.56)	(1.58)
prio1000alag	2.508***	2.420***	2.388***	2.205***	2.407***	2.413***	1.946***	0.0794***
	(5.44)	(5.37)	(5.00)	(4.52)	(4.90)	(5.16)	(3.91)	(4.88)
oildiamond	2.046***	2.357***	2.748***	3.550***	3.516***	1.958***	4.352**	0.178**
	(3.84)	(3.31)	(4.05)	(3.59)	(4.40)	(3.61)	(2.33)	(2.44)
mountains	0.0779***	0.101***	0.119***	0.158***	0.110***	0.0900***	0.214***	0.00875***
	(5.07)	(4.57)	(5.11)	(5.54)	(7.14)	(3.74)	(4.16)	(4.64)
democracya	-0.138	-0.102	-0.231	-0.136	-0.0950	-0.203	-0.175	-0.00715
	(-0.11)	(-0.07)	(-0.16)	(-0.10)	(-0.07)	(-0.15)	(-0.12)	(-0.12)
polrti3	-0.421	0.431	-1.644	-0.494	-1.193	-1.059	1.951	0.0796
	(-0.40)	(0.37)	(-1.13)	(-0.38)	(-1.03)	(-0.80)	(1.32)	(1.38)
civlti3	-1.931***	-1.769***	-1.278	-3.284***	-2.610***	-1.911***	-2.781***	-0.113***
	(-3.04)	(-2.58)	(-1.52)	(-4.74)	(-4.20)	(-2.84)	(-2.99)	(-3.40)
SubSaharan	0.977	-0.835	-1.048	7.185***	5.050***	1.273	4.653**	0.190***
	(0.58)	(-0.47)	(-0.61)	(4.20)	(3.49)	(0.77)	(2.39)	(2.58)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica	1.313	-1.545	-1.238	5.276***	4.100***	1.809	-0.623	-0.0254
	(1.07)	(-0.93)	(-0.73)	(5.26)	(3.64)	(1.33)	(-0.35)	(-0.35)
EuropeCentralAsia	1.429	-0.683	-2.521	1.198	2.201**	0.658	-3.830**	-0.156**
	(1.56)	(-0.55)	(-1.64)	(1.06)	(2.26)	(0.63)	(-2.52)	(-2.47)
SouthAsia	-0.306	-2.494	-2.036	1.734	3.695*	-1.397	-3.651	-0.149
	(-0.12)	(-0.80)	(-0.70)	(0.79)	(1.93)	(-0.50)	(-1.22)	(-1.20)
EastAsiaPacific	-0.398	-2.329	-2.973*	5.168***	5.135***	-1.392	3.211	0.131
	(-0.25)	(-1.28)	(-1.72)	(2.70)	(3.23)	(-0.87)	(1.09)	(1.12)
NorthAmerica	2.805**	-0.325	-0.824	9.394***	6.389***	3.902**	3.183	0.130
	(2.11)	(-0.18)	(-0.39)	(5.03)	(3.76)	(2.49)	(1.48)	(1.52)
CF	-32.68**	-53.61***	-67.57***	-29.96***	-26.92***	-37.96***	-77.28***	-3.153***
	(-2.50)	(-3.51)	(-4.51)	(-2.60)	(-2.65)	(-2.93)	(-3.81)	(-3.92)
ELF	2.433*	2.783**	4.592***	5.338***	3.437***	3.851**	6.085***	0.248***
	(1.66)	(2.10)	(2.86)	(3.74)	(2.61)	(2.28)	(4.85)	(4.59)
χ2	23.87	37.83	9.603	37.02**	15.79	23.31	103.0***	4.203***
	(1.14)	(1.50)	(0.37)	(2.02)	(1.15)	(0.89)	(3.09)	(3.27)
_cons	0.992	7.658	12.84	-21.04**	-13.41**	3.091	-14.49	
	(0.12)	(0.85)	(1.52)	(-2.52)	(-2.32)	(0.39)	(-1.64)	
N	428	428	412	412	428	412	412	412
pseudo R-sq	0.476	0.484	0.474	0.497	0.501	0.463	0.524	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 9—UAI Robustness Model 1

UAI Robustness Checks Model 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
uai	0.0547***	0.0557***	0.0752***	0.0796***	0.0556***	0.0723***	0.0924***	0.00364***
	(3.28)	(3.33)	(4.73)	(3.85)	(3.55)	(4.33)	(4.30)	(4.47)
idv		0.00238	0.00586				0.0270*	0.00106
		(0.17)	(0.42)				(1.66)	(1.60)
ltowvs			-0.0252*	-0.0237		-0.0248	-0.0267*	-0.00105*
			(-1.66)	(-1.45)		(-1.62)	(-1.65)	(-1.75)
pdi				0.0440**	0.0345**		0.0496***	0.00195***
				(2.50)	(1.98)		(2.76)	(2.81)
lgdpc2a	-1.453***	-1.477***	-1.418***	-0.968**	-1.093***	-1.349***	-1.148**	-0.0452**
	(-4.32)	(-4.04)	(-3.91)	(-2.48)	(-2.69)	(-4.16)	(-2.69)	(-2.48)
lpop2a	0.336*	0.331*	0.536***	0.598**	0.325	0.536***	0.549**	0.0216**
	(1.95)	(1.91)	(2.69)	(2.42)	(1.64)	(2.69)	(2.17)	(2.33)
prio1000alag	2.862***	2.860***	2.743***	2.515***	2.708***	2.748***	2.463***	0.0970***
	(5.90)	(5.87)	(5.75)	(5.40)	(5.72)	(5.78)	(5.21)	(7.38)
oildiamond	1.978***	1.976***	2.081***	1.855***	1.796***	2.102***	1.881***	0.0741***
	(4.17)	(4.17)	(3.91)	(3.20)	(3.61)	(3.96)	(3.09)	(3.10)
mountains	0.0496***	0.0498***	0.0501***	0.0665***	0.0583***	0.0497***	0.0716***	0.00282***
	(4.95)	(5.06)	(3.26)	(3.02)	(4.19)	(3.25)	(3.02)	(3.26)
democracya	-0.261	-0.266	-0.416	-0.311	-0.147	-0.407	-0.338	-0.0133
	(-0.28)	(-0.29)	(-0.45)	(-0.33)	(-0.15)	(-0.44)	(-0.35)	(-0.35)
polrti3	-0.876	-0.862	-0.962	-0.892	-0.747	-0.992	-0.690	-0.0272
	(-0.98)	(-0.96)	(-1.01)	(-0.96)	(-0.87)	(-1.05)	(-0.73)	(-0.72)
civlti3	-1.412***	-1.393**	-1.086	-1.444*	-1.733***	-1.132	-1.302*	-0.0513*
	(-2.58)	(-2.49)	(-1.51)	(-1.83)	(-2.63)	(-1.58)	(-1.71)	(-1.75)
SubSaharan	0.828	0.763	1.117	2.463*	1.490	1.272	2.011	0.0792
	(1.01)	(0.81)	(1.00)	(1.66)	(1.50)	(1.19)	(1.45)	(1.47)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica	2.628***	2.573**	2.197*	2.654*	2.892***	2.313**	2.107*	0.0830*
	(2.85)	(2.44)	(1.86)	(1.95)	(2.84)	(2.06)	(1.80)	(1.86)
EuropeCentralAsia	1.325*	1.281	1.611	1.239	1.170	1.701*	0.785	0.0309
	(1.86)	(1.58)	(1.51)	(1.18)	(1.50)	(1.66)	(0.76)	(0.78)
SouthAsia	1.871**	1.837*	2.619***	3.414***	2.432**	2.721***	3.314**	0.130***
	(2.08)	(1.93)	(2.61)	(2.68)	(2.11)	(2.91)	(2.50)	(2.62)
EastAsiaPacific	3.377***	3.393***	4.317***	4.366**	3.424**	4.261***	4.721***	0.186***
	(2.99)	(3.11)	(3.04)	(2.48)	(2.56)	(2.91)	(2.64)	(2.80)
NorthAmerica	3.335***	3.264***	3.420***	4.563***	3.910***	3.572***	3.836***	0.151***
	(3.52)	(2.88)	(3.02)	(3.42)	(3.48)	(3.63)	(3.01)	(3.27)
ELP	0.186	0.139	-0.0815	-1.543	-1.581	0.154	-2.344	-0.0923
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(-0.02)	(-0.38)	(-0.55)	(0.04)	(-0.58)	(-0.59)
ELF_Fear	1.855	1.898	1.719	1.644	2.092	1.558	2.142	0.0843
	(1.19)	(1.24)	(1.02)	(0.75)	(1.08)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.95)
Gini	15.52***	15.46***	24.41***	31.30***	17.08***	24.28***	32.36***	1.274***
	(2.92)	(2.91)	(3.66)	(3.63)	(2.77)	(3.63)	(3.80)	(4.06)
_cons	-4.881	-4.765	-9.617*	-17.91**	-10.30	-9.749*	-18.00**	
	(-0.89)	(-0.85)	(-1.79)	(-2.35)	(-1.58)	(-1.83)	(-2.22)	
N	527	527	511	511	527	511	511	511
pseudo R-sq	0.458	0.458	0.451	0.467	0.469	0.451	0.470	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 10—UAI Robustness Model 2

UAI Robustness Checks Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
uai	0.0850***	0.112***	0.129***	0.136***	0.101***	0.0940***	0.210***	0.00856***
	(4.64)	(5.16)	(4.73)	(4.69)	(4.35)	(4.17)	(3.56)	(3.93)
idv		0.0696***	0.0788***				0.168***	0.00687***
		(2.74)	(3.12)				(3.08)	(3.19)
ltowvs			0.0144	0.0317		0.0129	0.0316	0.00129
			(0.99)	(1.44)		(0.80)	(1.32)	(1.28)
pdi				0.0784***	0.0638***		0.108***	0.00440***
				(3.68)	(3.78)		(5.54)	(5.96)
lgdpc2a	-0.777*	-0.892*	-1.087**	-0.655	-0.359	-0.945**	-0.303	-0.0123
	(-1.68)	(-1.84)	(-2.14)	(-1.39)	(-0.69)	(-2.06)	(-0.62)	(-0.61)
lpop2a	0.262	0.212	0.276	0.632***	0.421*	0.308	0.596	0.0243
	(1.12)	(0.94)	(1.25)	(2.61)	(1.72)	(1.30)	(1.56)	(1.58)
prio1000alag	2.667***	2.598***	2.495***	2.205***	2.407***	2.570***	1.946***	0.0794***
	(5.11)	(4.89)	(4.76)	(4.52)	(4.90)	(4.93)	(3.91)	(4.88)
oildiamond	3.111***	3.095***	3.151***	3.550***	3.516***	3.080***	4.352**	0.178**
	(5.61)	(5.65)	(4.87)	(3.59)	(4.40)	(5.23)	(2.33)	(2.44)
mountains	0.0782***	0.0868***	0.105***	0.158***	0.110***	0.0909***	0.214***	0.00875***
	(8.21)	(9.07)	(4.63)	(5.54)	(7.14)	(4.70)	(4.16)	(4.64)
democracya	-0.326	-0.405	-0.519	-0.136	-0.0950	-0.426	-0.175	-0.00715
	(-0.27)	(-0.32)	(-0.41)	(-0.10)	(-0.07)	(-0.35)	(-0.12)	(-0.12)
polrti3	-0.733	0.207	0.446	-0.494	-1.193	-0.574	1.951	0.0796
	(-0.67)	(0.19)	(0.33)	(-0.38)	(-1.03)	(-0.45)	(1.32)	(1.38)
civlti3	-1.702***	-1.153*	-1.343*	-3.284***	-2.610***	-1.873***	-2.781***	-0.113***
	(-2.95)	(-1.93)	(-1.76)	(-4.74)	(-4.20)	(-2.89)	(-2.99)	(-3.40)
SubSaharan	2.671***	0.911	1.571	7.185***	5.050***	3.204***	4.653**	0.190***
	(2.84)	(0.91)	(1.18)	(4.20)	(3.49)	(3.14)	(2.39)	(2.58)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica	2.915***	0.213	0.540	5.276***	4.100***	3.289***	-0.623	-0.0254
	(2.89)	(0.17)	(0.40)	(5.26)	(3.64)	(3.64)	(-0.35)	(-0.35)
EuropeCentralAsia	2.100**	0.170	-0.535	1.198	2.201**	1.714	-3.830**	-0.156**
	(2.18)	(0.15)	(-0.36)	(1.06)	(2.26)	(1.31)	(-2.52)	(-2.47)
SouthAsia	1.835	-0.837	-1.612	1.734	3.695*	1.104	-3.651	-0.149
	(1.27)	(-0.45)	(-0.73)	(0.79)	(1.93)	(0.56)	(-1.22)	(-1.20)
EastAsiaPacific	4.014***	2.869**	3.001	5.168***	5.135***	3.898**	3.211	0.131
	(3.22)	(1.98)	(1.47)	(2.70)	(3.23)	(2.12)	(1.09)	(1.12)
NorthAmerica	4.298***	1.734	2.294	9.394***	6.389***	5.045***	3.183	0.130
	(3.54)	(1.16)	(1.27)	(5.03)	(3.76)	(3.70)	(1.48)	(1.52)
CF	-16.39	-31.78**	-32.62**	-29.96***	-26.92**	-15.94	-77.28***	-3.153***
	(-1.59)	(-2.38)	(-2.21)	(-2.60)	(-2.65)	(-1.26)	(-3.81)	(-3.92)
ELF	2.833*	3.309**	3.725***	5.338***	3.437***	3.370**	6.085***	0.248***
	(1.83)	(2.40)	(2.83)	(3.74)	(2.61)	(2.21)	(4.85)	(4.59)
χ2	24.23	50.03**	57.21**	37.02**	15.79	29.50	103.0***	4.203***
	(1.38)	(2.19)	(2.09)	(2.02)	(1.15)	(1.33)	(3.09)	(3.27)
_cons	-5.568	-0.599	-2.526	-21.04**	-13.41**	-6.969	-14.49	
	(-0.99)	(-0.10)	(-0.32)	(-2.52)	(-2.32)	(-0.91)	(-1.64)	
N	428	428	412	412	428	412	412	412
pseudo R-sq	0.477	0.485	0.472	0.497	0.501	0.463	0.524	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 11—IDV: Combined Models

Individualism: Combined Model 1 and Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
idv	-0.00469	-0.00543	-0.00246	-0.00356	-0.00581	-0.00530	-0.0263*	-0.0261*	-0.0244*	-0.0292**	-0.0269*	-0.0308*	-0.0234	-0.0251	0.00503	0.000234
	(-0.54)	(-0.63)	(-0.32)	(-0.48)	(-0.80)	(-0.60)	(-1.81)	(-1.70)	(-1.66)	(-1.96)	(-1.77)	(-1.78)	(-1.17)	(-1.33)	(0.25)	(0.25)
lgdpc2a	-0.488***	-0.499***	-0.532***	-0.575***	-0.688***	-0.578***	-1.024***	-0.985**	-1.079***	-1.033***	-1.040***	-0.812*	-0.924**	-0.692	-0.598	-0.0278
	(-3.21)	(-3.31)	(-3.95)	(-3.79)	(-4.38)	(-3.62)	(-2.65)	(-2.50)	(-2.83)	(-2.62)	(-2.67)	(-1.92)	(-2.11)	(-1.49)	(-1.20)	(-1.19)
lpop2a	0.299***	0.269**	0.222**	0.208*	0.250**	0.288**	0.187	0.219	0.214	0.281	0.287	0.250	0.201	0.226	0.246	0.0114
	(2.71)	(2.46)	(2.01)	(1.88)	(2.28)	(2.47)	(0.94)	(1.11)	(1.18)	(1.31)	(1.44)	(1.14)	(0.93)	(1.08)	(1.05)	(1.04)
prio1000alag	3.330***	3.262***	3.247***	3.237***	3.242***	3.196***	3.108***	2.975***	3.058***	3.050***	2.966***	2.963***	2.853***	2.921***	2.784***	0.130***
	(8.98)	(9.16)	(8.92)	(8.88)	(8.90)	(8.68)	(6.70)	(6.64)	(6.60)	(6.73)	(6.19)	(6.19)	(5.52)	(6.28)	(5.62)	(8.52)
oildiamond		0.446	0.629	0.660	0.867**	0.946**	1.725***	1.670***	1.471***	1.743***	1.542***	1.899***	1.743***	1.670***	1.725***	0.0803***
		(1.16)	(1.37)	(1.48)	(2.14)	(2.39)	(3.78)	(3.46)	(3.63)	(3.76)	(3.62)	(4.18)	(3.55)	(3.43)	(3.68)	(3.63)
mountains			0.0131*	0.0132*	0.0113	0.00802	0.0415***	0.0394***	0.0369***	0.0424***	0.0380***	0.0497***	0.0457***	0.0451***	0.0480***	0.00223***
			(1.72)	(1.81)	(1.45)	(0.93)	(3.62)	(3.34)	(3.71)	(3.79)	(3.86)	(3.66)	(3.72)	(3.82)	(3.89)	(4.42)
democracya				0.219	-0.434	-0.431	-0.346	-0.263	-0.360	-0.296	-0.271	-0.155	-0.363	-0.220	-0.306	-0.0143
				(0.42)	(-0.72)	(-0.73)	(-0.37)	(-0.28)	(-0.39)	(-0.31)	(-0.28)	(-0.13)	(-0.30)	(-0.18)	(-0.24)	(-0.24)
polrt3					-1.075**	-1.755***	-1.218	-0.680	-1.141	-1.096	-0.784	-1.138	-0.885	-0.502	-0.00374	-0.000174
					(-2.18)	(-2.84)	(-1.33)	(-0.70)	(-1.29)	(-1.22)	(-0.78)	(-0.95)	(-0.91)	(-0.48)	(-0.00)	(-0.00)
civlib3						1.073	-1.064*	-1.478**	-1.100*	-1.267**	-1.451**	-1.480**	-1.030	-1.120	-0.890	-0.0415
						(1.62)	(-1.82)	(-2.43)	(-1.79)	(-2.13)	(-2.42)	(-2.04)	(-1.62)	(-1.58)	(-1.42)	(-1.42)
SubSaharan							0.323	0.510	-0.159	0.513	0.259	1.501	0.388	0.612	-1.266	-0.0590
							(0.31)	(0.49)	(-0.16)	(0.50)	(0.28)	(1.21)	(0.35)	(0.46)	(-0.86)	(-0.86)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica							2.429**	2.298*	2.408**	2.597***	2.449**	3.416***	2.834**	2.516**	-0.0829	-0.00386
							(2.06)	(1.91)	(2.01)	(2.16)	(2.00)	(2.80)	(2.51)	(2.08)	(-0.06)	(-0.06)
EuropeCentralAsia							1.127	1.157	1.422	1.316*	1.438	2.039***	2.166***	1.512**	0.788	0.0367
							(1.48)	(1.49)	(1.62)	(1.71)	(1.63)	(2.78)	(2.85)	(2.12)	(0.72)	(0.70)
SouthAsia							1.237	1.326	0.902	1.241	1.077	2.066	1.143	0.921	-2.754	-0.128
							(1.01)	(1.02)	(0.84)	(0.96)	(0.98)	(1.53)	(0.84)	(0.50)	(-1.16)	(-1.15)
EastAsiaPacific							1.045	1.185	1.247	1.124	1.295	1.901*	1.503*	1.043	-1.338	-0.0623
							(1.06)	(1.18)	(1.14)	(1.11)	(1.18)	(1.87)	(1.80)	(0.92)	(-0.78)	(-0.78)
NorthAmerica							2.337*	2.379*	2.419*	2.535*	2.531*	2.810**	2.742**	2.295*	0.758	0.0353
							(1.77)	(1.77)	(1.81)	(1.90)	(1.87)	(2.12)	(2.04)	(1.79)	(0.54)	(0.54)
ELP								5.269*			2.983					
								(1.80)			(0.96)					
ELF_Fear									1.445		0.874					
									(1.08)		(0.58)					
Gini										12.99***	8.744					
										(2.65)	(1.64)					
OF												-4.563			-24.88*	-1.159*
												(-0.52)			(-1.89)	(-1.84)
ELF													2.291		1.730	0.0805
													(1.61)		(1.05)	(1.03)
χ²														12.84	41.48*	1.931*
														(1.35)	(1.83)	(1.80)
_cons	-5.529**	-5.037***	-4.388*	-3.862	-1.730	-3.501	0.994	-0.224	0.468	-0.737	-1.238	-0.111	-1.840	-3.253	6.828	
	(-2.17)	(-1.98)	(-1.81)	(-1.53)	(-0.70)	(-1.50)	(0.19)	(-0.04)	(0.09)	(-0.14)	(-0.24)	(-0.02)	(-0.31)	(-0.58)	(0.88)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	666	527	527	527	527	527	428	428	428	428	428
pseudo R-sq	0.362	0.364	0.369	0.369	0.382	0.391	0.435	0.440	0.438	0.439	0.442	0.431	0.442	0.434	0.451	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 12—MAS: Combined Models

MAS: Combined Model 1 and Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
mas	-0.00935	-0.0102	-0.0126	-0.0125	-0.0164	-0.00929	0.0142	0.0217	0.0152	0.0157	0.0212	0.0259	0.0281	0.0179	0.0354*	0.00163*
	(-0.54)	(-0.59)	(-0.68)	(-0.71)	(-0.95)	(-0.60)	(1.02)	(1.52)	(1.03)	(1.15)	(1.48)	(1.43)	(1.40)	(1.17)	(1.77)	(1.72)
lgdpc2a	-0.521***	-0.541***	-0.537***	-0.578***	-0.691***	-0.604***	-1.210***	-1.185***	-1.257***	-1.247***	-1.234***	-1.076**	-1.109**	-0.852*	-0.610	-0.0282
	(-4.59)	(-4.61)	(-4.87)	(-4.40)	(-4.91)	(-4.01)	(-3.26)	(-3.11)	(-3.43)	(-3.27)	(-3.25)	(-2.65)	(-2.51)	(-1.88)	(-1.34)	(-1.33)
lpop2a	0.324**	0.292**	0.256*	0.238*	0.288**	0.297**	0.0964	0.138	0.135	0.177	0.192	0.148	0.161	0.140	0.297	0.0137
	(2.57)	(2.28)	(1.89)	(1.82)	(2.26)	(2.39)	(0.49)	(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.84)	(0.96)	(0.72)	(0.82)	(0.69)	(1.35)	(1.29)
prio1000alag	3.306***	3.240***	3.220***	3.208***	3.210***	3.181***	3.090***	2.903***	3.028***	3.035***	2.895***	2.906***	2.767***	2.872***	2.659***	0.123***
	(8.70)	(9.09)	(8.79)	(8.70)	(8.70)	(8.57)	(6.76)	(6.72)	(6.52)	(6.79)	(6.56)	(6.03)	(5.56)	(6.17)	(5.51)	(9.26)
oildiamond		0.464	0.678	0.702*	0.916**	0.957**	1.726***	1.663***	1.436***	1.748***	1.502***	1.973***	1.688***	1.599***	1.836***	0.0847***
		(1.24)	(1.61)	(1.66)	(2.44)	(2.45)	(3.79)	(3.41)	(3.49)	(3.79)	(3.44)	(4.20)	(3.30)	(3.33)	(3.88)	(3.81)
mountains			0.0145**	0.0147**	0.0136*	0.00991	0.0426***	0.0397***	0.0369***	0.0434***	0.0374***	0.0513***	0.0427***	0.0438***	0.0459***	0.00212***
			(2.14)	(2.18)	(1.84)	(1.13)	(3.83)	(3.58)	(3.93)	(4.09)	(4.15)	(3.61)	(3.25)	(3.82)	(3.37)	(3.71)
democracya				0.155	-0.476	-0.466	-0.419	-0.317	-0.431	-0.386	-0.332	-0.241	-0.450	-0.283	-0.280	-0.0129
				(0.32)	(-0.81)	(-0.81)	(-0.42)	(-0.32)	(-0.44)	(-0.38)	(-0.33)	(-0.19)	(-0.35)	(-0.22)	(-0.21)	(-0.21)
polrl3					-0.997**	-1.608***	-1.046	-0.306	-0.964	-0.898	-0.394	-1.034	-0.824	-0.264	-0.196	-0.00906
					(-2.01)	(-2.63)	(-1.04)	(-0.30)	(-1.00)	(-0.91)	(-0.38)	(-0.72)	(-0.74)	(-0.23)	(-0.14)	(-0.14)
civlt3						0.927	-0.680	-1.231**	-0.740	-0.833	-1.177*	-1.062	-0.427	-0.697	-0.710	-0.0328
						(1.51)	(-1.12)	(-2.07)	(-1.16)	(-1.36)	(-1.91)	(-1.54)	(-0.55)	(-0.98)	(-1.04)	(-1.03)
SubSaharan							-0.687	-0.582	-1.196	-0.664	-0.924	0.152	-0.868	-0.495	-1.675	-0.0773
							(-0.85)	(-0.72)	(-1.62)	(-0.84)	(-1.22)	(0.13)	(-0.84)	(-0.41)	(-1.15)	(-1.14)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica							1.483	1.168	1.478*	1.491	1.247	2.050**	1.772*	1.438	-0.519	-0.0240
							(1.64)	(1.27)	(1.65)	(1.63)	(1.36)	(1.97)	(1.84)	(1.38)	(-0.47)	(-0.48)
EuropeCentralAsia							0.445	0.496	0.828	0.542	0.754	1.270	1.597	0.813	1.042	0.0481
							(0.70)	(0.80)	(1.17)	(0.86)	(1.08)	(1.56)	(1.60)	(0.98)	(0.94)	(0.90)
SouthAsia							0.663	0.699	0.311	0.566	0.419	1.203	0.320	0.205	-3.360	-0.155
							(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.38)	(0.84)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(-1.37)	(-1.36)
EastAsiaPacific							0.644	0.752	0.907	0.627	0.876	1.203	0.903	0.508	-1.837	-0.0848
							(0.74)	(0.86)	(0.92)	(0.70)	(0.86)	(1.18)	(1.05)	(0.47)	(-1.14)	(-1.12)
NorthAmerica							0.998	1.034	1.179	1.028	1.138	1.190	1.499	0.960	0.797	0.0368
							(1.08)	(1.13)	(1.28)	(1.11)	(1.23)	(1.12)	(1.36)	(0.92)	(0.72)	(0.73)
ELP								7.056**			5.002*					
								(2.38)			(1.65)					
ELF_Fear									1.677		1.039					
									(1.21)		(0.64)					
Gini										12.45**	6.214					
										(2.34)	(0.99)					
CF												-8.780			-29.58**	-1.366**
												(-0.97)			(-2.09)	(-2.07)
ELF													2.689**		2.141	0.0988
													(2.21)		(1.42)	(1.32)
χ²														14.48*	44.19**	2.040**
														(1.70)	(2.17)	(2.20)
_cons	-5.390**	-4.792*	-4.419*	-3.870	-1.791	-3.174	2.687	0.948	1.825	1.299	0.132	4.000	-1.738	-1.941	6.606	
	(-2.18)	(-1.91)	(-1.74)	(-1.52)	(-0.80)	(-1.43)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.03)	(0.53)	(-0.32)	(-0.36)	(0.86)	
N	757	748	748	742	666	666	527	527	527	527	527	428	428	428	428	428
pseudo R-sq	0.363	0.365	0.372	0.372	0.386	0.392	0.434	0.441	0.437	0.437	0.442	0.433	0.446	0.434	0.460	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 13—LTOWVS: Combined Models

LTOWVS: Combined Model 1 and Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
ltowvs	-0.0250***	-0.0227**	-0.0224**	-0.0220**	-0.0144	-0.0169*	-0.0121	-0.0110	-0.0123	-0.0150	-0.0132	-0.00822	0.00900	-0.00643	0.0186	0.000967
	(-2.63)	(-2.52)	(-2.47)	(-2.30)	(-1.43)	(-1.68)	(-0.74)	(-0.63)	(-0.73)	(-0.85)	(-0.72)	(-0.49)	(0.57)	(-0.36)	(1.09)	(1.04)
lgdpc2a	-0.464***	-0.486***	-0.518***	-0.543***	-0.714***	-0.624***	-0.878***	-0.870***	-0.904***	-0.852***	-0.869***	-0.790**	-0.933***	-0.606	-0.637	-0.0330
	(-3.80)	(-3.79)	(-4.05)	(-3.33)	(-3.81)	(-3.35)	(-2.80)	(-2.81)	(-2.95)	(-2.70)	(-2.83)	(-2.20)	(-2.62)	(-1.53)	(-1.62)	(-1.56)
lpop2a	0.420***	0.383***	0.365***	0.346**	0.289**	0.325**	0.331*	0.331*	0.322*	0.424**	0.386*	0.359*	0.329	0.400*	0.411*	0.0213*
	(3.63)	(3.07)	(2.95)	(2.49)	(2.09)	(2.24)	(1.76)	(1.76)	(1.70)	(2.16)	(1.83)	(1.69)	(1.49)	(1.91)	(1.87)	(1.73)
prio1000alg	3.031***	3.013***	2.982***	2.966***	2.974***	2.889***	2.801***	2.713***	2.761***	2.746***	2.704***	2.800***	2.621***	2.693***	2.538***	0.132***
	(8.80)	(8.99)	(8.83)	(8.90)	(8.87)	(8.73)	(7.69)	(7.49)	(7.27)	(7.57)	(7.35)	(6.96)	(5.87)	(6.80)	(5.75)	(9.88)
oildiamond		0.208	0.325	0.349	0.615	0.665	0.687	0.641	0.617	0.670	0.618	0.657	0.596	0.525	0.573	0.0297
		(0.51)	(0.73)	(0.78)	(1.51)	(1.53)	(1.22)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.17)	(1.06)	(0.95)	(0.97)	(0.80)	(0.98)	(1.00)
mountains			0.0103	0.0106	0.0135*	0.0121	0.0275***	0.0265***	0.0288***	0.0285***	0.0283***	0.0290*	0.0293*	0.0315*	0.0331**	0.00172**
			(1.39)	(1.45)	(1.88)	(1.55)	(2.72)	(2.53)	(2.65)	(2.78)	(2.52)	(1.80)	(1.77)	(1.86)	(2.01)	(2.07)
democraoya				0.0769	-0.333	-0.406	0.0964	0.0921	0.0833	0.0618	0.0649	0.0171	-0.107	-0.0232	-0.0514	-0.00267
				(0.16)	(-0.60)	(-0.76)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(-0.12)	(-0.03)	(-0.05)	(-0.05)
polrti3					-0.757	-1.794**	-0.808	-0.467	-0.686	-0.733	-0.536	-0.784	-1.146	-0.157	-0.868	-0.0451
					(-1.54)	(-2.53)	(-0.98)	(-0.55)	(-0.85)	(-0.89)	(-0.59)	(-0.90)	(-1.37)	(-0.19)	(-0.90)	(-0.90)
civiti3						1.405**	-0.0630	-0.354	-0.181	-0.0986	-0.284	-0.230	0.117	-0.199	-0.0427	-0.00222
						(2.10)	(-0.09)	(-0.52)	(-0.26)	(-0.13)	(-0.38)	(-0.30)	(0.14)	(-0.26)	(-0.05)	(-0.05)
SubSaharan							0.109	0.202	-0.0438	0.163	0.115	0.802	0.220	0.347	-0.158	-0.00821
							(0.17)	(0.31)	(-0.07)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.75)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(-0.15)	(-0.15)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica							1.390*	1.328*	1.472*	1.368*	1.386*	2.141**	2.430***	1.600*	1.234	0.0640
							(1.82)	(1.65)	(1.82)	(1.73)	(1.65)	(2.31)	(2.66)	(1.68)	(1.12)	(1.13)
EuropeCentralAsia							-0.331	-0.361	-0.196	-0.312	-0.244	0.324	0.277	-0.0491	-0.512	-0.0266
							(-0.39)	(-0.42)	(-0.16)	(-0.35)	(-0.27)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(-0.04)	(-0.38)	(-0.38)
SouthAsia							0.320	0.368	0.282	0.316	0.321	0.906	-0.219	-0.494	-2.975	-0.154
							(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.66)	(-0.16)	(-0.27)	(-1.23)	(-1.16)
EastAsiaPacific							0.219	0.261	0.455	0.231	0.359	0.744	0.262	-0.210	-1.799	-0.0934
							(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.42)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.62)	(0.25)	(-0.16)	(-0.97)	(-0.93)
NorthAmerica							0.532	0.617	0.682	0.465	0.604	0.942	1.451	0.747	1.072	0.0556
							(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.82)	(0.60)	(0.72)	(1.01)	(1.38)	(0.78)	(0.99)	(0.97)
ELP								3.806			1.829					
								(1.10)			(0.40)					
ELF_Fear									0.805		0.389					
									(0.75)		(0.31)					
Gini										12.00*	7.847					
										(1.82)	(0.85)					
CF												-0.257			-17.94	-0.931
												(-0.03)			(-1.57)	(-1.46)
ELF													2.746**		2.258	0.117
													(2.38)		(1.53)	(1.44)
χ²														18.76**	31.58	1.639
														(2.28)	(1.59)	(1.49)
_cons	-6.641***	-6.005**	-5.689**	-5.215*	-1.786	-3.255	-2.370	-2.662	-2.427	-4.253	-3.755	-3.891	-4.115	-6.696	1.050	
	(-2.73)	(-2.31)	(-2.25)	(-1.78)	(-0.56)	(-1.11)	(-0.53)	(-0.60)	(-0.54)	(-0.93)	(-0.81)	(-0.52)	(-0.77)	(-1.25)	(0.15)	
N	716	707	707	701	632	632	572	572	572	572	572	457	457	457	457	457
pseudo R-sq	0.362	0.361	0.364	0.363	0.365	0.379	0.383	0.385	0.384	0.385	0.386	0.379	0.398	0.389	0.408	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 14—IVR: Combined Models

IVR: Combined Model 1 and Model 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit	AMEs
iwr	0.00322	0.000969	0.000574	0.000922	-0.00477	-0.00534	-0.00801	-0.00882	-0.0104	-0.00789	-0.00979	-0.0187	-0.0239	-0.0208	-0.0202	-0.00108
	(0.35)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(-0.51)	(-0.56)	(-0.63)	(-0.70)	(-0.77)	(-0.63)	(-0.75)	(-1.28)	(-1.58)	(-1.49)	(-1.38)	(-1.34)
lgdp2a	-0.633***	-0.671***	-0.688***	-0.687***	-0.836***	-0.816***	-0.827***	-0.810***	-0.825***	-0.819***	-0.812***	-0.652*	-0.659**	-0.424	-0.420	-0.0224
	(-4.63)	(-4.74)	(-4.91)	(-3.98)	(-4.35)	(-4.22)	(-2.69)	(-2.61)	(-2.71)	(-2.64)	(-2.64)	(-1.92)	(-2.18)	(-1.11)	(-1.13)	(-1.11)
lpop2a	0.283**	0.217	0.190	0.181	0.159	0.159	0.242	0.255	0.228	0.299	0.261	0.287	0.288	0.329	0.360*	0.0192*
	(2.21)	(1.61)	(1.37)	(1.24)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.42)	(1.51)	(1.31)	(1.61)	(1.31)	(1.43)	(1.44)	(1.61)	(1.80)	(1.68)
prio100alag	3.152***	3.085***	3.034***	3.021***	3.076***	3.062***	2.841***	2.750***	2.809***	2.808***	2.751***	2.875***	2.681***	2.778***	2.622***	0.140***
	(7.77)	(8.11)	(7.92)	(7.92)	(8.05)	(7.97)	(7.72)	(7.34)	(7.40)	(7.54)	(7.25)	(7.03)	(6.20)	(6.89)	(6.01)	(11.57)
oildiamond		0.644	0.884*	0.876*	1.125**	1.134**	0.744	0.692	0.684	0.739	0.672	0.790	0.825	0.655	0.751	0.0401
		(1.55)	(1.91)	(1.80)	(2.40)	(2.40)	(1.27)	(1.16)	(1.18)	(1.26)	(1.14)	(1.10)	(1.28)	(0.95)	(1.21)	(1.24)
mountains			0.0155**	0.0153**	0.0190***	0.0181***	0.0261***	0.0248**	0.0267***	0.0268***	0.0258**	0.0274**	0.0281***	0.0254*	0.0274**	0.00146**
			(2.41)	(2.23)	(2.74)	(2.59)	(2.57)	(2.35)	(2.60)	(2.65)	(2.51)	(1.95)	(2.23)	(1.89)	(2.19)	(2.44)
democracia				-0.0260	-0.477	-0.483	0.239	0.237	0.246	0.227	0.237	0.159	-0.0115	0.109	0.0112	0.000599
				(-0.05)	(-0.83)	(-0.84)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(-0.01)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
polrt3					-0.888	-1.335*	-1.065	-0.683	-0.954	-1.025	-0.730	-1.162	-1.231	-0.629	-0.863	-0.0461
					(-1.56)	(-1.89)	(-1.27)	(-0.79)	(-1.15)	(-1.22)	(-0.82)	(-1.29)	(-1.32)	(-0.71)	(-0.88)	(-0.86)
civlit3						0.551	0.119	-0.191	0.0261	0.0981	-0.149	0.120	0.319	0.216	0.196	0.0105
						(1.03)	(0.16)	(-0.26)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(-0.19)	(0.14)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)
SubSaharan							0.0702	0.161	-0.135	0.0998	0.0243	0.869	0.230	0.242	-0.113	-0.00601
							(0.11)	(0.25)	(-0.23)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(1.03)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(-0.13)	(-0.13)
MiddleEastNorthAfrica							1.258	1.139	1.234	1.260	1.163	1.644	1.417	0.932	0.568	0.0303
							(1.37)	(1.20)	(1.33)	(1.35)	(1.22)	(1.48)	(1.42)	(0.83)	(0.49)	(0.50)
EuropeCentralAsia							-0.927	-0.945	-0.809	-0.958	-0.882	-0.361	-0.0275	-0.752	-0.323	-0.0172
							(-1.35)	(-1.40)	(-1.20)	(-1.32)	(-1.27)	(-0.36)	(-0.03)	(-0.77)	(-0.33)	(-0.33)
SouthAsia							-0.120	-0.108	-0.260	-0.156	-0.199	0.246	-0.737	-1.199	-2.266	-0.121
							(-0.11)	(-0.10)	(-0.24)	(-0.14)	(-0.19)	(0.18)	(-0.51)	(-0.74)	(-1.14)	(-1.08)
EastAsiaPacific							-0.160	-0.121	0.0324	-0.190	-0.0346	0.337	0.132	-0.644	-1.113	-0.0594
							(-0.17)	(-0.13)	(0.03)	(-0.19)	(-0.03)	(0.29)	(0.13)	(-0.53)	(-0.77)	(-0.75)
NorthAmerica							0.435	0.496	0.530	0.412	0.522	0.846	1.112	0.507	0.731	0.0390
							(0.51)	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.48)	(0.58)	(0.85)	(1.11)	(0.51)	(0.72)	(0.72)
ELP								4.023			2.701					
								(1.23)			(0.68)					
ELF_Fear									0.859		0.482					
									(0.87)		(0.42)					
Gini										8.552	2.831					
										(1.34)	(0.29)					
CF												-0.0273			-10.80	-0.576
												(-0.00)			(-1.01)	(-0.98)
ELF													2.734**		2.064	0.110
													(2.17)		(1.36)	(1.30)
χ²														17.85**	21.89	1.168
														(2.53)	(1.39)	(1.33)
_cons	-4.309	-3.022	-2.783	-2.636	0.383	0.197	-1.163	-1.658	-1.192	-2.306	-1.891	-3.172	-4.116	-5.835	-1.716	
	(-1.43)	(-0.95)	(-0.89)	(-0.78)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(-0.28)	(-0.40)	(-0.28)	(-0.52)	(-0.42)	(-0.45)	(-0.83)	(-1.12)	(-0.27)	
N	686	677	677	671	605	605	569	569	569	569	569	462	462	462	462	462
pseudo R-sq	0.368	0.374	0.382	0.381	0.392	0.394	0.394	0.396	0.395	0.395	0.397	0.397	0.418	0.407	0.422	

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

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