From Victims to Victimizers: The Evolution of Modern Algerian Politics

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From Victims to Victimizers:
The Evolution of Modern Algerian Politics

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the evolution of modern Algerian politics and the transition of the Algerian government from a colonized nation to a free state. In the second half of the 20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from both internal and external enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War are frequently viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after researching the two, one can draw a large number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the actions of the French in the War for Independence were strikingly similar to those of the Algerian administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can be claimed that the actions of the FLN in the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of the 1990s. Finally, it could also be hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of the “Phony War” in 1955, the course of Algerian politics would have been altered significantly towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the conflicts that remained similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and propaganda transcended the thirty years between the conflicts. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than through a violent revolution like that of the FLN. The victims of the War for Independence now became the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy for their cause. After nearly fifty years of political liberation, the Algerians have created a
cyclical pattern where violence and political success have become mutually exclusive and change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives
In the second half of the 20th century Algeria was plagued with war and violence from both internal and external enemies. The Algerian War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War are frequently viewed as two separate conflicts with little or no ties yet after researching the two, one can draw a number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the actions of the insurgency organizations and the governments are strikingly similar. In less than fifty years the FLN evolved from victims of one war to the victimizers of another. In researching the two conflicts in-depth, one can also create a hypothetical theory that had the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of fighting in 1955, the course of Algerian politics would have been altered, resulting in a more peaceful outcome. It is through close analysis of the colonial history of Algeria, the subsequent War for Independence, and the Algerian Civil War that these two arguments can be fully supported and understood.

The first section of the following work focuses on the details of the colonization of Algeria by France. After a three-year blockade of Algerian ports, the French King decided to invade the country in 1830, in an attempt to validate his power. Both Western and Eastern urban centers were colonized, pillaged, and depopulated and the French troops committed countless atrocities. Although Algerians resisted, the government was decentralized and the French quickly overtook the nation, implementing mass social, political, and economic changes. As France continued to transform the nation, an increasing number of French citizens began to establish roots in Algeria. The colons, or pied-noirs, grew increasingly powerful as the years passed and became an important
player in French power politics. The colons not only influenced political institutions but they also introduced new political ideology to the citizens of Algeria.

The second section of the thesis is an in-depth study on the Algerian War for Independence which lasted from 1954 until 1962. There were many political parties which were pro-independence through peaceful means, yet divisions began to occur as the younger generations became impatient for results; consequently the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force to obtain Algerian self-determination. This radical movement of the FLN was a result of both Islamic and French influences. The first sign of conflict was on November 1, 1954 when there were over thirty simultaneous attacks on military or police targets by the military branch of the guerilla organization.

The FLN tactics during this war were unlike anything that the French had previously encountered. The liberation organization used scare tactics to coerce Algerian civilians to support it and relied on guerrilla warfare and terrorist techniques to alienate the French government from the Algerian people. These methods increased in frequency as the war evolved from a “Phony War” to a full conflict with the massacre at Philippeville in August 1955. It was not solely the FLN who took violent means to obtain its goal; the French adopted a policy of immediate, collective, and extremely violent responses. As the conflict between the rogue party and the European government escalated, France granted the military unbridled power to defeat the FLN. The military implemented torture techniques which varied from the use of electrodes to severe beatings and members of the FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide”.

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Finally, after the disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France in 1958 and the establishment of a new government, headed by Charles de Gaulle, it appeared that there was progress towards a mutual agreement, with the new President acknowledging that the self-determination of Algeria was the only possible solution to end the war. After four more years, which included an attempted French military coup and the continuation of violence by both sides, the Evian Accords were signed on March 19, 1962 and the Algerians officially received their independence four months later. Not only did Algeria lose between 350,000 and 1.5 million citizens in the conflict, but the war justified the use of violence as a means of obtaining political success. This theory would later be used to validate the actions of both the FLN and the FIS, as the organizations battled for control over Algeria’s political landscape.

The third section of the thesis is a detailed case study of the Algerian Civil War, which began in 1992, under President Chadli Bendjedid. The FLN had been in power since the end of the War for Independence and used its actions against the French, with the support of the military, to validate its leadership position. During the late 1970s and 1980s, Algeria was undergoing a severe economic crisis and in an attempt to appease the citizens, Bendjedid overthrew the single party system and created a new Constitution, which created a more plural, democratic government. In response to both the economic crisis and the new opportunity to become involved in politics, a coalition of Islamic groups was created under the name of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). After winning the first round of Parliamentary election at the end of 1991, the FIS was viewed as a serious threat by many members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials.
At the risk of losing power with the continuation of the elections, the military leaders informed Bendjedid that he was to cancel the elections and resign as President.

What resulted was a deeply divided and fragmented government and nation over the start of a civil war between the Algerian military and the guerrilla fighters of the FIS. Some armed branches of the FIS, especially the GIA and MIA, believed in jihad and it adopted a policy of terror attacks against civilians and government institutions alike. The members would bomb heavily populated places and commit massacres on villages. In response, the Algerian military implemented a policy of violent, collective punishments. As the years passed, the violence continued to escalate, with atrocities being committed by both sides. The Algerian Civil War never had a decisive ending yet the combination of the fair and free election of President Bouteflika and his later efforts of reconciliation with leaders of the FIS party, led to the weakening of the FIS and the GIA by 2000. In the end, the political system of Algeria is certainly more pluralistic and democratic than it was in the late 1980s, yet the nation lost an estimated 150,000 civilians in the process.

In conclusion, after comparing the conflicts of the War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War, the thesis draws upon two main suppositions. The first is that, despite the differences that exist, the FLN of the 1950s and the FIS of the 1990s, as well as the Algerian and the French administrations, share a number of parallels. It can be claimed that the FLN adopts the role of the French in the 1990s and makes the evolution from the victim to the victimizer. The second conclusion is that had France not adopted a policy of war in the 1950s, Algeria would have been left with a more moderate political population and the FLN would have been stripped of its political legitimacy; the Algerian Civil War could have been avoided.
The first relationship analyzed is the link between the FLN and the FIS insurgent organizations. There are many examples which could be used to support the claim that the FIS of the 1990s took many of their policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of the 1950s. Both relied heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the support of Algerian citizens. The FLN hoped that the French would react to these activities with unequal, greater responses, which they did; this was the same goal of the FIS in the 1990s and once again the policy worked.

The second relationship examined is the parallel between both the French and Algerian administrations. Both the French government and the FLN offered empty promises of reform in the hopes of placating the population prior to each crisis and when the threat to its power continued to thrive, both governments turned to policies of collective reprisals and torture as a means of stifling the opposition. Another shared reaction of both governments was the role that each gave to the military as the conflict unfolded. Each provided its armed forces with unbridled power and as a result each undercut any possibility for a political negotiation with its opponent.

Finally, it can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955, prior to the Philippeville Massacre, it may have resulted in a more peaceful outcome for Algerian politics. The voice of the moderate political party would not have been stifled by the FLN and it would have provided a balance to the more radical policy of the organization. The FLN would also not have obtained its claim of legitimacy; the sentiment garnered from the war carried the party for over thirty years. In the end, this body of work tries to prove that when finally given the chance to be a free nation, the Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its European predecessor while the FIS knew of no
other way to express its discontent than through a violent revolution like the FLN. Since Algeria has never been able to create its own history, the colonization by the French resulted in irreparable damages that lasted far longer than the War for Independence.
Chapter 1: The History Behind the Franco-Algerian Relationship

Since its inception, Algeria was a nucleus uniting Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The land was formally settled by the Berbers in 4000 B.C.E. and since then its geographic location and wealth of resources has resulted in six invasions prior to its colonization by France. The Phoenician-Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Turks all conquered the Berbers and each instance introduced a different aspect to the Algerian culture although the argument can be made that it was the Arabs and Turks whose impact has had the most longevity.

It was the Arab leader who first tried to overtake the country in 682, Oqba Ibn Nafi, who converted the Berber leaders to Islam. These Berber leaders brought the lessons of the Koran back to their tribes and “Islam managed to bring about a melding in the population between the autochthonous Berber culture and the new Koranic ethic” (Stora 2001, 3). Islam overcame the pagan belief system that was so prevalent in the early stages of the nation and created equality amongst all believers. The faith of Islam gave the Berbers the cohesion that they had previously lacked, one that became increasingly important in the struggle to regain their independence. The Arabs did not only change the Berbers’ religion, but also impacted their national identity. Today, almost all Algerians are Berber in origin, yet only a minority define themselves as Berber, separating themselves from the Arab culture and identity which has been adopted by the majority of the population (CIA “World Factbook, Algeria”, 2008). The introduction of Islam is an example of the impact that an invader can have on a country, yet no invasion has had more influence on modern-day Algerian politics and society than that of the French.
During the period of Turkish rule, which lasted for over three hundred years, the Algerians were able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy. They were able to preserve their rural tribes and the nation was divided into four different provinces, Algiers, Titri, Oran, and Constantine, which varied in size and resources. Each province was further divided into districts and “despite the excessive decentralization of power, which resulted partly from the segmentary social organization, this pre-colonial state, with a bureaucratic and military apparatus, managed to govern the population and hence hold the entire society together for more than three centuries” (Bennoune 1988, 17).

Despite some linguistic differences, the people of Algeria had a relatively communal culture, sharing a history of tribal communities and a common ideology.

Prior to the French invasion in 1830, Algeria had undergone a complicated evolution in political institutions; but in 1671 the leadership position of the dey was created. The dey was selected by the divan, a committee of sixty notables, who restricted the dey’s power. Serving as a “constitutional autocrat”, the dey only had direct control over the Algiers region but was able to appoint beys, who governed the other three provinces (Metz 1993, 20). This political system created a decentralized government and the beys were primarily left to their own devices. Although the structure led by the dey controlled the country for over a hundred and fifty years, it was its weakness that inevitably contributed to the takeover by the French.

The pre-1830s economy of Algeria was already distinctly divided between rural and urban areas. Algeria’s rural production was based on four primary activities: agriculture, animal husbandry, horticulture, and the planting of fruit trees. The geographical conditions of Algeria “fostered a broad specialization of production along
ecological lines”, further promoting the decentralization of the Algerian government (Bennoune 1988, 23). There existed a social hierarchy within the pre-colonial rural areas of Algeria; the population was divided into the big landowners, the peasant cultivators, and the impoverished or landless producers (Bennoune 1988, 23). Throughout most of the Turks’ rule, the urban areas of Algeria were prosperous, with “ruling elements, merchants, artisans, and apprentices” (Bennoune 1988, 27). Although the rural economic sector of Algeria was relatively protected from European influence, the urban areas of the nation experienced an increasingly commercial aggressiveness from the European capitalist nations beginning in the 18th century (Bennoune 1988, 27). This undermined the economic activities that had previously been the source of funding for urban areas and as a result “certain coastal cities and towns lost about half of their inhabitants” and the cities underwent decay (Bennoune 1988, 27). Despite being seemingly backwards compared to European economic institutions, the pre-colonial economy of Algeria was relatively prosperous in both urban and rural sectors.

**The History of the Franco-Algerian Relationship prior to 1830**

France’s interest in expanding its influence in Northern Africa was based on the two nations’ pre-colonial commercial relationship. The trading relationship between the Maghreb and France began in the Middle Ages, with its importance being fully realized in the thirteenth century (Bennoune 1988, 29). For over five hundred years the trading relationship seemed relatively equal and balanced, yet it was at the end of the eighteenth century that French merchants began to overtake the North African markets. They had founded a number of factories and trading establishments in Algeria and exploited its natural resources, using everything from wheat and wool to coral to increase the wealth
of the European nation. France, through a pre-established trading company, Compagnie d’Afrique, began to buy the monopoly on Algeria commerce. The “monopoly over coral fishing in the eastern coast and the export of wool, animal skins, wax, and wheat through the port of Bone was granted to France for the amount of 30,000 dollars per year… The bey of Oran also received 30,000 dollars from a firm for the right of export monopoly” (Bennoune 1988, 30). The extremity of the “unequal exchange between the two different economic systems” prompted the French Consul, Deval, to consider the possibility of France obtaining control over La Calle, the country’s economic stronghold in Algeria (Bennoune 1988, 31). The domination of La Calle was simply the beginning of France’s elaborate devices to impose its power on Algeria.

The eventual collision of France and Algeria can be found in the longstanding economic and political relationship between the two nations. A large number of debts had been acquired by French merchants who purchased wheat for the French state during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. The leaders of France had never intended to repay Algeria for these loans and the dey became extremely agitated (Stora 2001, 3). The French viewed this refusal to repay the debts as a means of punishment for the Algerian Regency, which had supported the Revolutionary cause in 1796. This unfair response was compounded by the events of a meeting that took place on April 27, 1827 between the Algerian dey and the French consul, Deval. The two met to discuss the contentious issue of La Calle and the possibility of France’s occupation. Naturally, the dey was adamantly opposed to such measures and Deval claimed that the dey struck him on the nose with his fan in what is known as “The Fan Affair”. Taking offense at such treatment, France broke
all diplomatic relationships with Algeria and implemented a blockade of the entire sea coast.

The conquest of Algeria by the French was motivated by both long-term and short-term goals, some national in nature and others more individually motivated. While it is true that “by consolidating the influence of France in the western Mediterranean basin, the government would open their markets and create outlets for trade and nascent industry”, the short-term goals resulted in the more immediate push for this military conquest (Stora 2001, 4). By focusing national attention on a struggle abroad, Charles X expected to promote patriotic sentiment and increase his popularity in the hopes of reestablishing an absolute monarchy. There also existed the fear “that Britain, which was pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, would move to fill the vacuum left by a French pullout” (Metz 1994, 24). The Algerian government was decentralized and the dey was politically, militarily, and economically weak since there was still a certain amount of dependence on the Ottoman Empire. Algeria appeared to be a weak target that would present the French with an easy victory and by acting upon this weakness, the French were able to prevent the British from increasing its colonial power. These factors combined led to a military conquest that took several unexpected turns over the years.

The Invasion and Colonization of Algerian Urban Centers

After three years of an unsuccessful blockade, Charles X initiated a military expedition against Algiers with the hope of saving his monarchical rule. On June 12, 1830, thirty-four thousand French soldiers landed 27 kilometers west of Algiers, beginning what was to be a long conflict between the two nations. The dey responded
with seven thousand janissaries, nineteen thousand soldiers from Constantine and Oran
and seventeen thousand Kabyles (Metz 1994, 23). Although Algeria sent more troops into
the conflict, France had superior artillery and was able to organize more effectively; as a
result Algiers was conquered after three weeks. As the dey fled to exile, the French began
their “civilizing mission” with raping the women of the city, looting, desecrating
mosques, and destroying cemeteries (Metz 1994, 23). Within one year of the initial
occupation, Algiers had lost thirty thousand inhabitants, who were either killed or forced
into exile (Bennoune 1988, 37). Both Western and Eastern urban centers were colonized,
pillaged, and depopulated in the same manner. Examples can be found in the city of
Constantine, which lost ten thousand inhabitants, or Masacra, a city whose initial
population was ten thousand, of which nine thousand were killed (Bennoune 1988, 38).
The occupation of the urban areas of Algeria is the first of the four stages of French
colonization, which lasted from 1830 until 1839. The urban areas resisted but since there
were no centralized forces, they fell quickly and were shown little mercy by the colonial
powers.

**The Expansion and Opposition of French Influence in Rural Areas**

The second stage of the French occupation was the colonial army’s attempt to
extend its sovereignty across rural Algeria. Roughly lasting from 1840 until 1847, the
French encountered many difficulties and conflicts during the implementation of its
plans. The most successful opposition that immediately followed the defeat of Algiers in
1830 was found in the region of Constantine and was led by the bey, Ahmad ibn
Muhammad. He initiated radical policy reforms and created a uniformity and solidarity
within his realm of leadership in an attempt to increase the strength of locality to defend
against the French. He replaced Turkish leaders with local leaders, made Arabic the official language, and attempted to reform finances according to the precepts of Islam. The French had to retreat from Constantine in 1836 but it was captured the following year with a renewed effort.

Until 1840, the French adopted a policy of limited occupation, during which the French would occupy the main cities in the country but would exercise their dominion over the rest of nation through native rulers. This policy,

took concrete shape in 1834 when the position of governor-general for Algeria was created… yet the policy of limited occupation failed because it was incompatible with two dynamic elements in the Algerian situation: the military resistance of Algerian Muslims to French rule, and the uncontrollable ambitions aroused in a technically advanced community exercising power over a less advanced society (Abun-Nasr 1987, 253).

Although Ahmad bey did implement policies that had a foundation in Islamic beliefs and led efforts to counter those of the French, he was not the main leader of the Islamic holy revolution against the colonizers.

The French did not only experience challengers in the East with Ahmad bey; they also faced an Islamic-based revolt in the West. In 1832, in the city of Oran, the “superior of a religious brotherhood, Muhyi ad Din… launched attacks against the French and their allies” (Metz 1994, 25). Seeing as he was becoming weak with age, that same year the tribal elders elected ad Din’s young son, Abd al Qadir, to lead the jihad. “A devout and austere marabout, he was also a cunning political leader and a resourceful warrior” who quickly gained support throughout Africa (Metz 1994, 25). He began to implement his plan of building a Muslim state with the interior communities of the nation and by 1839, Abd al Qadir controlled more than two-thirds of the country (Metz 1994, 25). He was able to collect taxes, maintain armed forces, and stimulate economic activity for the land
under his control. The French in Algeria were concerned about this growing Muslim state and the possibility of it restricting European expansion; adding to their concerns were the numerous battles between Abd al Qadir’s forces and French troops. The colonizers’ unease continued to grow and, two years after signing a peace treaty recognizing Abd al Qadir’s regime, the French provoked the Muslim government by occupying Constantine. Although Abd al Qadir initially fought off the French troops, the European nation’s resources and manpower began to weaken his efforts; by 1840 one-third of France’s soldiers were stationed in Algeria. By 1843 the Muslim state fell and Abd al Qadir surrendered on December 23, 1847. He represents one of the individuals behind the Algerian opposition and is thought of by the Algerians as the first hero of Algerian independence.

Colonization and Military Control, 1847-1871

From the time of the surrender of Abd al Qadir in 1847 until 1871, the actions of the French colonial army focused solely on severing all of Algeria’s former economic and political ties. By 1848 nearly all of Northern Algeria was under French control and the country was forced to uproot and transform its administration. It was during this time that the drastic inequality between the French and the Algerians started to be put into practice. Louis-Philippe’s reign over France’s constitutional monarchy was overthrown this same year and “the new government of the Second Republic ended Algeria’s status as a colony and declared the occupied lands an integral part of France” (Metz 1994, 29). Three of the four main regions, Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, were organized as French départements and were brought under a common civilian government. French citizens were able to vote for their representatives on councils as well as their mayors, whereas
the “Muslims had to be appointed, could not hold more than one-third of council seats, and could not serve as mayors or assistant mayors” (Metz 1994, 29). Those who lived outside of the zones settled by the colons, or French, were able to function under a régime du sabre, where local Muslim administrations were able to have control of government affairs, but were forced to report to the French military commanders.

With another change in French leadership came another set of changes towards the Algerian colony. Napoleon III took power in 1852 and was “profoundly impressed with the nobility and virtue of the tribal chieftains and shocked by the self-serving attitude of the colon leaders” (Metz 1994, 29). Unlike many of the colons, Napoleon III wanted to limit the expansion of the French as well as the interaction between the Europeans and the Muslims. He planned on promoting the Arab race, claiming that “‘Algeria is not a colony… but an Arab kingdom… I am as much the emperor of the Arabs as of the French!’” (Stora 2001, 5). His desire to be the roi des Arabes (King of the Arabs) in the royaume Arabe (Arab kingdom) led to the initiation of two different decrees which affected the “tribal structure, land tenure, and legal status of Muslims in French Algeria” (Metz 1994, 29). Although Napoleon III meant to protect the Algerians with these decrees, they furthered the already palpable separation between the colons and Muslims in the nation.

The first of these two decrees was executed in 1863 and directly addressed the issue of land and ownership. The goal was to renounce the state’s claims to tribal lands and eventually end in private ownership for tribes, resulting in the protection of their land from the colons. Unfortunately there was little accountability for this ruling and French officials who were sympathetic with colons took much of the land that they had surveyed
into the public domain. In addition, many of those tribal leaders who had received some part of land quickly sold their communal property with the hopes of making a quick profit.

Napoleon III visualized “three distinct Algerias: a French colony, an Arab country, and a military camp, each with a distinct form of government” and the second declaration was meant to highlight the differences and separation between the three (Metz 1994, 30). It stated that, if the Algerians became French citizens, then they would be granted the protection of French law. Yet in order to gain citizenship they had to accept the full jurisdiction of the French legal code and therefore reject the importance of the religious courts; in other words “a Muslim had to renounce his religion in order to become a French citizen” (Metz 1994, 30). Although it was meant to propose an option to those who would like to be included under the protection and legal system of the French, it created an immense feeling of resentment among Muslims, with fewer than three thousand of them choosing to obtain citizenship.

France’s Second Empire ended in 1870 when the Prussians captured Napoleon III and the colons in Algeria viewed this change in leadership as an opportunity to overthrow the military regime, establish a civilian controlled administration, and completely immerse Algeria into France. One of France’s ministers, Adolphe Crémieux, was given the task of uniting the two countries and issued a series of decrees “providing for representation of the Algerian départements in the National Assembly of France and confirming colon control over local administration” (Metz 1994, 31). The Crémieux Decrees granted blanket citizenship to all Algerian Jews, totaling forty-thousand individuals. This created a distinct division between the Algerian Muslim population and
the Algerian Jewish population that did not exist prior to the colonial period. This decree segregated the Jewish population from the rest of the nation because the Muslims recognized them as members of the colon sector whereas the colons saw little difference between Algerian Muslims and Jews.

Riots broke out across Algeria in 1871, after the global demand for grain had pushed the price of Algerian wheat to European levels and Algerian farmers sold their crops to speculators, depleting the reserves that were needed when crops failed. A famine ensued and with it came serious consequences; for example, in a three year period, “it was estimated that twenty percent of the Muslim population of Constantine died” (Metz 1994, 31). In addition to the riots, France’s loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871 led to extreme land reforms due to a new pressure for the French government to find a place for the five thousand refugees from Alsace-Lorraine. This sudden need of land was the perfect reason to impose harsh restrictions on the Muslims, indirectly providing punishment from the riots. Although the Senatus Consultus of 1863 was not overly successful in the distribution of land titles to Arabs, the French used the Warnier Laws to fulfill their need of land and reverse what few land titles had been granted to the Arabs. Initiated by the leader of the colon delegation, Auguste Warnier, these laws resulted in the “facilitation of the private transfer of land to settlers and continued the Algerian state’s appropriation of land from the local population and the distribution to settlers” (Metz 1994, 32). These land reforms doubled the amount of land owned by Europeans as well as the number of settlers in a decade. As a result of the land exchange, “tens of thousands of unskilled Muslims, who had been uprooted from their land, wandered into the cities or to colon farming areas in search of work” therefore lowering the price of
labor and furthering the inequality between the colon and indigenous populations (Metz 1994, 31).

**The Supremacy of the Colons in Algeria, 1871-1914**

After the revolts of 1871 and the land reforms of 1873, colons were given complete control of Algeria in all sectors. The Algerians had little alternative but to “attempt to live in a society whose political and economic structures were geared to serve the interests of the settler community, and whose educational system was designed to submerge the Arab-Islamic identity” (Abun-Nasr 1987, 268). Government representation in Algeria’s National Assembly was just one example of the inequality that permeated every aspect of life in the country. The Muslim population had virtually no representation on both the national and local level. Because of the religious requirements imposed on individuals who qualified as French citizens, only 50,000 Algerians were eligible to vote by 1915 (Metz 1994, 32). Reforms, regardless of how modest, were impossible to pass because of the power of the serving colons and their unwillingness to ameliorate the lives of the Algerians. It was important for the French-established, Algerian government to vote in a manner which supported the prominent attitudes and ideas of the colon population in order to avoid anarchy; “their support was important to any government’s survival” (Metz 1994, 32). Because of the land reforms that were able to be passed, the colons owned thirty percent of the total land, which included the majority of land that was fertile and accessible to irrigation. This allowed them to produce nearly two-thirds of the total agricultural exports just thirty years after installing their own civilian government.
Not only were the colonial powers overtaking some of the most lucrative sectors of the Algerian economy, they were also increasing taxes for the native population. Despite their significant decrease in wages, the Muslim population was taxed considerably more than European settlers. By 1909 Muslims constituted almost ninety percent of the population yet they produced only twenty percent of the total income. Regardless of this vast difference in prosperity, the Muslims paid nearly seventy percent of the direct taxes (Metz 1994, 33). Despite paying the majority of taxes, the Muslim population did not reap the benefits of their efforts. The colon officials had control over the taxes and therefore used the funds to benefit the colon towns, which “had handsome municipal buildings and paved streets lined with trees, fountains, and statues” (Metz 1994, 33). The disproportional distribution of tax burdens and tax revenues continued the sentiment of resentment that was becoming increasingly popular, even among those individuals who were pro-French.

The colons used taxes and land reforms to gain power over the Algerians through economic means and viewed education as a way to decrease the influence of the Islamic ideology that was so important to many Algerians. This was one of the final social domains in which change was needed for a complete separation from pre-colonial Algeria. For a population who had previously relied on religious schools, even for the most basic reading and writing instruction, “the colonial regime proved severely detrimental to the overall education for Algerian Muslims” (Metz 1994, 33). The colons had appropriated the lands upon which the religious foundations, that created much of the income to support religious institutions, were located. After cutting off the main source of Islamic funding in the nation, officials refused to allocate money to properly maintain
mosques and schools. The colons were spending five times the amount on European education as they were for Muslims, who had five times more children of school age (Metz 1994, 34). The lack of educational funding resulted in a spill-over effect; few Muslims received the education needed to become teachers and therefore Muslim schools became staffed primarily by French instructors, resulting in the continuous decline of Arabic studies. In 1890, a new effort was put forth to educate a small number of Muslims with Europeans in the French school system. Within a generation, a new class of Muslims had emerged. Known as the évolués, this group of well-educated Muslims had accepted French citizenship despite the constraints. Although not initially well-received by the majority of the Algerian Muslims, it was in this new class and its close interaction with the French that a new Algerian self-consciousness matured.

Nationalism and Political Movements amongst the Algerian Population, 1914-1954

The events of World War I left the entire population of Algeria in a state of shock and truly tested the allegiance of both the colons and native Algerians. The pieds noirs, or colons, naturally felt the need to defend their nation and twenty-two thousand of them perished during the war. Despite their anger towards the French, the indigenous population’s role became more important than that of the colons. Recruitment led to 173,000 Muslim soldiers, of which 25,000 died as well as the requisitioning of 119,000 Muslim Algerians who were meant to satisfy the demand for labor in French cities (Stora 2001, 12). When the war was over Algerian political ideology was beginning to undergo a drastic revolution, starting with those workers and soldiers who had experienced first-hand the rights of the French. Woodrow Wilson’s idea of self-determination, the end of the Ottoman Empire, the growing movement of pan-Arabism, and the sudden influx of
Algerian workers to post-war France all led to the creation and development of the idea of national independence and created a sudden solidarity among the Algerian population that it had never experience before.

During the post-war period a number of political movements and organizations began to form, varying from integrationists to independence groups. One of the earliest political movements came in the form of the Federation of Elected Natives (Fédération des Élus Indigènes- FÉI), a group which stemmed from an earlier political faction, the Young Algerians (established by Ferhat Abbas). Primarily comprised of évolutés, the FÉI was an integrationist group which lobbied for assimilation with the French pending the rights of full citizenship to Muslims, without renouncing their religious status, equal pay for Algerian government employees, the abolition of travel restrictions between the two countries and electoral reform (Metz 1994, 36). A counter to this group was the Star of North Africa (Étoile Nord-Africain, known as Star), the first political organization that openly demanded for Algerian independence (Stora 2001, 17). Established by North African workers in Paris and led by Messali Hadj, it promoted separation from France, freedom of press, a parliament chosen through universal suffrage, the confiscation of large land estates, and the re-institution of Arabic schools (Metz, 1994, 36). The party was banned in 1929 and reformed in 1933 only to later dissolve in 1937. That same year, Messali Hadj formed the Party of Algerian People (Parti du Peuple Algérien- PPA), a movement to mobilize the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat colonization. These groups looked to France as the inspiration for their ideological models and it was the First World War which allowed the Algerians to gain experience in a political atmosphere that was so unlike their own.
While some political groups were formed with the sense of nationalistic pride as their foundation, others were established on the nation’s principles of Islamic and Arabic roots. Beginning in the 1920s the “reform ulama, or religious scholars, promoted a purification of Islam in Algeria and a return to the Quran” (Metz 1994, 37). Establishing their own schools, they stressed the importance of the Arab language and culture, unlike those institutions that had been operated by the French. The reformist ulama created the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama (Association des Uléma Musulmans Algériens-AUMA). The AUMA gained in popularity and “struck a cord among Muslim masses, with whom it had closer ties than the other nationalist organizations” (Metz 1994, 37). After being seen as a threat, the AUMA was no longer able to preach in official mosques, therefore limiting their power. The pieds-noirs rejected any sort of reform movement, including those that were pro-French, and forced France and other European nations to support their position of control over the Algerian administration and police forces.

Algerian Muslims once again rallied to the aid of the French during World War II, yet the establishment of the Vichy Regime and the increased popularity of the idea of Algerian independence would forever change the Franco-Algerian relationship. The Algerian administration enforced the anti-Semitic laws that were imposed by the Vichy regime, stripping the Algerian Jews, as well as the few Muslims who had conformed, their rights of citizenship. After the fall of the Vichy regime in Algeria at the end of 1942, France pleaded to the Muslim population for the re-enforcement of troops and Ferhat Abbas, former leader of the Young Algerians, as well as twenty-four other Muslim leaders replied that they would be willing to fight as long as they were able to hold a conference and develop their own political, economic, and social institutions within the
French framework. The resulting Manifesto of the Algerian People was enormously influenced by Abbas, “who had abandoned assimilation as a viable alternative to self-determination” (Metz 1994, 40). The document claims that “The French colony only admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level; sacrifice on the battlefield” (Horne 2006, 42). This clean break from the idea of assimilation called for the “immediate and effective participation of Muslims in the government and the establishment of a constitution guaranteeing inter alia, liberty and equality for all Algerians, the suppression of feudal property- as well as various other planks borrowed from the more radical platform of Messali” (Horne 2006, 42). Although the Manifesto was rejected by the French government, the conference resulted in the joining of Abbas and Hadj with the organization, Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté-AML). The AML would clearly define the split between the native Algerians and the pieds-noirs.

Amid the strong sentiment of animosity towards the French, social unrest grew amongst all social classes as a result of a poor wheat harvest, the shortage of manufactured goods, and severe unemployment; thousands of hungry peasants streamed towards the cities where they were met with a lack of jobs and were forced to congregate around soup kitchens (Stora 2001, 21). It was under these pretences that the AML organized demonstrations in most Algerian cities on May 8, 1945. After being told that they were not allowed to promote their nationalist sentiments during the protests, the marchers carried banners that read, “Down with fascism and colonialism” and police in Sétif opened fire on them (Stora 2001, 21). The marchers countered these attacks and over a hundred Europeans were killed. Word of the violence spread across the nation and
villagers attacked colon settlements and government buildings. On May 10th, “the authorities organized a ‘war of reprisals’ which turned into a massacre” (Stora 2001, 23). Shootings and summary executions as well as blanket bombings were carried out and although French estimates state that 1,500 Muslims died as a result (Metz 1994, 42), Algerian nationalists claim that the figure was upwards of 45,000 individuals (Stora 2001, 22). This act of violence created an irreparable rift between the Muslim majority and the European minority; it set the stage for the commencement of the Algerian War for independence nine years later.

Although the AML coalition was not formally recognized by the French, the work of Messali Hadj did not come to a halt. The political leader continued to operate the PPA as a clandestine organization until 1946, when he reconstituted it under a new name. The Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, MTLD) continued Hadj’s quest of Algerian independence through peaceful means and was founded with the goals of the Manifesto in mind. It desired to bring together “those Muslims who were still committed to evolutionary change” (Evans 2007, 53). After a year of activity, the most militant Algerians, “those clearly committed to the armed struggle” were drawn to the Organisations Spéciale (OS), the paramilitary group for the MTLD (Evans 2007, 53). Formed secretly in 1947, the core of this sub-division was comprised of a group of young men in their twenties, who were from a literate artisan or middle-class background. Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, and Mohammed Boudiaf were all members of the OS, which trained approximately 4,500 men before mounting its first action. The organization was dismantled by 1951, yet many
of its former members remained active in politics and took shelter in other Middle Eastern nations, including Egypt.

After the Organisations Spéciale disbanded, the previous members feared that the nationalist movement had lost its momentum. The ex-militants believed that the MTLD was playing into the “hands of colonialism and reinforced their conviction that what was needed was a totally new organization which would prepare the way for an armed insurrection” (Evans 2007, 55). The same young men, including Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, and Boudiaf, formed the Comité Révolutionnaire pour l’Unité et L’Action in March 1954. They “were under no illusions about the scale of the task confronting them but their confidence was bolstered by the French defeat in Indo-China” (Evans 2007, 55). The group was renamed the Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front, FLN) on October 10, 1954. Since many of the leaders of the FLN were veterans of the French military and former activists in the MTLD, it is not surprising that the organization created a military-style structure with a military equivalent, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). It would be the ALN that would commit many of the acts of terror in the war against France.

While the FLN was beginning to take shape, the MTLD continued its struggle towards self-determination. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the MTLD and several hundred nationalist leaders were arrested. Those who were not, were forced to hide underground or join the guerrilla forces of the FLN. The militant organization intended to benefit from the dissolution of Hadj’s party, hoping to take ownership of the weapons that it possessed as well as its connections abroad. Messali Hadj was adamantly opposed to the use of violence against the French as a means of
obtaining political liberation and established the Mouvement National Algerien (National Algerian Movement, MNA), which was the only socialist faction to not eventually join the cause of the FLN.

**War of Independence, 1954-1962**

On the morning of November 1, 1954 the National Liberation Front began a war that would shake the foundations of France’s Fourth Republic and inevitably lead to its collapse. Launching attacks against military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities around the nation, members of the FLN called on Muslims to “restore the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of Islam” (Metz 1994, 44). The response from the French was minimal and few thought that the nation had just entered into another war (Stora 2001, 38). This first year can be referred to as a “Phony War”, a time where the FLN was able to spread its campaign throughout the countryside and the French could attempt to implement reforms to pacify the Muslims (Stora 2001, 41). Jacques Soustelle, who was the Governor of Algeria beginning on February 11, 1955, was known for being a liberal and he tried to understand the plight of the Algerian Muslims. Trying to balance the demands of the FLN with France’s allegiance to the colons, he promised integration and reforms- but it was too late, and on August 20, 1955, the “Phony War” ended and the real conflict began.

This watershed event was based on a poorly planned revolt where several thousand peasants and agricultural workers rushed to thirty villages, including four major cities: Collo, Constantinois, Guelma, and Philippeville. At first, the clash at Philippeville followed the standard FLN policy of attacking solely government and military targets.
Then there was a dramatic escalation of violence where the FLN and its supporters killed one hundred and twenty three people, of which seventy-one were European citizens. The reression for the Philippeville massacre, which was immediate, collective, and violent, set the standard for the rest of the war and although the official death toll was 1,273, the FLN has put forth a figure of 12,000 Muslims losing their lives to the French following the attack. It was this incident that ended all French “peace-keeping missions” and resulted in a state of emergency that provided carte blanche for the French army.

The tactics used during this war from both the French and the FLN were increasingly brutal. Recognizing the fact that it had smaller troop numbers and less technologically advanced weapons, the FLN resorted to guerrilla tactics. Focusing on “ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colon farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities” (Metz 1994, 48). The French frequently resorted to means of torture and brutal tactics in the quest to maintain their colonial holdings, yet the FLN also would commonly kidnap individuals and ritually murder and mutilate captured members of the French military, colons, suspected collaborators, and traitors. In addition to torture tactics, the French also applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, cooperating with the guerrillas… they also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from aiding the rebels (Metz 1994, 51).

Living conditions in the camps were poor and in the three years that this tactic was used, over two million individuals were moved from their homes, and were unable to
reestablish themselves economically or socially. The French changed their tactics in 1958 as its government began to collapse and adopted a policy of using mobile forces to complete search-and-destroy missions.

The hope of ending the war came with the fall of the Fourth Republic and the establishment of a more liberal French leader. Regardless of citizenship, many individuals were pleased to see Charles de Gaulle come into power and felt that his freethinking views were the key to ending the violence between France and Algeria. With his proposed social, economic, and political reforms, he was the improving the Muslim situation while weakening the power of the FLN in Algeria. In September 1958 all Muslims were granted the right to vote and one year later de Gaulle “uttered the words ‘self-determination’, which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France” (Metz 1994, 53). Convinced that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by certain units of the army, staged riots in January 1960 and began enacting their own terrorist activities, directed at both Muslims and pro-governmental Europeans.

The end of the war came with the “Generals’ Putsch”, which marked the turning point of the official attitude toward the Algerian war. The leaders of this movement, who were French generals who had been banned or transferred from Algeria and supported the continuation of the war, formed the Organisation Armée Secrete, or OAS, and intended to seize control of Algeria and topple the de Gaulle regime. The organization garnered the support of the colon population and, although fear swept both France and Algeria, the putsch was terminated after four days. Despite the collapse of the revolt, the organization continued to thrive and began to commit violent attacks against both Muslims and
government employees, in the hopes of promoting its objective of resisting Algerian disengagement. It was after this event that de Gaulle became “prepared to abandon the colons, the group that no previous French government could have written off” (Metz 1994, 54). Talks with the FLN opened at Évian and a cease fire took effect on March 19, 1962. On July 1, 1962 nearly 6 million of the total 6.5 million Algerian electorate “cast their ballots in the referendum on independence and the vote was nearly unanimous” (Metz 1994, 55); two days later the President of France declared Algeria a free nation.

The total cost of the War for Independence has been an issue of contention for years. The FLN estimated that nearly three hundred thousand individuals had died during the eight year revolution, yet Algerian sources later raised that figure to nearly 1.5 million people. The French claimed that their losses totaled to eighteen thousand individuals with over ten thousand Europeans dying in forty-two thousand recorded terrorist incidents (Metz 1994, 55). There was also a mass exodus of colons after the signing of the truce and, at the end of the subsequent year, fewer than thirty thousand Europeans chose to remain in Algeria. Yet it was not simply the material destruction of land, the collapse of the economy, or loss of life that impacted the country. Even after Algerian independence the relationship between Algeria and France has been tense. With an intertwining of interests yet distinct differences, Algeria celebrates the day it received its independence, whereas France did not even publicly acknowledge that a war was fought in Algeria until 1999. Within the country of Algeria itself, the war for independence legitimized the use of unrestricted force to obtain a justifiable goal. The determination of the FLN to regain sovereignty would be repeated thirty years later in the Algerian Civil War, with its
determination to hold onto the position in the government and the extreme force that would be used to achieve its goals.

**The Lasting Impacts of French Colonialism on Modern-day Algeria**

The effects of French colonialism on modern day Algeria are numerous in the social, economic, and political sectors, yet there are also differences that cannot be quantified. When Algiers first fell in 1830, the systematic confiscation of land and the increasing inflation due to the introduction of the French currency led to “the rise of the modern Algerian proletariat” (Bennoune 1988, 37). These individuals suddenly had no other means of survival than to hire out their labor on a day-to-day basis. Some Algerians feel that, “colonization resulted in the expropriation of most of the Algerian producers as well as in the deconstruction-transformation of both the pre-existing urban system and the rural landscape” (Bennoune 1988, 39). It was not simply the urban areas that felt the impact of French colonization; “rural colonization was the most important single factor in the destruction of traditional society” (Metz 1994, 24). The seizures of land from the countryside undermined Algeria’s pre-colonial economic and social systems and those individuals who had sustained themselves with the field of agriculture were no longer able to do so when the “primary natural resources were taken from the native producers” (Bennoune 1988, 52). In addition to the rise of a proletariat class was the formation of an Algerian upper-middle class with the évolués. Receiving a French education, this group of individuals formed the foundations of political resistance and began the establishment of political movements that would become so divisive to Algerian life in later years.

Not only did the French alter Algeria’s economic and social structure but they also impacted Algerians’ religious viewpoints and morals concerning war. Firstly, the
Arab-Islamic identity became completely separate from life in Algeria. The French indirectly closed all Islamic schools by refusing them funding and asked Algerians to relinquish their Muslim identity in order to gain French citizenship. Few Muslims were willing to go to such lengths and, as a result, the foundations of a more extreme religious sect were laid. The Algerians further embraced their religion and morals due to the frequency and intensity of war crimes both in the French plan of colonization and the Algerians’ struggle for independence. During the 1800s the French adopted strategies such as “scorched earth”, where they burned everything down, or “smoke out”, where they trapped and burned soldiers in caves (Bennoune 1988, 40). These war crimes, “were not committed because the ethical standards of the 19th century Frenchmen had degenerated; they were motivated by the firm conviction that the colonization of Algeria would be in the best interests of France” (Bennoune 1988, 40). This is an important result of French colonization because it laid the foundation of the ideology of the FLN, which was the belief that extreme violence was justifiable if it resulted in political success.

The French and Algerians’ relationship is one that has been so detrimental to both countries yet ties will never be completely severed. The violent history between the two cannot be denied although some French and American historians have downplayed the events that occurred during that hundred year period. The French had a massive impact on their colony, some good, such as the exposure to democracy and political movements, and other negative, such as the justification for extreme violence. Although it was solely the Algerians who caused the civil war that tore their nation apart, it is important to understand the history of colonial Algeria and the foundations that the French laid that allowed such a conflict to come about.
Chapter 2: The Algerian Civil War, 1954-1962

Prior to the start of the war in 1954, it was difficult to separate the countries of France and Algeria. The colony of Algeria constituted three French departments and as the French Minister of the Interior said, “Algeria is France” (Stora 2001, 30). After 125 years of controlling Algeria the invested interest between the two nations was great; nearly one million Europeans had moved to the North African country to establish a new life and many Muslims had rushed to aid the French in both World Wars. With the immigration of Algerians to France came a new understanding of socialist ideas, however, and the desire for independence began to grow.

The French Republic saw itself as assimilationist yet millions of Muslim Algerians felt that their citizenship was a sham since they voted in a college that was separate from the Europeans (Stora 2001, 30). Muslims were beginning to feel that total independence would be the only way to fully undo the unfair treatment and policies of the French. Political parties, such as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) which were pro-independence through peaceful means, became divided and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) formed with the goal of using force to obtain Algerian self-determination. This distinct separation in ideology forever changed the history of Algeria.

The Members and Doctrine of the Front de Libération Nationale

Prior to November 1, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a relatively unknown association that was guided by a group of young individuals who were rebelling against French colonialism. The actions of the All Saints’ Day attack was conducted internally by six men: Larbi Ben M’Hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat,
Krim Belkacem, Mohamed Boudiaf, and Mostefa Ben Boulaid (Stora 2001, 36). There was also a movement outside of Algeria, in Cairo, which was led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Mohammed Khider (Stora 2001, 36). They were all originally members of the Parti du Peuple (PPA), and later the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), and had contributed to the group’s efforts to mobilize the working class in Algeria and use political action to combat colonization. These young activists became “advocates of armed struggle and clashed violently with the old head of the PPA, Messali Hadj”, leading to the creation of the FLN (Stora 2001, 36). Many of the individuals who shaped the FLN were educated men who came from well-known rural families that were becoming “affected by the general downward mobility at work in Algerian society” (Stora 2001, 37). Several of the original leaders had also fought as French soldiers during World War II and their formal training allowed them to understand “intimately the strengths and weaknesses of the French military”, a fact that was greatly to their advantage and aided their success (Millen 2008, 36). They hailed from various regions in Algeria, including Marnia, Kabyle, and Constantine. They also had differing backgrounds; Ben Bella was a merchant’s son who rose to the rank of Sergeant-Major in the French army, Hocine Ait Ahmed was the son of a Kabyle lawyer and a formidable orator, and Mohammed Boudiaf was also a French army veteran who was afflicted with chronic tuberculosis from a young age (Evans 2007, 54). With such diversity, the organization was founded on a policy of collective leadership, which once again worked to its advantage since it became much more difficult for the French to isolate and target so many individuals. These men changed the general outlook on
Algerian independence, feeling that slow, collective work was outdated and ineffective and that one must turn to military action to gain results.

The radical movement of the FLN was a result of both French and Islamic influences. The first pro-independence activists were based in Paris and their “French experience taught them the models of organization and the rudiments of socialist ideology by which they would analyze the situation of their nation…it put them in contact with industrial and urban models of life” (Stora 2001, 65). Another factor to consider during this time is that almost all Algerians were faithful to their religious customs. “Islam was both a combat ideology and a social project” and took the form of a nationalist philosophy (Stora 2001, 66). An example of this can be found in the text of a tract that was broadcast on Radio Cairo following the first attacks. The tract introduced the people of Algeria to the FLN and stated the goal of the FLN as “National Independence through the restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam” (Evans 2007, 57). One of the internal objectives also stated in the same document was the “pursuit of North African unity in its national Arab-Islamic context” (Evans 2007, 57). The party was aware of the contradictions that existed within this theory but used the main goal of independence as a means of deflecting questioning.

**The Start of the “Phony War” (1954-1955) and the French Reforms that Followed**

Early on the morning of November 1, 1954, Algeria plunged into a battle for its freedom. Across the country there were over thirty simultaneous attacks on military or police targets from the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), otherwise known as the military branch of the FLN, which had little more than four hundred miscellaneous small
arms (Millen 2008, 28). Although the attacks resulted in the deaths of seven people, overall the assault on the police stations, barracks, and industrial plants did not have the impact that the revolutionary fighters had hoped for (Stora 2001, 35). Few weapons were procured and “militarily, the operation was a complete failure”; in addition the hoped-for popular uprising failed to follow (Millen 2008, 28). Although the ALN presented itself as a disorganized military operation with a small arsenal, this event was not reflective of the political groundwork that the FLN had already established in certain regions of Algeria.

The immediate response of the French to this outburst was minimal. François Mitterand, Minister of the Interior, sent just an additional six hundred men to be at the disposal of the thirty-five hundred troops who were already stationed in the colony. The “events”, as they were referred to in France, received little press attention, and few French citizens believed that their country had just entered another war (Stora 2001, 36). The government greatly underestimated the capabilities of the members of the FLN, whom they viewed simply as another tribal group, and “the misreading of the situation helps explain the French incremental, expedient, and short-sighted response” (Millen 2008, 28). The French government’s actions would attempt to balance three goals: maintaining a strong appearance domestically for the citizens who cared little for the colony of Algeria, the appeasement of the colons in Algeria, and the avoidance any collateral damage that would anger either group of citizens.

Just a few short weeks after the first signs of conflict in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco gained internal autonomy, leading to a greater interest and further justification for the work done by the members of the FLN party. It became clear that “the Arab world was under the influence of the Nasserian revolution” which was beginning to “shake the
colonial empire” (Stora 2001, 39). After the initial attack, the FLN continued with its provocations while the French retaliated with “mass arrests, false imprisonment, and collective punishment” as well as an increased military presence in the country (Millen 2008, 29). These additional troops and military operations were accompanied by proposed reforms with the hopes of forming an agreement. During the month of January 1955, the French government proposed the creation of a school administration in Algiers that would give Muslim Algerians access to posts of responsibility in the public sector, as well as the reduction of the gap in Algerian and European salaries (Europeans had a gross income that was twenty-eight times that of the typical Algerian citizen), the initiation of major public works projects, and the formal recognition of the state of economic poverty in many regions throughout Algeria (Stora 2001, 39). The positive changes proposed were barely discussed after the French deputies delivered a non-confidence vote to Premier Pierre Mendes-France on February 5, 1955 by a margin of 319 to 273 (Stora 2001, 40). Political parties sided with the colons and did not approve of the changes that were proposed to improve the lives of the Muslim Algerians.

Jacques Soustelle became the new governor of Algeria; a Gaullist, he had a reputation as being an open and liberal man. He formed a more diverse cabinet and his willingness to explore new possibilities regarding the French-Algerian relationship made him unpopular amongst those individuals already in power in Algiers, who feared that a change in the Franco-Algerian relationship would mean a loss of their power. In the first few months of his term, he “labored to understand the discontent of the Muslim population” and through his trips to the troubled regions he came to understand that this was not a conventional battle (Stora 2001, 40). He realized that it was going to take more
than military deployments to truly win this fight but his efforts were fruitless and the National Assembly strengthened the powers of the army and authorized the “displacement of contaminate populations to ‘settlement camps’” (Stora 2001, 40). These camps further alienated the Muslim population from the French and strengthened the cause of the FLN.

**The FLN Tactics During the First Years of War**

The FLN tactics of this time differed from anything that the French had fought against previously and their underestimation in conjunction with sincere misunderstanding led to military mistakes. Initially the sentiments of the FLN were not shared throughout the entire Algerian Muslim population. It was not through the power of persuasion that the Muslims came to side with and aid the FLN, but rather scare tactics. FLN members would extort food and funds from the civilians and use “acts of terror to intimidate the inhabitants into silence”, including the mutilation of French loyalist and the elimination of Muslim moderates (Millen 2008, 29). This did not go unnoticed by the French and throughout his trips, Jacques Soustelle observed that “the FLN ‘never sought to attach the rural populations to their cause by promising them a better life, a happier and freer future; no, it was through terror that they submitted to their tyranny’” (Millen 2008, 29). This practice was started from the onset of fighting and continued throughout the entire war.

Although the majority, approximately eighty-six percent, of the FLN was Muslim the organization showed no difference in its policy towards a moderate or pro-French Muslim and the actual colonists; in its eyes an enemy was an enemy and its treatment towards them was unforgiving. In many cases the final initiation requirement to join the
FLN was the assassination of a government official or informant. The mutilation of French loyalists, both Muslim and colon, was also a common practice that served to belittle the enemy (Millen 2008, 29). This served as a scare tactic which forced other Muslims to support the FLN cause.

At the start of the conflict there were Muslims who were more moderate in nature and were willing to meet and negotiate with the French. One of the first acts of the FLN was to eliminate these Muslim moderates because it did not want “any moderate interlocutors available for the French to negotiate peace” (Millen 2008, 29). At the end of the war it was estimated that almost sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed by the ALN and that many of these losses were a result of internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The few moderates who remained joined the FLN after a few years due to their shock at the extreme nature of the French response. In addition to removing the moderate Muslims, the FLN strategically planned its attacks with the intention of severing European contact with the Muslim population (Millen 2008, 29). The French no longer communicated to and trusted the Muslim population, unable to be sure which individuals were members of the FLN, and in turn, the Algerians no longer had faith in the French since the military responded with such harsh, collective reprisals. These tactics were extremely effective and caused huge setbacks for the French. They were shocked at the success and number of the attacks by the FLN and as a result they disarmed many citizens for fear that the weapons would be given to the militants. This plan backfired and left the general population defenseless against the FLN; with no other option many soon aided the militant organization.
The Change from a “Phony War” to a Full Conflict, Philippeville 1955

After several months of conflict it appeared that the strength of the FLN was beginning to wane under the continuous military strikes by the French. The leaders of the Constantinois region felt that the Algerian population needed a boost in spirits and that the revolution needed momentum. They decided that, “collective reprisals against Europeans, military or civilian, should be used as a reply to the colonial policy of collective response” (Hutchinson 1978, 50). The FLN adopted this policy in August 1955 and in essence “raised the level of the conflict” by broadening the scope of their attacks to include civilians (Millen 2008, 29). Until the clash at Philippeville, the FLN had performed “ambushes and night raids” on army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and transportation and communications facilities (Metz 1994, 48); rarely, if ever, did it attack European civilians.

On August 20, 1955, thousands of Algerian peasants revolted in over thirty villages within the four main cities of Collo, Philippeville, Constantine, and Guelma. The initial intention of the events was to mark “the second anniversary of the deposing of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youcef, sultan of Morocco, by the French” (Stora 2001, 43). At first the attacks focused mostly on police stations, the military, and various government buildings, yet soon the thousands of peasants and agricultural workers began performing acts of violence against citizens. Many “French people, but also Muslims, were murdered with axes, billhooks, picks, or knives” and various political figures were attacked (Millen 2001, 43). This escalation of violence resulted in the deaths of one hundred and twenty three people, seventy-one of whom were European. After this event the French would severely increase their tactics for defeating the FLN.
The French response was immediate, collective, and extremely violent. Soustelle declared a state of emergency and the French government “ceded its political authority to the military leadership in Algeria” as a way of ending the insurgency by any means (Millen 2008, 30). The weakening of political direction and constraints on military strategy “virtually undercut any political settlement of the insurgency” (Millen 2008, 30). France sent sixty thousand reservists to Algeria and private militias were formed; and, rather than solely attacking the FLN, the French continued to enact a policy of collective responsibility. In the end the official death toll was 1,273 although the FLN claims that the actual figure was 12,000 persons who were missing or dead in the following weeks (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Overnight the war changed from a mild conflict to a severe battle.

The initial goal of the Philippeville attacks, which was to incite a massive Algerian uprising, failed to transpire yet overall the results were successful. The actions of August 1955 were considered “a major event which led many hesitant Muslims to opt for the FLN” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Those few moderate Muslims who had not been removed in the first months of the war now viewed the FLN as a serious organization that was “representative of a Muslim population, which now aspired to independence rather than assimilation or integration” (Hutchinson 1978, 51). Moderate Muslims renounced negotiations and joined the FLN in favor of full confrontation (MSN Encarta, “Algerian War of Independence, 2008). The possibility for negotiations was no longer seemed like a viable or popular option by either side.

**Changes in French Government and Military Tactics Following Philippeville**

The actions of the FLN at Philippeville resulted in changes in the French government. Four days after the initial attack in August 1955, sixty thousand soldiers
who had recently been released from duty were recalled to service in Algeria and on
August 30 “the government decreed that 180,000 dischargeable soldiers would remain in
the military” (Stora 2001, 44). Instantly the soldiers and their families began protests
across France and although they claimed to have the encouragement of the French
civilians, the lack of actual support caused the protests to be short lived. During this time
individuals as well as major organizations and political parties were more “preoccupied
with the tumult of political life within France” and with good reason (Stora 2001, 45). On
November 29 the Assembly passed a no-confidence vote on the current French
government, resulting in its dissolution. This vote, with a margin of 318 to 218, was not
directly linked to Philippeville but rather a number of issues that were plaguing France at
the time.

Within Algeria during this time there was also an uprooting of the current
government. The government decided to postpone elections until there was a more stable
situation. It was also during this time that the elected officials in Ferhat Abbas’ Union
Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, one of the few moderate organizations to survive
the FLN’s purge, resigned from the Algerian assembly. This was following in the
footsteps of the sixty-one Muslim officials who had already left in opposition to
Soustelle.

The French elections were held on January 2, 1956 and the Front Républicain, a
new party formed by Socialists and Radicals, surprisingly won fifty-two out of six
hundred and twenty-three seats. The Communists also won fifty seats; the landscape of
the French government was beginning to change. On February 1, Guy Mollet, a French
Socialist of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière Party, became the Premier
under the new government. The next day Jacques Soustelle, who had arrived in Algeria as a relatively unpopular Premier, left the country as thousands of Europeans demonstrated their affection. A few days later, Mollet arrived with a neutral policy and a desire to find peaceful negotiations. He was met with a demonstration by supporters of a French Algeria and five days later “abandoned his policy” of peace (Stora 2001, 46).

Soon after Pierre Mendes-France, an individual who was against colonialism, resigned his post as State Minister; this new Socialist-led government would lead France into a fully-fledged war.

The colon extremists and military personnel viewed this new government as an opportunity to increase French manpower in Algeria, which was already totaling 190,000 soldiers by that time. Robert Lacoste was quickly appointed Minister Resident in Algeria and introduced a bill in the National Assembly “authorizing the government to set in place a program of economic expansion, social progress, and administrative reform in Algeria, and enabling it to take all exceptional measures in view of reestablishing order, protecting persons and property, and safeguarding the territory” (Stora 2001, 46). What followed were decrees that allowed the increase of military action and the recall of reservists as well as a law which established special powers that suspended most of the guarantees of individual liberties in Algeria; by stripping individuals of their civil liberties, a total and complete war could now be fought without effect on one’s conscience.

With the recall of reservists, tens of thousands of soldiers made their way into Algeria; this allowed the French to change their strategy vis-à-vis to the FLN. Algeria was divided into three different sections: a zone of operation, a pacification zone, and a
forbidden zone (Stora 2001, 46). Each zone had a specific army corps and goal: the forces of the operation zone were meant to destroy the rebels; the soldiers within the pacification zone oversaw the protection of the European and Muslim populations; and the forbidden zones were evacuated, with their populations being sent to camps that were run by the army. Although this strategy of concentrating the troops was effective overall, it took time for these new troops to become accustomed to the harsh terrain and unconventional battle tactics.

The Introduction of “Revolutionary Terrorism” by the FLN

The FLN did have two alternatives during this time and could have either “sought the tolerance of at least some part of the European population or treated Europeans as a monolithic enemy and concentrated on gaining Algerian approval” (Hutchinson 1978, 53). The unwillingness of the FLN to accept anything less than total independence made the latter the only viable option. Events of late 1955 and early 1956, including the French capture of Ben Bella, an increase in European violence against Algerians, and continued military repression, created a situation where the FLN would have been unable to win European neutrality even if the Muslim population had desired it (Hutchinson 1978, 53). The FLN had already been organizing events of compliance terrorism (terrorism directed at Muslims to obtain compliance) as well as isolation terrorism (terrorism meant to isolate Muslim and European communities) and organizational terrorism (terrorism directed at Muslims to strengthen the FLN) (Prochaska 1980, 132). With the subsequent events of Philippeville and the increase in French violence, the party now implemented a policy of endorsement terrorism, a variety of terrorism designed to target the Europeans with the hope of gaining the support of the Muslims (Prochaska 1980, 132). This new
type of endorsement terrorism continued to strengthen the position of the FLN within Algeria and proved to be multifunctional; it directed Algerians to side with the FLN cause, created insecurity among colonists, and weakened the French government.

This new policy of actions frequently led to indiscriminate and violent French reactions. The FLN was getting closer to its overall goal, which was to force the French to react in a more brutal manner and subsequently convincing more Muslims to support the FLN, regardless of whether the reaction from their plans came from the military or the European civilians. With these violent responses came a greater polarization between the European and the Muslim populations and the furthering of Algerian support for self-determination. With their increasing isolation, the French became more insecure and this “fear and anger was expressed in hostility and irrational violence towards Algerians”, creating a continuous chain that resulted in an increased support for the FLN (Hutchinson 1978, 54). The fear that existed among the French colonial population would result in serious consequences near the end of the war.

**Total War in Algeria, 1956**

On March 16, 1956, only four days after the special powers vote that stripped Algerians of their liberties, Algiers suffered attacks from the FLN. Lacoste immediately imposed a curfew on the city and increased France’s military presence there. As the year continued “terrorism took root nearly everywhere” and initially the French suffered many casualties as they put their plan of the quadrillage system, a method of dividing a counter-insurgency terrain into sections as a means of isolating the people within while searching the enclosed area for insurgents, into action (Stora 2001, 47). Although the early failures caused the French public to become “acutely aware of the war in Algeria”, the French
response became increasingly successful and inflicted 13,899 casualties on the FLN over the span of nine months (Millen 2008, 31).

Throughout the year there were many terrorist attacks which were spearheaded by the FLN and resulted in counter-terrorist attacks by the French. Examples of this can be found in the French decision to begin executing the captured FLN prisoners in June and the decision for troops in August to bomb a house in the Algiers Casbah, resulting in at least seventy Algerian casualties (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The French response of counterterrorism to the FLN attacks created a situation where “the terrorist commandos were practically forced to act to satisfy popular calls for vengeance”, the goal of endorsement terrorism, even though the French tried to defend itself, insisting that the FLN struck first with its bomb attacks (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The FLN responded with an attack where two time bombs were placed in two restaurants in the European center of Algiers; the explosions left two dead and sixty injured (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The Algerians expressed a general enthusiasm for these actions and were “offended by European indifference to counterterrorism and outraged by the execution of prisoners” (Hutchinson 1978, 57). The cycle of violence, particularly in Algiers, would always be justified as an act of retaliation, resulting in an inevitable cyclical effect where neither party acknowledged its own responsibilities.

The relatively successful operations of the French could have possibly been enough to end the war in victory, yet as the year came to an end the focus became diverted to the Suez War and the annihilation of Nasser. The FLN took full “advantage of these events to make its presence known in the countryside and in the cities” (Stora 2001, 48). They took the repressive actions of the French army and used them to recruit
thousands of young Algerians toward their guerilla forces; by the end of 1956 the ALN had “tens of thousands of warriors in its ranks” (Stora 2001, 48). Guy Mollet appointed General Raoul Salan as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Algerian forces; a veteran of Indochina, his leadership would cause France to enter a new phase in the Algerian War.

A Further Increase in Violent Tactics, The Battle of Algiers, 1957

On December 27, 1956 Amédée Froger, the President of the Association of European Mayors and an unofficial spokesman for the colons, was murdered in Algiers. The following day at his funeral, there was a massive outbreak of violence against the Arab population, which the French police failed to control due to their sympathy with the colons’ cause. Tensions between the colons and the Muslims were at an all-time high and the Algerian general government decided to act. Due to the “special powers” law that had been passed in March 1956, Lacoste was able to “entrust the pacification of Algiers to the Commander of the Tenth Paratroopers’ Division” (Stora 2001, 49). On January 7, 1957 eight thousand paratroopers occupied the city and the “Battle of Algiers” began.

The violence was immediate and widespread within the city and the practice of torture and excess was committed by both parties. During this time the ALN carried out an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month (Metz 1994, 49). In theory one can differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism, yet with the Battle of Algiers it was sometimes difficult to separate the two, in either the case of the French or of the FLN. An example can be found in an event with the following FLN explanation:

January 22, 1957, the Algiers-Kolea bus was attacked, at 6:30 pm, by a group of the ALN. The European passengers were executed. After the burial of one of them, a sergeant living at Fouka, the racist militia of that locality kidnapped and killed six Algerians... Why did the ALN conduct this daring raid and proceed to these executions? The reason is simple. Kolea is the seat of a military school and a battalion of paratroopers.
Before the attack on the bus...a grenade was thrown on a paratrooper patrol. During the night they descended to the Arab town ‘after a loss of control’. Led by the territorials, they forced their way into houses that they pillaged before ‘cleaning them out’ with grenades or knives. The number of victims, including several women, is almost sixty. Sixteen girls were raped (Hutchinson 1978, 59).

Another example can be found in May 1957 when FLN terrorists killed two paratroopers; in response the French army killed or wounded eighty Algerians (Hutchinson 1978, 56). Uncontrolled reprisals “against the Algerian population were almost as common in the army as they were in the European civilian population” (Hutchinson 1978, 56). An example can be found on January 26 when two charges exploded in the bar L’Otomatic and the café Le Coq Hardi; two Muslim Algerians were lynched by a European mob in response (Stora 2001, 49). In June 1957 an FLN bombing of the Casino de la Corniche killed eight and wounded forty-five. In reply, six Algerians were killed and forty five were wounded in addition to the twenty cars that were burned and the hundred Algerian stores that were pillaged (Hutchinson 1978, 55). The severity of the colon and military action caused problems for France both within its domestic population and the international arena.

The events in Algeria caught the attention of the international community after two years of violence. There were many countries, especially those with a history of colonizing other nations, which accepted the French position but not their specific policies. Others, such as Tunisia and Morocco, were providing the FLN with weapons and reinforcements. The “Algerian Question” was placed on the agenda for the United Nations General Assembly sessions in January 1957. In preparation, the FLN sent delegations to Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the United States, China, India, and Latin America.
Prior to the UN conference, Britain and the United States, “wanted the French to accept a more innocuous resolution on Algeria rather than a confrontational approach” (Alexander 2002, 167). Mollet responded to this request by saying that he could not “go any further towards independence without provoking a revolution in Algiers, which would be backed by a considerable portion of the French Army” (Alexander 2002, 168). The powers that were given to the colon population in France now restricted the actions of the French government and risked the international alienation of France; this would foreshadow the events of the Generals’ Putsch, which came later in the war.

On January 28, 1957, with the hopes of influencing the United Nations debate on the “Algerian Question”, the FLN organized an eight-day strike in Algiers in which many workers and businesses participated. Although General Massu used the paratroopers to break the strike and systematically destroy the FLN infrastructure in Algiers, the event showed that the FLN had the capability to rally a mass response and exemplified its appeal among the Muslim population.

After the strike the city was divided into sections and “the Muslim neighborhoods were isolated behind barbed wire, under searchlights” (Stora 2001, 49). Massu’s men made “massive arrests, systematically took down names, and in ‘transit and sorting centers’, located on the periphery of the city, practiced torture” (Stora 2001, 50). The French released stories of FLN leadership mysteriously “committing suicide” after undergoing interrogations. Despite their questionable morality, the methods of using electrodes, dunking suspects in bathtubs, and severely beating them were effective and the FLN’s sub-organization in Algiers, the ZAA, was destroyed while attacks were reduced by nearly seventy-five percent in less than two months.
The French military’s means of obtaining information and results were not popular with many of the soldiers who were forced to enact them. For many of them, they would live with those “nightmares for the rest of their lives” (Stora 201, 50). On March 28, 1957 General Paris de Bollardière asked to be relieved of his duties in Algeria because he simply could not endorse torture after his experiences with the Nazis the previous decade. Massu’s Paratrooper’s Division responded by declaring, “One cannot fight against revolutionary war except with methods of clandestine action” (Stora 2001, 50). Paul Teitgen, the Secretary General of the Algiers police, resigned and spoke out against the practices of General Massu; he claimed that 3,024 individuals had disappeared during the Battle of Algiers (Stora 2001, 50). Despite these horrible practices, the paratroopers had the support of the colon population and Yacef Saadi, leader of the ZAA, was arrested at the end of September while his assistant committed suicide; the Battle of Algiers had finally come to an end.

**The War amongst the Algerian Muslim Population and the Expansion of the FLN**

It is important to pause for a moment and discuss the internal war that was occurring between Algerian political factions during this time. With the start of the Algerian War on November 1, 1954 there was no single structure or leadership within the organization of the FLN. On November 4, 1954 the Council of Ministers disbanded the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) which was headed by Messali Hadj and was meant to replace the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). Several hundred nationalist leaders were arrested and those who were not, were forced to hide underground or join the guerilla forces. The FLN intended to benefit from the MTLD’s dissolution and established “structures to intercept the majority of disoriented Messalists”
as well as take ownership of the weapons that they possessed and their connections abroad (Stora 2001, 57). Messali Hadj was adamantly against the start of the Algerian War and established the MNA or Mouvement National Algérien which was the only socialist faction to not eventually join the FLN’s cause.

There was a very clear differentiation between the “activists”, who formed the FLN, and the “Messalists”, who became members of the MNA, resulting in a struggle to gain the support of the “centralists”, which would lead the two organizations to violent confrontation in late 1955. During the first year of the war against the French, the FLN printed an assortment of propaganda directed at the MNA. The leader of the FLN in Algiers printed a pamphlet in which he referred to Messali Hadj as a “shame-faced old man who holds the Angoulême front, at the head of an army of police officers, which assures his protection against the anger of the people” (Stora 2001, 59). On December 10, after a year of passive verbal exchanges and propaganda, two FLN militants executed Sadek Rihani, the leader of the MNA in Algiers. For the rest of the war there existed an internal civil war that unfolded in both France and Algeria. The “‘shock commandos’ of the FLN and MNA waged a long, cruel battle using every means possible: traps, betrayal, infiltration, and executions to serve as an example, all of them sowing fear” (Stora 2001, 59). The especially brutal of actions of the FLN caused MNA supporters to turn and join the French forces. By the end of 1962, it was would be predicted that within France, the nationalist conflict would result in four thousand deaths, twelve thousand assaults, and over nine thousand injuries; the numbers within Algeria would be larger, with six thousand dead and over fourteen thousand wounded (Stora 2001, 59). The FLN would
emerge triumphant but at the expense of ten thousand dead civilians and a lack of a more moderate voice in Algeria’s post-war government.

During the first two years of the war, the FLN reached out and increased discussions with other divisions of the pro-independence movement yet despite these efforts, it expected the other parties to simply disband and their members to join its cause. Many of the centralists slowly joined the FLN, including Ferhat Abbas’ UDMA, which joined forces with the FLN after the Philippeville massacre. The FLN was able to obtain such support through the approval of the religious ulama, which “glorified the resistance to colonialism” (Stora 2001, 60). Even the Algerian Communists were incorporated into the FLN on July 1, 1956 (Stora 2001, 60). The unification of the political organizations naturally led to a strengthening of public support for complete independence.

The Soummam Congress, which was held on August 20, 1956, made official the dissolution of all other parties, including the ulama and UDMA. The twenty-day conference was based on the “assertion of the civil over the political… Its intention was to endow the FLN with formal structures and a clear chain of political command” (Evans 2007, 64). The Congress formed a thirty-four member Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne, which was to be the ruling body of the FLN and serve as a sort of parliamentary skeleton. This structure of collective leadership placed an emphasis on domestic issues. The sixteen men that congregated also gave a full assessment of their material capabilities and plans were formed to strengthen weapons supply operations. This led to a complete overhaul of the ALN, with the restructuring of Algerian territories and the formation of a regular army, including a very fixed hierarchy. This meeting was the only of its kind but it laid the groundwork for the future government of Algeria.
The Disintegration of the Fourth Republic of France and the Continuation of War

Entering the third year of the conflict, France was faced with a growing number of problems, including a deteriorating relationship with other nations as well as the colon population. A number of foreign countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, had begun to aid the FLN by providing Tunisia with weapons and funds. The French government also considered shortening the length of military service during this time because of its immense confidence in programs such as the electric barrier, known as the Morice Line. This electrified, barbed-wire fence spanned over one hundred and fifty miles across the Algerian-Tunisia border and was meant to prevent Tunisia guerillas from entering the colony. Any break in the wires was instantly registered on control panels in French military posts and brought detachments of troops to the area. Although these measures were extremely effective, it isolated Algeria, angering many of the colons. On March 13, police officers violently protested in Paris and a month later individuals who were beginning to crack under the pressures of the UN were voted out of the government (Stora 2001, 70). The fall of the franc, the lack of power in the administration, and the foreign trade deficit only added to the problems facing the government.

There was speculation for months regarding what or who was needed to restore France back to its prior greatness. One name that became increasingly popular was General Charles de Gaulle. A veteran of both World Wars, de Gaulle was Prime Minister of France’s Provisional Government in 1944 and he retired two years later following political conflicts. To “the army and settlers he presented himself as the man to save Algeria, while to the public at large he cast himself as the only bulwark against a military
takeover” (Evans 2007, 61). He had wonderful political instincts and although many people supported his candidacy, General de Gaulle waited to take control in an attempt to establish a new French government with increased presidential powers. After nearly a month of protests, killings, and threats within Algeria, the situation had become out of control and Robert Lacoste was called to Paris. A huge riot in Algiers trapped the French leadership and forced them to “facilitate General de Gaulle’s accession to power”; two days later the General announced that he was “ready to assume the powers of the Republic” (Stora 2001, 71). On May 26 the premier was convinced to resign and General de Gaulle’s investiture by the assembly occurred on June 1 (Metz 1994, 52). Three days later he traveled to Algeria where he declared, “I have understood you” (Metz 1994, 52). He proposed measures to improve the economic, social, and political status of the Muslims but at the same time gave hope to the colons and military for a future of assimilation. Very quickly he put forth a distinct plan and wanted to bring together both the Muslims and the Europeans; interestingly, he “banished from his speeches the expressions ‘French Algeria’ and ‘integration’” (Stora 2001, 73). On September 28, 1958 both Europeans and Muslim men and women voted in favor of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. During this time de Gaulle promised fifteen billion francs for public works and urban development in Algeria as well as a new plan for Muslim education. He was voted the first President of the Fifth Republic on December 21, 1958. The actions of General de Gaulle throughout the year, including offering pardons for the convicts in the FLN, caused concern amongst the pied noir, or colons, population.

By the middle of the 1959, after serious pressures from the international community and tremendous losses for the French, General de Gaulle declared that self-
determination must be the course that France pursues in the war. This came after the President began the year by ordering the army to perform the “harshest blows against the FLN” (Stora 2001, 75). The French started to once again make military progress and killed many of the higher level officials within the FLN framework. They also placed many Algerians in internment camps; by the end of the war nearly two million people had been displaced (Stora 2001, 75). Although de Gaulle initially gained much support from the colon and military populations, he understood that they were a large “part of rather than the solution to the insurgency problem” (Millen 2008, 33). He used the military push to create a situation where the French would have a favorable position in negotiation talks and did so by reducing the ALN troops in half by the end of the year (Millen 2008, 33). The President had created a situation where he was able to offer Algeria a moderate government with close ties to France but he did not anticipate the response from the European population.

The Colon and Military Response to Self-Determination

As the possibility of independence became clearer, Europeans began to fear for their future. The colons were outnumbered nine to one by the Muslim population and they knew that their lives in Algeria were finished once France pulled out their troops; they began to experience a “great panic” (Stora 2001, 77). On January 24, 1960 the colon activists, who were fearful that the French policy was beginning to waver, clashed with the gendarmes. These activists set up an entrenched camp in the name of French Algeria and called on the army and European community to support them (Stora 2001, 77). Although the rioters surrendered in the beginning of February, there had been suspicious activity by some officials within the French military against the French government. This
event, which would come to be known as “Barricades Week”, exposed some wavering within the command and military.

By the spring of 1960 the French army believed that it had won the war and on June 25 the FLN and the French government opened their first set of negotiations. Although nothing resulted from these talks, they brought an enormous hope to France for “peace and the return of the contingent” (Stora 2001, 79). Pressure grew from the international community, with Algerian leaders traveling across the world to garner the support of the UN. France’s African allies called for the country to recognize the nation’s right to self-determination as well. Even within France, people were uneasy with the prospect of forcing their imperialist views against the citizens’ free-will. Fifty-three youth movements in France came together and set forth a common position of wishing to see the war end. Other political organizations in France also banded together and signed a declaration wishing to see the start of negotiations. People were coming to the realization that there was no longer a possibility of re-establishing a pre-war Algeria.

The FLN was able to recover “through politics and diplomacy all the ground lost by the use of force” and on January 8, 1961, President de Gaulle submitted his policy of self determination to a referendum vote which passed overwhelmingly; negotiations were set to open on April 7 in Evian (Stora 2001, 77). It was at this time that General Salan, who had been banished from Algeria, organized the Organisation Armée Secrète, or OAS, to perform a counterrevolution led by the army and colons. General Maurice Challe, who had been transferred after suspicious activity during Barricades Week, secretly arrived in Algiers, along with Salan and two other generals, to launch a coup
d’état. The army had promised a French Algeria and it refused to give in to the country’s desire for self-determination.

On April 21, 1961, the Green Berets, or special forces of the French Navy, “marched on Algiers and seized the general government, the airfield, the city hall, and the weapons depot” (Stora 2001, 80). Within three hours the city had fallen and the French government declared a state of emergency. Because it lacked the overall support of the army, the French President understood that the putsch would be failure and called for resistance by soldiers against their officers. Five days after first taking the city, Maurice Challe surrendered and the putsch collapsed; the OAS however, continued to thrive.

After the putsch General Salan went underground and gained supreme command of the OAS, an organization with the objective of resisting Algerian disengagement and constructing a new “fraternal and French Algeria” (Stora 2001, 82). With the start of negotiations in Evian on May 20, the OAS adopted a policy of terrorism, attacking Muslims and government employees to create a barrier within negotiations. The organization began to gain support amongst the colon population and created a cohesive policy in the fall 1961 with the colons’ participation. The OAS even gained some support within the National Assembly. It organized massive demonstrations and General Salan claimed that he would be able to have an army of 100,000 men for the start of the following year. Yet, an increase in OAS actions resulted in an increase in repression by both the police networks and the FLN, with a severe increase in violence.

OAS actions became bolder as the prospect of negotiations became a clearer reality. Its members would be disguised as gendarmes, get prisoners released to them, and then execute them a few minutes later. They murdered six leaders within the academic
realm, including Mouloud Feraoun, a writer and friend of Albert Camus, another famous Algerian-born French author. The members also resorted to bazooka attacks on the barracks of the gendarmes and booby-trapped cars in Muslim neighborhoods. Fear became something that people of Algiers lived with, yet the OAS did not succeed to halting the pro-independence movement.

The Evian Accords and Algerian Independence

After eight years of intense fighting, a cease-fire was signed on March 19, 1962 and people in both Algeria and France rejoiced. Negotiators for the FLN made a few concessions regarding the rights of Europeans (dual nationality for three years, then the option of Algerian nationality or the status of privileged resident alien), control of the Sahara (preferential rights for French companies in the distribution of research and exploitation permits for six years, payment for Algerian fossil fuels in French francs), and the military bases (Mers el-Kebir was to remain French for a period of fifteen years and the installations in the Sahara for five years) (Stora 2001, 98).

The French in return offered economic and financial aid to the Algerians, including sixty-two thousand acres of land for Muslim farmers, the construction of housing for one million people, regular employment for four thousand new workers, schooling for all Algerian children within three years, and salaries and benefits equal to those in the metropolis (Stora 2001, 98). The agreement also took into account the French citizens within Algeria and required that their property rights be respected and that they have a fair and equal role in the government.

Despite this reassurance, OAS attacks continued and in fact became even more violent. During the month of May, “ten to fifty Algerians in Oran were slaughtered by the OAS on a daily basis” (Stora 2001, 100). Europeans were fleeing the cities (ten thousand left in May) and the FLN leaders were finding it “increasingly difficult to hold back an
exasperated Muslim population who wanted to strike back” (Stora 2001, 100). Many of the original leaders including Salan were arrested and the OAS understood that its fight was over and yet it refused to leave without incident. It continued to enact its policy of “scorched-earth”; finally at the end of June, after setting the city of Oran on fire, the remaining members of the OAS went into exile while thousands of Europeans continued to leave the country.

On July 1, 1962, six million voters in Algeria declared that they wanted to become an independent state within the guidelines of the Evian Accords; only 16,534 voted no. After seven years of bloodshed, the Algerians rejoiced in their new-found autonomy yet there were still final purges and violent acts occurring within the country. Four days after the vote, a massive Muslim mob entered the European city of Oran and proceeded to hunt for anyone who remained. In the end, ninety-five people were killed, twenty of whom were European, and one hundred and sixty-one were wounded. In the end 3,080 people were abducted, of which 257 were killed (Stora 2001, 106). This was the last battle within French Algeria, yet another battle, one for control, was about to ensue in the country.

**The Consequences of War**

The war of Algerian liberty cost both France and its former colony severe economic and social setbacks. It is difficult to make an accurate calculation of the financial costs but it has been estimated that solely during the war, France lost twenty-seven to fifty billion francs, or ten to eighteen percent of its GDP (Stora 2001, 107). The various reparations were an addition seven billion and these totals do not include the income lost by their loss of income from Algeria. There has also been a discrepancy with
the total number of casualties on both sides. In 1962, the FLN estimated that nearly three hundred thousand people were dead from war-related causes although “Algerian sources later put that figure at approximately 1.5 million, while French officials estimated it at 350,000” (Metz 1994, 55). Another estimated sixty-nine thousand Muslims were killed by the ALN due to internal purges (Stora 2001, 110). The French never formally released their losses but it is estimated that nearly twelve thousand citizens perished. These numbers do not include the massacre of the harkis, Muslims who aided the French, the Europeans, or the losses during the clashes for power after 1962. The total human loss of the war and its aftermath will never truly be known.

The Less Immediate Results of the War for Independence

There were many aspects of the war that had residual consequences; one of these was the questioning and use of torture. The French army’s “use of torture has been the focus of public controversy since the war years, and the horrific details that emerged from survivors’ accounts later became inescapable reference points for an entire generation in France” (Hargreaves 2005, 126). At the time the use of torture, rape, and resettlement were given the names of social, police, or psychological operations but the leaders of the FLN reached out to the international community and exposed the French acts for what they were, making France a subject of global controversy. Stories of atrocities have come forth and have been verified by key military players in the conflict, including General Massu, who controlled the Paratroopers of Algiers. This completely shattered the romantic image that many French citizens had of the conflict and caused them to resent the amnesty laws that were passed throughout the next thirty years.
Another lingering issue was that of the Algerian immigration to France during the years of the war; the number had doubled during that period. Most “of the immigrants were men” between the ages of twenty and forty who had been displaced due to French military policy (Stora 2001, 63). During this time nearly one million men of working age were unemployed in Algeria and France was in serious need of workers to replace the men who had been sent to fight (Stora 2001, 64). This would later become a problem when the immigration laws within France would tighten and people were only able to move to the country through family reunification. Even today, the issue of immigration, especially of peoples from North African countries, plagues French politics.

The Evian Accords assured that the new Algerian government maintained close ties with France; the intertwining of interests, despite very distinct differences, has led to the continuation of a tense relationship. Algeria continues to celebrate its independence from France yet the European nation chose to have a collective memory of denial; it did not publicly acknowledge that a war was fought until 1999. For the Algerians, the war for their independence justified the use of violence to obtain political success and reinforce the ideology of the FLN. Thirty years later, this theory would be used to validate the actions of the organization with their struggle to maintain their position in government against the FIS.
Chapter 3: The Algerian Civil War

Twenty-five years after achieving independence from France, Algeria was almost unrecognizable, having undergone radical changes in its economic, societal, and cultural foundation. From the ashes of the war arose a fairly stable, single party system which was “legitimized by the conquest of national independence and grounded in the key institutions of the nationalist struggle, the party, and the army” (Mortimer, 1996, 18).

With a new-found freedom and government, what was once a rather rural nation now had iron and steel complexes, oil refineries, fertilizer factories, and natural gas liquification plants. By the end of the 1970’s, the country was “one vast construction site where everywhere roads, factories, and schools were being built” (Martinez 2000, 2). Algeria began to invest heavily in education and health care, leading to a drop in infant mortality and a significant increase in the population (Pierre 1995, 134). Young Algerians, including women, were given increased accessibility to an education. The number of wage-earning jobs had increased dramatically, making the shift from 700,000 in 1963 to 2,300,000 in 1981; to fill these positions, people began moving to urban centers (Stora 2001, 193). These positive changes in Algerian society were relatively immediate; yet in the late 1970s and 1980s, the flaws in the government’s programs began to show.

Although the Algerian regime was able to maintain a relatively stable position for over a decade, its projects of industrialization and national improvements were overambitious; problems began to wear down the single party establishment. Beginning in the 1970s and into the 1980s three crises simultaneously faced the nation, the most obvious beginning economic (Pierre 1995, 132). The sudden increase in population and urbanization rates produced a housing crisis where “one million housing units would
have had to be built within ten years merely to reduce the scarcity to its 1973 level” (Stora 2001, 193). At this time there was an inadequacy of hydraulic equipment which led to water rationing in most large cities. The Algerian regime had made vast changes to improve the health of its citizens but it had not prepared properly for the inevitable result of an increased population.

In the late 1970s the number of unemployed began to increase and affect the younger generations of Algerians. In 1985, “nearly seventy-two percent of those looking for work were under twenty-five” and this segment of the population was a direct product of the “Arabized” education that the regime had tried to put forth since gaining power (Stora 2001, 193). The youths that were now looking for work in Algeria were of the first generation completely educated in the independent nation and they were barely literate in either Arabic or French (Pierre 1995, 134). This population of youths, unacquainted with the war against the French, began to become disenchanted with the regime under President Chadli Benjedid. Up until this point, the FLN’s power rested on a legitimacy which was founded in the idea that the political party had obtained Algeria its independence from the French. They relied on war-time stories and depended on the older generations to instill this respect in the younger populations of the nation. When this failed to transpire, the administration’s war-time rhetoric was no longer effective and therefore its legitimacy came into question.

To implement these sudden changes in infrastructure and society, Algeria took out billions of dollars worth of loans with high interest rates. The country’s economy was dependent upon oil and gas revenues, and fossil fuels represented nearly a third of the nation’s GDP at the end of the 1970s (Stora 2001, 186). The leaders of the government
depended upon the increasing revenues from this sector to repay their loans, a plan which backfired when oil prices tumbled in the 1980s. For a period of time oil revenues were large enough to allow “a boom in consumer goods” and a private sector emerged, as did a large gap between the rich and poor classes (Pierre 1995, 134). This gap led to further embitterment when the oil market plummeted. There was a lack of consumer goods and a scarcity in hard currency as a result. Citizens had to suffer shortages of cooking oil, coffee, and tea; “women waited in long lines for scare and expensive food while young men milled in frustration on street corners unable to find work” (Metz 1994, 62). The economic and socio-cultural crises were about to combine and create an explosive political crisis.

During this time of economic disaster, Islamists were able to increase their influence over a population who felt that their government had been unable to fulfill its economic promises. In the late 1970s, “Muslim activists engaged in isolated and relatively small-scale assertions of their will: harassing women whom they felt were dressed inappropriately, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting official imams from their mosques” (Metz 1994, 62). The Islamists increased their activism and called for the dissolution of the National Charter and the formation of an Islamic government in 1982.

Islam had always been a unifying force in Algeria and had played a role in the decisions of past leaders of the nation; Ben Bella banned the marketing of alcohol, Boumedienne chose Friday, the day of prayer, as the new weekend day, and Benjedid promoted the 1984 Family Code, which deprived women of the freedom to act on their own by making them wards of their family prior to marriage and accountable to their
husbands after marriage (Tahi 1995, 214). It was in the same year, 1984, that the government turned to religious leaders to “attest that its regime was essentially in conformity with Islam” and in return built one of the largest Islamic universities in the world amidst economic strife (Tahi, 1995, 214). The concessions that the government presented to the Islamists did not improve the status of its economy which was directly linked to the country’s social issues. Political Islam, “just like any other extremist ideology, nourishes itself essentially on poverty and hopelessness. Economic insecurity breeds fear, and fear breeds intolerance and violence in Algeria” (Tahi, 1995, 214). The single-party regime no longer held popular favor amongst its citizens and saw Islamists as a potential threat to its monopoly on power.

**Economic Reforms under Bendjedid**

Algeria’s third President, Chadli Bendjedid, came into power in 1979 and adopted a guideline of distancing himself from the economic policies of his predecessor, Houari Boumedienne. Under his plan,

basic industries were accused of monopolizing investment capital to the detriment of other sectors, running up external debt by their voracious cash demands, and operating bloated, bureaucratized enterprises at such low levels of productivity that they weighed down the whole economy. They had failed to create jobs in the numbers expected and those created were concentrated in three or four privileged northern towns while most of the country remained an economic backwater. The lack of attention to agriculture and consumer industry generated demand for imports that wasted foreign currency reserves and threatened the ability of the economy to capitalize growth in the future (Ruedy, 2005, 233).

Inheriting a litany of public complaints, Bendjedid adopted the first five-year plan, which aimed at providing solutions to many of these problems. Under this plan, industry was given only 38.6% of the state’s total investment, which was used to complete pre-existing
projects. The agricultural sector received an increased 11.7% of investment, and there was also an increase in housing, healthcare, and other social infrastructure projects.

A second five-year plan was passed by the FLN Central Committee in May 1984 with the recognition that “means of implementation were at least as important as goals themselves in achieving the better life” (Ruedy 2005, 233). The regime was trying to prepare its citizens for the continuation of the economic crisis that would occur before the improvements to the system would be felt by the general public. Citizens’ faith in the regime was waverering, and before the reforms had time to make an impact on the economy, the society began to react violently. In 1985, there was serious rioting in the Casbah and by 1986 the protests, organized primarily by young students, had spread across the country to Algiers, Oran, Skikda, Constantine, and Setif. The riots, strikes, and protests of 1987 were a “continuation of student unrest but also the beginning of labor unrest spreading rapidly from one sector to another” (Ruedy, 2005, 248). Eight years after the first Benjedid economic plan went into effect, wages remained stagnant, while prices soared and unemployment was at its highest rate in over a decade. There had not been an increase in new capital in the industrial sector as was hoped for, and popular perceptions of corruption within the government were furthering the feelings of resentment.

Protests and riots had been plaguing the nation during the month of September 1988 and finally these events reached the city of Algiers on October 2, when postal employees went on strike. There were calls within the city for a general strike on October 4, and although such a strike did not occur, “secondary school students did walk out and their movement spread rapidly amongst laborers and unemployed young people” (Ruedy
2005, 248). The next day the movement turned into a “popular revolt against a system legitimized by the ideals of November 1954” (Tahi 1995, 198). Thousands of young men stormed the center of the city, where they destroyed government and party property. Over the next two days the movement, which included student groups, unionists, and fundamentalists, spread to Oran, Blida, Annaba and many other towns throughout the nation.

The response of the FLN was quick and swift. Although the party did not outright blame the Islamists, it claimed that the “irresponsibles were manipulated by secret partners” (Stora 2001, 196). The President called in the military to restore order on October 6 and announced a state of siege (Mortimer 1996, 21). The military repression that would come to dominate the next decade had begun; the armed forces used clubs, tear gas, live ammunition, and several different kinds of automatic weapons to quell the masses. In the end, “before order was more or less restored on October 10, hundreds of Algerians-mostly young men- had died and thousands had been taken into custody where many were tortured” (Ruedy 2005, 248). This response left the country angered at the military as well as the single-party system and the repression did not halt opposition but rather encouraged its growth. Citizens from all classes began to call for the administration’s recognition of its role in the events in addition to a change of government.

President Benjedid responded to these calls for change and by the end of the month he had outlined a clear strategy for reform, which included making the government responsible to Parliament (Assemblée Populaire et Nationale- APN), summoning a party congress to consider other constitutional reforms, and asking for a
popular referendum on proposed reforms that would revise the 1976 Constitution (Ruedy 2005, 249). There were three goals in the proposed referendum which the regime hoped would please the people: “separation of state and the FLN, freedom of candidacies in municipal and legislative elections and the independence of ‘mass organizations’” (Stora 2001, 197). On November 3, Algerians approved the constitutional amendments with ninety-three percent of the vote and President Benjedid appointed Colonel Kasdi Merbah as the state’s new Prime Minister. That December the sixth regular party Congress met to discuss the next candidate for Presidency. Despite receiving strong criticism of the new changes that he tried to implement, which undercut the privileged position of the FLN, Benjedid received the nomination as the FLN candidate for Presidency for a third term and was elected on December 22 (Ruedy 2005, 249). After securing his power, Benjedid was able to bring his reforms directly to the people. In presenting these reforms, the President hoped to give the people enough political freedoms to temporarily placate them, which would in turn protect his administration.


In February 1989 Algerian voters overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution, which had the goal of creating a more plural system in the country and provide the break with the past that the citizens so desired. This new Constitution guaranteed “the freedoms and basic rights of man and the citizen” including freedom of expression, association and meeting (Ruedy 2005, 250). With the previous political system in Algeria, the Presidency, the FLN party, and the army were the three main centers of power, yet the new Constitution only allowed the President to retain his influence. The new document no longer mentioned socialism or the FLN and Article 40 opened the nation to a multi-
party system (Stora 2001, 198). The army was characterized as “a military institution for the defense of the unity and sovereignty of the nation” and in March the army officially withdrew its participation from all political bodies (Ruedy 2005, 250). There was an enormous amount of excitement surrounding these changes, yet the regime had not effectively prepared for the differences that would come with a more plural and democratic government.

After the approval of the new Constitution, there was a wealth of legislation from the APN designed to expedite the democratization process. It produced “a new law on political associations, a new electoral law, and a new public information act” in addition to abolishing the State Security Council, the main purpose of which was punish political deviation (Ruedy 2005, 251). It was also during this time that Prime Minister Merbah tried to reform business operations and restart the growth of the economy. Merbah’s economic policy encountered difficulties, including the challenge of learning the new methods of management, the absence of a stock exchange, the scarcity of means for making foreign debt payments, the lack of social consensus, the lack of an economic and democratic culture within civil society, and the blocking of reform by the deputies, all of whom belonged to the FLN (Stora 2001, 199).

These problems in addition to the continuation of strikes, shortages, and inflation led President Benjedid to fire Merbah and replace him with Mouloud Hamrouche.

Citizens took advantage of the new pluralistic government and the weakness of the current regime by forming new parties to challenge the status-quo. Leaders of parties who had previously opposed the FLN returned from exile, including Hocine Ait Ahmed of the Front des Forces Socialists (FFS) and Ahmed Ben Bella, who returned to lead the Mouvement pour la Démocratie en Algérie (MDA). It was not solely pre-established
parties that came to challenge the regime, however; in fact forty-four parties were formed within that first year. Human rights leagues, women’s rights organizations, and cultural movements all developed and “the democratization process was real, even though the FLN remained a dominant party” (Stora 2001, 199). Of the parties that emerged, thirty-three were officially recognized, the majority of which were secular in nature. Of the three parties that were religious, it would be the Front Islamique du Salut that would come to be the largest threat to the FLN and its grip on power.

**The Formation of the FIS**

The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was a coalition of Islamic groups whose leaders came together on February 18, 1989 to discuss their unification. Although it publicly announced its formation of an allied party on March 10, the group was composed of two main currents, the radical Salafis and the Djazarists (Ruedy 2005, 251). The members of the Islamic movement, including both the Salafis and the Djazarists, recruited not only the underprivileged but also the young elite in the mass education institutions who faced a lack of “job outlets that corresponded to their qualifications and met their aspirations, as well as a lack of access to any posts of responsibility” (Tahi 1995, 215). The agenda of the Djazarists did not contain a revolutionary dimension and it believed in the “necessity of change, informing the population about the relevance of Islam to a modern life, and activism in spreading Islamic values and practices” (Ruedy, 2005, 251). It felt that the taking of power legally through elections was the only way to truly have a stable Islamic state. The Salafists, on the other hand, felt the necessity to establish “an immediate Islamic state after the taking of power by arms” (Tahi, 1995, 215). This section was an offshoot of reformist salafism and demanded rapid
transformation of the Algerian state and society (Ruedy 2005, 251). The majority of this sect was comprised of imams or preachers in districts that subscribed to the traditional Arabic language and Islamic education. Many of the Salafists were also former members of the Buyali band, a group that had taken up arms in the 1980s, or veterans of the war in Afghanistan (Mortimer 1996, 23). It would be the Salafists who would later form the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), a military organization that would make it extremely difficult to hold negotiations between the regime and that FIS front.

The official authorization of the FIS marked the first time a Muslim and Arab nation sanctioned a political party that had Islam at its foundation, a fact that was made very clear with its official declaration. The group highlighted seven key objectives, some of which would be abandoned as the struggle for representation continued. The FIS was initially founded with the goals of “the preservation of the unity of the Muslim umma, the substitution of Islamic ideology for imported ideology, movement via a middle path, tactical moderation, collective action, encouraging the spirit of initiative, and the safeguarding of Islamic historical and cultural heritage” (Ruedy 2005, 252). The party was led by Abassi Madani, who served as President, and Ali Benhadj, the FIS’ Vice-President. Many in the FLN party feared the potential of the FIS, knowing the important role that religion plays in Algerian society, but the President and Prime Minister believed that institutional guarantees were strong enough to defeat any threat.

**FIS Victories and the Military Coup**

With the new formation of a multi-party system, the President announced that local and provincial elections would be held in June 1990. The electoral system was established in such a way that it would overwhelmingly favor the largest party, which
was presumed to be the FLN, and as a result many of the smaller, secular parties including the FFS decided to boycott these elections. In addition to unfair practices, these parties had little time to establish a grassroots foundation whereas the FIS, which had links to over 9,000 mosques, had an “instant and effective organization” (Ruedy 2005, 253). On June 12, the FIS party won 54% of the popular vote, whereas the FLN garnered 28%; these results translated to the FIS obtaining control of 800 out of 1500 municipal councils including Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Annaba (Ruedy 2005, 253). At the time, the government thought that economic and social measures would allow it to limit the FIS’ influence. This was a misunderstanding of the significant grassroots work done by the Islamist militants; but above all, it was a poor judgment of what made the FIS strong: its conception of the nation as exclusively Muslim and rid of all foreign influence (Stora 2001, 203).

To those who voted, a vote for the FIS party was seen as a vote in protest of the current regime, yet the outcome of this democratic election was not what the FLN or the military had hoped for.

Immediately the FIS began to implement and enforce its Islamist agenda which sometimes conflicted with constitutional requirements. Within its districts, the organization began closing schools that were co-educational, forbidding married women to work outside of the home, requiring all women to wear headscarves, and prohibiting all alcohol (Ruedy 2005, 253). The FIS strengthened its new-found authority with the start of the Gulf War. As an organization which opposed all foreign influence, it began to call on the FLN to assist its Islamic brethren and wanted to send volunteers to fight against Western forces. The FLN refused to further stretch its already limited resources and thousands of people marched on the streets in protest. Despite conflicting opinions
toward Saddam Hussein amongst the Algerian population, all parties condemned the actions of the West and once again provided the Islamists with leverage against the current regime.

The FIS party began lobbying for parliamentary elections under the new multi-party system to replace the 1987 APN. After “great controversy and internal splits, the regime decided to go ahead with parliamentary elections in December 1991 and foolishly adopted an electoral system similar to the French two-cycle, winner-take-all model” (Pierre 1995, 135). In an attempt to ensure a pro-FLN outcome of the elections, legislation was passed which promoted gerrymandering favoring the party, the implementation of a ban on campaigning at mosques and schools, and the repeal of the right of men to cast votes for their wives” (Ruedy 2005, 254). Islamists naturally opposed these measures and organized a strike, which the military interpreted as an assault on the state. While “the strike was not especially well organized or successful, demonstrations and the occupation of public places by FIS supporters” made the military fearful of a possible assault (Ruedy 2005, 254). The military believed that the policies of the Homrouche government were too permissive and after severe pressure from Major General Khaled Nezzar, the President declared a state of siege on June 4, which resulted in fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests (Ruedy 2004, 254). A new Prime Minister, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, was appointed and promised reform of the new electoral laws. Although this temporarily placated the FIS, the two leaders of the party were calling for an Islamic Republic and threatened the regime with a jihad by the end of the month. The army quickly moved in again and arrested Madani, Benhadj, and hundreds more. The FIS
Council quickly named Abdelkader Hachani as the temporary leader of the party and outbursts of violence continued in the months leading up to the election.

The first round of the elections took place on December 26 and the government continued to assume that it could turn this winner-take-all system “to its own advantage, winning more seats than it would be entitled to through a popular vote” (Pierre 1995, 135). The opposite actually occurred and even though the FIS received one million votes fewer than in the municipal elections, “the non-Islamist vote was so badly fragmented” that it became clear that the FIS would overwhelmingly win the second round of elections (Pierre 1995, 135). In this first round, the FIS received 47.54% of the vote, which translated to 188 out of 430 districts, whereas the FLN won 15 and the FFS won 26 districts (Ruedy 2005, 255). The government and FLN claimed that the elections were invalid since there were massive voting irregularities and an abstention rate of 39%, but despite these serious concerns it appeared that the President was going to continue with the second round of elections (Ruedy 2005, 255). Despite his intentions to fulfill his promise for a more democratic and pluralistic government, Benjedid’s actions would not be accepted by the majority of the regime.

Members of the government’s cabinet, including military officials, felt that the transfer of power to the FIS would be an utter disaster for a variety of reasons. Some in the regime were, “concerned about preserving the secular, nationalist traditions of the nation and others about maintaining its fragile transition to democracy. Still others were concerned about losing personal power and access to wealth” (Ruedy 2005, 255). The military leaders had come to a common decision and informed President Benjedid that he was to step down as the leader of Algeria. He resigned on January 11, 1992, after
dissolving the Parliament; this created the difficult question of leadership since the replacement, according to the constitution, is the Speaker of the APN. The military leaders of the coup decided that power would be passed to the only constitutional body of power left, which was a Presidential advisory committee, known as the Haut Comité de Sécurité (HCS). The HCS was a “hastily convened body made up of Ghozali, the Prime Minister, along with Benhabiles, President of the Supreme Court, Benkhelil, the Justice Minister, Brahimi, the Foreign Affairs Minister, and three senior military officials: Nezzar, the Defense Minister, Belkheir, the Interior Minister, and Guenaizia, the Chief of Staff” (Evans 2007, 171). The HCS declared that the December election was annulled and that the second round of legislative elections would not go on as planned. To fill the vacuum of power that now existed, the organization created the Haut Comité d’État (HCE), a five-person political body that would serve as a collective presidency until elections could be held at the end of 1993. This new organization now created a severely unstable political situation in Algeria, where the regime in power was lacking legitimacy while another party was willing to use violent actions to obtain power.

The High State Council and the Descent into War

The HCE was immediately rejected by the major political parties in Algeria, including the certain members of the FLN, who believed that “nobody was entitled to stop the electoral process” (Tahi 1995, 200). Nearly a quarter of the population had voted for the FIS during the election and naturally they felt that “they had played by the rules and passionately believed that the second round should have proceeded” (Ruedy 2005, 258). It was at this time that the Salafists came into ascension, as it had proved that the Djazarists’ theory of political action held little clout in overthrowing the current regime.
In the beginning of 1992, Algeria was a deeply divided country in need of a leader who could rejuvenate and reconcile. This individual came in the form of Mohamed Boudiaf, a hero from the Revolution who had been in exile in Morocco for many years. He initially delivered harsh criticisms against both the regime and the FIS party and believed that he could, “steer the country between the dual shoals of the old FLN order and the new Islamism while averting a complete takeover by the army” (Mortimer 1996, 26). Boudiaf returned to Algeria and became the acting President of the High State Council. The other four members of the HCE were Major General Khaled Nezzar, Colonel Ali Kafi, Tidjani Haddam, a former minister of religious affairs, and Ali Haroun, who had been the head of the Office National des Anciens Moudjahidine. Within the HCE the impact of the army was felt and it adopted a goal of completely repressing the FIS before the new elections in 1993.

The division between Djazarists and Salafis became increasingly pronounced as the Algerian regime relied more on violence as a means of suppressing the opposition. The Djazarists had yet to form a military branch to counter the actions of the Salafis. The group had evolved “from an informal, mostly francophone group of Algiers University faculty and students and had developed in the intellectual path laid out by Malek Bennabi, a French-educated professor” (Ruedy 2005, 251). The Djazarists party came to power within the FIS organization after the consultative council “named Abdelkader Hachani, a representative of the moderate djazarist wing, as interim head of the party” in the middle of 1991 (Ruedy 2005, 254). Under his leadership, street activism markedly declined and the anti-violence message of the Djazarists was promoted. Even after the establishment of the HCE, Hachani and other FIS leaders called “upon demonstrators to
avoid violence and sought cooperation with other parties—such as the FFS and the FLN” (Ruedy 2005, 259). The policy that the Algerian administration adopted in the beginning of 1992 made it increasingly difficult for FIS supporters to embrace the ideology of the Djazarists.

Despite the change in leadership within the FIS, the Salafis, which was primarily comprised of imams or preachers in popular districts with traditional Arabic language and Islamic education, was validated in its quest for jihad with the cancellation of the 1992 elections. It was also during this time that the organization began to separate into smaller armed groups. The main one from 1991 until 1993 was the Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA), which was reconstituted with the “belief in the efficacy and importance of armed struggle” (Willis 1997, 269). Although the group preferred not to attack the regime directly, it began to launch individual operations against the security forces after the establishment of the HCE in 1992 (Willis 1997, 269). By the summer of that year the MIA had become the main source of organized armed resistance within the party. Despite the effectiveness of the MIA, it was not the only armed group to exist during this time; “Personal ambition and ideological differences played a significant part in the formation of the dissident groupings” (Willis 1997, 280). The MIA was a forerunner for the Groupement Islamique Armé (GIA), which was based on the ideology that “We reject the religion of democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equal to sedition. It has never been our intention to participate in elections or enter parliament. The right to legislate belongs solely to God” (Willis 1997, 282). Although the leader of the GIA, Mansour Meliani, was arrested by security forces in the middle of June 1992,
the organization would regroup in 1993 and become one of the most violent factions within the FIS.

Although the Djazarists continued to call for an avoidance of violence, the army began to arrest suspected members of the party the day after it was announced that the second round of elections were cancelled. News of “the arrests and violent measures taken by police brought dramatic increases in the number and size of protests, which ranged from street marches to blockades of public buildings, student strikes, and massive demonstrations outside mosques after Friday prayers” (Ruedy 2005, 259). Party leaders, including Djazarist leader Hachani, were arrested for encouraging revolts against the army and the government began to severely limit the press coverage that the FIS actions were getting. Despite these measures, the protests continued and on February 9, 1992, the High State Council declared a state of siege, which “empowered the Interior Minister to take all actions necessary to maintain law and order” (Ruedy 2005, 259). The next day, for the first time since its formation, the Islamists publicly declared responsibility for the deaths of eight police officers; with these mass arrests it was no longer possible for the Djazarists to provide a balance to the Salafis’ argument. By early February it was estimated that between fifty and a hundred and fifty people had been killed and between two hundred and seven hundred had been wounded in the protests; several thousand had been arrested and sent to internment camps (Ruedy 2005, 259). The goal of dismantling the FIS was growing with urgency as the political crisis continued.

On March 4 of the same year, the Algiers Judicial Council officially dissolved the FIS political party and by the end of the month the government had disbanded nearly half of the councils that the FIS had won in the municipal elections. These actions of the
government did not destroy the Islamist movement but simply forced it underground. During this time, Boudiaf “strove to avert the slide into violence by promising a radical change of the old order and criticizing the corruption which had characterized the Benjedid years” (Mortimer 1996, 27). He did not support the principles of the Islamist parties but understood that acts of compromise, such as the closing of some of the internment camps, were necessary to avoid a catastrophic conflict. His opposition to the FLN made him a threat to those in power and his willingness to negotiate made him a target for organizations like the Armed Islamic Group, which believed that compromise would not result in an Islamic Republic. Boudiaf was assassinated on June 29 although it was never determined if it was the act of the Islamists or the government itself.

On July 3, Ali Kafi became the new President of the High State Council and inherited a further deteriorating political and security situation as well as a fragile economy. The murder of Boudiaf “hastened the polarization into two camps: the military and the Islamist movement, which gradually fell under the sway of its most violent elements” (Mortimer 1996, 27). At first, Islamist violence, led by the MIA, was directed at soldiers, police, and their facilities, yet on August 26 the rules of the conflict changed when a bomb exploded in the international terminal at the Algiers airport. This marked one of the first random acts of violence against citizens and as a result ten people were killed and at least one hundred were injured (Ruedy 2005, 261). By November, the estimates of the number of deaths ranged from three thousand to six thousand people and it was at this time that the government imposed a curfew in the major cities that served as hotbeds for FIS activity in Algeria.
Just as there was a division within the FIS organization over the use of violence, there was a division within the current regime between the Eradicators and the Conciliators. The Eradicators were composed of members from the Rally for Culture and Democracy, a liberal, secular political party, the Parti de L’Avant Garde Socialiste, a communist organization that was the second most powerful party in the 1960s and 1970s, and the Sécurité Militaire, all of whom banned together to refuse a referendum and demand the annihilation of the FIS. The Conciliators were comprised of members of the FFS, FLN, MDA, and HAMAS, a moderate Islamist party, and demanded “a gesture of receptivity from the authorities and the inclusion of the ex-FIS in the dialogue” (Tahi 1995, 205). These divisions would continue to plague Algeria and make it extremely difficult for any form of popular resolution to be produced.

A year after the resignation of President Benjedid, the cancellation of the elections, and the establishment of the High State Council, Islamist organizations more than doubled its attacks, which now included non-combatant individuals. General Nezzar narrowly escaped an assassination attempt with a car bomb in February 1993. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began to reform as a coalition of urban terrorist groups, which were responsible for the first assassinations of “civilian intellectuals” beginning in March 1993 (Mortimer 1996, 28). Former Prime Minister Qasdi Mirbah published an open letter calling for the FIS to enter into negotiations with other political parties, namely those of the Conciliators, as a means of forming a government of national union. Since he was referring to negotiations and a mutual compromise as a means of ending the violence, he posed a threat to the ideology of the GIA and was murdered by the organization in August (Mortimer, 1996, 32). In October, three French consular officers were kidnapped
and released with a note demanding that all foreigners leave the country by the end of the month; beginning in November, these Islamist armed forces began to specifically target all foreigners who refused to heed this warning (Ruety 2005, 261). In the end the GIA killed thirty-four foreigners between September 1992 and March 1993 (Roberts 2003, 154). This naturally concerned many Western nations, specifically France, which began to send weapons and financial aid to the Algerian military as the attacks on its citizens by the GIA increased.

As 1993 came to a close, the mandate for the High State Council was set to expire and a new President was to be elected. The National Dialogue Commission was formed in September 1993 with the “specific task of achieving a consensus with the opposition parties on the nature of the new governing body that the HCE had pledged itself to cede power to when its own two year ‘mandate’ expired at the end of the year” (Willis 1997, 311). It was hoped that the Commission would result in a reconciliation conference attended by all of the political parties, but since the Conciliators refused to participate without the FIS, the talks were futile. Recognizing that the nation was no more stable now than it was two years ago, the High Security Council appointed Defense Minister Liamine Zeroual as President for a three year term and dissolved the HCE.

**The Insurgency in the Civil War**

After 1993, the amount of violence within the nation intensified and it was estimated that the attacks and murders attributed to both the Islamist groups and the actions of reprisal by the Algerian forces resulted in 30,000 deaths by the end of 1994; after May of that year between forty-five and sixty people were killed everyday (Stora 2001, 215). Islamist armed groups became the most effective methods of promoting the
ideology of the FIS religious movement as it increased its violence over the next two years. Even before the political crisis that befell Algeria in 1992, there were Islamic groups which believed that jihad was the only way to obtain an Islamic state, including the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), which would later battle the GIA for control over the Islamist movement. After 1992, the GIA would become the most successful, radical, and violent wing of the movement and was developed by numerous insurgency cells which banded together. Its official slogan was “No dialogue, No truce, No reconciliation” and it condemned all non-believers in jihad, even if they were active members of the FIS party (Ruedy 2005, 263). Under Ahmed Ben Aicha, the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) was formed in May 1994. By this time the FIS had considered negotiating with the Algerian government and therefore was labeled as a traitor by the GIA; therefore the AIS was in direct opposition the armed movement of the GIA (Ruedy 2005, 264). AIS attracted many FIS loyalists as well as some fighters from the MIA and a considerable number of army deserters. It proclaimed itself the “armed wing of the FIS”, and although it did maintain that jihad was a way of establishing an Islamic state, it did not feel that this policy was imperative; it also condemned the specific targeting of civilians.

Despite the formation of the AIS as a means of balancing the actions of the GIA, the latter increased their terrorist attacks on civilians. On the rebellion’s side there was a mass attack “by 150-200 armed men on the prison of Tazoult, near Batna, in which some 900 prisoners (1,684 according to a FIS statement) were freed, mostly FIS militants and condemned Islamist terrorists” (Roberts 2003, 152). The armed Islamist group also murdered the Director of Communications in the office of the Prime Minister and one
week later killed a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these two attacks meant that “the terror was now unprecedentedly close to front-rank political office-holders” (Roberts 2003, 152). It was also during this time that the GIA announced that “anyone who attended a regime school, followed a lifestyle contrary to Islamic teaching, or failed to support jihad was a target” and as a result they began setting off bombs in restaurants, post offices, markets, cinemas, and other public places (Ruedy 205, 264). It adopted the policy of compliance terrorism, or terrorism directed at Muslims to obtain compliance, as well as organizational terrorism, which had the goal of strengthening the organization. These are the same policies that the FLN had successfully used in the 1950s to defeat the French. On October 6, 1994 the Minister of Education announced that over six hundred schools had been burned or destroyed and fifty civilian teachers had been killed (Stora 2001, 216). Communes and villages were forced to pay large fees to members of the GIA and those who did not would suffer large scale massacres. It was through threats and massive acts of violence that the GIA obtained the support, or at the very least compliance, of the general public.

It was not solely the policy of the Islamists that caused massive casualties. Civilians also suffered under the tactics of the Algerian police and military forces. These tactics included the “indiscriminate targeting of young males in communes supportive of the FIS as well as arrests, torture aimed at extracting information and summary executions” (Ruedy 2005, 265). There is also evidence that soldiers acted out terrorist acts dressed as insurgents as a way to increase support for their goal, which was to maintain the power of the current regime. By dressing in disguise, the military would be promoting the image that the violent acts of the Islamists discredited their claim to power.
It was also reported that attacks on civilians near military posts would generate no response from the forces itself, which chose only to help those that it knew were never pro-FIS.

**Elections and Constitutions of 1996**

President Zeroual had previously associated himself with the Conciliators and believed that military means alone would not restore civil order. Although he and his government carried on dialogue with the leaders of FIS, “Zeroual was limited in the actual concessions he could grant” because the military members of the cabinet refused to give into demands, such as the release of FIS leaders from prison (Ruedy 2005, 265). At the same time, the rivalry between the GIA and the MIA “caused them to up the ante and to engage in a race to expand from their initial bases into new territory, and this situation in turn made it impossible for the FIS to respond unequivocally to Zeroual’s gestures in its direction” (Roberts 2003, 155). The military insisted that the first concession come from the FIS yet the political leaders of the opposing camp could “ill afford to give an order that the armed insurgents would ignore”; both sides were limited by extremists (Mortimer 1996, 34). Zeroual once again attempted to initiate negotiations in the summer of 1994, when he reopened talks with the two main leaders of the FIS, who were imprisoned in Blida. This “elicited two letters from them in which, alongside a number of demands, the FIS pledged to ‘respect political pluralism and alternation in power via elections’” (Mortimer 1996, 34). The President took this as a sign of good faith and released Madani and Benhadj to house arrest in Algiers, where they would have unrestricted communications. The forces of the GIA released a statement reiterating its refusal to negotiate with the government while anti-Islamists criticized the government
for a “unilateral concession” (Mortimer 1996, 34). As the fortieth anniversary of the start of the War for Independence approached, negotiations came to a halt as neither party could fulfill the preconditions of the other.

Encouraged by the willingness of the President to consider dialogue with the opposition, and his announcement in November that Presidential elections would be held in Algeria before the end of 1995, several of the major political parties, including the FIS, FLN, FFS, and MDA, met with the Saint Egidio Catholic community in Rome to once again initiate negotiations -- this time without the restrictions and preconditions of the Algerian administration. It is important to note that by this time the GIA was a “headless monster, inflicting senseless murder and violence on all sides” (Evans 2007, 222). Just as the GIA was separate from the FIS, so too was the FLN separate from the Algerian regime, which was now overtaken by the military. The talks in November led to four basic principles: “the rejection of violence, support for democracy, open competitive elections, and respect for human rights” (Mortimer 1996, 35). Despite the condemnation of the Algerian government, the parties met again and on January 13, 1995 signed the Platform for a National Contract, a document which represented a wide variety of political opinions that existed in Algeria. The Platform called for the convening of a national conference to create a transitional authority that would oversee free and pluralistic elections under the rules of the 1989 Constitution. It also outlined “the basic values and principles underlying its program and the system it wished to implement. These included the affirmation of human rights, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the separation of powers” (Ruedy 2005, 267). The document also assured the freedom of religion to all, while acknowledging that Islam has played an important role in shaping Algeria’s
identity. The Rome Platform “demonstrated what most people already knew, that the political parties were not the source of the impasse… and that they were not so deeply divided by ideological differences as to be unable to agree on the basic principles necessary to the foundation of the system of constitutional party-political competition” (Roberts 2003, 172). Despite the positive measures that these parties tried to take, the efforts were rejected by the government out of fear that it would force the military to admit to its atrocities.

Around the same time of the Platform of Rome, the President installed a special commission to help prepare for the Presidential elections on November 16, 1995. The FIS was still unable to participate in the elections, therefore the major parties that had talked in Rome refused to take part in the voting. Only four candidates were able to collect the 75,000 signatures necessary; besides Zeroual, the entrants were Said Saadi, of the secularist RCD party, Mahfoud Nahnah, the head of moderate Islamist HAMAS, and Nouredine Boukhrouh, the leader for the liberal Islamic movement PRA. The environment leading up to the elections was extremely tense and the GIA circulated death threats to those who voted; despite this fact, the turnout was nearly seventy-five percent and the elections were basically free and fair (Ruedy 2005, 267). In the end Zérroual won another term in office with nearly sixty-one percent of the vote.

Despite an increase in violence that occurred in January 1996, the re-elected President announced that the government would hold parliamentary elections the following year, pending the draft of a new constitution. Algeria’s fourth constitution made numerous changes, the most important being the reinforcement of the executive branch. The new constitution “gave Algeria a bicameral legislature for the first time
where the lower house, the APN, was to be chosen by popular vote every five years, and the members of the upper house, the Council of the Nation, were selected two-thirds by communal and wilaya councils and the remaining third by the President” (Ruedy 2005, 268). It also limited the President’s tenure to two five-year terms and although it promoted the creation of political parties it stated that “no political party could be founded on a ‘religious, linguistic, racial, sex, corporatist, or regional basis’” (Ruedy, 2005, 268). With this new constitution, the President and government tried to ensure that there would not be a repeat of the 1991 catastrophe.

Despite the fact that 1997 was the bloodiest year to date, the parliamentary elections were held, a massive step in overcoming the single-party system of the 1980s and the military regime of the 1990s. On June 5, 1997 the Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique, a new party formed by regime supporters including the Prime Minister, received the largest number of votes, totaling thirty-two percent or a hundred and fifty-six out of three hundred and eighty seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). The Mouvement pour la Societe et de la Paix, formally known as HAMAS, garnered sixty-nine seats and the FLN won sixty-two seats (Ruedy 2005, 268). Nearly all parties protested the results, making such claims as a lack of equal access to electronic media or that ballot boxes were destroyed. Despite the overwhelmingly bitter tone towards these elections, it is important to note that all the parties who met at the Platform of Rome did actively participate.

**The Continuation of Violence and the Presidential Elections**

In the months immediately following the elections there was once again a massive outbreak of violence. Members of the GIA and other Islamist forces conducted massacres in several major cities to the south and east of Algiers, an area that had popularly
supported the FIS in the 1991 elections. One massacre was in the town of Bentalha, ten miles south of the capital. On September 22, 1997 over four hundred people, regardless of their sex or age, “were pitilessly slaughtered” (Roberts 2003, 309). According to witness accounts, “authorities refused requests from Bentalha’s residents for arms with which to defend themselves, security forces were stationed on the edge of the city, knowing what was taking place, troops manning the roadblock into the city stopped citizens from nearby villages from coming to the rescue, and the assailants were allowed to freely leave the city once they were finished” (Roberts 2003, 309). There were once again claims that the assailants were not Islamists but actually members of the army who were part of a special commando unit. This has never been formally proven although it would correspond with previous claims against the military, as well as its philosophy to perform any action that could discredit the Islamists. These violent acts continued into 1998 as the international community began to investigate the Algerian problem in forums such as the United Nations. As the President’s record came under question, he announced on September 11, 1998 that there would be presidential elections in February 1999.

In response to the announcement, forty-eight individuals announced their candidacies, yet in the end only seven were able to be confirmed by the Constitutional Council. The seven candidates were comprised of

“former Prime Ministers Moloud Hamrouche and Mokdad Sifi, Hocine Ait Ahmed of the FFS, Youssef Khateb, who had chaired the abortive national dialogue in 1994-95, moderate Islamists Abdallah Djaballah and Ahmed Taleb al Ibrahimi, and former Foreign Minister Abdelazi Bouteftika”,

all of whom were powerful civilians (Ruedy 2005, 275). Bouteftika was the clear favorite of the military and although they never supported him outright, he did have more funds to spend on campaigning, as well as the support of the four most important parties in
Parliament. The six opposition candidates claimed that there were irregularities in the voting system and demanded to meet with the President prior to the election; he declined to meet with them and in response “they decided upon collective withdrawal from the elections and the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the results of the polls” (Ruedy 2005, 275). These drastic changes to the election process, less than twenty-four hours before voting booths opened in Algeria, convinced nearly forty percent of the population not to participate in the election. In the end, President Bouteflika was inaugurated on April 27, 1999.

Bouteflika first chose to launch efforts for national reconciliation and quickly gained the support of the major leaders of the FIS party, including Abassi Madani. On July 13 he issued the Law of Civil Concord, which stated that it was providing the government with, “special measures to relieve from standard penalties, persons involved in, or who have been involved in, acts of terrorism or subversion who express in good faith their wish to cease their criminal activities, and to grant them the opportunity to put in concrete form this wish through re-entry into society” (Ruedy 2005, 276). Through this document, the individuals of the Islamist movement, specifically the AIS, were to come forward to the authorities, who then would grant amnesty to the fighters. The referendum for the Law of Civil Concord was held on September 16, 1999 and passed with 98.6% of the popular vote; by January 13, 2000, the final date for compliance, roughly 5,500 militants had turned themselves over to the authorities (Ruedy 2005, 277). The Law of Civil Concord confirmed the strong desire across political barriers for the end of violence and upheaval throughout Algeria.
An Undefined End to a Civil War

While some members of the GIA did turn themselves in by the designated date, many resented the blanket amnesty granted to the AIS fighters and were fearful of the punishment they would receive should they surrender. Consequently, hundreds of guerilla forces from the GIA continued to fight and formed a coalition with another organization known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (Ruedy 2005, 277). The Law of the Civil Concord was not only disliked by the members of the GIA, but it was also disliked by the military. The army “launched major offensives against the guerrillas immediately after January 13 and the result was that the number of violent incidents actually increased during 2000 and that the number of deaths, rising to about 5,000, was roughly double that of 1999” (Ruedy 2005, 277). Yet after that year, the number of violent outbursts has continued to decline and in 2004, Nabil Sahraoui, the emir of the GSPC, was killed after his group had ambushed a military unit.

The Algerian Civil War has brought about a variety of results, some positive while others extremely negative. The political system is certainly more pluralistic and democratic than it was in the late 1980s and the country underwent yet another Presidential election in 2004, when President Bouteflika was re-elected for a second term. Yet, the road to experiencing this political state led to the division of a nation, one that is still under a state of emergency, fifteen years later (US Department of State). The actions of the military and Islamist guerilla groups have cost an estimated 150,000 lives with many more wounded or imprisoned. It will take many years for the state to become fully reconciled and prevail over the destruction of this conflict.
Conclusion: From Victims to Victimizers

After analyzing the two main conflicts that affected Algeria in the twentieth century, despite noting some differences, one can draw a large number of parallels leading to the conclusion that the actions of the French in the War for Independence were strikingly similar to those of the Algerian administration in the 1990s. In addition, it can be claimed that the actions of the FLN in the 1950s greatly influenced the FIS policy of the 1990s. Finally, it could also be hypothesized that had the French pulled out of Algeria after the first year of the “Phony War”, the course of Algerian politics would have been altered significantly towards a more peaceful outcome. It is not solely the actors in the conflicts that remained similar, but tactics and events as well as political actions and propaganda transcended the thirty years between the conflicts. The role of the FLN and the French government are clearly defined during the War for Independence, one organization was fighting for political liberation while the other was trying to maintain colonial holdings. These roles are not as clearly defined during the Civil War and yet the argument could be made that the FLN administration had become the enemy, much like the French, while the Islamist organization of the FIS was viewed as a source of freedom, similar to the FLN in the 1950s. The victims of the War for Independence now became the victimizers, with a new organization garnering sympathy for their cause.

There are differences that exist between the War for Independence and the Algerian Civil War. Firstly, the War for Independence had a clearly defined, external enemy and a common goal that would benefit almost all Muslim Algerians. This made it somewhat easier for the FLN to garner support at the time; even moderate political parties joined the battle for self-determination after France reacted so violently to the
threat against its power. Neither the FLN nor the FIS were able to experience this type of universal support during the Algerian Civil War. Because it was an internal conflict, it was difficult to define which organization was the enemy and therefore the support of the Algerian population was extremely divided.

There were some differences between the Algerian and the French administration and the way both handled its military. Although both gave unbridled control to its armed forces during the war, as discussed below, the French government was able to still maintain control over the military. There were individuals in the French military who disagreed with the policies of Charles de Gaulle and they tried to overthrow the government with Barricade’s Week, the Generals’ Putsch, and the formation of the OAS. Although these individuals certainly tried to override the policies of the French government, they were unable to garner enough support or power to do so. The administration was able to quickly quell any attempts of a coup. This was not the case with the Algerian administration. The military had an extremely powerful role in the Algerian government, even prior to the crisis in 1991. It was the military which pressured the President to declare a state of siege in 1991, it was military leaders who informed President Benjedid that he was to resign, and it is suspected that it was the military which assassinated Boudiaf. The military successfully enacted a coup in 1992 and became the puppet master of the Algerian government. The French government had a much more distinct separation between its administration and its military, which allowed it to more easily form and implement policy as well as enter into negotiations with the FLN in 1962. It was the tangled relationship of the Algerian government and military which contributed to such a long internal conflict.
In addition to the differences in enemies and political goals, there were dissimilarities between the make-up of the actors and their actions. The FLN of the 1950s and the FIS of the 1990s differed in its armed factions. The FLN rallied with the ALN, and the two organizations worked together to support a common goal through common means. Both organizations believed in Algerian self-determination and its tactics and methods of achieving that goal evolved together. Both used scare tactics, such as the mutilations of French loyalists, to coerce Algerian citizens to provide food and funds. The FLN and the ALN together, adopted a policy of collective reprisals and terrorism, which would include acts against citizens. Although FLN battled with the MNA, that was a separate political party with a separate ideology. This unity was not shared by the FIS in the 1990s. The organization itself had two very distinct ideologies; the Salafis believed that jihad was necessary to establish an Islamic political state, whereas the Djazarists believed in the taking of power legally through elections. This division alone caused distinct policy problems and made it difficult for the leaders of the FIS to have control over their party, as shown by Hachani, the temporary leader of the FIS who was undermined by the armed groups in 1991 and 1992. There were also many different armed organizations under the common umbrella of the FIS. The GIA differed from the MIA as well as the AIS and these political factions all battled each other based upon the understanding that its individual political ideology was the best method possible to obtain an Islamic state. The GIA refused to negotiate with the Algerian administration, whereas the FIS and the AIS wanted to enter into peace talks. This internal split within the FIS weakened the party greatly and although it implemented many of the same policies of the FLN in the 1950s, the divisions prevented it from being successful.
Despite the aforementioned differences, the revolutionary organizations of the FLN in the 1950s and the FIS in the 1990s are extremely comparable in both ideology and makeup. The FLN was comprised of a small group of young men who were in their twenties and from middle-class backgrounds. The organization was based on a policy of collective leadership, which worked to its advantage since it became difficult for the French to completely dismantle it. Its doctrine strongly exemplified Islamic influences and it turned to the Islamic ulama to garner support amongst the citizens and other political parties. There were splits within the cause itself, as demonstrated by the constant battle with the Mouvement National Algérien, but the party was generally united. The FLN was unwilling to accept anything less than total independence, a quality of stubbornness that that the FIS, and more specifically the GIA, would later adopt.

The FIS was also an organization that was founded on a coalition of Islamic groups, and much like the FLN, was deeply divided in its cause between two main currents, the Salafis and the Djazarists. The main body of the organization was found in the young generations of Algerians, who were once again displeased with the performance of their government. These men were unemployed and well-educated, with no ties to the FLN or the War for Independence. There were more moderate factions of the group, like the AIS, which believed that negotiations were possible, yet there were also those, like the members of the GIA, who believed that negotiations were a sign of defeat by the Algerian administration. Much like the FLN in the 1950s, the more extremist factions of the FIS attacked the moderate groups, not wanting a different viewpoint to gain popularity. With so many similarities, the FLN administration should have been able to look at the FIS and understand what type of reaction was needed to
quell such a group and yet it was unable to do so because it had changed so much since it first took power.

**The Changing Role of the FLN in Free Algeria**

Besides the parallels in the insurgency organizations of both conflicts, there were numerous similarities in the policies of the governments prior to the War for Independence and the Civil War. Before the outbreak of total violence at Philippeville in 1955, France tried to offer a number of reforms, with the hopes of placating the FLN. It promised the initiation of major public works projects as well as an increase in salary and the improvement of the Algerian education system. Although these proposals were never carried out because the Algerian government was disbanded, the efforts of the French administration were nearly identical to those that the Algerian administration proposed in the 1980s leading up to the crisis. Algerian President, Chadli Bendjedid, created two five-year plans, in 1979 and 1984; both tried to address issues such as high unemployment rates and the monopolization of investment capital by basic industries. The President was unable to make affective changes and soon the citizens of Algeria began to strike. The leadership in Algeria, whether French or Algerian, was unable to properly address the major problems that faced the country and this atmosphere of discontent led to the promotion of civil uprising and Islamic ideology.

The reactions of the Algerian administration towards a threat to its power seemed strongly influenced by those of its colonial predecessors. Although the French did not initially view the FLN as a serious threat, it did respond to the action of the organization with mass punishments. An example of collective reprisals by the French can be found in its response to the Philippeville Massacre, where over twelve thousand people were killed
or went missing. The FLN, which at the time used these mass punishments as a further justification for extreme and violent reactions against the French, came to adopt a policy of torture and extreme violence with its newfound power. It indiscriminately targeted young males in areas known to support the FIS, conducted massive arrests, and performed summary executions. Torture became the administration’s favorite technique to extract information, much like a French policy that was highly controversial for many years after the end of the War for Independence.

Another common reaction by both the Algerian administration and the French administration that seemed to shape the way in which the conflict unfolded, was the role that each gave to the military. When it became clear that the FLN was a very serious threat to the French colonial power, and that the organization had the ability to perform effective political and military actions, the French government ceded its political authority to the military leadership in Algeria. This naturally undercut any possibility for a political negotiation. The Battle of Algiers, where the paratroopers were given carte-blanche, was another example of the atrocities that occurred when the military was given unrestricted power. There was so much violence in that city that it became difficult to differentiate between provocation terrorism and vengeance terrorism and although the military was successful in removing the FLN from the city, its actions persuaded more individuals to support the cause of Algerian liberation. The unobstructed power of the military would once again come to haunt Algerian politics, when the military forced President Bendjedid to resign in 1992, and set in place a system where military personnel became leaders in the new government. With an indirect, yet increasing, control over the government, the military adopted an ever more violent policy, which in turn led to a
growing number of protests from citizens. Even at the end of the conflict, after the Law of Civil Concord had been passed, the army launched major offensives against the guerillas, doubling the number of deaths for the year. The leadership of free Algeria made the same policy mistakes as its colonial precursor and its aggressive and brutal actions led to an increase of support for the FIS, rather than showing the people that an Islamic government would fail to provide the changes needed for national success.

There are also many examples which could be used to support the claim that the FIS of the 1990s took many of its policies, strategies, and tactics from the FLN of the 1950s; this only adds further irony to the situation since the FLN administration of the 1990s claimed its legitimacy from its actions in the war against France and yet it believed that the events planned by the FIS invalidated the Islamic party. Both groups relied heavily on scare tactics and threats of terrorism to receive the support of the Algerian citizens. The FLN would extort food and funds from the civilians and threaten them with violence if they refused to cooperate and maintain their silence. The FIS destroyed hundreds of schools across the country with fires and communes and villages were forced to pay large fees to members of the Islamic militant groups of the FIS; those communities which refused would suffer large scale massacres. Acts of terrorism by the insurgents were also popular tactics during both wars and proved to be fairly effective tools of provocation. The FLN would place bombs at popular meeting places or other locations that would garner a great deal of attention from the French. Its hope was that the events could provoke the French to react with an unequal, greater response, further angering and instilling fear in the people of Algeria; numerous examples were previously discussed in the prior chapter. The FLN administration was forced to deal with the same policy over
thirty years later, when the FIS began to set off bombs in restaurants, post offices, markets, cinemas, and other public places. The FIS once again fostered a sense of hopelessness and terror amongst Algerians and the government was forced to react with collective punishments, further angering the citizens and directing their support towards the insurgency.

**A Hypothetical, Peaceful Algeria**

When one looks back on the history of Algeria, it can be noted that there are a number of events, which having received a different outcome, would have completely altered the North African country. One such event is the continuing stay of France in Algeria, even after that first year of unrest. Many scholars view the decision of the colonial power to remain in control as catastrophic for both nations. Although the truth can never be fully know, it certainly can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955, before the Philippeville Massacre, the FLN would not have been as powerful and as militant as it was and that the Civil War of the 1990s would have been avoided.

It is well-documented that there were a number of more moderate, political parties who were supportive of a politically liberated Algeria but believed that freedom could come in a form other than violence. These moderate groups did not initially support the doctrine of the FLN and it was only after the massive, collective response by the French for the Philippeville Massacre that the majority of the moderate parties joined forces with the FLN. One organization which bucked the popular sentiment was the Mouvement National Algérien, and as was previously discussed, this organization was filled with political moderates who would get into a violent conflict with the FLN after the summer of 1955. Had France left the country before August 1955, there would not have been the
uprising by the FLN that summer or the response of the French military, which inevitably provided the Algerian organization with more legitimacy from the politically moderate faction. The FLN would not have grown in power and the MNA would not have become an internal enemy of the insurgency. There would have been a moderate voice in the post-colonial government that would have provided Algeria a counter to the more radical, militant views of the FLN.

In addition to preserving a diversity of viewpoints, an early French departure would have left the FLN with little legitimacy in a free nation. There was a large power vacuum when French institutions left the nation, and with the purge of all moderate voices, the FLN used its actions in the war to justify its takeover. This was an effective strategy and the sentiment which emanated from the war carried the FLN for nearly thirty years. The combination of stagnant policy results and a younger generation, who no longer appreciated the war-time feeling, has been shown to have led to the questioning of the FLN administration, a perfectly suited situation for the Islamist political ideology to take root. With no war, there would not only be no platform for legitimacy of the FLN, but there would be a more plural and diverse pool of voices from which the government would have been formed.

In the end the wars that have torn Algeria apart can not simply be blamed on one specific organization. There were many individuals who took part in the War for Independence and the Civil War. It can be argued that had France left Algeria in 1955 the two main issues that caused the Civil War, lack of legitimacy and moderate viewpoints, would not have plagued the nation; France must certainly take responsibility for its direct role in the 1950s conflict. It can also be claimed that the FLN of the 1950s provoked the
French military and created an ideology in Algeria that the use of violence can be justified in the goal of obtaining political success, a philosophy that was adopted by the FIS forty years later. It can also be disputed that the Algerian administration of the 1990s reacted in the same way that the French government did in the 1950s and that the FIS operated with tactics similar to those of the FLN during its struggle for liberation. In the end, Algeria has never been able to create its own history, having always been monopolized by a single power. When finally given the chance to be a free nation, the FLN and Algerian administration knew of no other way to govern than that of its European predecessor while the FIS knew of no other way to express its discontent than through a violent revolution like the FLN. After nearly fifty years of political liberation, the Algerians have created a cyclical pattern where violence and political success have become mutually exclusive and change must come at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives.
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