The stability of The Transatlantic alliance in the 21st century: the impact of the development of European Union foreign policy in comparison to American objectives

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The Stability of The Transatlantic Alliance in The 21st Century: The Impact of the Development of European Union Foreign Policy in Comparison to American Objectives

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ABSTRACT


This thesis explores the history of the transatlantic alliance since World War II in conjunction with the unification and development of the European Union, particularly examining the stability of the alliance, as the EU has become a major global actor economically and politically. The foreign policies of EU/US international interventions are examined in a pre and post- September 11th context, focusing on the Balkan crisis and the Bush administration’s Global War on Terrorism.

The European Union, often referred to as “an economic giant but political dwarf,” declared its intention to develop a common European foreign policy (CFSP) in 1992. Focused on ‘soft power’ and multilateralism, the EU lead the negotiations as conflict first broke out in the former Yugoslavia. However, an EU position was not solidified by this point and their lack of military clout to back up negotiations failed to ease the conflict. The US militarily intervened and was successful in negotiating the Dayton Peace Accords. The post- September 11th case study suggests that foreign policy in a globalizing world should be more focused on the promotion of ‘soft power’ and the use of multilateralism. The US focus on ‘hard power,’ based on Cold War tactics, is out of date and has only proven to be detrimental to our objectives and post- 9/11 world image. It is therefore suggested that to be more internationally effective and to improve relations with the EU, the new US presidential administration should abstain from the Bush administration’s hegemonic policy and instead promote more ‘soft power’ tactics and multilateral cooperation.
# Table of Contents

Introduction 1

History of American/European Relations 7

The Fortification of a European Identity 27

US/EU Intervention Pre-9/11: The Balkans 51

US/EU Intervention Post-9/11: The Global War on Terror 80

Conclusion 110

Bibliography 117
Introduction

...no important problem in the world can be resolved without the joint efforts of the United States and Europe; no problem is unsolvable when we confront it together.¹

...structurally the bonds that link the Union to the United States are still mutually important- in terms of trade, investment and more or less common political philosophies. But room for conflict over...differing conceptions of how to promote the political good life may also make for tension.²

Since the end of World War II the American/ Western European alliance has strengthened throughout the post war reconstruction of the continent. Since this time European solidarity has also unified, coming together to develop the European Union into an ‘economic giant’. Yet despite increased political integration, the EU has long been considered a political dwarf. The lack of a European political identity has reinforced the EU’s military reliance on the United States. Throughout the 1990s the EU has voiced its commitment to developing a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The eagerness of the EU to speak with one voice, independent to that of the United States’, has influenced the perception of a faltering relationship. In analyzing the evolution of EU foreign policy, particularly regarding a pre-and post- 9/11 context, the emergence of European values and objectives emerge- most notably in terms of the Iraq war. It seems that throughout the Bush administration’s Global War on Terrorism, EU member states, although initially divided, have converged in opposition to Bush’s unilateral and hegemonic policies. The

subsequent distrust of US policy and perceived lack of legitimacy of America’s role in
international affairs is evident among Europeans and has provided the basis for the
atrophy of the alliance.

I believe that analyzing the deterioration of the alliance in regard to Europe’s
developing political identity, compared to that of the United States, shows significant
implications on the future of the individual members themselves. The 9/11 terrorist
attacks and subsequent focus on Islamic terrorism suggests that the 21st century is
evolving from a post-Cold War context to an increased globalization of international
relations. In this sense of globalizing relations and security threats, the Bush
administration’s post-9/11 hegemonic policies have actually proved counter effective to
US agenda of defeating terrorism by increasing instability in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Furthermore, Europe’s ‘soft power’ principles of economic development to stop terrorism
at its roots have proven to be more effective than Bush’s declaration of “war” on
terrorism. As a result, the EU’s image as a global actor has increased in credibility at the
expense of the US reputation. The preservation and bolstering of transatlantic ties are
significant in terms of the stability of America’s global role. With the power and
international influence of the US slowly decreasing as Europe’s is only increasing,
strengthening the relationship and facilitating collaboration with the EU will help to
increase the legitimacy of the US. Therefore, the US must learn from their European
allies to employ more multilateral ‘soft power’ tactics to their foreign policy agenda.

In Chapter 1, an examination of the historical evolution of the transatlantic
alliance and the parallel development of the European Union since World War II are
examined. This provides the context for the historically strong American/European
partnership while inferring the strengthening of relations within the EU itself during this time.

Chapter 2 lays out the recent results of the Lisbon Reform Treaty. The passing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty all but in name marks the passage of the 2004 constitution, since 90% of the constitution is represented in the treaty. This treaty’s establishment of a High representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy illustrates the increased solidification EU foreign policy, and their ambition to play a larger role in international relations. The foreign policies and political values of the EU and US are also examined in this chapter, revealing differences in the objectives of the EU and US. Essentially, the EU has been more focused on ‘soft power’ negotiations employed through multilateral institutions, whereas the US has been more inclined to act unilaterally with the use of ‘hard power’ force.

Chapter 3 examines the post-communist EU and US crisis interventions in the Balkan region. This pre-9/11-based intervention chapter identifies the EC initial control of mediating the Croatian independence struggle and Bosnian conflict. The EU’s inability to unify on a position to effectively mitigate the crisis suggests the failure of a premature CFSP. The subsequent US control of the crisis only confirmed the EU’s subordinate role in foreign affairs to that of the US and UN. Soon after the US took control, they were able to negotiate the Dayton Peace Agreements. After the EU failed to alleviate the conflict in Bosnia they aimed to further develop the CFSP, thus making it more effective in dealing with the crisis in Macedonia.

Chapter 4 addresses a shift toward more globalizing international relations and examines the US and EU positions in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The
detrimental impact of US increased unilateralism and hegemony became clear as the GWOT progressed. This led not only to the debate between the EU and US on appropriate military action, with the US advocating pre-emptive strike, but also to an intra-EU debate which essentially divided the continent in two. As the failures of US policy and tactics of fighting terrorism with solely ‘hard power’ became apparent, the EU emphasis of combating terrorism at its roots with ‘soft power’, was implied to be the more successful policy in a globalized international order. European and global public opinion turned against the US as its failure in Iraq became apparent, thus further undermining the transatlantic alliance.

Post-9/11 analysis of intervention clearly represents the United States’ strong military capacity but lack of legitimizing ‘soft power’ authority. On the other hand, post-9/11 EU objectives have suggested Europe’s military weakness but presence of the legitimizing power of morality and international law. With the EU and US possessing the tactical strength of that which the other lacks, a future of less US unilateralism and more coordination of resources would presumably optimize EU and US effectiveness in international affairs. More US equal dialogue with the EU along with less emphasis on militaristic force would attempt to begin a refortification of the transatlantic alliance.

I therefore suggest that the United States, perhaps under the new 2008 administration, abandon their unilateral hegemonic agenda and incorporate more cooperation with the EU on an equal and multilateral level to thereby bolster the EU/US partnership.
History of American/European Relations and the Unification of the European Continent After World War II

Europe and the United States have traditionally had strong ties. Although there were rough times between the two powers in colonial history, the 20th century was mainly characterized by a strong US commitment to European affairs. During World War I, an isolated United States joined the war on behalf of her British, French, and Russian Allies. In 1941 the United States exhibited a similar tendency to intervene in support of the British, French, and Russians. After World War II much of Europe was devastated by the violence the continent endured. The nations were in political disarray, militarily feeble, and economically in need of rejuvenation. The United States recognized that regenerating Europe was just as essential to its security as it was to Europe’s.

The 1947 Marshall Plan was essentially a US economic aid program to “build up not only the victors allied with it but also, for the sake of the future of Europe, the losers (Germany, Austria, and Italy).” The Soviet Union saw the Marshall Plan as an “instrument of imperialism” and thus a threat to their influence over Eastern European nations. The Soviet Union created Cominform, a plan similar to the Marshall plan but intended for Eastern European states, to prevent US aid from being implemented in those nations. “The Marshall Plan therefore spurred the satellization process in the countries occupied by the Red Army.” It was clear the former allies of WWII, united against the

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6 Ibid Page 227.
common Nazi enemy, were drifting and the ideological differences between them would only sharpen this divide.

Both the United States and Europe realized the need to rebuild Europe and promote an organization to diminish the threat of another world war. The United Nations was founded in 1945 to replace the League of Nations and aimed to “see nations achieve a higher standard of living, find a solution to social, economic, and medical problems, and observe human rights.”

Europe, along with the international system, needed to reform to ensure international security and the protection of human rights. The United Nations seemed to do just that, but the United States and Western Europe recognized that with the threat of the Soviet Union their alliance also needed the backing of a supranational system.

The Yalta and Potsdam conferences essentially gave way to the descent of the iron curtain enclosing the countries occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war. By 1945 the “Soviet Union was consolidating its own sphere of influence” in the countries it occupied, guiding their governmental systems and economies toward communism. With the origins of the Cold War stemming from dividing Europe into communist and democratic nations, the US and many western European nations began to realize the importance of a strong alliance. As Winston Churchill stated, an “Iron Curtain” now divided the East from the West. And “perhaps the most important idea shared by the governments stemmed from the East-West division of the continent: there

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was a determination to preserve Western Europe from communism.”¹⁰ The United States clearly shared this concern, in 1947 Truman issued the Truman doctrine “which amounted to a political guarantee of support to ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.’”¹¹ Soon after, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was developed, in essence, to counter the communist threat and provide US military protection against Soviet attack. British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin called to strengthen Western Europe’s “ability to resist communism while building upon its long-term military preparedness.”¹²

This counterbalance to communism came in the form of the March 1948 Treaty of Brussels which included France, Britain, and the Benelux powers.¹³ Equally important to Bevin was a military alliance with the United States to bolster Western Europe’s military capabilities and “provide an umbrella under which the Brussels treaty system could develop.”¹⁴ NATO was intended to achieve more than just military cohesion but was also an economic, political, and psychological security system to counter the lure of communism.¹⁵ United behind a new common threat, the spread of communism, the United States and Western Europe furthered their commitment to each other which had been fortified in WWI and WWII.

The formation of NATO was intended to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and to counter the Soviet communist threat. The deal essentially was “that the United States would contribute to the defense of Europe and to Europe’s economic recovery from the

¹⁰ Ibid Page 15.
¹¹ Ibid Page 16.
¹⁴ Ibid Page 10.
¹⁵ Ibid Page 3.
war if the Europeans would organize themselves to help defend against the Soviet threat and use the economic aid efficiently.”\textsuperscript{16} Although organizationally there was political unity between the US, Western Europe, and Canada, in reality there were different notions of perceived threats. The United States, on one side of the Atlantic, was mainly concerned with the Soviet threat while countries like France, still afflicted by the memories of WWII, was primarily focused on the German threat. “The conflict between French and American priorities could not have been sharper…French vision remained fixed on the ‘German problem’, which it hoped to solve once and for all by denying Germany the armed forces with which it could once again threaten France.”\textsuperscript{17}

This point of contention was soon addressed when North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950. “The Korean War, seen as demonstrating the global threat of communist aggression, provided the political momentum required to overcome congressional resistance to a substantial deployment of US ground forces in Europe.”\textsuperscript{18} The reality of the spread of communism not only influenced the US to deploy troops in Europe, but also made them put pressure on Western Europe to undertake massive rearmament. This naturally exacerbated the French’s perceived threat of German re-armament but the US realized that German military strength was essential to continental defense to “provide sufficient ground forces to balance the Soviet Union in central Europe.”\textsuperscript{19} The rearmament of Germany was not easily accepted throughout Western Europe but it was finally agreed upon that, “the United States had gained French adherence to at least the

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid Page 19.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid Page 19.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid Page 19.
idea of German rearmament. The French gained an immediate American military commitment to the defense of Europe while delaying the rearming of Germany.”

This rapid rearmament threatened the post-war economic recovery, overseen by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). This introduced a debate as to the impact of NATO versus the OEEC in post-war re-development of Western Europe. Finally an informal OEEC-NATO committee was developed to facilitate economic cooperation. From this, the European Defense Community (EDC) was formed to ensure military effectiveness and to “reassure France against future German power and to provide a constructive framework for the creation of a united Europe.”

Although the EDC eventually became ineffective and essentially enforced by NATO, it did serve as “a useful agent for advancing the agenda of integration” in Western Europe. Thus the Korean War and the threat of communism in many ways brought about radical changes to the organization of NATO and its relationship with the OEEC along with an attempt at a more unified Europe.

**Unifying Western Europe:**

As has been stated, World War II left Europe bruised and shaken. But within this political disarray there was a sense of optimism between the Western European nations that a catastrophe of that nature could be avoided in the future. This led to the post-war institution building that eventually led to the deep integration of the modern day

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20 Ibid Page 22.
European Union. The formation of the European Union took a lot of time and initiative by many member states. Just as the US and Western European powers noted the importance of a strong alliance against the common communist threat, these European countries also realized the value in a Western European partnership.

Around the same time of the formation of NATO, in May 1948, 750 prominent Europeans met in The Hague and called upon the nations of Europe to create a political and economic union. One year later the Statue of the Council of Europe was signed by ten European states. Among the agreements of the Council of Europe was a “common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Although the Council of Europe was ultimately unsuccessful, the cooperation among states did set a standard for a future coalition among Western European powers.

In all of the efforts to unify Western Europe economically and politically after World War II, it seems that France was the pivotal actor in rallying support and advocating for this partnership. It seems that just as the UK was the largest European supporter of NATO, France had been the leader behind Western European institutionalization. “Experts agree that European cooperation took the shape it did in the 1950s-the institutionally strong, geographically limited EEC-above all because the French government demanded it.” Other nations such as Britain, Germany, and the Benelux nations, seemed to favor a more broader and weaker institution. Britain’s

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stance comes as no surprise, however Germany and the Benelux nations were clearly swayed by the French suggesting that the French were the most pivotal voice in the creation of European institutions. The French eagerness to form a European Community seems to make sense in a post-war historical context. Of all the Western European states, France was arguably one of the most devastated countries after World War II. This could be one of the main reasons for France’s “community mindedness” and insistence on preserving democracy and promoting cooperation between Western European states.

France’s perseverance for a strengthened and more unified Western European bloc can be explained by many of the governmental concepts of the time. In March 1949 Jean Monnet, often considered the ‘founding father’ of the EU,\(^29\) stated that at that time “Western Europe was a vacuum, on either side were the two great dynamic forces of communism and American capitalism…This vacuum could be filled either by one of these two outside forces or by the development of a Western European ‘way of life.’”\(^30\) Monnet perceived the inadequacy of the current European institution, the OEEC, which consisted of too many sovereign nations and could not “consider European problems in a European way.”\(^31\) The French saw the need for Western Europe to evolve into a more unified power. The British, on the other hand, felt that they should not “go further in the way of integration with the French than seemed wise from the economic point of view…we should not agree…to anything which would render us incapable of sustaining

\(^{31}\) Ibid Page 23.
an independent resistance if France were overrun.”  

This statement clarified the British reluctance to further integrate Western Europe on a “supranational” level.

With the strong British and American partnership, and Britain’s unwillingness to give up sovereignty, France realized their goal would have to be met without British participation. The 1950 Shuman Plan, proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Shuman and masterminded by Jean Monnet led to the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This essentially laid the groundwork for the European Union of today. Although it did involve other countries, the ECSC was essentially an agreement between France and Germany. The French postwar goal of keeping Germany weak while rebuilding French strength seems far from “community minded”. But, through this agreement it seems the French were willing to see German rehabilitation as long as it was under their supervision. “In return for fostering German reconstruction and reindustrialization, France sought a framework for planned production and distribution in its own coal and steel industry.”

This agreement not only improved trust between the French and the Germans, but also bolstered defense against communism with the outbreak of the Korean War.

One significant factor in this agreement was the institutionalization of an intergovernmental decision-making body responsible for policy initiation and management of the agreement. This supranational executive body is considered the

32 Ibid Page 23.
“Monnet method” and provided the model for future treaties.\textsuperscript{36} The formation of the ECSC with Germany signifies France’s backing away from seeking British support and instead leading their own agenda in the creation of a united Western European bloc. Charles De Gaulle perceived that “the United States had entered an era of imperialism and colonial expansion, and Churchill, with incredible malice, had turned Britain into an American dominion.”\textsuperscript{37} De Gaulle saw the need for “a Western federation…to defend the values of European civilizations against the Americans, and if necessary the Russians.”\textsuperscript{38} While De Gaulle and Monnet both saw the need for a European institution, De Gaulle seemed to take on more of an anti-American stance than other French politicians at the time.

Although many Europeans, French alike, could not see “a Europe without Great Britain,”\textsuperscript{39} the French had convinced the previously skeptical nations to form a strong Western European block. In the case of the Benelux countries, whose vulnerability was emphasized in the Second World War, not one of these states “was in a strong enough position to ignore Franco-German initiatives for economic integration.”\textsuperscript{40} In the case of Italy, European integration offered the prospect of a new beginning after Fascism.\textsuperscript{41} In 1957, six Western European nations France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Italy, came together to further the economic partnership that France and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid Page 21.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Parsons, Craig. "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union." International Organizations. 56(2002): Page 60.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Ibid Page 24.
\end{itemize}
Germany had created. The 1958 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC) along with the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).  

The EEC Treaty set up a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to protect agricultural products and establish a common market. The common market unified the six nations more closely than ever before by reducing tariffs and establishing the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital among the member states. Euratom, also formulated by Jean Monnet, was an institution to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy. This institution was “founded first on the hesitation of the United States to share its uranium and then to the desire of France to keep its military options open.” Euratom did provide advancements and diversification in the fields in which the six nations unified however there was a loophole for national secrecy in order to preserve national security. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1951, along with the 1958 Treaty of Rome dictated the future of the “vacuum” of Western Europe. As Monnet envisioned, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations came together institutionally and formed an economically united bloc. This not only bolstered their economies but also enabled them to stand up to what Monnet referred to as the two great powers on either side of it, Soviet communism and American capitalism.

**Deepening of the EEC through Political Unity:**

Established in 1958, the EEC has come a long way from its six member economic community to taking on political integration as well. In the 1969 Hague Summit EU

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42 Ibid Page 32.
member states began to focus on non-binding foreign policy coordination. Even after De Gaulle’s resignation in April of 1969, France, under Georges Pompidou, still played a large role in setting the agenda and leading the EEC in the direction of further unification.\textsuperscript{46} This Hague summit agreed to granting membership to four applicant countries, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway. With the addition of four new member states occurring in 1973, the founding members vowed to continue to strengthen and deepen the institution.\textsuperscript{47} Also on the agenda for the 1969 Summit were the issues of enlargement, economic and monetary union, and political union.

The 1970 Luxembourg report brought the concept of political union into fruition. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was instituted in 1970 aiming to coordinate the foreign policy of EU member states and to “speak with a single voice in world affairs.”\textsuperscript{48} But unlike the ever-developing economic integration of this time, the EPC was “relatively inward-looking”\textsuperscript{49} and did not actually address many issues in its first decade. This may have stemmed from the fact that while most of the member states were willing to sacrifice some economic sovereignty for long term financial gain, this was not true in terms of political matters. The EPC did not actually hold much clout because any hint of a formalized EU foreign policy “which could be seen or portrayed as abrogating the sovereignty of member states, particularly on the sensitive areas of security and defense, was rebuffed.”\textsuperscript{50} At this point, the member states were not willing to give up political

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. Page 66.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid Page 110.
sovereignty to create an effective foreign policy institution, something that is still being attempted today.

In fact, even after the implementation of the EPC it is evident that the institution was minimally effective. Only a few security related issues were discussed in the meetings of the early 1970’s such as Middle East and East-West relations, and few concrete policy decisions were actually made.\textsuperscript{51} Within the first decade of the formation of the EPC, less than twenty foreign policy actions such as economic sanctions were made.\textsuperscript{52} Although the EPC was not particularly influential in terms of political actions, it was effective in the creation of a common European political identity. For example, in the Middle Eastern dialogue the Danish and the Germans generally favored an Israeli approach but gradually moved toward the EPC position which was more pro-Arab.\textsuperscript{53} The EPC provided the arena for dialogue that brought some member states with outlying perspectives to a more moderate position consistent with most of the other EC states. Although the EPC was effective in swaying the positions of some EC member states, it seems that many of the EC nations were still focused on defense through the NATO framework rather than the EPC.

It is not to say that the member states were ignorant to the futility of the EPC. After its formation, many reports were conducted in an attempt to improve foreign policy cooperation between the states. The 1972 Paris Summit and the 1973 Copenhagen Report issued more detailed procedural frameworks, increasing the duties and meetings of foreign ministers and making the “Luxembourg model” of intergovernmental procedures.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid Page 110.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid Page 118.
the standard practice.\textsuperscript{54} This “Luxembourg model” refers to the appointment of officials to the European Assembly from each member state with the notion that each nation “possesses a distinct ‘European Identity’ in the field of international relations” in order to achieve a truly common foreign policy.\textsuperscript{55} The EPC was becoming increasingly mature throughout the 1970s with the implementation of new reports and documents broadening the duties of the institution practically on a yearly basis.

The London Report of 1981 expanded the actions and the functional issues which the EPC dealt with. Debates in the 1980s on Community foreign policy concluded the further development of a foreign policy tool. “The Community’s foreign policy became enshrined in two international treaties- the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) and the 1993 Treaty on European Union.”\textsuperscript{56} The SEA is often described as “heralding the ‘re-launch’ of European integration in that it provided the foundations for a considerable increase in the pace of integration.”\textsuperscript{57} Continuing this trend of increased integration, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 fortified the three-pillar system of the European Union, which still exists today. The new organization of the EU was based around the three pillars: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).\textsuperscript{58} This treaty also progressed the agenda of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) by instituting a single currency, the Euro. With the establishment of the European Union, the Maastricht Treaty explicitly stated for the first

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid Page 68.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid Page 84.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid Page 49.
time that the Union was “to be founded on the principles of democracy and fundamental human rights.”

The transition from the EPC to the CFSP fortified the European Union’s foreign policy goals and increased its involvement in conflict prevention/democratization processes. This is seen extensively in the Central/Eastern European states, the Mediterranean region, the former Soviet states, South Africa, Central America and elsewhere. One of the most significant advances in the formation of the CFSP is that it “laid the groundwork for the use of police or military forces in certain areas, which now includes plans for a European rapid reaction force.” This development is a clear instance of EU member states sacrificing some of their sovereignty and pooling their recourses for the collective good of EU to be a more proactive foreign policy instrument.

“EU foreign policy has moved from protecting the EU from the unilateral foreign policy actions of its members to acting with a single purpose in world politics to serve common goals. This development…reflects an institutionalized transition from the narrow instrumental rationality behind the creation of the EPC to the more socially driven of a common interest.”

Since the formation of the ECSC in 1952, the postwar Western European partnership has clearly evolved from a relatively weak six state partnership, into a twenty-seven member deeply integrated union. As Smith states, the EU has transformed into a socially driven entity in which most aspects of European life are addressed by the EU rather than on a nation-to-nation basis. This collective effort has transformed Europe into an economic giant but on the other hand, many

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61 Ibid Page 112.
63 Ibid Page 113.
contrast the integrated economy with the nominal “common foreign policy”. Thus, the EU is labeled an economic giant but a political dwarf.

The economic success of the EU and relative political failure of the institution could be explained by the fact that upon the formation of the EC, the founding fathers’ main concern was the economic development of Western Europe. Political unification through the EPC and eventually CFSP seems to have come about as an after thought of the economic success of the region. This is sustained by the “Monnet method” which formed the basis of European integration. “This method, often identified with the social science theory known as ‘functionalism.’ favored promoting economic integration in specific sectors, with the notion that this would produce ‘spillovers’ into other sectors and eventually create both the need and the momentum for political integration.”\(^64\) It therefore comes as no surprise that the political unification of the EU is not as advanced as the economic sphere.

This leads to the question, is political unification and a common foreign policy intended and even practical for the EU? This concept of “what Europe is” has certainly been debated among EU member states. Furthermore, it has been suggested that, “European integration is like riding a bike- unless you keep moving forward, you will fall off…because European integration has been viewed as a journey rather than a destination, there is enormous ambiguity about precisely where it is heading.”\(^65\) Congruent with the “spillover” concept, it seems that the


\(^{65}\) Ibid. Page 42.
EU will continue ‘riding the bike of integration’ thus moving forward with further integration and over time leading to a common foreign policy.

Many of the EU member states are aiming to change the concept of the EU as a ‘political dwarf’. In general, there has been an increasing acceptance of European states promoting cooperation in foreign policy. The 2007 EU Constitution would have brought about a more clear and effective foreign policy however, it was rejected by referendum by French and Dutch voters. This dissent within the EU suggests that despite all of the advances in political unity in Europe since World War II, it will likely be a matter of time before the status of a truly effective common foreign policy is decided upon in the EU.

**The Future of the Alliance:**

The United States and Western European nations have shared a common history, but recently it seems that their historic partnership is on the rocks. Throughout World War II the US, Britain, and France allied against their common enemy of the axis powers. Even after WWII, the US played a major role in the development of Western Europe and the promotion of democracy in the area. The political polarization of the Cold War further united democratic Europe and the US against their communist enemy. But with the diminished Soviet threat, the EU and US are no longer united against one common cause and the question remains, does EU and US still have enough common interests to keep a strong alliance?

The destruction of Europe by the end of World War II created the need for a united Western European democratic bloc. This unification was encouraged and essentially funded by the US and advanced Western Europe while Eastern Europe
declined economically. “The Second World War unquestionably marked a turning point in the West European state system. Just a few years after the end of the war, states were cooperating, and...were even integrating, in a manner that would have been inconceivable before the war.” It is clear that WWII exacerbated the need for a unifying system that eliminated the possibility of war between European states. NATO, along with the formation of the EC provided the means to this goal. The US Marshall Plan, as previously discussed, provided the funds that allowed for this economic redevelopment.

The United States is often criticized for asserting its power on ‘weaker’ nations. However, the implementation of the Marshall Plan seems to have been more on the basis as an amicable act out of a democratic alliance rather than a domination tactic. “The role for the United States in Western Europe at this time should not be seen as having been unwelcome… US aid was not insidiously imposed on unwilling states but was actively sought.” The US/ Western European alliance at this time was truly a mutually expedient relationship, the US helped facilitate the rebuilding of Western Europe while gaining a pivotal ally against Soviet communism. The time period after WWII could arguably be when the United States and Western Europe’s alliance was strongest. This seems to have been a time of true partnership in which both sides of the Atlantic converged against the communist threat and focused on their common historical culture throughout the beginning of the Cold War.

The further integration of the European Community throughout the 1960s and 1970s, led to more cooperation between the member states along with a more succinct European ‘voice’ in global matters. The NATO framework was still essential to the

67 Ibid Page 16.
defense of Europe, but the role of the EC was becoming increasingly more important. Similarly, as the Cold War progressed, the US and EC political perspectives began to diverge. The EC’s Document on the European Identity (1973) aimed to unite its members with one voice in international affairs. The EC was pulling away from diplomatically operating in the United States’ shadow because throughout the 1970’s the two were beginning to hold different perspectives in terms of political and economic issues. “The Europeans and US disagreed on Vietnam, international monetary relations and the relative merits of Israeli and Palestinian claims in the 1973 October war.” 68 It comes as no surprise that the divisions between the US and EC came at a time when the EC was in the beginning stages of political unity. As the EC was developing its own political identity, the differences in US/EC perspectives were becoming increasingly apparent. The US now had to adapt the way it conducted relations with Western European states in terms of negotiating on a supranational level rather than on a nation-to-nation basis. In 1973, Kissinger had wanted to organize a new economic, political and defense relationship between the US and UK. In the process Kissinger insulted the efficacy of the EC by “relegating the Europeans to the status of junior partner as he insisted that the US had global interests to protect while the Europeans possessed only regional interests.”69

This statement clearly devalued the efforts of the EPC to bolster Europe’s voice in international relations while discrediting the role of the EC in the transatlantic partnership.

Belittling the role of Europe in the US/EC alliance undermined the partnership and only made the EC more focused on strengthening Europe’s role in international

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69 Ibid Page 77.
relations. In this, the EC was faced with the dilemma of how to keep a strong transatlantic alliance while promoting a separate EU political voice, “European Political Cooperation was based upon US security leadership within NATO and yet at the same time was an effort by the West Europeans to maintain an international political identity distinct from that of the United States.” Since the United States role in NATO was so essential to Europe’s security the institution and effectiveness of NATO had to be upheld, however, the US and European perspectives were beginning to diverge.

The future of the EU/US relationship has been frequently debated. In the recent years it seems, more than ever, that the transatlantic gap is widening. With the success and integration of the EU in economic and political terms, the EU is increasingly defining its own objectives in international relations.

Europe seems to be turning away from supremacy and is more focused on the promotion of peace through intergovernmental institutions, while the US is content with its role and domination as a superpower. Robert Kagan goes as far as to suggest that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” Kagan proposes that Europe “is moving beyond power and into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation…the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace.’” While the United States on the other hand, “exercises power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.” Evidence does suggest that the EU and US do favor differing foreign

70 Ibid Page 78.
72 Ibid Page 3.
73 Ibid Page 3.
policy instruments. The EU is generally more likely to impose sanctions in order to influence other nations while the US is more inclined to use military power.

Although the EU and US seem to be developing differing perspectives on international relations, are the two powers as different as Kagan suggests? Or does the 1973 Document on the European Identity stating that “the close links between the US and EC member states, based on shared ‘values and aspirations founded on a common heritage’”\(^\text{74}\) still hold true? Furthermore, if the transatlantic gap is actually growing and the EU intends to institute a clear and effective common European foreign policy, what does this mean for the future of the EU/US relationship?

The Fortification of a European Political Identity: examination of US/EU foreign policy in a globalizing world

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a disintegration of the foreign policy tools and objectives of the United States and much of Europe. With their common enemy and security threat diminished, the US and EU began taking on new global outlooks. Although in many ways the alliance continued, the EU began looking introspectively at how to strengthen its unity along with preparing for the rebuilding of many of the post-communist eastern European states. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty fortified the three pillars of European government furthering the alliance between all member states. This treaty laid out an agenda for the strengthening of Europe’s role in the world affairs. Hoping to lessen it’s reliance on the US partnership, the ‘pillar’ of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aimed to bolster the Europe’s diplomatic say.

With a solidified Europe attempting to “hold it’s own” as a major power in foreign affairs, separate from US hegemony, the transatlantic alliance has diverged on some issues. Security threats and foreign policy have clearly evolved from the common communist threat during the Cold War, to the modern issues both states face of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Although the strong US/European partnership of much of the 20th century is yet again confronted with analogous security threats, the question remains, will the alliance strengthen on its similarities or be undermined by differences of interests and diplomatic strategies?

International Relations in a Globalizing World:
The twenty-first century marks a new era in global history. With the end of Cold War world politics and the increasing spread of technology around the world, many countries are beginning to experience Western democratization and development. The integration of economics and technology among nations has entwined the world into a globalized net of relations. “In the past two decades, capitalism has lost its national characteristics. It has become global due to the growing power of transnational corporations with their global market strategies.”

Globalization has not only impacted the way business and economics are conducted but has also incited a new way in which foreign policy should be conducted.

Just as Multi-National Corporations have become the major players in global technological and economic interactions, non-governmental and supranational institutions have experienced an increasing role in political affairs. “Global civil society represented by transnational social movements and NGOs will force the institutions of the modern world system/international society to change rapidly… shared sovereignty regimes of states will become a more salient feature in the future.” Many experts agree on the increasing significance of multinational political cooperation. Globalization has essentially made the world seem smaller by blurring the borders and differences between many countries through economic and even political cooperation. Furthermore, it has been theorized that global governance has become pluralized; rulemaking is “no longer a matter simply for states or intergovernmental organizations. Private firms, NGOs, subunits of governments and the transnational and trans-governmental networks that result, all play a role, typically with central state authorities and intergovernmental


76 Ibid. Page 30.
organizations.”\textsuperscript{77} In fact, Magone suggests in his book \textit{The New World Architecture} that “we are in the middle of a paradigm shift that no longer sees the nation-state as the only central actor of international society.”\textsuperscript{78} The decreasing strength of the traditional importance of the nation-state comes to little surprise considering the nature of transnational politics today.

Political interests and security threats of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century have gone beyond nation-to-nation diplomacy. David Held suggests that in this new world order “threats to national security are becoming both more diffuse and no longer simply military in character.”\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, “transnational problems, including economic, environmental, terrorist, cultural, criminal, and other threats to national security cannot be resolved by national means alone. Solutions require regional and even global mechanisms of cooperation and coordination.”\textsuperscript{80} It is clear from the transnational nature of security threats facing many nations, particularly the EU and US that international security has become globalized and thus must be dealt with on a global scale. Therefore, in terms of dealing with such threats as terrorism and WMD proliferation, “even the most powerful nation in the world is impotent in light of this threat. Unilateral efforts are ineffective or counterproductive. In order to preserve and increase their power, states must (a) cooperate, and (b) negotiate international regulations and establish corresponding

international regulations…not rivalry but cooperation maximizes national interests.”

The United States’ hegemonic actions, particularly in terms of the war in Iraq, undeniably goes against this multilateral approach to increasing one’s power in this new world order. As will be discussed in the later part of this chapter, the US has clearly isolated themselves from the prospect of compromise and cooperation with other states.

This is particularly evident in the US/EU alliance. The transatlantic gap is seemingly widening with the US exerting its superpower status on a unilateral level while the EU remains focused on a multilateral approach.

**Emergence of a European Foreign Policy:**

Although the EU has come together to form the world’s largest economy, political unification has traditionally been an afterthought intended to seemingly evolve over time. As previously discussed, the European Union’s recent goal has been to pool the national government together developing one voice in foreign policy to have a greater global impact. Putting forth the Constitution of Europe in 2004, Brussels aimed to establish this more effective CFSP while also solidifying and strengthening the supranational role of the EU. The European Constitution intended to replace the existing EU treaties offers “a vision of how the enlarged European Union of 25 or more states can deal with the challenges of the future.”

Although all other Member States signed the constitution, the French and Dutch referendum put the initiative on hold. The constitution’s 2005 referendum failure represented a major set back to those in support of

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84 Ibid.
a more dynamic EU. However, in October of 2007, “the leaders of the European Union took the constitution…changed the odd phrase, muddled the odd concept and presented the Lisbon ‘reform treaty’ to the world.”

The passing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty all but in name marks the passage of the 2004 constitution, since 90% of the constitution is represented in the treaty. The treaty attempts to accommodate enlargement of the union, at its now 27 members, by making “EU institutions more efficient and ‘streamlining’ decision-making.” Some of the major provisions include majority voting in some policy areas, in place of the current unanimous voting system, and the creation of a full standing president of the Counsel along with a foreign-policy chief. The High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represents, at least on paper, a major advancement of the CFSP. The consolidation of roles gives this new political chief, working for national governments and the Commission, more political power, money, and his own diplomatic corps. This new foreign minister post, if enforced efficiently, seemingly answers Henry Kissinger’s age old question: “if a world power needs to talk to Europe, whom do they call?”

Many people regard the Lisbon treaty “as the moment that Europe finally resolved to live up to its economic heft and become a power on the world stage.” However, the “constitutional” treaty seems to have come too soon for some. The fact that a chief of

86 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
foreign policy has been instituted during a time when EU leaders still don’t even agree upon the purpose of the EU, “a political project, or just an exercise in international economic governance,” suggests that internal disagreements need to be resolved before constructive political decisions can be made. This ambiguity of the purpose of the EU is essentially the Achilles heel of Europe’s integration.

This internal friction between those who support a stronger EU, “eurocrats”, and those who believe in more national sovereignty, “euroskeptics”, is exemplified in the differing notions of the political implications of the treaty. For example, the Spanish prime minister, Zapatero sees the treaty as one which “will ’open new horizons’ for the EU, finally giving the 27 member block the international profile it deserves.” Zapatero upheld the treaty’s influence stating that it would “permit us to better transmit our values and affirm our role as defenders of peace on the international scene”, essentially giving the EU a distinct voice from America. On the other hand, British prime minister Gordon Brown minimizes its significance describing the “reform treaty” as “a modest piece of housekeeping, that merely tweaks the way decisions are taken after a dozen new members have been absorbed in the past few years.”

Differing groups within the EU are clearly interpreting the treaty through their own ideological lenses, choosing to see the legislation as supporting their intended outcome. It is thus hard to predict the impact of

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94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.
the Lisbon treaty, how effective can a foreign policy figurehead be without a common policy?  

The advancement of the Europe’s global role is difficult to achieve with such internal dissent. The British value of sovereignty and its special diplomatic relationship with the US influences them to consider the EU as more of “a convenience rather than a concept.” The British, along with other “euroskeptic” member states, favor retaining national sovereignty thus hoping to limit the EU in becoming a super-state. “Those who want an EU that is a world power in political and military as well as economic terms, constantly run up against the problem of trying to build a continental state in an intellectual and moral climate that is hostile to the predominance of the state.” Many member-states are not willing to give up their political autonomy and therefore view the role of the EU as mainly a coalition of nations rather than a ‘continental state’. This adds to the difficulty of establishing a common EU foreign policy.

In an interview conducted with Luis Balsells-Traver, an official on the Subcommittee on Security and Defense (SEDE) of the European Parliament, Luis expressed his optimism in the effectiveness of the treaty. Luis affirmed that ever since the formation of the CFSP, “member-states have set their own foreign policy agenda and the EU tools have essentially been put on the back burner.” However, he stated that with the passage of the “reform treaty” the world will immediately witness the EU working with “a common agenda, but not yet a complete common foreign policy.” When asked

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how effective this would actually be considering a common foreign policy was not foreseeable in the immediate future, Luis remained confident that over time it would strengthen. He credits the Solidarity Clause, which “calls for the Union and its Member States to act jointly if a Member State is the target of a terrorist attack,”\textsuperscript{101} as an integral part of foreign policy solidification because of its cross-border effects.\textsuperscript{102} In terms of terrorism, Luis suggests that a lot is being done at the EU level to counter terrorism which receives a large portion of funding. But dealing with Islamic radicalism within the EU will need to be conducted on a nation-to-nation basis.\textsuperscript{103}

Luis is confident in Europe’s ability to take on crisis management issues aside from NATO and states that at this point “the EU is better equipped than NATO.”\textsuperscript{104} While he affirms that the transformation of Europe’s defense will bolster their international role, he recognizes some of the internal setbacks. He states, “Within the EU, anything seen as taking away from national power, such as the High Representative of foreign policy, is controversial. Therefore the international agreements of other countries need to be considered while developing a common foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{105} Another interesting predicament within the EU Luis identifies is the use of the EU as a scapegoat. “A major internal problem with integration of the EU is its use as a ‘scapegoat’...when something goes wrong, national leaders are quick to blame the inefficiency of the EU, but take credit for the positives of the Union.”\textsuperscript{106} This is an interesting phenomenon because it likely creates a sense of distrust of the union among citizens, something that needs to be

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\url{http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/external_relations/index_en.htm}.
\textsuperscript{102} Balsells-Traver, Luis. Personal interview. 21 Nov 2007.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
addressed before nations are apt to give up some national sovereignty by converging on a common foreign policy.

It is suggested that in order to formulate a common foreign policy “ongoing ‘normative integration’ would be necessary, that is, a reference to shared values in a public realm extending beyond the borders of individual countries…that, in turn…is not only the precondition but also the effect of a successful European foreign policy.”¹⁰⁷ In the development of a uniform foreign policy the concept of a European identity needs to be promoted in order to combine nationalistic views and policies into a common European stance. Regardless of the debated extent of the impact of the Lisbon treaty, it can only be a step forward, no matter how big or small, in the cohesion of the union. Therefore, for the future it is mainly a matter of whether this political unity will continue to evolve thus determining how effective it’s global role will be.

Withstanding the internal disputes as to the political purpose of the EU, “there has been a gradual strengthening, over the past 2 decades, of commitment to and capacity for foreign policy cooperation.”¹⁰⁸ Similarly, a 2003 Transatlantic Trends poll suggests that 2/3 of those polled wanted to see the European Union become a superpower.¹⁰⁹ Along the same lines, when asked about the future of the EU, the vast majority of citizens proposed their support for more political intervention and decision-making at the European level on such issues as terrorism and organized crime.¹¹⁰ With the citizen’s fundamental support and the recent passage of the Lisbon treaty, it seems likely that the EU will continue to

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Page 80.
develop its role in international politics, advancing its position as global actor in the future.

Although many Europeans would like to see the EU become more involved in international policy, Levy et al. suggests that the essential missing element is agreement upon a common foreign policy. “Only when Europe succeeds in developing a culture of world-political thinking will it assume a prominent and relevant role in the shaping of the world… what Europe needs most urgently is a rational calculation of its cosmopolitan interests.”\(^{111}\) Furthermore, in an essay in *La Republica*, Umberto Eco states “without a common foreign policy and a military defense plan, Europe will end up counting as much as ‘Guatemala.’”\(^{112}\) Eco clearly holds an extreme view of Europe’s world role. However, it is evident that if the citizens truly seek a more politically influential EU, a common foreign policy representing the interests of all members must be agreed upon.

**European Union Security Threats and Strategies:**

An emerging European common foreign policy and global role likely will not represent what American’s typically consider international policy and military power to be. In general, Europeans seem to favor more multilateralism and negotiations in diplomacy. Which interestingly corresponds with what experts outlined as how to maximize one’s national interests and power in a globalizing world.

While it is evident that Europeans are not very eager to evolve into a super-state system, many recognize the benefit of a more politically unified EU. One commonality among European states is the their reluctance to go to war. National politicians realize that the European public would never agree to taxation for defense spending close to


\(^{112}\) Ibid. Page 64.
anything like that of the US.\textsuperscript{113} This is likely because their “threshold of tolerance for the use of force against persons is relatively low.”\textsuperscript{114} Military power is certainly low on Europe’s agenda. Instead, they emphasize the influence of ‘soft power’ in diplomatic relations. “For among the many other motives pushing toward integration is the desire of Europeans to be a major player on the world scene. Some may hold that this can be achieved wholly through ‘soft power’- that is the power of European example in pointing toward a world governed by multilateralism and the rule of law.”\textsuperscript{115} There is a strong sense among Europeans that as a world actor, they could counter America’s ‘hard power’ inclinations and advance Europe’s values of multilateral promotion of peace, democracy, and human rights.

The EU places much of its international political clout in supranational institutions. For the EU, “the desire for a multilateral and legally regulated international order is connected with the hope for an effective global domestic policy, within the framework of a reformed United Nations.”\textsuperscript{116} The idea of giving more power to the UN in a reformed framework represents many European’s desire to exert their global influence through the cooperation of the UN. Clearly this suggests Europe’s emphasis on transnational rule of law in guiding foreign policy. Therefore, it is no surprise that, “in European academic circles, at least, multilateralism in all its forms occupies the moral high ground, and national interests and outlooks are generally regarded as retrograde.”\textsuperscript{117} Most Europeans view foreign relations through a globalized framework, regarding the

power of the nation-state as ‘retrograde’. This is suggestive of the EU’s desired global role to counter America’s national interest based view of foreign policy.

Corresponding to this notion of Europe’s focus on the advancement of public good is the European value of the promotion of peace, democracy, and the preservation of human rights. Most European member-states have traditionally been active players in humanitarian aid, and in 2000 the EU collectively listed “poverty reduction as the principle aim of development policy.” It is clear that Europe’s emerging political role is global in scope since the EU is by far the world’s largest donor of both development and humanitarian assistance, providing 70 percent of overseas development assistance to poor countries, four times more than the US. This value seems based upon Western Europe’s long history of imperialism in much of the world, which has eventually evolved into establishing the EU’s “role as a relatively benign ‘patron/mentor’ in relation to the South.” Since 9/11 the EU has aimed to increase EU coordinated development with more of a focus on establishing security in developing nations. The 2003 European Security Strategy emphasized that “security if the first condition for development” and that the effectiveness of EU humanitarian institutions, such as the European Development Fund, “can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.” Even though the EU is already a major global actor in development, the full potential of the EU’s role “could be realized only if greater consistency was achieved between EU and

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121 Ibid. Page 114.
Member State policies.” Yet again, increased coordination within the EU, through a common foreign policy, could yield to greater effectiveness of the EU as a global actor. 

Accompanying the EU’s extensive role as a global aid donor, it also focuses much of its external relations as a regional actor. The mere notion of the European Union as a desirable “club” in which much of the region aspires to belong to is arguably the EU’s most effective foreign policy mechanism. The benefits and exclusivity of the union has supplied Europe with the means to democratize and build up the continent through the ‘golden carrot’ of the prospect of membership. The concept of EU membership as a foreign policy instrument is apparent in the union’s regional relations. The fall of the Soviet Union left much of Central and Eastern Europe searching for political order. The EU was able to use the prospect of membership to advance democracy and improve relations with the region. The Central and East European Countries (CEEC) transformed their political and economic institutions to converge with EU interests as set forth in the Copenhagen Criteria. The Copenhagen Criteria for membership, established in 1993, requires candidate countries to meet specific guidelines including stable democratic institutions, functioning market economies, and the ability to integrate the aims of the EU. The European Union’s ability to transform regional governments to their standards is an impeccable example of Europe’s “soft power” at work. Soft power is essentially “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is

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122 Ibid. Page 136.
123 Ibid. Page 139.
enhanced.” The legitimacy of the EU has enabled it to engage transitional governments in the region and use soft power as a democratizing tool.

This foreign policy tool has not only proven effective in the democratization of the 10 post-communist nations admitted in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, but has also improved relations with Turkey and the Western Balkans. Although Turkey’s capability as an EU member is widely debated, its formal candidate status has ensured democratic reform in Turkey. It is evident that in the transition from authoritarian governance in the south and east of Europe, “the European Union has become the major agency in reshaping the public administrative structures of these semi-peripheral regions.” The integration incentive into the booming European Union has proven to be one of their most effective foreign policy tools in spreading peace, prosperity, and democracy throughout the region.

Of course there are many nations and regions in which the prospect of membership is not an option because of mere geographical reasons. In order to exert their soft power, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) “in an attempt to provide an overarching framework for EU relations with Southern and Eastern ‘non-candidate’ neighbors.” This policy basically consists of Action Plans in which nations are given financial assistance as an incentive to the commitment of EU political, economic, and social values. One significant factor in these agreements is the ‘neighbors’
promotion of combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, essentially using Europe’s ‘soft power’ to combat these threats from within the countries themselves.

The European Union has certainly utilized their advantageous status of an exclusive “club” as a foreign policy tool to globally promote their values. However, in a post 9/11 political context, they do face global threats, which citizens agree, must be managed on a collective EU level. The Council’s 2003 *European Security Strategy* “identifies, and links, four ‘key threats’ to the Union’s security- terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts and state failure. It concludes that the ‘first line of defense will often be abroad’. “127 This document identifies a shared concept of security threats, not only among EU member-states, but also “echoes US thinking on these matters.”128 Similarly, the Council stated that it would fight all forms of terrorism and that “the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union.”129 While this statement of European foreign policy does seem congruent with American governmental sentiment at the time, the two seem to differ in their strategies on the threat of terrorism.

Whereas the Bush Administration declared the “War on Terror”, Europeans were more concerned with addressing the roots of terrorism. The EU associates terrorism as “essentially a question of justice and global distribution of wealth, and therefore not a problem that can be solved by declaring war on it.”130 In accordance with this perspective, the EU identified foreign policy tools/strategies for alleviating the cause of terrorism through the prism of development. The European Development Fund (EDF),

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127 Ibid. Page 133.
128 Ibid. Page 182.
130 Ibid. Page 19.
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), along with other third parties are to become the main forces in combating the cause of terrorism and nuclear proliferation.\textsuperscript{131} The EU approach to terrorism differs greatly from the US strategy of preemption, emphasizing a long-term soft power approach as previously mentioned, combined with a hard power response utilizing the ESDP instruments.\textsuperscript{132} Although a common foreign policy has not yet been solidified, this stance is certainly evidence of a trend in European diplomacy. With a focus on soft power, humanitarian and development aid, and a multilateral approach, it seems that the EU has been exhibiting consistency in international diplomacy. Taking into consideration the recent political advancements of the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps a common foreign policy for the EU is not as far off as we think.

**US Security Threats and Strategies:**

Examining American foreign policy and the role it plays in global politics, it seems that US foreign policy instruments act in antithesis to how the European Union conducts diplomacy. The Bush Administration’s reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks have fueled an environment in which the America’s priority is to pursue its hegemony, even if that means ‘going it alone’. Kagan states that the United States “remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.”\textsuperscript{133} Kagan’s description of American

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\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. Page 182.
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international relations does seem valid, at least in terms of the policies of the Bush Administration.

The motives of the ultra-conservative Washington based think tank, the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), seemingly mirrors Kagan’s assessment of the American priority of military power. PNAC sets forth many radical goals for the global role of the US. For one, they “demand the establishment of a global US empire to bend the will of all nations” with this, the “US armed forces must establish American dominance for all to see.”  

Among the strategies for creating this empire is the modernization of the military by increasing defense spending by almost a third, from 3 percent of the country’s GDP to 3.8 percent. PNAC also calls for ‘four core’ military missions in which the US must win multiple and simultaneous major theatre wars in order to shape the security of ‘critical regions’. All of this seems like just an extremist viewpoint, after all most America’s “don’t necessarily take to the idea of being some sort of new Rome.” However, under the Bush Administration, the men who had created PNAC’s imperial dreams became the men who now run the Pentagon, US Defense Department, and White House.

This ideological project has been developing for years and has finally gotten its say in politics under Bush’s presidency. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 proved to be the perfect time to institute PNACs strategy under “Bush’s PR War”. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Bush’s released National Security Strategy was “an ideological match to

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137 Ibid. Page 21.
PNAC...in many places, it uses exactly the same language to describe the US’s new place in the world.”\textsuperscript{140} Furthermore, Bush’s proposed defense budget called for “$379 billion...almost exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.”\textsuperscript{141} With Iraq listed as “the tactical pivot”\textsuperscript{142} of US influence in the Middle East, it’s chilling that PNAC’s plan has been instituted in American governmental policy without the public realizing or understanding what was going on.

September 11, 2001 clearly provided the means to institute the Bush Administration’s agenda of a \textit{Pax Americana}. This focusing event also signifies American foreign policy taking a turn toward more hegemony and unilateral action, differentiating itself from its European allies. In September 2002 “the president unveiled his new national security strategy...his aspiration to put American military power ‘beyond challenge’ and his endorsement of ‘preemptive actions’ against threats from terrorist rouge states.”\textsuperscript{143} Indeed Bush did put the US ‘beyond challenge’ in terms of international support for Iraq. As will be further discussed in a later chapter, allied and UN support for Iraq faltered and rather than the US proceeding further with international support, the US went ‘beyond challenge’ by taking unilateral action.

It has been suggested that this US promotion of self-interest and hegemony is a “re-nationalization” of America; essentially an ‘empire-like’ insistence on its own priorities, separating itself from international law. “The re-nationalization of the United States goes hand in hand with the non-adherence to the Kyoto Protocol on climate protection, the contempt for the International Criminal Court, and the refusal to

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid. Page 21.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid. Page 22.
acknowledge the worldwide biological-weapon convention.”144 Similar to the EU’s strong emphasis on multilateral action in environmental standards, with the Kyoto Protocol, the EU is an avid supporter of the ICC. The signing of the ICC statute was “hailed as ‘a historic victory for human rights and international justice’ because it created a reliable method for prosecuting war criminals when domestic efforts fail.”145 Although the US participated in the creation of the ICC under Clinton, Bush withdrew that signature and now demands US immunity from prosecution in the ICC.146 Bush’s fear of US prosecution and subsequent demand of immunity seems to suggest to the international community that Americans have something to hide. Furthermore, Bush’s divergence on the ICC has also unified the EU against the US on this issue.147 This is a significant divide between the EU and US since as previously discussed; getting all EU members to unite on a common stance is typically not an easy task.

The United States international policies since 9/11 seem to be a stark contrast from the EU’s focus on multilateralism and international law. With the case of the ICC, Bush is essentially blocking one of Europe’s most valued foreign policy tools. To make matters worse, “America does not care whether or not Europeans regard its actions as a breach of international law.”148 US hegemony in this case is not only belittling multilateral efforts by the EU, but is also signifying Bush’s apathy in the continuity of the transatlantic alliance.

America’s egocentrism in foreign policy and the Bush Administration’s emphasis on world dominance is completely contradictory not only to Europe’s aims as a global actor, but also to what experts had suggested for obtaining power in a globalizing world. In terms of the future, Fukuyama suggests, “the key questions that Americans face as they proceed forward with this war on terrorism are how deep this fundamental challenge [anti-western forces] is, which sorts of allies it can recruit, and what we must do to counter it.”

There is clear insistence on multilateralism and alliances in modern global international relations. However, the Bush Administration has continually undermined their participation in these groups thus eroding allies’ trust and support. “There is increasing evidence that the policies and tone of the new unilateralists were directly responsible for the decline of America’s attractiveness abroad.”

The Bush administration’s “re-nationalization” and advancement of their Pax Americana agenda has isolated the US and has increased anti-American sentiment abroad. “In the United States, the realization will finally dawn that even a hegemonic power can get entangled in growing difficulties when it thinks it is able to act without partners.”

In a globalizing world, it seems America’s unilateralism and hegemony in foreign policy can only detrimental to ourselves as it “seems to draw nothing but hate.”

US and EU Security and Threats Examined:

The post-9/11 international environment has marked a complete shift from Cold War politics. The terrorist attacks have forced Western democratic governments to

address Islamic radicalism and come up with strategies to alleviate the growing tensions between East and West. Once again the EU and US are facing the same security threats. The European declaration immediately after the terrorist attacks that “we are all Americans,” suggested a stronger partnership between the two democracies. But, seven years later, the gap between two powers’ political perceptions and strategies are quite evident.

An emerging European foreign policy has altered EU reliance on the United States. Although both powers identify the same main threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation, their strategies to counter these threats are remarkably different. As previously discussed, the EU generally exercises ‘soft power’ whereas the US tends to focus on ‘hard power’. “Post-heroic Europeans tend to favor procedure, talk, international institutions and incremental measures to resolve ideas, where Americans tend to favor resolve backed by force.” This is clear in their security strategy analyses, with the EU aiming to curb terrorism at its roots and the Bush Administrations focus on fighting it from the top down with military dominance in the region.

The reason for differences in their diplomatic strategies is certainly ideological in nature, while also tying into their individual perception of threat. After all, “perceptions create the overall context in which foreign policy decisions are made...[and] the threat perceptions and security concepts are different in Germany and the United States.” The Bush Administration was seemingly always a proponent of US hegemony and the 9/11 terrorist attacks signified an infraction on this power. It could be argued that because the

153 Ibid.
Bush Administration conducts world politics in a paradigm of ‘hard power’ and domination, they therefore perceived World Trade Center Attack as a breach to power thus aiming to retaliate with extreme force. Europe on the other hand, whose “mission is to oppose power” and places value on humanitarianism, perceives terrorist activity as an economically based problem. Furthermore, “what differentiates the US and Europe are striking oppositions in their perception of danger...For Americans, it is the horror of terrorism that reveals itself, while for the Europeans it is the horror of war.” The two powers essentially function under paradigms with differing values therefore influencing them to take different stances on seemingly identical issues.

Perhaps Europe’s vivid memory of a war-dominated continent has influenced their hesitation toward the use of ‘hard power’. “Peace is much more of an absolute value today in Europe than in the United States, as are opposition to the death penalty and commitment to reversing global warming.” Looking at the EU’s external relations, their global scope of issues is apparent. In general European citizens are more concerned with the protection of the environment and human rights than Americans are. Similarly, Europeans contribute more to the development of nations. In 2003, Foreign Policy magazine ranked wealthy nations by their ‘commitment to development’ “the Netherlands did the best, closely followed by Denmark and New Zealand. [Whereas] Japan just beat the United States for bottom place.” It seems remarkable that the US, already the world’s superpower, can allocate $379 billion a year on military spending but comes second to last in developmental aid.

Going hand in hand with the EU/US differing values are their foreign policy strategies. As discussed, it is clear that Europeans and Americans emphasize different foreign policy tools of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ however; it is unclear as to which is more effective. It has been suggested that enlargement and the prospect of membership has been the EU’s most successful foreign policy tool. Chris Huhne suggests, “The EU…exercises a soft power on its periphery that has far more transformational impact than the American neo-con agenda in the Middle East. Countries in the Balkans wanting to come into the European democratic family have to adapt.” Indeed, the impact of European ‘soft power’ relations has proven successful in the democratization and economic development of the Central and Eastern European nations. Similarly, other countries in the region, such as the Balkans, and nations of the Neighborhood Policy have also been greatly impacted by the EU’s focus on development. While on the other hand, the US military actions to institute democracy in the Middle East have shown minimal success.

Although the EU does not yet have a common foreign policy, it seems that their use of ‘soft power’ has bolstered respect in the international arena, while US militarism has only lessened their accountability. “Despite the fact that many Eastern European leaders supported the US-led war [Iraq], their citizens felt that the EU plays a more positive role than the US on a variety of transnational issues…ranging from fighting terrorism to reducing poverty.” In addition to their use of ‘soft power’, the EU also utilizes international institutions for peacekeeping. “Europe has ten times as many troops as the United States involved in peacekeeping operations under multilateral organizations

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such as the UN and NATO.”¹⁶² Their larger proportion of peacekeeping troops in the UN and NATO may be due to the fact that the EU does not have its own army, while the US does. However, their extremely large proportion does reflect Europe’s focus on multilateral peacekeeping. Joseph Nye has suggested that the use of ‘soft power’, multilateralism, and alliances are key to solving problems in a globalizing world. If this is true, it seems that the Bush Administration’s approach to ‘world domination’ should be reconsidered. In fact it has been suggested that the EU should “exert their influence to pressure, shame, and encourage the United States and its citizens to join in this project.”¹⁶³

This shift of interpretation of US foreign policy is not likely under the Bush Administration’s PNAC- ‘empire’ oriented global strategy. But perhaps with the 2008 US presidential election, a more moderate administration will be elected under which the EU and US can work collectively in this global environment.

EU/US Intervention in a Pre-9/11 Context: the premature unveiling of European foreign policy compels Americans to ‘take the reins’

...a third milestone in EU/US relations was the agreement signed by the United States and the European Union in December 1995 on ‘A New Transatlantic Agenda’...to acknowledge the EU’s pivotal role as the center of the new politico-security architecture emerging in post-Cold War Europe...These priorities looked set to shape the European Union and the United States joint security agenda for the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{164}

The increasing political unity of the European Union in the early 1990s evolved simultaneously with the growing crisis in the Balkans. The foundation for a European political voice was declared in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; providing European officials with the illusion that the union was prepared to lead their first EU-level crisis intervention mission. The EU, having previously been involved in many humanitarian and peacekeeping operations under UN and NATO command, decided to showcase their new foreign policy immediately declaring control over handling the Yugoslav crisis. As diplomatic relations materialized, the lack of policy cohesion within the EU led to differing strategies and thus negotiations between the ethnic groups were undermined by the lack of a united front. In addition, once negotiations were put forth, the lack of military power to enforce the agreements detracted from EU authority. Relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were most detrimental to Europe’s crisis management credibility and as the fighting ensued, it took US military involvement to mediate the conflict. While Macedonian diplomatic relations proved to be the most successful, the EU crisis mitigation effort in the Balkans seems to be unprepared from the beginning due to the novelty and lack of capacity of EU foreign policy.

**Issue of European Recognition of Croatia:**

One of the first post-Cold War conflicts came with the dissolution of communism in Yugoslavia, breaking up the state into conflicting ethnic entities. The democratic elections following the collapse of the federal Communist party became the grounds for the entities’ “right to national self-determination.”\(^{165}\) Conflict over territorial autonomy began in June of 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia.\(^{166}\) The European Community (EC) effectively mediated the ten-day war between the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) and Slovenia,\(^{167}\) however the situation in Croatia would prove to be a more complicated issue. The newly elected Croatian government under Tudjman pursued a nationalist agenda thus creating hostilities between the Croatian government and Serbs in the region, eventually bringing about war between Croatia and the YPA.\(^{168}\)

Soon thereafter, Foreign Minister Jacques Poos made clear the intention of the EC with its newly developing political role. “If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.”\(^{169}\) The war in Croatia had created the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II, forcing the EC to take a stand.\(^{170}\) The EC urged the UN to broker a cease-fire between the Serbians and Croatians, and UN peacekeeping troops

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\(^{166}\) Ibid. Page 146.

\(^{167}\) Ibid. Page 146.


were sent into the region.\textsuperscript{171} The concept of recognizing the declared independence of Slovenia and Croatia was highly debated within the EC. Under immense German pressure by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the EC agreed to accept Slovenia and Croatia’s right to national self-determination. This recognition, as declared in the Brioni Agreement was originally “hailed as the first success of Europe’s new independent foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{172} However, the Brioni Agreement gave little thought to the political implications that recognition would have on the other former Yugoslav republic’s, which also aimed for independence thus pushing Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to war.\textsuperscript{173}

This initial diplomatic neglect to see the ‘larger picture’ seems to be due to the Western internal division as to how to approach the conflict. In opposition to the Brioni Agreements, for example, Britain’s Lord Peter Carrington, chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, suggested that withholding recognition could provide the EC with leverage in order to influence the former republics to negotiate a peaceful solution. Additionally, he identified that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would justify Bosnia-Herzegovina’s right to independence, thereby initiating civil war.\textsuperscript{174} Although it is not certain whether Carrington’s withholding recognition would have ameliorated the situation, it does seem clear that Croat and Slovene independence heightened the likelihood of war.

\textbf{Bosnia-Herzegovina:}

The ethnically heterogeneous state of Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, whose differences had typically been mediated by the autocratic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[171] Ibid. Page 200.
\item[173] Ibid. Page 93.
\item[174] Ibid. Page 94.
\end{footnotes}
communist government. The break up of Yugoslavia along with EC recognition of Slovene and Croatian independence “opened the door to war by forcing the question of the self-determination of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its respective nationalities.”

Contention among Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ethnic groups quickly led to conflict, which Western governments failed to prevent.

In an analysis of Western involvement during the emergence of conflict and in the peace process of the Bosnian War, reveals the internal disputes regarding the debated extent of effective negotiation along with the use of force. It seems that this lack of coordination within and among Western powers hindered the resolution of the conflict, drawing on the war longer than necessary.

Authors Burg and Shoup suggest that, “opportunities to avert war in Bosnia were overlooked during the earliest stages of Western involvement.” The initial European response to the Yugoslav crisis revolved around the EC’s proposed principles that territorial status quo should not be altered, the use of armed force in border conflicts was unacceptable, and the approval of self-determination as long as it was democratically based and did not aim to alter borders by violence. When declaring the principle of a territorial status quo not only did the EC fail to take into consideration the legitimacy of the communist administrative unit borders but also that regaining territory and re-defining borders was one of Serbia and Croatia’s main goals.

It seems that the EU neglected to consider all sides of the argument in how to avert increasing conflict. For instance, the EC immediately rejected a plan put forth by the Netherlands advocating the possibility of redrawing territorial borders to acquire a

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175 Ibid. Page 17.
176 Ibid. Page 11.
177 Ibid. Page 80.
settlement before the conflict increased even further. The EC disregarded the Netherlands’ suggestion claiming that the only long-term success would be in a comprehensive solution. However, it is suggested that the only available comprehensive solution would have been to divide up Bosnia, which was essentially what was decided upon in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Similar to the EC’s dismissal of the Netherlands’ proposal, which ended up being the basis of the peace compromise, the suggestion of a rapid reaction force by the EC was immediately “discarded and buried.” Although retrospectively it is easier to identify ineffective strategies, it does seem that in the initial crisis phases, the EC disregarded competent diplomatic proposals that could have altered the nature of the conflict.

Burg and Shoup imply an inherent failure of Western governments to effectively take diplomatic action in the initial conflict, which they suggest, could have prevented war. The EU had come together specifying clear principles of negotiation in the Balkan region; their next step was to ensure that the situation did not collapse into violence. Lord Carrington put forth the prospect of a peace conference to discuss the Bosnian independence referendum. In the 1992 Cutilero negotiations, EC mediator Jose Cutilerio proposed a “state of national regions” which would essentially divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic cantons, which together would rule an independent Bosnian. Cutilerio planned to support all three ethnic groups in a Bosnian government; however this plan only “deepened the gap between the three sides over the future of

178 Ibid. Page 84.
179 Ibid. Page 85.
180 Ibid. Page 108
181 Ibid. Page 108.
Bosnia. Each side rushed to exploit the situation, or to attack the accords.”\textsuperscript{182} Getting all sides to agree on the issue of how the cantonal borders would be drawn proved to be an endless task. With the Muslims disfavor of cantons based on the view that they would essentially be de facto secession, whereas the Serbs and Croats support of the plan simply for that reason, the Cutilero plan failed to reach a consensus.

During this time in 1992, Bosnian Serbs had rejected independence, which resulted in a vote for succession from Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{183} Western internal discord over whether or not to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence was high at this time. The United States pushed to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 arguing, that Serbia was preparing for an attack against Bosnia and that recognition would be beneficial stating that it would discourage civil war.\textsuperscript{184} However, the United States’ proposal did not take into account the hostility that would arise from Western recognition of Bosnian independence. Burg and Shoup suggest, “the progressive disintegration of Bosnia meant that Croatia and Serbia would be forced to intervene at some point, if only against each other.”\textsuperscript{185} It seems that America’s policy of recognizing Bosnian independence stemmed from their lack of analysis of the regional crisis. This is most likely due to a reoccurring American trend of governmental lack of interest and involvement at the onset of a crisis. Opposition in the Pentagon made it difficult for the US to get involved, however the governmental notion that the Balkan crisis did not pose a threat to US national interest was primarily what hindered initial US direct

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\textsuperscript{182} Ibid. Page 109.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. Page 123.
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involvement. Additionally, it has been suggested that the US government was deterred from getting too involved in the Balkans because of a post-Vietnam syndrome. Thus, the US was essentially ineffective in mediating the crisis in the beginning due to several different factors but primarily due to a lack of self-interest.

While the US government should have been more willing to cooperate in the region, their stance is understandable considering the EC declaration that ‘it is the hour of Europe,’ and ‘if anybody can achieve things it is the European Community.’ However, the United States had already started to get superficially involved and was beginning to influence EC policy. The US clearly didn’t have much vested interest in the Balkan conflict and it seems therefore that their policy decisions were not as calculated and coordinated as they could have been. US advocacy of Bosnian independence had clear Serbian repercussions. However, the US did not pressure the Serbians to compromise when they easily could have offered recognition of Yugoslavia thereby influencing Serbian acquiescence to the peaceful reorganization of Bosnia. It seems that if the US were genuinely invested in negotiations, they would have fought to pursue a compromise with Serbia. Researchers have suggested that US policy recognizing Bosnia’s independence was influenced by the US aim to replicate Germany’s successful strategy of recognizing Croatia. However, “US policymakers failed to perceive the basic difference between the wars in Croatia and Bosnia: The former was a straightforward territorial dispute; the latter was a question of the existence or

189 Ibid. Page 124.
190 Ibid. Page 123.
nonexistence of the state itself and, in the eyes of some, the survival of its peoples.” 191 The US essentially chose its policy toward Bosnia carelessly based on previous negotiations between Germany and Croatia. Furthermore, it seems that part of the rationale for early recognition was in the aim to create an independent state so that Serbia could then be blamed for violating sovereignty.

The EC response to Bosnia’s request for recognition set forth a number of conditions by the advice of the Arbitration Badinter Commission in January 1992. 192 The Badinter Commission criteria essentially focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s democratic capabilities. One of the initial conditions for recognition was to hold a referendum to prove popular support for independence. 193 However, this advice was not followed and “just as Germany ignored the Badinter Commission’s advice that Croatia did not meet its conditions for recognition, so the EC ignored a crucial ruling by the Commission on Bosnia Herzegovina.” 194 This ruling suggested that the voted referendum would only be valid if a substantial percentage of all three ethnic populations voted, however the Serbs refused to vote. 195 Thus, the EC recognized Bosnia Herzegovina’s independence despite the fact that the Serbs were not represented in the referendum.

In the initial phases of crisis, Europe was leading the negotiations. This seems to have been good for the furthering of the political goals of the EC however, it has been suggested that a strong US presence in initial negotiations would have brought about more cooperation in the Balkans. “The problem was that the United States, which held

193 Ibid. Page 194.
194 Ibid. Page 280.
195 Ibid. Page 280.
the key to resolution of the Bosnian conflict, was not present at the EC negotiations.**196** Whether or not increased US influence would have led to more effective negotiations is debatable. But a more involved and informed US, by attending the EC negotiations, could have bolstered Western cooperation in the initial period of crisis, thereby possibly avoiding the conflict to come.

US involvement in essence began with their proposal to recognize Bosnian independence. The EC at this point was in the process of negotiations of a peaceful Bosnian settlement among the Bosnian government, Serbs, and Croats. Regardless of whether these negotiations would have been successful, they were rendered ineffective with the US proposal of strategy contradictory to this EC agreement. The EC internal discord regarding a strategy to ameliorate the conflict is apparent on this issue. While much of the EC was in favor of continued negotiations on a Bosnian settlement that would turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into tri-ethnic cantonal state, another portion joined the US proposal of recognition of Bosnian independence. Consequently, the Cutileiro negotiations collapsed once part of the EC joined with the US, jointly recognizing Bosnia in April.197 Negotiations clearly could not be successful with an uncoordinated EC that is saying and doing two different things. Cutileiro’s natural disappointment of the EC’s failure to unify on a position is apparent. He states, “A chance for a peaceful solution had been allowed to slip away” due to the advice from “well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better.”198

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197 Ibid. Page 208.
198 Ibid. Page 125.
Cutilerio’s statement reflects his view that the EC was close to negotiating a successful agreement to mitigate the conflict. The EC had been facilitating negotiations with the three ethnic parties for quite some time and therefore was relatively more acquainted and informed of the Balkan issues. Cutilerio implies that US did not fully understand the effects of recognizing Bosnia and thus undermined EC negotiations. While Cutilero’s distress over the deterioration of the negotiations due to US policy is warranted, the failure also occurred on an intra-European level. EC member states clearly were not unified on a common approach to handling the crisis, therefore many European nations jumped on the US-bandwagon simply because of the lack of a comprehensive EC stance. Accordingly, the breakdown of the Cutilerio negotiations seemed to result from both the internal dissent within the EC along with the external influence of US recognition policy. One factor is clear, if the EC had a thoroughly developed common stance and policy in handling the Bosnian crisis, the US suggested recognition would not have held as much clout and thus the negotiations might have proved more fruitful.

Although US involvement was limited, their impact on Bosnian recognition is evident. Initially all three sides, the Bosnian government, Serbs, and Croats supported the Lisbon Agreement but the Bosnian leader, Izetbegovic pulled out at the last minute. It has been suggested that Izetbegovic’s reconsideration of the plan was the result of US encouragement to hold out for a better deal. Contrary to Cutileiro’s statement that the US ‘thought they knew better’, it seems that both the US and EC had been forewarned of the consequences of their policy. “US and EC diplomats received numerous warnings from both official and unofficial sources in Serbia that recognition of Bosnia-

Herzegovina would result in war.” It seems that US involvement not only hindered the success of the Lisbon Agreement but also divided EC policy, resulting in the highly discouraged policy recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence indicating, “war was inevitable.”

Although this EC/US decision has been highly criticized, it has also been suggested that the diplomatic misstep came earlier. “The mistake of the West was not in recognizing Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992. The mistake came earlier, and consisted of its unqualified support for the holding of a referendum on independence before the three nationalist parties had agreed on a constitutional solution.” Regardless of when EC diplomacy failed to arrange a peaceful solution, it seems that in all cases inconsistency and lack of unification among Western governments led to ineffective policies.

EC and US recognition did indeed accelerate the road to war. Immediately after recognition, in April 1992, Milosevic, the leader to Serbia invaded eastern Bosnian Muslim cities along with the Croats attacking Herzegovina shortly after. One would think that with the onset of fighting in the Balkans the Western community would realize the severity of the situation and strive for a unified approach to end the conflict. With the EC still leading the peace effort their coordination of strategy was essential to obtaining a favorable outcome. However, differences within the EC on the actual foreign policy agenda and even more so on the implementation of its objectives are still evident. For instance, the French argued for European intervention through the Western European

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201 Ibid. Page 124.
202 Ibid. Page 126.
203 Ibid. Page 125.
Union (WEU). The British, however, reflected their pro-American posture and advocated involvement through NATO, which would thus limit EC-level control of the crisis.\textsuperscript{204} The discrepancy in foreign policy within the EC itself made it difficult not only for them to react to the crisis effectively, but also hindered the entire Western response. “International efforts to end the conflict were further hampered by the lack of coordination among international actors, and the ongoing unwillingness or inability of local leaders to fulfill their commitments.”\textsuperscript{205} It is clearly difficult for Western collective coordination to evolve when the principle actor itself is not unified.

This lack of collaboration among Western governments and institutions is also evident in trying to allocate troops to defend the region. At the onset of war Cyrus Vance, appointed the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to deal with the Yugoslav crisis, argued for a strong UN role to handle the conflict. Likewise, Boutros-Ghali turned down an agreement to send UN troops handing responsibility back to the EC to find a solution to the crisis.\textsuperscript{206} But because the EC does not have its own military force, they are essentially required to fall back on the military backing of NATO, the UN, or even the US. Yet, “the use of force was highly circumscribed, out of concern on the part of policymakers not to be drawn into commitments from which they would not be able to disentangle themselves.”\textsuperscript{207} The reluctance of individual Western governments and institutions to bear the costs of war presents a dilemma of what foreign policy tools and institutions to use to ease the conflict. With no western government perceiving a specific incentive for involvement, both the EC and US initially held back waiting for the other to

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid. Page 207.  
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid. Page 202.  
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. Page 204.  
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid. Page 129.
step up and take responsibility; only to waste valuable time in dissipating the conflict.\textsuperscript{208} In addition to the EC and US desire to “free ride”\textsuperscript{209} on someone else’s leadership, the UN and NATO were also waiting for guidance.

Congruent with Western reluctance to become too militarily involved in the Balkans, Burg and Shoup suggest that another Western diplomatic deficit was that their responses were essentially ‘crisis driven’. According to this view, responses to the fighting in Bosnia “were shaped by the need to ‘do something’ rather than by carefully calculated policy objectives.”\textsuperscript{210} This would explain the inconsistency of action and policies by the West. And is also suggestive of the previously discussed lack of US interest, which resulted in ineffective, poorly thought out policies. It seems that if Western institutions had been more proactive and consistent in their policy perhaps they could have been able to prevent or even stop the war soon after it started.

By July 1992 it became clear that the EC led negotiations “ceased to function as a means of achieving a political settlement and an end to the fighting,”\textsuperscript{211} therefore more influential and multilateral strategies were necessary. With the Western powers still unwilling to use force, more intensive negotiations were pursued. In August, the EC and UN came together creating the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) as the means to negotiate between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. Despite this attempt of reconciliation, the London meetings proved ineffective as fighting in Bosnia sharply increased. Furthermore, although these meetings suggested EC/UN cooperation,

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they only deepened the rift between UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and European member states involved.\textsuperscript{212} This rift was evidently over the previously mentioned European call to extend UN troops in the region, which against Boutros-Ghali’s position, were dispatched.\textsuperscript{213}

The ICFY negotiators led by former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance and former British foreign secretary Lord David Owen, attempted to balance the recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the post-Yugoslav states with the individual rights and constitutional guarantees of the minorities.\textsuperscript{214} The Vance-Owen plan involved dividing Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous territories; however disputes between the ethnic groups ensued regarding the logistics of the plan.\textsuperscript{215} The Vance-Owen plan was making seemingly little progress with each group unwilling to cede their objectives. Even before the Serbs rejected the plan in April 1993,\textsuperscript{216} it has been suggested that from the beginning it “never received the support necessary to make it a realistic bases for settlement.”\textsuperscript{217} With the dissolution of the Vance-Owen plan, the EC pursued a strategy of conceding to Serb and Croat demands for partition.\textsuperscript{218}

By this point in the conflict, a discrepancy between Western public concern for the stability of the region and the lack of effective governmental action was apparent. In both Europe and the United States, there was “relatively strong citizen preferences, particularly for multilateral action, with relatively weak governmental policies even about

\textsuperscript{212}Ibid. Page 214.
\textsuperscript{213}Ibid. Page 214.
\textsuperscript{214}Ibid. Page 214.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid. Page 262.
employing allied forces.” In addition, Western public support for intervention continued to grow as Serbian aggression increased, putting pressure on EC and US leaders to take more assertive action. Accordingly, United States officials called for a stronger policy of “lift and strike” through NATO, which consisted of arming and training the Bosnians while utilizing air power to protect them. The US proposal to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government was strongly opposed by many Europeans. The EC “appeared willing to accept the status quo rather than become more deeply involved militarily.” Instead, Europe proposed to establish and defend ‘safe areas’, which Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued would not only facilitate ethnic cleansing, but also increase the number of ground troops needed. With the British and French veto of this US policy, the US reluctantly accepted the establishment of safe areas because even though they were not perceived as a feasible end to the conflict, the plan was consistent with Clinton’s strategy of containment.

The breakdown of the Vance-Owen plan, in part because of the US “lift and strike” proposal, created a large rift between the US and Europe. Lord David Owen criticized the US for “its failure to back his negotiating efforts.” Owen also suggests, “at the heart of the dilemma facing the Europeans and Americans was the disjunction between those attempting to negotiate a settlement- the ICFY- and those with the power

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222 Ibid. Page 253.
223 Ibid. Page 254.
226 Ibid. Page 255.
to implement it— the United States and NATO.”

This illustrates the coordination disparity between the US and EC and also the inherent inability of the EC to single-handedly mediate the crisis. The EC negotiation based approach to stabilizing the region lacked of power to implement the regulations thereby discrediting their authority in the region. On the other hand, the US and NATO power represented the means to enforce agreements, but until this point mainly stood on the side-lines of intervention.

A unifying Western mission seems to be emerging at this point with a more military based involvement by the US, UN, and NATO. The U.N. Security Council took action extending sanctions several times and establishing a ‘no–fly’ area and ‘security zones’ in Bosnia–Herzegovina. Similarly, the US and NATO provided “a kind of sword protecting the shield (UNPROFOR) from Serbian attacks.” However, there still seems to have been an inherent divide between foreign policy objectives, with the EC pursuing negotiation and hoping for US ground forces to help police of the area. Whereas, the US still believed that the war was “not central to our vital interests” and therefore continued to refuse to supply ground troops to Bosnia. Although Europeans provided the majority of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC failed to lead the ambiguous Western effort and thus “did not play a major part” in the stability of the region.

In analyzing the Western military effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina during 1992 and 1993, it is clear that the EC was still unwilling to use force in the region. Although the

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227 Ibid. Page 255.
229 Ibid.
EC supplied the majority of UN troops, they remained insistent upon international ground forces as purely a humanitarian effort. It has been suggested that this “pursuit of diplomacy and of humanitarian intervention became obstacles to military coercion.” This problem is consistent with Lord David Owen’s suggestion that the lack of international will for military involvement reduces one’s diplomatic clout. Thus, with no real Western military threat, the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina ensued.

*EU Diplomatic Failure Leads to US Leadership Role*

The February 1994 Sarajevo marketplace massacre, when Serbian forces opened fire on civilians, marked a turning point leading to the NATO ultimatum to the Serbs to pull out their heavy weapons from Sarajevo. The Serbs complied but also responded to NATO forces by taking 200 peacekeepers as hostages. It “quickly became apparent that Europe had neither the will nor the means to act.” With the threat of the withdrawal of UN troops and “the prospect of a complete collapse of the international effort to end the war,” the US began to see military involvement in the area as inevitable. President Clinton stated that in order to save the UN peacekeeping forces, the US should strengthen NATO forces and therefore finally agreed to send 25,000 troops as part of a NATO mission. Furthermore, Clinton’s advisors encouraged the

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232 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
broadening of air strikes.\textsuperscript{239} This signifies increased involvement and a hardening of the US position, strengthening the Western military initiative.

The United States gradually took on the role of hegemonic actor in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the EC was “criticized for its inability to act ‘in the manner of a conventional superpower’.”\textsuperscript{240} The US began to devise a strategy for peace in the region through utilizing negotiations of political concessions while integrating military force. The United States violated the arms embargo in order to arm the Croats and Muslims, thus changing the face of the war. The US turn toward coercive diplomacy in 1995 was facilitated by the development of a Muslim-Croat alliance aimed to counterbalance Serbian power.\textsuperscript{241} The threat of Bosnian Serb defeat by the Croat-Muslim alliance combined with the American offer to lift sanctions was essentially what convinced Milosevic to finally abstain from violence against the Bosnian Serbs.\textsuperscript{242} A cease-fire plan was finally agreed upon in early October with the last Serb-held territory of eastern Slavonija reintegrated into Croatia.\textsuperscript{243}

With a cease-fire in place, the three parties came together in Dayton, Ohio to begin peace settlements. The Dayton negotiations were a long and arduous process, which in the end, actually created an agreement closely resembling the European and contact group proposals for \textit{de facto} partition in the initial phases of conflict.\textsuperscript{244} The willingness of the US to exert more pressure than ever to get the three parties to agree

was an essential factor for compromise. Concessions were finally agreed upon to “create stability, restore human rights and build enduring peace in the devastated state.”

The Dayton constitution defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state composed of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Bosnian [Muslim-Croat] Federation) and the Republika Srpska (the [Bosnian] Serb Republic). The security of the country was essentially split among four Western organizations. “The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would manage elections, the United Nations would handle aid, and the EU would offer funds for reconstruction, and NATO would send 50,000 troops to keep the peace.” Essentially the US, UK, and France would command a zone in Bosnia under NATO for one year as the Implementation Force (IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR). The public impression after the seemingly successful Dayton Agreements was a realization that “after three years of European ineffectiveness…it took only two months of the American plan to end the war.”

The sense of failure by the European Community at the end of the war was unmistakable. “The EU found itself in the embarrassing position of initially telling the US to keep out of Europe’s ‘back yard’, and then relying on the US to force the sides in the conflict to sit down…to negotiate a peace agreement.” The failure on behalf of the EC was essentially due to internal dichotomy in terms of political and military action. It has been suggested that during this conflict, one major downfall of the CFSP was that it could be used to prohibit the use of force by a member state if this was against a common

248 Ibid. Page 120.
EU policy, but could not be utilized to coordinate EU military strategy and action.\textsuperscript{250} It was therefore extremely difficult for the EC to agree on a common strategy, which made negotiations essentially ineffective. In addition to the lack of a common strategy as the leader of the Western initiative, the EC also lacked the military clout necessary to put pressure on negotiations. "The diverging role of the European Union and United States in the Balkans through mid-1995 showed Europeans the risks of conducting diplomacy without the military power to back it up."\textsuperscript{251} Throughout the crisis the US was perceived as an intrinsic factor to compliance in ending the war because they had military power to back up threats.

Although European foreign policy instruments were ineffective in mediating the Bosnian crisis, they did seem to learn from their failure. "By the time of the second Balkan war in Kosovo in 1999, the EU had altered its role to that of senior partner in the civilian aspects of the military effort."\textsuperscript{252} Additionally, the Bosnian War took place right at the conception of Europe’s role as a political power in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Since then Europe has passed legislation strengthening their foreign policy tools suggesting that now, they might be more equipped to handle international crisis more effectively.

While the EC was leading the Western response to the Balkan crisis, failure to stop the fighting was not necessarily all their fault. There was a general "lack of understanding of the pursuit of national self-determination and its implications for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid. Page 394.  \\
\textsuperscript{251} Ibid. Page 394.  \\
\end{flushleft}
international intervention among the Western institutions. The inherent question of whether Bosnia was an internal civil conflict or an external war, led to differences in political strategies of handling the crisis. The disagreements and inconsistency among western institutions also extended the timetable for feasible solutions to ending the war.

### Main Western Governmental Faults in Mediating the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall lack of Common Foreign Policy hindered leadership capabilities and the use of force.</td>
<td>Lack of interest based on the view that the Balkans did not threaten US national interests limited the success of preventing the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to recognize that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would facilitate war in Bosnia and thus the EU's inability to mitigate the crisis and take effective diplomatic action early on.</td>
<td>US policy advocating the recognition of Bosnia was not strategically planned and based on superficial notions (Germany's policy in Croatia). This consequently undermined the Cutliero negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unqualified support for holding a referendum on independence before the three parties had decided on a constitutional solution</td>
<td>US 'Lift and Strike' proposal led to the downfall of the Vance-Owen plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to communicate a clear and consistent message to the ethnic parties</td>
<td>Would not get militarily involved in Bosnia until late in the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal disagreements on policy along with some member states 'bandwagoning' with US policy (As seen in the Cutliero Negotiations)</td>
<td>Dayton Agreement brought the fighting to a halt but failed to solve the ethnic issues of the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwillingness to get involved militarily and the lack of military clout to enforce negotiation agreements</td>
<td>Put too much pressure on new governments to turn over war criminals to the UN tribunal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 refers to the main faults of Western governmental crisis intervention in Bosnia. Perhaps the only consistent trend of the Western initiative was that, until the end,

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it continued to be ‘crisis driven’. Even during the peace agreements, “rather than having planned in advance the precise sequence of events that led to Dayton, the Americans appear to have reacted to developments as they unfolded.”254 As previously noted, this was driven by a lack of US interest in the region until it was clear that US military involvement was inevitable. Even after involvement, the US effort continued to be ‘crisis driven’ with the US aiming to simply stop the fighting as quickly as possible. The Dayton Agreement “reflects the interest of the US administration in bringing the fighting to a halt, rather than the readiness of the three warring parties to settle their political differences.”255 Therefore, on the surface it produced peace in the region however, by not addressing the parties’ inherent differences, underlying instability remains.

This is clear by the fact that in 1996, a year after the signing of the agreement, “an estimated 100,000 Bosnians have moved, with minorities from each of Bosnian’s three regions fleeing to areas where their ethnic groups are a majority.”256 Furthermore, in the 1996 elections for the rotating three-man presidency, the ethnic factions each voted for their own community representatives by margins reaching 90% based on their own nationalities.257 It is clear that although the Dayton Agreements curbed the conflict between the ethnic groups, Bosnia still remains ethnically divided.

Not only did the Western peace agreement fail to ease ethnic divides, but they also seem to have put too much pressure on the new governments in turning over war criminals to the United Nations war crimes tribunal. In some cases, such as Serbian

255 Ibid. Page 318.
257 Ibid. Page 35.
nationalist Vojislav Seselj, surrender to the UN court was voluntary. However, in most cases the West put extreme pressure on Balkan governments to comply and turn over war criminals to the tribunal. In a case that looks remarkably similar to the US regime change in Iraq, the US poured $70 million to organize an uprising to remove Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic from power. The Western-friendly Zoran Djindjic took over as prime minister, suggesting a promising democratic future for Serbia. However, Djindjic was assassinated in 2003 likely due to, “the intense pressure by Western governments to arrest war crimes suspects, particularly Gen. Ratko Mladic” which “had forced him to confront holdovers from the Milosevic era.” Djindjic’s assassination due to intense US pressures to hand over Milosevic era war criminals marks a major set back for the US relationship and the prospects for Serbia. The US should have recognized the danger they put Djindjic in and perhaps found some middle ground in the pressure put on him to turn in war criminals.

The inability of the EC to take on the necessary leadership role along with the lack of US interest in the region enabled the conflict to go on longer than necessary. Once the Western institutions were able to unite on a common strategy under US leadership, peace did ensue. However, failing to address the underlying ethnic dissent in Bosnia suggests that there are also faults in the Dayton Agreement.

Macedonia:

Crisis in Macedonia evolved just as conflict developed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and individual pursuance of

independence. However, Macedonia represents a unique example of the Balkan crisis in that, serious conflict was averted through increased EC and US involvement.

Following the example of Slovenia and Croatia, Macedonia declared its sovereignty from Yugoslavia in September 1991. As seen in the Bosnian crisis, EC support for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia paved the way for the right to Macedonian independence.261 The newly elected Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov held a referendum in which 71 percent of the electorate supported independence; however, the political parties representing ethnic Albanians and Serbs declared a boycott.262 In January 1992 the Badinter commission justified the recognition of both Slovenia and Macedonia.263 Despite the Badinter commission’s authorization of an independent Macedonia, the EC and US refused to recognize Macedonian independence due to the internal discord among the ethnic entities.264 The increasing conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a large effect on the instability of Macedonia.265 As the threat of conflict was increasing for Macedonia, Gligorov turned to the international community for assistance.

Historically, Macedonians have an insecure sense of national identity. The territory and culture of Macedonia has been claimed by many of its neighbors such as Bulgaria, the Serbs, and even the Greeks claim authority to the name ‘Macedonia’.266 However, many Macedonians have developed on a strong sense of nationalist identity.

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262 Ibid. Page 140.
265 Ibid. Page 284.
through their government, thus threatening the minority groups within the country. The Albanian community in Macedonia makes up 23% of the population. Most live in a concentrated area in western Macedonia along with areas in Kosovo. Macedonian Albanians, fueled by Albanians in Kosovo, mobilized for political action in the democratization movement throughout the 1990s. The Macedonian nationalist government aimed to maintain stability by offering the Albanians some political representation in the hopes that this would deter them from demanding national rights. However, Albanians were “rapidly radicalizing in their demands for group—based political rights to territorial autonomy for Ilirida, as they called their proto-state in the western countries.” As exemplified in the other Balkan crises, the EC and US was initially reluctant to get involved in the Macedonian conflict. However, the west did intervene, proposing special status for Albanians at The Hague Conference in October 1991.

The West seemed to be making the same mistake as it had been in other areas of the Balkans of “talking to warring parties as if this were a civil war rather than a struggle by each for national rights.” As a result of this discrepancy, the west was focusing on the human rights of the Albanians, which was facilitating the link of Albanians in Macedonia with those in Kosovo. This essentially created a dual role for the West, “unqualified support for Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity was coupled

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268 Ibid. Page 342.
269 Ibid. Page 342.
270 Ibid. Page 342.
271 Ibid. Page 343.
272 Ibid. Page 343.
with demands to improve the lot of Albanians.”\textsuperscript{273} The international community was labeling the Albanian paramilitary groups as ‘terrorists’ while supporting the sovereignty of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{274}

The EC was in a unique, but yet again, divided position at this time, as they were arguing for the recognition of Macedonia with Greece urging against it.\textsuperscript{275} The Greek government refused to recognize the sovereignty of Macedonia because they claimed sole legal right to the title ‘Macedonia’; the name of the Northern Greek province bordering Macedonia.\textsuperscript{276} The European reluctance to punish this Greek stance on behalf of Macedonia “bred alienation among average citizens…against the international community.”\textsuperscript{277} Although this feeling of neglect was felt, the international community made up for it by bolstering a proactive policy. In November of 1992, with fighting on its borders, the Macedonian government requested UN assessment of the stability of the area. The following month UN authorized UNPROFOR to “monitor conditions and to report any threatening movements” along the Macedonian border with Serbia and Albania.\textsuperscript{278} Additionally, the signing of the Association and Stabilization Agreement gave Macedonia preferential trade relations with the US and EC.\textsuperscript{279} The west was successful in hampering this potential crisis by condemning the violence on the National Liberation Army (NLA) and “applied enough pressure and incentives to convince

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{274} Ibid. Page 147.
\bibitem{278} Ibid. Page 295.
\end{thebibliography}

The political situation in Macedonia has been teetering on the verge of conflict since the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Although Macedonia has proven to be one of the most stable Balkan countries throughout the 1990s, the spillover effects of violence from the 1999 Kosovo war had dangerous effects. The 2001 crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), instigated by the proliferation of Albanian paramilitaries from Kosovo, was a direct result of NATO’s failure to disarm and disband the Kosovo Liberation Army.\footnote{Ibid. Page 146.} The ethnic divisions and political instability of Macedonia implied that conflict could encapsulate its “porous borders”\footnote{Ibid. Page 146.} at any moment. It seems that in the wake of the failure to prevent conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU revamped its crisis intervention willingness and capability. The EU, along with the US and NATO effectively put pressure on the insurgent’s target, by reforming the Macedonian government, while emphasizing negotiation and applying “enough pressure and incentives to convince Albanian and Macedonian elites that their best interest would be found in a negotiated settlement.”\footnote{Ibid. Page 130.} As Robert Hislope has suggested, the EU crisis prevention in Macedonian differs from that of the other Balkan crises, in that Macedonia was too militarily weak to resist negotiation initiatives.\footnote{Ibid. Page 146.} Therefore, although international intervention was successful in FYROM, exaltation of the EU’s foreign policy capabilities should be taken one step at a time.
Effectiveness of the EU’s Emerging Foreign Policy

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set forth the creation of a political dimension to the European Union. Coinciding with EU foreign policy evolution, the dissolution of communist Yugoslavia provided the EU with essentially their first crisis-handling situation. The EU immediately claimed responsibility for managing the stability of the region however, as one diplomatic crisis led to another, war ensued. With war raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU’s inability to unify to cohesively solve the crisis became apparent. The US government, finally convinced of the importance of stability in the Balkan region, became involved. The United States military involvement through NATO was effective providing the necessary authority and incentives for diplomatic agreements, and eventually the Dayton Agreement established peace in the region. Furthermore, NATO’s involvement fortified the institution’s relevance and viability in the post-Cold War era. “It was going to be a new alliance, based on newly defined conditionality and honed for out-of-area operations…proof that the old institutions need not disintegrate or fade away.”

Cooperation within the transatlantic alliance seemed to be increasing with the end of the Bosnian war (yet mainly under US control) and fully came together in preventing conflict in Macedonia through negotiation. Although the Balkan region has had spurts of instability since this time, major crisis has generally been averted. Ensuring the future stability of the Balkan region, however, will depend on the effectiveness of EU foreign policy.

The failure of EU management of the escalating conflict revealed the inadequacy of the CFSP at that time and thus confirmed the EU’s role in foreign policy as

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subordinate to that of the US and UN.\textsuperscript{286} However, the EU has seemingly learned from their diplomatic mistakes in the Balkans and has now become the principle external actor in the region.\textsuperscript{287} The realization of the inadequacy of the EU in mitigating the Bosnian conflict and subsequent reliance on US involvement has opened Europe’s eyes to its need to alter its civil capabilities with military instruments and has thus only increased the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).\textsuperscript{288} Moreover, in recognition of its lack of military clout in Bosnian negotiations the EU aimed to bolster its influence by developing a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). In 1999, Europe fortified its role in foreign policy and influence in the Balkan region launching its first-ever military operation, taking over NATO forces in Macedonia and also replacing NATO as the lead for the police mission in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{289} 

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid. Page 196.
US/EU Intervention in a Post-9/11 Context: Bush’s imperial hubris squanders international support and American credibility

...the underlying worry on the European side of the Atlantic is that the United States is trying to play God in the volatile Middle East at enormous risk to everyone.²⁹⁰

...Europe sees the United States today more through the prism of Baghdad than Berlin.²⁹¹

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon sparked a transformation of global foreign relations marking a clear change from Cold War and post-communist politics. The US and EU, again faced with a common threat, showed a unified multilateral response to the terrorist attacks. European leaders immediately guaranteed their “unlimited solidarity” with the United States, and within hours NATO implemented the Article V mutual defense clause.²⁹² Bush, who was largely disliked in Europe before 9/11, gained allied support due to a perception of his carefulness and the appropriateness of action against Afghanistan. This resulted in Europeans “strongly supporting military action not only against the Al Qaeda network but also against its Taliban hosts.”²⁹³ Furthermore, Bush even won the unusual French support as illustrated by their statement “we are all Americans.”²⁹⁴ The transatlantic alliance seemed to be synthesizing out of the tragedy of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. However, this unified opposition to terrorism soon began to collapse based on policy differences.

²⁹³ Ibid. Page 1.
It seems that post-9/11 relations in the Middle East have “served as the most significant backdrop against which the EU-US differences were played out.”

Their conflicting policy preferences became apparent throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq engagements and seemingly stems in part from differing perceptions of the threat of terrorism. The United States essentially interpreted 9/11 as an attack on ‘Western Values’, whereas Europeans saw it as an attack on US policies towards the Middle East and much less of a direct threat to the EU. As examined in the second chapter, perceptions create the context for foreign policy decision-making. Therefore, the opposing perspectives on the threat of terrorism influenced both sides of the Atlantic to act through differing prisms of foreign policy. Furthermore, the European notion that the attacks were motivated in opposition to US policy would make them more likely to pursue a differing more ‘soft power’ approach to deterring terrorism in the region.

In essence, although the US and EU both still recognized a common security threat, “the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks have not re-created the same level of unity that the Soviets did.”

The differences in policy throughout the Afghan and Iraq wars clearly illustrate the paradigm differences between the US and EU. The United States’ inability to effectively fight terrorism and promote democracy in Afghanistan, and to an even greater extent, in Iraq, have demonstrated that solely ‘hard power’ tactics alone are not effective in 21st century globalizing politics. It seems that the US is trying to fight terrorism through a Cold War era mentality of ‘hard power’, which has only fueled terrorist

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296 Ibid. Page 60.
mentality and activity in these nations. Although as of now there is no definitive strategy to combat terrorism, it seems that the EU approach to eliminating it at its roots through ‘soft power’ has had greater success than the Bush administration approach, which has thus far only been counterproductive.

An examination of the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks illustrates the Bush administration’s promotion of ‘hard power’ militant tactics through the declaration of War on Terrorism. As the war evolved from fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, to invading Iraq for the sole purpose of regime change, the legitimacy of the war crumbles. This not only stems from the fact that the US-led efforts are unable to effectively combat terrorism and ensure reconstruction and stability for the regional populations, but is also based on Bush’s increasing contempt for multilateralism. Throughout the war effort many EU nations recognized the Bush administration’s unilateralist approach and this notion was fortified with the continued build up of the Iraq war. Additionally, US policies and subsequent failure in Iraq exacerbated what little European support the US did enjoy. Thus further discrediting American ‘hard power’ policies and overall capabilities, while undermining the initial strong EU support for the US and the transatlantic alliance as a whole.

**Bush Administration’s Post-9/11 Emphasis on Militarism**

Although Bush’s first year of presidency assumed little of the unilateral militarist foreign policy that would be revealed in the wake of September 11th, it has been suggested that the Bush administration always had its eye on Iraq. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated in 2000, “the United States must mobilize whatever resources it

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can…to remove him [Saddam Hussein].”

The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks quickly centered US attention on the Middle East and essentially provided a ‘window of opportunity’ for Bush’s more aggressive foreign policy and regime change-agenda in Iraq.

President Bush identified the attacks as “an act of war against our country” thus declaring US engagement in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of foreign policy themes, outlined mainly in the September 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), affirms four key elements of “preventative war, confronting the nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and catastrophic terrorism, ‘regime change’ for ‘rouge states’, and democracy promotion.” The Bush administration aimed to exert US domination on terrorists and their accomplices calling “for yet another expansion of the empire of liberty…it must pre-empt such threats wherever they appear; it will extend democracy everywhere.” This post 9/11 foreign policy represents a shift toward fundamentally aggressive unilaterality based on the United States’ hubris as a superpower.

The hegemonic principles of the Bush Doctrine emerging throughout this time reflect the ideals of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). As discussed in chapter two, this neoconservative think-tank aims to give birth to a Romanesque global American empire by “fighting and decisively winning multiple, simultaneous major

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302 Ibid. Page 60.
theater wars” and occupying those areas to exert US dominance in a post-war context. PNAC members recognized one of their main obstacles was in finding the political support to implement such imperious foreign policy and stated the need for “some catastrophic and catalyzing event- like a new Pearl Harbor.” The terrorist attacks essentially fulfilled this role and served as the basis for the Bush administration’s implementation of a more militaristic foreign policy.

Consistent with Bush’s pursuance of a more bellicose foreign policy was his declaration of the War on Terror. One of the first objectives of this newly declared war was to wipe out the Al Qaeda terrorist network and with that the Taliban government who assisted them. As previously mentioned, much of Europe was in political solidarity with the US, eager to take action against the terrorist threat. The partnership appeared to be strengthening as Bush stated his commitment to multilateral cooperation, stating that the attacks should “erase the concept…that America can somehow go it alone in the fight against terrorism or in anything else for that matter.” Despite his purported insistence on multilateralism, it seems that from the start, Bush’s main objective was to execute his GWOT agenda with as little constraint from international law and allies as possible. Therefore, much of the War on Terrorism was carried out under US command to avoid limitations from other institutions and governments. In essence, Bush was willing to involve other actors as long as they complied with US objectives and any criticisms of the US plan were generally not eased by compromise but by US unilateral action. The

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Bush Administration’s trend toward focusing on the advancement of their own agenda can be increasingly seen throughout the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars leading in part to the perceived arrogance and eventual failure of US policy in the region.

**Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom**

Despite the EU’s statement of ‘unlimited solidarity’ with the US, disagreement between the allies began to sprout with Bush’s declaration and use of the word “war” on September 20, 2001.\(^{309}\) While Europeans supported the prevention of terrorism, many did not agree that taking war-like military action would be successful. Instead, Europeans generally believed that “while US power might defeat specific terrorist groups through offensive military action, terrorism itself would continue until the root social and political causes had been addressed- a long-term project under the best circumstances, and certainly not one that could be accomplished by military means.”\(^{310}\) In spite of initial policy disagreement, most Europeans continued to support the effort and the War on Terror hammered on.

Within a month of the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks the United States was already leading the overthrow of the Taliban regime under the seemingly benevolent title “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Having been negotiating with their European allies since the attacks, the Bush administration originally did incorporate some international assistance in the Afghan campaign; however they soon made it very clear that this would be a US-led operation. Indeed, in the initial phases of the war the biggest obstacle for the European allies was that they wanted to send more troops than the US was willing to take

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\(^{310}\) Ibid. Page 61.
This military commitment seems surprising considering Europe’s typical emphasis on ‘soft power’ and yet Bush, blind to the “legitimacy and burden-sharing” that a coalition of allies and institutions would yield, preferred to operate “on an ad hoc basis” to limit policy constraints. In addition, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s statement that the “mission should define the coalition” angered many Europeans as they realized the implications of this statement, that this was a US operation rather than a collaborative effort to fight terrorism. Rumsfeld’s statement essentially meant that those willing to comply with Bush’s war would be a part of the coalition, as opposed to an alliance of US/EU or NATO or UN institutions determining how to go about the mission. This neglect had a detrimental impact on NATO since US unilateralism discredited NATO’s founding principle and the recent invocation of Article V’s mutual defense. Bush clearly made this an American war despite international support and only accepted minimum assistance so as not to cede any control or consultation outside of the US. “The structure of the coalition in Afghanistan… meant that US operations were invulnerable to allied interference…US military forces, aided primarily by local Afghan allies, pushed ahead according to the original plan.”

The Plan and Implementation of Operation Enduring Freedom

With less than one month of planning and little outside deliberation on the mission at hand, it is not surprising that the US war in Afghanistan seems to have been poorly planned from its inception. Inherent in the title of “Operation Enduring Freedom”
is the objective to institute a democracy by way of dismantling the Taliban regime. The optimism and indeed naiveté, not only of the American public but also the Bush administration, in the assumption that all peoples would welcome democracy with open arms, has proven to be one of the major impediments in the effort to deter terrorism. As Francis Fukuyama points out, “by definition, outsiders can’t ‘impose’ democracy on a country that doesn’t want it; demand for democracy and reform must be domestic. Democracy promotion is therefore a long-term and opportunistic process that has to await the gradual ripening of political and economic conditions to be effective.”

Therefore, the key to success in promoting democracy lies in gradual “policies that open regional economies, reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth, improve educational systems...[and] demonstrate that liberal democracy can be consistent with local cultures.” According to this logic it would seem that the US strategy of exerting military dominance and imposing a democratic government would actually turn out to be counter-effective. The Bush administration’s shortsighted strategy of democratization through military means reflects one of the downfalls of their unilateral approach to fighting terrorism. Perhaps if the US had collaborated more with their European allies they would have adopted more of a EU approach of promoting modernization through economic ‘soft power’, rather than abruptly dismantling the Taliban regime and imposing democracy. While this problem is evident in Operation Enduring Freedom, the failure to effectively implement democracy is apparent to an even larger degree in Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the United States’ goals were to combat terrorism and replace the Taliban regime with democracy, however they had little strategy for doing so. The Bush

administration’s inability to fully comprehend the effects of their aggressive military action on the political situation in Afghanistan proved to limit the effectiveness of combating terrorism. This seems inherent in the fact that US policy in this operation “gallops off in all directions. It does so without a comprehensive assessment of the threats it now faces, and lacking a coherent strategy for combating mega-terrorism.”

Furthermore, Europeans who had been following US military authority recognized this lack of planning after only three weeks and began to question US strategies, tactics, and even Bush’s motives. With the initial undivided support after 9/11 beginning to dwindle, many European nations began to suggest that the Bush administration initiated war too quickly, thus limiting effective planning, and had disregarded essential allied and international support. This lack of planning and an insistence on US leadership in the war seems to stem from the hubris of the administration in the anticipation of not only a quick victory but also the population’s quick acceptance of democratic rule.

The initial US unilateral effort in Afghanistan was successful on the surface; however the US was far from “winning” the campaign. Once the Taliban regime was taken out of power, the US instituted an essentially democratic government, yet significant violence continued. As the situation got worse, Rumsfeld finally altered this unilateralist agenda and persuaded European allies to send troops.

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321 Ibid. Page 2.
The issue of the need for reconstruction of the conquered nation was highly debated at this time, with much of the Bush administration suggesting that it was not their responsibility to rebuild the nation.\textsuperscript{323} The European influence of British General Robert Fry finally convinced the Bush administration of the necessity of reconstruction in stabilizing the country and fighting terrorism in general. Fry stated the need for a “combination of military power, economic power and institutional change…All these things have to act together…The military dimension is extremely important but we have also got to be about creating institutional change in Afghanistan and creating a durable economy as well.”\textsuperscript{324} Fry’s insistence on the development of Afghanistan to stabilize the country and discourage terrorist activity was essentially the first time European ‘soft power’ policies were able to make their way into the US-led planning of the operation. Yet, even though Bush expressed his commitment to reconstruction\textsuperscript{325} no plan was developed and the US continued to focus their efforts on military missions.

Despite initial reluctance to cede any control of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US finally turned to allied involvement to help secure the nation. Although the US was now incorporating a more multilateral coalition in Afghanistan, the organization of the forces ensured that the US still had unilateral control over military aspects of the operation by simply delegating foreign troops to the task of reconstruction. In 2002, the US deployed 8,000 troops with explicit orders to hunt and fight terrorists and not to get involved in reconstruction or peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{326} This guaranteed that the US would still be

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid. Page 5.
in complete control of the military aspects of the Afghan campaign, whereas most of the allied effort would consist of an international peacekeeping force which would not venture beyond Kabul.\textsuperscript{327}

US officials devised a plan to train Afghans to ensure their own security. In this loosely organized plan “US would train a 70,000 member army. Japan would disarm some 100,000 militia fighters. Britain would mount an antinarcotics program. Italy would carry out changes in the judiciary. And Germany would train a 62,000 member police force.”\textsuperscript{328} This seems like an effective way to ensure long-term stability, but due to the diversion of US funding and interests to Iraq, along with a lack of a central command, it has retrospectively been recognized that the US stabilization effort was “state-building on the cheap, it was a duct tape approach… fixing things that were broken, not a strategic approach.”\textsuperscript{329}

Although there were clear flaws in the planning of Operation Enduring Freedom, eventually incorporating multilateral support seemed to represent a step in the right direction. Luckily, international actors were more than willing to help. In December 2001 the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was deployed to “support the Afghan Transnational Authority in expanding its authority in the country and in providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free elections, the spread of the rule of law, and more broadly, the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{330} All European member states except Luxembourg and Ireland contributed forces to the ISAF,

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid. Page 5.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid. Page 5.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid. Page 5.
along with the applicant states of Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{331} It seems the EU truly unified, employing multilateralism by organizing under the UN, to provide postwar reconstruction for the US-led operation. This nineteen-country force initially under British command was eventually taken over by NATO in August of 2003. It is significant to note however, that even though the US did not contribute forces to the ISAF, they still retained operational control over it.\textsuperscript{332}

Although the US was essentially in command of all aspects of Operation Enduring Freedom, their inclusion of NATO, considering their previous neglect of the institution, proved influential on the alliance. As previously alluded to, the initial American disregard for NATO involvement had adverse effects on the transatlantic relationship and NATO itself. It has been suggested that since the end of the Cold War, NATO was in search of a new mission and the 9/11 terrorist attacks had the potential to redefine NATO’s role. However, the failure to make the first campaign of America’s Global War on Terrorism NATO’s campaign proved to be a landmark shift. Instead of restoring the transatlantic link, the operation in Afghanistan threatened to decouple America from Europe.\textsuperscript{333} The Bush administration’s oversight of NATO, especially after the induction of the mutual defense article, set limitations on the future effectiveness of the institutional alliance.

“On October 7, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom. Hindsight demonstrates that it marked the end of NATO as the premier transatlantic security organization not only because of the US decision to go it alone but also because during the 1990s NATO never went beyond Europe as the legitimate area of its operations. Although it subsequently provided a small stabilization force in Afghanistan, it would

\textsuperscript{331} Mowle, Thomas. \textit{Allies at Odds?}. 1\textsuperscript{st} ed. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Page 139.
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid. Page 139.
prove crippling to the alliance’s prospects that in the fall of 2001 NATO lacked a global definition for its operations.”

The US unilateralism in the beginning of the Afghan campaign had clear ramifications for NATO. Moreover, it has been suggested “if the allies began to see NATO as no longer relevant to their needs, the alliance would progressively atrophy.” In fact, US unilateral actions in Afghanistan do seem to validate the perception that “the US is allied to NATO but it is not of NATO”. While the role of NATO seems to be increasing in Afghanistan, it will be significant to keep an eye on its worldwide effectiveness as an indicator of transatlantic relations.

*The Widespread European Support for the US-led Initiative*

The international support available to the US at this point in the Afghan war effort is remarkable considering Bush’s original disregard for multilateralism. Although there were many political disagreements throughout the campaign it has been suggested that in general the post 9/11 European policies in support for war in Afghanistan were essentially the blind support of “American policy” rather than a collaborated plan of an “Afghanistan policy.” This concept is exemplified in the October 2001 Ghent Summit discussion of Afghanistan between the UK, Germany, and France. In this meeting the three powers “reconfirmed their solidarity and full support for the US-led” operation in Afghanistan. Although the US at this point was still reluctant to accept too many international troops, many European countries aimed to do all that they could and thus an

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334 Ibid. Page 108.
338 Ibid. Page 16.
EU-wide arrest warrant was issued, reinforcing and strengthening the instruments to fight against international terrorism.\(^{339}\)

The US disregard for EU-level involvement in the initial phases of Afghanistan was felt deeply within the EU. Shortly after the attacks the US turned to the UK for support inevitably making the UK the mediator between the US and the EU. The fact that the Bush administration called Tony Blair instead of Javier Solana, the EU High Representative of the CFSP, essentially minimized the political cohesion of the CFSP that the EU had been progressing toward and “caused the CFSP to shatter into pieces.”\(^ {340}\)

Once the Taliban was routed the EU as a whole began to play more of a cohesive role in the reconstruction of the nation. Nearly all European member states were involved in the ISAF, which provided the means for the EU to exercise their soft power foreign policy in Afghanistan thus increasing EU solidarity. In addition, the emergence of differences in policy perceptions between the US and EU throughout the campaign and even more so in the invasion of Iraq, also increased unity in Europe.

Imbedded within the differing policy perceptions between the US and EU was their contrary objectives in the Afghan operation. “While the essential purpose of the US in Afghanistan has been to capture the supposed terrorists either alive or preferably dead, the EU…mainly aimed at bringing a sustainable peace to the region, promoting the stability and development, respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, and providing humanitarian aid.”\(^ {341}\)

In accordance with divergent US/EU divergent intentions in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the Bush administration, who initially went in unilaterally exercising ‘hard power’ without constraint, only afterwards called on

\(^{339}\) Ibid Page 16.

\(^{340}\) Ibid. Page 15.

\(^{341}\) Ibid. Page 5.
the EU to come in to help clean up the mess they had made. This essentially gave way to a US/EU split in operations in Afghanistan. “The EU-dominated ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom became two commands chasing different objectives.”

This lack of central command between the two operations along with a lack of planning undermined the effectiveness of the entire Afghan war effort.

The ISAF under NATO command but largely made up of European forces, seems to have been influential in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan. “Reconstructing the internal security system- including the police, justice system, and military” has been identified as “one of the most immediate and important tasks in Afghanistan.”

The US also played a role in the pursuit of this goal of stability but more through fighting and eliminating Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda members. In general the “reconstruction efforts have not curbed several critical security threats to the state.” For example, “terrorist attacks against Afghan civilians and foreign workers have increased considerably since January 2002, the cultivation and production of opium poppy have risen since 2001, despite the governments progress warlords and regional commanders still control substantial territory, and there is still no functioning justice system.”

Furthermore, the Al Qaeda organization has far from been defeated and allegedly simply escaped over the border into Pakistan reorganizing there.

Unless the US is able to ensure the stability of the security threats in Afghanistan the entire mission will essentially be a failure. Operation Enduring Freedom has certainly

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344 Ibid. Page 62.
345 Ibid. Page 62.
not proved to be the ‘quick success’ the Bush administration anticipated. If it does turn out to be a failure, in addition to invading the country and dismantling the governmental structure with no fruitful results, the ensuing instability will only increase terrorist activity posing an even greater direct threat to American security.

*Effects of Afghanistan on Transatlantic Alliance*

The divisions in policy opinion between the US and EU became quite apparent in the Afghan campaign. Washington officials complain that their European allies are unwilling to take on the military risks of fighting the Taliban, influencing the US to take on the issue unilaterally.\(^\text{347}\) Whereas, EU foreign policy considers nation building and peacekeeping as the most important aspect of the campaign against terrorism and therefore view the Bush administration’s emphasis on ‘hard power’, and the subsequent civilian casualties, to have turned the Afghans against the West.\(^\text{348}\) The European assessment of the Bush administration’s disproportionate use of military power seems to accurately outline the main downfall to the US-led Afghan campaign. As the State Department’s counter terrorism chief stated, “winning a war like the one in Afghanistan required American personnel to ‘get in at a local level and respond to people’s needs…these are the fundamentals of counterinsurgency, and somehow we forgot them.’”\(^\text{349}\) This failure of the US in securing local support is a tactic that is emphasized in Europe’s counterterrorism policy, which according to this logic would seem to be more effective in discouraging terrorism. If the Bush administration had given more prominence to European involvement in Afghanistan, rather than basically treating them


\(^\text{349}\) Ibid. Page 11.
as subordinates, perhaps the planning would have been more influenced by European policies. This same disagreement over the extent of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power shows itself again in the Iraq war, yet this time many European nations don’t simply sit back in blind support of Bush’s policy the debate escalates.

**Iraq- Operation Iraqi Freedom**

While still involved in the reconstruction of the aftermath of the Afghan war, in March 2003, the Bush administration continued to advance the Global War on Terror by launching Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bush’s war in Iraq seems to have replicated the mistakes made in Afghanistan yet to an even higher degree. The basic failure of the US-led effort in effectively instituting democracy and ensuring stability in Iraq has discredited the image and influence of the US not only among Iraqi civilians but also among much of the rest of the world. This has thus caused what little international support the US did have for military operations to dwindle and although many European states have stepped up to the task of post-war reconstruction, their view of the US effort and subsequent failure has been based on the premise “we told you so.”

**Bush’s Unilateral Path to War**

It seems that regime change in Iraq has been on the Bush administration’s agenda since he took office, but as Condoleezza Rice suggested, there wasn’t enough support for such an operation at that time.\(^{351}\) The September 11th terrorist attacks proved to be the ‘window of opportunity’ for the Bush administration to implement their PNAC based aggressive foreign policy by declaring the Global War on Terrorism. In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush identified the “axis of evil” and went on to

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describe the threat and hostility that the Iraqi regime poses to Americans. Throughout this
time period the Bush administration engaged in a ‘propaganda campaign’ presenting Iraq
and the Hussein regime as a dangerous threat to the US, purporting their possession and
willingness to use WMD along with falsely tying Hussein to the 9/11 terrorist attackers.352

Once successfully linking Hussein to terrorist activities and WMD, Bush set the
stage for US military involvement in Iraq regardless of international opposition. In June
2002 President Bush proclaimed his new ‘doctrine’ of pre-emptive attack which
“reserves the right to determine what constitutes a threat to American security and to act
even if that threat is not judged imminent.” 353 The implications of Bush’s speech were
clear, not only did this confirm Bush’s right to pre-emptive attack but it also reserved the
right to act unilaterally for the security of the US in which “no nation or alliance should
or could stand in the way.” 354

American government officials were successfully convinced of the threat of Iraq
as a result of Cheney’s statement that there was “no doubt” that Iraq possessed WMD,355
along with the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which essentially presented
uncertain evidence as fact.356 Furthermore, by cleverly putting the opposition on the
defensive, stating “If you think I’m wrong, prove it,”357 Cheney essentially ended the
American WMD debate. With the call for war incontestable within the US, the Bush

2006. Page 49.
356 Ibid. Page 53.
357 Ibid. Page 51.
administration’s next task was to rally allied support for the war campaign. However, US military action was now seen as inevitable\textsuperscript{358} irrespective of the amount of international support or opposition.

The Bush administration aimed to relay a sense urgency of the threat of Iraq to the international community. In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell was selected for his reputation of trustworthiness to convince the United Nations of Iraq’s threat. In now one of his most regretted moments, Powell falsely verified the danger of Iraq based on false evidence which was already discredited for inaccuracy.\textsuperscript{359} The UN as a whole remained doubtful of the Bush administration’s argument since UN weapons inspectors still found no support of the allegations. Furthermore, withstanding the US claims, a UN mandate for war seems to have been unlikely from the beginning. For even if Iraq did possess WMD, it is unlikely that the UN would have supported military involvement based on the logic that war would have only provoked the use of weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{360} Based on this concept and arguing that military action should be a last resort- rather than first option, France and Germany opposed UN authorization of force in Iraq in March 2003.\textsuperscript{361} It soon became clear that regardless of UN opposition the Bush administration would lead the US and its meager coalition into Iraq. Their lack of concern for allegiance to UN law and multilateralism was made quite clear when Bush stated “when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act. And we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so.”\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{358}Ibid. Page 39.
\textsuperscript{359}Ibid. Page 90.
\textsuperscript{362}Ibid. Page 141.
European Reactions to Bush’s Advancing War

Not only did the UN Security Council opposition hasten the Bush administration’s willingness to ‘go it alone’, but it also exposed a rift within Europe in terms of those who supported the war and those against it. The differences within the EU as to when and how, if at all, military force should be used against Iraq polarized the continent’s policy position. Throughout the war in Afghanistan fissures within EU policy objectives were surfacing but became most notably evident in the Iraq war debate, essentially splitting the EU in two. 363 Early on, the governments of Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Britain announced their support for an American-led pre-emptive strike on Iraq.364 These states represented a minority view within the EU, where most member states, mainly led by the French and Germans emphasized working multilaterally through the UN using a “diplomatic approach to the escalating crisis, advocating the resumption of UN weapons inspections in Iraq…[with] military intervention…[as] a measure only of last resort.”365

One implication of this policy split within the EU is that it seems to have been yet another impediment to the development of a common foreign policy. The debate exposed differing national-level foreign policy priorities; such as Britain’s close relationship with the US, therefore hindering the ability of the EU to come together as a whole to take a stance on the invasion of Iraq. The pro- ‘Atlanticist’ faction, led by the UK, was comprised of Denmark, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and most of the applicant

364 Ibid. Page 33.
365 Ibid. Page 33.
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) supported the US war effort.\textsuperscript{366} Whereas France, Germany, Belgium, and Finland, the main opposition to an invasion of Iraq criticized the US/UK fervor of a pre-emptive attack also argued that this invasion could destroy the international fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{367} The growing political unity of the EU, since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was essentially impeded by this debate as it became evident that despite the increasing role of the EU, national governments would still act according to their individual interests.

Aside from discrediting the likelihood of a common European foreign policy, the debate also impacted some of the dynamics within the EU and “created a new divide between ‘old and new Europe.’”\textsuperscript{368} Prior to this debate, the Blair and Schroeder governments had established close ties based on a common view of the future of the EU, however the Iraq war put an abrupt end to the increasing closeness of the German and British positions.\textsuperscript{369} Instead, the debate unified France and Germany who previously disagreed on many critical European issues but were able to “cover up their differences and stand as one against Britain and America over Iraq.”\textsuperscript{370} This Franco-German partnership thus began to dominate the European agenda whereas Blair’s inability to balance and mediate between the EU and US undermined Britain’s leadership role in the EU.\textsuperscript{371}

\textit{US failure to Stabilize Iraq Increases Europe’s Role in Reconstruction}

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid. Page 42.
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid. Page 46.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid. Page 46.
It seems that Bush assumed that the international community would support invading Iraq under the banner of the War on Terrorism just as they supported Afghanistan. However, this was clearly not the case. While the US did have some international support, all of the planning and the vast majority of troops involved were supplied by the United States. While the invasion of Iraq and the major combat effort to take over Baghdad was essentially successful in fulfilling the Bush administration’s goals, the United State’s inability to effectively stabilize the country has made the entire operation essentially a failure.

Despite the multitude of warnings regarding the difficulty of peacekeeping and reconstruction of a post-war Iraq, the Bush administration neglected to address these key questions. As a result, there was no “real plan for postwar Iraq that could be implemented by commanders and soldiers on the ground.” In essence, the lack of post-war stability planning completely undermined the US-led war effort as a whole. The inability of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to provide basic services, such as electricity and clean water shifted Iraqi public opinion against the US in the fall of 2003. As a result, US troops began to be perceived as occupiers, not liberators, thus making their humanitarian effort counterproductive.

The US-led war in Iraq proved to be detrimental to US national security, facilitating the breeding of terrorists based on US aggressive foreign policy. “By the end of 2004, the US intelligence community would conclude that the invasion had turned Iraq into a new breeding ground for a fresh generation of tougher, more professional Islamic

373 Ibid. Page 79.
374 Ibid. Page 111.
375 Ibid. Page 192.
extremist terrorists.” The Bush administration completely failed to address the postwar stabilization of the country, which is where the majority of the planning should have been focused. Instead, by focusing on military power rather than counterinsurgency tactics and humanitarian relief, the United States “fought the war we wanted to fight, not the war that was.” The United States repeated the same mistakes made in Afghanistan in terms of overlooking the importance of postwar stability. By focusing on ‘hard power’ military tactics the Bush administration carried out many of the previously discussed European criticisms after the war in Afghanistan, that military domination will only increase terrorism.

The Bush administration essentially “removed a dangerous tyrant in Iraq, but simultaneously increased the ability of the Al Qaeda network to gain new recruits.” The US failure in Iraq and its future not only has implications on US national security, but also on the entire Middle East region. It influenced a widespread European commitment to nation building, as “all European governments see it in their own interest, as much as in US interest, to ensure the best possible political and economic outcome in Iraq.”

US Failure in Iraq and Its Impact on the EU

Although the Iraq debate initially weakened the solidarity of the EU that had been developing throughout this time, it seems that as US unilateralism increased and the failure of the US-led effort became apparent EU unity essentially refortified. In general

376 Ibid. Page 378.
“the aftermath of 11 September 2001 most clearly shows European states acting on their own to support the United States, ignoring EU procedures in the process. This began to change with the 2003 war in Iraq, when a few European states took a firm stance against American policy.”

With some European states, mainly France and Germany, strongly opposing an invasion of Iraq, “the crisis over Iraq may mark the beginning of the first serious effort by the EU to balance American power rather than merely trying to restrain it.” Thus in the process of balancing American hegemony, the strengthening and emboldening of a European common foreign policy will likely occur.

Through an analysis of Bush’s path to war with Iraq, his unilateralist agenda is clear. Although the US has been accused of ‘going it alone’ in the past, the Bush administrations actions in the Iraq war have hardened European perceptions of American unilateralism and ‘hard power’ motives. Even among the Iraq coalition allies of Britain and Poland, “two-thirds of these countries’ populations agree that US unilateralism is an important threat.” In addition to the ‘coalition of the willing’s’ negative perception of US unilateralism as a threat, European nations that did not support the US-led effort in Iraq felt even more strongly. “Nearly nine in ten French and Germans…perceive the threat of US unilateralism as comparable to the threats represented by North Korea’s or Iran’s developing weapons of mass destruction.” This comparison of US unilateralism as similar to the threat of North Korean and Iranian development of WMD is a staggering concept. The Bush administration’s decimation of the US image and influence through their failure in the Iraq war is incontestable.

381 Ibid. Page 145.
383 Ibid. Page 64.
Despite the Bush administration’s pursuance of an aggressive and unilateralist agenda in Iraq, most of the international support the US received was from European nations. Figure 2 represents a compilation of the main foreign troops in Iraq.  

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<th>Main Foreign Troops in Iraq as of March 20004</th>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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The United States supplied the vast majority of troops for the military endeavors of Operation Iraqi Freedom while most of the international assistance was directed for peacekeeping operations. However, due to deficient postwar stabilization planning, many European peacekeeping troops were faced with a job they did not sign up for. Many international forces contracted for peacekeeping missions began to face violent combat, influencing them to think “they had been brought into the country under false pretenses.” This inadequate treatment of the few nations actually willing to contribute to the controversial US-led effort seems to be yet another mistake of the Bush administration.

News that peacekeeping troops were faced with combat situations likely contributed to an increase of anti-Iraq sentiment in many of the coalition nations’ public opinion. Many of the ‘coalition of the willing’ government’s were faced with an anti-

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Iraq public but a pro-US government. For instance, Spanish Prime Minister Anzar’s commitment of troops to Iraq in August of 2003 was met with massive public protests. The terrorist bombings in Madrid vastly increased Spanish opposition to the war, exacerbating the debate between government and public, thus influencing the election of an anti-Iraq Prime Minister into office. In April of 2004 Zapatero immediately withdrew all troops from Iraq but also vowed to double the number of Spanish soldiers in Afghanistan, where there is a UN mandate thus making it more legitimate. Aside from Spain, withdrawal of other coalition forces increased as the faults of the Iraq war became more and more evident. This concept even affected the United Kingdom, the main US supporter. The rise in anti-Iraq/Americanism in Britain was a key reason behind the Labour Party’s loss of seats in Parliament in May 2005. Furthermore, the British have slowly been decreasing their amount of troops in Iraq, with the British Prime Minister announcing an additional cut to 5,000 troops by the end of 2007. The international reactions to Bush’s war in Iraq are clear, even the nations willing to support the operation are withdrawing and “allies have a new distrust of the US government’s decision-making process.” The Bush administrations inability to suppress the increasing violence and humanitarian instability has discredited the legitimacy of the war. This lead to the question, “What will happen the next time the US government seeks international participation in a military operation.”

Implications of Failure in Iraq

392 Ibid. Page 432.
The general failure of the US initiative and the subsequent increase in terrorist operations in Iraq not only discredits US policy capabilities but at the same time fortifies the EU foreign policy values. European officials, as previously discussed, have been warning the US of the detrimental impacts of a solely ‘hard power’ approach to fighting terrorism. The Afghan operation and certainly Iraq have clearly pointed out that military aggression only deepens and contributes to the terrorist’s mentality, thus suggesting the success of EU anti-terrorism policies. Had the US been successful in post-war reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan and particularly Iraq, perhaps the civilians would have welcomed US influence. The EU response to countering terrorism is to stop it at its roots through economic development. This policy has been incorporated into European involvement in the US-led war efforts. For instance, the Dutch led task force in Afghanistan has “shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the Taliban’s fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in.”\textsuperscript{393} The Dutch also used these less aggressive tactics in Iraq and advanced the argument that their soldiers faced less violence and had better civilian relations than American units.\textsuperscript{394} Furthermore, the Dutch affirm that too much aggression is counterproductive, “civilian deaths and property damage caused by American tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan…have hardened villagers’ attitudes, which helps the insurgents with recruiting, intelligence and protection.”\textsuperscript{395} The Bush administration’s aggressive tactics in the Global War on Terror have seemingly only increased the prevalence of terrorism and deepened those sentiments in the Middle East region.

\textsuperscript{394} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{395} Ibid.
In contrast to the Bush administration, “the EU has something that the US does not: the working relationship…with some of the Middle Eastern powers.” European ‘soft power’ policy seems to have developed a benevolent and trustworthy image. This is not surprising considering that in the aftermath of 9/11 the US has exerted hegemonic policies in the Middle East while the EU has been encouraging ‘cultural cooperation’ in the region aiming to improve cultural consciousness. Furthermore, since 9/11 the EU has steered away from replicating the US mistake of trying to impose democracy, and instead intends to strengthen security cooperation with incumbent regimes through a more “power-protection security.” The EU seems to have developed more influential foreign policy goals in actually counterbalancing the terrorist mentality in the Middle East. The US hegemonic approach has not addressed the underlying causes of terrorism but has only fortified the perception of American aggression. One of the main downfalls to the Bush administration’s approach to fighting terrorism has been their military involvement in the region. “The real key is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow.” This seems to be a reoccurring concept in foreign policy in a globalized world; however the Bush administration’s policy seems to defy this logic. American militaristic policy throughout the war on Terror has not only had adverse implications for the future of Afghanistan and Iraq but it has also significantly damaged the transatlantic relationship.

How Iraq has Altered European Perspectives of the US

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398 Ibid. Page 223.
Researchers have suggested, “the transatlantic relationship only needed the right issue to deteriorate rapidly into serious crisis. And Iraq was precisely the right issue.”

While European support was very high immediately after the September 11th terrorist attacks, differing policy objectives became apparent in Afghanistan and were further exacerbated in the war in Iraq. EU public opinion polls reflect that European perceptions of the global role of the US have significantly decreased throughout the failures of Bush’s War on Terror. As seen in Figure 1, the percentage of positive feedback regarding the US role in the fight against terrorism has progressively decreased whereas the perception of the EU’s role has become more positive.

![View of the Role Regarding the Fight Against Terrorism](chart)

A positive perception of America’s role in combating terrorism was at a high of 54 percent during the Afghan campaign in the autumn of 2002. As the war in Iraq evolved, not only did 82 percent of the European public report anti-Iraq War sentiment, but also the 2002 positive perception of the US shifted in 2003 as the majority of Europeans viewed the US role in combating terrorism in a negative light. This trend continued

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throughout the Iraq war and although there is no data available for 2007, it seems likely that this negative sentiment would have continued. In contrast, the majority of Europeans have increasingly indicated their approval of EU antiterrorism actions throughout the Iraq war. Additionally, in 2006 with the failures of the Iraq war apparent, 77 percent of Europeans suggested that the US has a negative role in the promotion of world peace. As the Iraq war has developed and US ineffectiveness has become apparent, public opinion has not only deteriorated among Iraqi civilians but also among our European allies. Consequently, it is clear that the European ‘unlimited solidarity’ proclaimed after the 9/11 attacks has diminished.

In the future the US should utilize the transatlantic partnership and adopt a more multilateral, ‘soft power’ approach to foreign policy which would likely be more successful than the Bush administrations post 9/11 policies. With much of the “damage” to the alliance already done, it seems that the stability of the relationship lies in the new 2008 US president learning from the mistakes of the Bush administration to conceivably ensure some change.

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Conclusion

...in retrospect, the final Clinton years were the calm before the storm, and clouds were gathering on the Atlantic horizon. It was under George W. Bush that the storm would strike.\(^{404}\)

The canvas on which the transatlantic alliance has evolved clearly illustrates many transformations and unfolding trends in the partnership. American and Western European rapport has picked up the pieces of World War II progressing in opposition to communism, and now embark upon a globalizing world order in which both governments yet again face a common threat—terrorism. The alliance has taken on new dynamics as the world order has shifted. Since the 1958 inception of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European continent has solidified into a 27-member economic and political entity. The relatively recent advancement of a common foreign policy (CFSP) will open new horizons for the EU to exert their influence and ideals on the world. As the EU’s diplomatic role comes to fruition, there is no doubt that the transatlantic relationship will be impacted.

An analysis of the history of US/European relations, their respective foreign policy agendas, and their policy effectiveness in cases of intervention in a pre and post-9/11 context clearly suggest that the strong link between the EU and US is diminishing and has only been exacerbated by the Bush administration’s hegemonic policies. Along these lines, it seems that America’s post-9/11 agenda has proven ineffective in addressing geopolitical issues, such as terrorism, while the EU influence has strengthened

their role as a global actor. The United States, therefore, has a lot to learn from European precedent and foreign policy.

**The European Counter-US Foreign Policy**

The motivating factors behind the European eagerness to play a role in international affairs seem to derive from an aim to counterbalance American supremacy. As the history of the unity of EU foreign policy has illustrated, many citizens were initially against a European role in foreign affairs. However, as the faults of the EU’s nascent foreign policy became apparent in the Bosnian crisis, increased support for political integration ensued. The Bosnian war illuminated the EU’s reliance on US military aid and thus increased public support for a more independent role from the US as seen through the development of the RRF. This trend has become even more apparent as anti-American sentiment has increased in Europe throughout the Iraq war. The failures of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies have shifted European perception of US legitimacy and effectiveness from the successful US mitigation in the Balkans to its failure in the Middle East. It therefore comes as no surprise that in 2007, 80 percent of Europeans argued that EU foreign policy should be independent of American policy.\(^{405}\) It therefore seems valid that “America as a negative entity has developed into a potent and legitimate mobilizing factor in European politics.”\(^{406}\)

Since support for an international European role has seemingly mobilized as anti-American sentiment has increased, it seems that the resulting EU common foreign policy would also oppose American agenda. The emerging EU opposition to American policies

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as the War on Terror progressed is apparent even among ‘the coalition of the willing’ members who, like the Dutch, began to employ independent and in fact opposing, non-violent tactics. Likewise, it has been suggested that an EU foreign policy would not only oppose US strategies but it would be based on the desire to “challenge US supremacy in all walks of government life.”

This anti-Americanism and its consequences on European policy, signifies a clear gap in the transatlantic alliance which would seemingly only deepen as the CFSP develops.

In contrast, some researchers suggest that it is unlikely that the EU would adopt a foreign policy position against that of the US because many EU member states see their interests more protected by the US than by the Franco-German stance. This concept does seem to hold true for states such as Britain in terms of their special relationship with the US. However, as outlined in Chapter 4, the Bush administration’s unilateralist and ultimately inadequate strategies in Iraq have significantly decreased EU citizens’ perception of the role of the US. Interestingly, this notion also fostered among the British public, which influenced the British government to go against US policy by continually decreasing the number of troops deployed in Iraq. It therefore seems that although some European nations have regarded their interests to be better protected by the US, the inherent failure of US ‘hard power’ global policies in the War on Terror has undermined the efficacy of such tactics, thus making EU members more likely to subscribe to EU ‘soft power’ politics.

American Role in the Transatlantic Alliance

From deterring communism in a bipolar world order to promoting peace in the post-communist Balkan region, the United States has consistently played the role of superpower not only in the world, but also in the European alliance. Whereas the Europeans were grateful for US involvement in the Bosnian conflict in the 1990s, the post-9/11 Middle East interventions conveys the Bush administration essentially overstepping its boundaries as a superpower in the region while treating its European allies as subordinates. Bush’s notion that “the globe’s sole remaining superpower will do the war fighting of men and leave lesser cleanup tasks to the boys,” suggests the administration’s disregard for EU capabilities. However, as instability in Afghanistan and Iraq unfolded, American ‘war fighting’ capabilities became less and less relevant and the US began to recognize the importance of peacekeeping and postwar reconstruction in the overall effort.

The recognized effectiveness of EU ‘soft power’ and multilateral foreign policy values in influencing change in a post-9/11 globalized context has fortified the failure of US hegemonic power and has actually made the Bush administration attempt to take a more neutral approach. However, “even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism, others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules.” The Bush administration’s post-9/11 imperialist agenda has essentially unified Europe, along with much of the rest of the world, against American “bullying.” This has greatly diminished American power and reputation in this suggested ‘alternate world order’, in which Europe’s influence is only growing while America’s standing is in

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411 Ibid. Page 1.
steady decline. Parag Khanna additionally states that in the future, poor regions of the world will aspire for the ‘European dream’ not the ‘American dream’.  

The Bush administration’s hubris and post-9/11 militaristic agenda has facilitated the devolution of the transatlantic trust and bond. The United States is now faced with the task of saving their tarnished international reputation. Although this would never occur under the current administration, the US should step down from their hegemonic- high horse and realize that maximizing national interest in a globalizing world system comes from multilateral cooperation and the utilization of ‘soft power’ foreign policy tools.

Accordingly, the 2008 presidential administration faced with the task of cleaning up the mess left behind by the Bush administration must make a lot of changes. In terms of strengthening the transatlantic alliance, I believe that the mere election of a new president will provide a stepping-stone in mending the alliance. Europeans seem optimistic for policy change with the US public’s strong support of democratic candidates Obama and Clinton, for not only do these candidates converge more with European ideologies, but to many Europeans- the election of the first African-American man, or the first woman president- signals the American public’s desire for change to an even higher degree. However, if John McCain is elected into office in 2008, although it would still represent a shift from the Bush administration, the fact that the majority of the public continued to stand by the Republican Party would not encourage the same amount European reinforcement of the compatibility of the alliance as a democrat would. The fact that nearly three-quarters of French and German citizens registering a negative view

412 Ibid. Page 3.
of the US stated that it was mainly an anti-Bush view suggests that prospects for the alliance after Bush look promising. 414

The new 2008 administration should also attempt to minimize the notions of US hubris and Bush’s disparate treatment of the European allies. Rather than simply asserting US initiatives, as seen in the buildup of the Iraq war, Americans should pursue equal dialogue with their European partners. A more balanced and equalized foundation of the EU/US relationship would facilitate more cooperation and thus strengthen the alliance.

One of the principles of the transatlantic alliance is the shared identity between Europeans and Americans. The extent to which the EU and US continue to hold similar identities has been increasingly debated in the wake of the Iraq war disagreements. It has been affirmed that “today the United States and Europe have a difference in interests but there is no separation of culture; indeed the two sides of the Atlantic cultures are blended, not opposed.”415 The cultural similarities between Americans and Europeans have traditionally brought them into closer partnership. Furthermore, it seems that the counter productivity and basic failure of the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies to fight terrorism have discouraged future reliance on solely ‘hard power’ tactics; thus indicating a shift toward more ‘soft power’ tactics. Although it is simply wishful thinking to assume that the majority of Americans would be willing to abandon US military hegemony for multilateral negotiations, it does seem that an increasing consistency of interests between the EU and US are developing out of the failure of ‘hard power’ in the Middle East.

In analyzing the European Union’s advancement toward a Common Foreign Security Policy the obstacles to this unity are evident. However, it seems that the European realization of Bush’s unilateral and imperialistic policy, combined with the inability of the US to stabilize the region, has decreased the view of the US international role. This, along with the relative effectiveness of EU tactics in the region, has increased public support for EU foreign policy thus progressing toward common European ‘soft power’ policies and multilateralism.

Post-9/11 analysis of intervention clearly represents the United States’ strong military capacity but lack of legitimizing ‘soft power’ authority. On the other hand, post-9/11 EU objectives have suggested Europe’s military weakness but have the legitimizing power of morality and international law. Assuming the strengthening of relations, as previously outlined in the suggested policies for the 2008 US presidential administration. In the future, with the EU and US possessing the tactical strength of that which the other lacks, a coordination of resources would presumably optimize their effectiveness as global actors and begin the refortification of the transatlantic alliance.

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