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The Codependent Development of Patriotism and Xenophobia in the United States, Particularly in Regard to Arabs and Muslims in America Following September 11, 2001

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**The Codependent Development of Patriotism and Xenophobia in the United
States, Particularly in Regard to Arabs and Muslims in America Following
September 11, 2001**

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Contents

Pages 3-4: Abstract

Pages 5-33: Chapter One

Pages 34-56: Chapter Two

Pages 57-76: Chapter Three

Pages 77-80: Bibliography

Abstract:

The United States has always claimed to be endowed with unique values, such as tolerance and justice, and so throughout its history has sought to convey these values with expressions of patriotism. However, is this patriotism simply symbolic, and further, does it even lead itself to xenophobia and racism. This thesis seeks to answer this question by examining the genesis and development of patriotism throughout the country's history, as well as the way in which its racism and xenophobia have changed. Beginning with a general examination of the usefulness and positivity of patriotism from a scholarly standpoint, the basic points regarding the controversial issue are laid out. The main ideas of this dispute are provided by noted scholars George Kateb and John Kleinig in their works *Patriotism and Other Mistakes* and *The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate*, respectively. Next, using research on history of the United States beginning from the Revolution, and ending with the Vietnam Era, an extensive picture of these issues in America develops. This then provides good comparison to the main discussion of this thesis; the change in patriotism and islamophobia following September 11th, and how they are connected. This will mainly revolve around the changing relationship that America had with its Arab and Muslim citizens, as well its changing relationship with the world. (The former is in many ways a result of the latter). In this more recent era, more primary sources are to be used, such as *One America in the 21st Century: The President's Initiative on Race*, as well as Newspaper articles. The positions of Patriotism and Islamophobia following soon after 2001 will be the peak of the research and discussion, as further than this is arguably too recent to garner useful research.

Throughout this thesis, the various issues with patriotism are explored, as well as its possibility for usefulness. What is meant to be shown throughout is that patriotism can and has been used to uphold the positive values of the country, but only when it is iconoclastic and willing to be admitted as false. When patriotism has been used symbolically and nationalistically, it has been the cause of extreme racism and xenophobia, especially in times of crisis such as during World War Two and after September 11th. In fact, patriotism has been a self fulfilling idea, as it seeks to protect itself by weeding out dissent. What this all shows is that patriotism is a hard term to get a clear definition of, but its form in the first decade of the 21st century was very damaging. It must be made to resemble a purer form of loyalty to the ideal rather than the symbol to ever be practical again.

Chapter One:

When discussing patriotism, an important question arises: What exactly is it? This question has been debated over and over again, but patriotism has generally been described as a loyalty to a land, democratic constitution, history, and cultural identity. This does not exclusively entail nation states either, as theoretically, patriotism can be to any territorial social order, from a polis, to a multinational body such as the European Union.¹ This definition is partly what distinguishes patriotism from nationalism. Instead of a loyalty to a specific ethnic or cultural group, a patriot is loyal to a democratic system as well as that system's history. This is where the term *patriotism* is derived; a devotion to the *patria* (fatherland) rather than the ethno-state.² The loyalties demanded from patriotism are also widely debated, but generally entail defending the ideals which the country provides, and further endeavoring to mend the nation rather than expatriating to another country when it begins to falter in any way. It is important to note how none of this necessarily entails a passionate love of the country, only a stout resolution to endeavor for its betterment.³ Additionally, it should be further said that a political system has forfeited its right to a patriotic citizenry when it delves into tyranny. This interpretation of patriotism is also quite close to the widely accepted idea of 'civic nationalism' with some even considering the two to be synonymous.⁴ Additionally, many definitions of patriotism also describe a transition to a more cosmopolitan, or globalist,

¹ John Kleinig, Simon Keller, and Igor Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism: A Debate*. Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015, 29.

² Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 20.

³ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 20.

⁴ *Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Leaders, Movements, and Concepts*. Vol. 2. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2001. 407.

view over time. The ideas described have been largely accepted as the theoretical example of a perfect patriotism, and clearly distinguish it from nationalism. However, there are other important factors which define it. In addition to the quasi-Social Contract aspects of Patriotism, which exist between the citizenry and the state, are aspects that most scholars consider to be inevitabilities. In the mind of some scholars, patriotism even becomes an end in and of itself as a byproduct of human nature and sociability.⁵ Whether for or against patriotism, most academic research agrees upon the social certainty of the grouping of peoples into political entities and feeling loyalty therein. What is not inevitable is the type of grouping which will be formed; a democracy based on pluralism or an ethno-state. (While ethnic states are not inherently undemocratic, the nation-states which depended on nationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries stand in stark contrast to the democratic multiethnic states which claim to demand patriotism in the twentieth and twenty-first century).⁶ Additionally, while many agree on the inevitability of patriotism, they do not agree that it is a positive.

In his scathing but principled castigation of patriotism entitled *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*, the political scholar George Kateb describes the various dilemmas caused by said political loyalty. Start with the simple idea that despite its inevitability, Kateb argues that intelligent people should know better than to espouse patriotism.⁷ He then goes on to describe the varied concerns of, and issues caused by it. Firstly, he describes the sad loss of personal identity of those who involve themselves in patriotic

⁵ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 22-23.

⁶ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 29

⁷ Kateb, George. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006. 3.

sentiments. In Kateb's mind, patriotism, like religion and other forms of group thought, is a simple form of idolatry. He even describes patriotism as arguably being its worst form. By embracing group love, Kateb argues, we lose all individual identity. He goes on to say that this form of collective identity is as harmful as being overly self-serving, but that selfishness at least comes with a shame which prevents one from become too narcissistic. In his mind, this is a trait which patriotism generally does not have.⁸ On the other side, some scholars have come to defend patriotism, tentatively, such as John Kleinig. Regarding the idea of patriotism as a form of idolatry or narcissistic group-love, Kleinig argues that we, as humans, are naturally inclined to become overly self-centered. Because of this, while humans occasionally are unthinking in loyalty, a healthy loyalty to the place which created us and our identity can in fact be a virtue. The key caveat here is the term 'healthy', as Kleing makes clear that patriots need to remain cautious as it is often a pitfall of loyalty to blindly praise some false and sterile heroism. In avoiding this, understanding the bygone, and affirming the liberties entailed in a democracy, people can engage in a more "mature" construct of patriotism.⁹ However, Kateb would likely disagree with this, as to him, the sanitization of history is simply a natural and unavoidable aspect of all national loyalty.

In Kateb's opinion, a country is an abstract entity consisting of only borders and transmitted memories. Moreover, these memories are often cleansed and purified to fit a country's idea of identity. This is in large part the second issue Kateb has with patriotism; the comfortably clean collective memory. Arguably even more cynical (or

⁸ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 15-16.

⁹ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 39.

realistic, depending on one's position) than the idea of a sanitized history is the argument that the shared memory a nation claims to be commemorating is not even really its own. Considering that most persons in a country like the United States are not completely native to it, they should not seek to claim identity with it in this fashion. In this way, the nation fits in with Kateb's idea of an abstraction not deserving of loyalty.¹⁰ However, the idea of a sanitized history is in direct conflict with Kleinig's idea of a 'mature' patriotism, given that understanding a country's past and one's place in it is vital to representing and fostering a nation's future. Additionally, Kleinig would likely further argue that a country is much less of an abstraction than Kateb believes. Countries can equally be characterized by landmarks, peoples, and laws, as well as its borders and collective memories. Given all this, is patriotism a blind chauvinism and vanity? Kleinig argues not, but rather, that pride in a national character absent of 'we're better than you' narcissism is acceptable and even laudable. Additionally, the universal values upheld by the nation are nothing to be ashamed of, and keeping them in mind and memory can even be indispensable.¹¹ However, Kateb would argue that in addition to being conceited, patriotism can also be immoral and dangerous.

Kateb begins this argument regarding the nefariousness of patriotism by discussing its effects, but in doing so, he does concede that it can in fact be used for good. Applying the example of Abraham Lincoln using patriotic sentiments to rally the people to defend the nation and end slavery, he says that patriotism can have an instrumental virtue. However, his caveat to this is that this is all patriotism can be; an

¹⁰ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 7-8.

¹¹ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 37-38.

instrument. This means that it is not, and can not be, a good in and of itself. Additionally, Kateb argues that, more often than not, it is used for much more immoral purposes. In essence, this implies that fighting for one's country may or may not be moral, but will always be patriotic.¹² Additionally, regarding fighting for countries which happen to be democratic, he says that a willingness to fight for a democratic country is not the same as fighting for the principal itself.¹³ On the other hand, Kleinig would argue that, in actuality, the cooperation which patriotism creates is the only reason a democratic country can flourish and remain so constitutional. In this way, while patriotism can be used in a corrupting fashion, it is also vital in upholding a country's positive virtues. However, he does clarify this with the qualifier that patriotism can be bastardized when people demonize dissent and claim it is 'us versus them'.¹⁴ Both scholars also discuss the main contention of this paper: The alleged inherent jealousy and mistrust which patriotism sows in citizens regarding persons both internal and abroad.

According to Kateb, patriotism is by its nature an envious form of loyalty, the crux of his argument essentially being that an ideal patriot desires less patriotism in other countries. Even in the case of democracies, which many claim to naturally want to work harmoniously, he believes one nation will seek to prey on another. Additionally, he argues that democracies often keep domestic liberty at the cost of tyranny abroad, and demanding patriotism in such a system is both hypocritical and exploitative.¹⁵ The example which comes to mind would be American proclamations of liberty, while using

¹² Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 12-13.

¹³ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 8.

¹⁴ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 39-40.

¹⁵ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 15.

products made in sweatshops overseas. He goes on to compare group love of patriotism to self interest again, saying that both enable immorality, but that the former was clearly an evil. Kateb's rationale here is that self-attentiveness and care for close friends does not demand the same enmity that group-narcissisms like patriotism do.¹⁶ Imbedded in this inherent antipathy is an aversion or even hostility to others. This type of sentiment is not only held by Kateb, as other, more neutral descriptions on patriotism admit the implied priority of citizens of the nation over non-citizens and foreigners abroad.¹⁷ However, Kleinig would likely counter this with a very simple but quite effective argument. All of the characteristics described are hallmarks of nationalism rather than patriotism. In his mind, true democratic loyalty allows for, and accepts the inevitability of, patriots abroad. In this way, patriotism in the mind of Kleinig is a perceptive and sympathetic loyalty, while nationalism is the allegiance which declares only itself to be legitimate.¹⁸ Arguably the final issue which Kateb finds with patriotism is also regarding the enmity inspired by patriotism, only now directed towards the mistrust it fosters domestically.

For Kateb, as well as being an inherently jealous vice, patriotism is also distrusting and paranoid. He describes this by discussing the divide which patriotism fosters in society. This entails the disdain for those members of society who do not show the same levels of flag-waving loyalty. This also means that in order for patriotism to function, it demands the obedience of all in the society.¹⁹ A byproduct of this is the

¹⁶ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 9.

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. 407.

¹⁸ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 41.

¹⁹ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 12.

perpetual need for enemies to root out. This necessity, along with the suspicion of other nations described previously, are largely the basis upon which people criticize patriotism and its xenophobic tendencies. However, as with almost all other issues brought up regarding patriotism, Kleinig has a cautious confidence in and defense of the virtues of patriotism. Regarding the societal apprehensions caused, he would likely counter with the idea that theoretically perfect patriotism is not inherently xenophobic, but rather it fosters genuine conversations about society. His reasoning would be that a perfect patriot should in fact endeavor to improve his or her nation through protest and dialogue.²⁰ The 'egoism and elitism' over those viewed to be 'unpatriotic' which Kateb alleges is unpatriotic itself, even if done by the citizen who waves his flag the most earnestly. A very simplistic but cogent way to think about this is a topic should be kept in mind for now. If a person protesting The Vietnam War burned the American flag and was subsequently called a traitor by his congressman, who is the true patriot? Kateb would likely argue that it is the congressman, as he is suspicious of the dissent and wants to root it out, therein lying the malice of patriotism. Kleinig would respond that as long as his or her intentions were the earnest betterment of America and her actions, the protestor was. This type of question will become increasingly important when directly discussing the connection between patriotism and xenophobia more in depth.

From all of these arguments for and against patriotism by scholars, there are few prominent points. In a wonderfully apropos analogy made by Kateb, he equated the conspicuous patriotism which people express to being a fan of a sports team. While the fan can and will actively cheer the team and delight when it does well, a precious few

²⁰ Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 39.

are actually part of the team and and benefit from its success. In this way, in cheering for the team and validating it, the fan is engaging in “willful self-exploitation.”²¹ Kleing would likely call this argument cynical, as patriots are, in his mind, very connected to the actions of the society. More than this, however, he is of the opinion that countries need something to bind the country together. For this glue to remain benign and not nationalistic or jingoistic, all citizens must engage in positive, remedial patriotism to the democratic system.²² This means that blind, flag-waving patriotism without any connection to ‘liberty and justice for all’ is in fact fraudulent loyalty to a more nationalistic sentiment. While Kateb would likely call this a naive view, many tend to agree with it. It is in pursuance of addressing this view that the remainder of this work shall be dedicated. To this, a preliminary discussion of American patriotism is required, starting from the very dawn of the United States.

The immediate aftermath of the American Revolution was obviously a very formative time in the history of the United States, because the actions and celebrations of the victory would be the genesis of patriotism in the country. The first question to be asked was; How to appreciate the victory and who could engage in the celebrations? Almost immediately, as it often is today, liberty and the pulpit were connected. There was almost instantaneously an evocation of the connection to the church and the new nation, and nowhere was this more exhorted than in the church itself. In associating Christianity and Republicanism, priests and ministers were in fact strengthening the

²¹ Kateb. *Patriotism and Other Mistakes*. 18.

²² Kleinig, Keller, and Primoratz. *The Ethics of Patriotism*. 27-28.

power and legitimacy of the government.²³ Also ingrained in post revolution patriotism, and again similar to today, was the virtue of military gratitude. In the minds of many citizens, the gratitude towards those who freed the nation from the yoke of British tyranny was the type of kindred patriotism that would hold the new states together. By extension, ingratitude would tear them apart. While on the outset this seems quite reasonable and even positive, like today, ingratitude or callousness would be seen as disloyalty.²⁴ Indeed, it can even be alleged that this type of loyalty testing was an effort by the new states to rout out disloyal citizens, whether intentionally or simply a serendipitous result. (This will be discussed more later in reference to the loyalist integration issue). While this is the form it took, patriotism still largely remained an apparatus of the government.

Strikingly similar to today, patriotism was not just a loyalty in and of itself in the post-revolution era, but was a device by which people were swayed. Just like many politicians today use patriotism as flagpole issue they are defending in order to gain popular support, political figures at the time also used it to further their ideals. Every political argument, from slavery, federalism verses republicanism, to foreign policy *vis-a-vis* the British, had an air of patriotism. Moreover, patriotism was allegedly directly used by the affluent to command additional control over the citizenry as well. In creating usable monuments and rallying points, the elites united the people under them and the

²³ Sarah J. Purcell. *Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2002. 50.

²⁴ Purcell. *Sealed with Blood*. 67.

country they controlled.²⁵ It was largely because of all this patriotic sentiment created around the new country that the Loyalist reintegration issue became so contentious.

One of the more important issues in post-Revolution America, which is often overlooked in favor of more 'federalism verses republicanism' discussions, was the issue of whether or not to reintegrate those who had remained loyal to the British. The main reason why new citizens of the United States mistrusted loyalists was because they fought against everything the new patriotism was formed around. Considering that post war loyalty to the United States was largely based around gratitude for the people who ensure the independence of the colonies, how could someone who actively fought against that independence possibly be patriotic or loyal?²⁶ The substantive goals of these loyalists did not matter, by dint of being loyalists, they could not be complete citizens of this new society. This meant former neighbors would forever be treated with skepticism and mistrust. This issue illustrates the main issue being discussed in the essay. While not precisely xenophobia, this apprehension of loyalists shows the inherent mistrust ingrained in patriotism. Also important in the critiques of patriotism is the allegation that patriots are not truly loyal to the ideals which they claim to be. The argument revolving around the revolution, and again one which is familiar today, is the mistreatment of veterans. For a society which claimed to be celebrating and revering those who fought and died fighting for liberty, they were not treated as such. This is largely the reason why, only a few years after the revolution, Daniel Shays, a veteran,

²⁵ Purcell. *Sealed with Blood*. 64-66.

²⁶ Purcell. *Sealed with Blood*. 68.

revolted against the society he believed had slighted him.²⁷ This is thus indicative of another possible problem of patriotism; that it is blind and even a boldfaced lie whose virtuous facets are hardly ever lived up to. Despite all these issues surrounding it, one of main sources of patriotic symbolism today is the era of Revolution. The next major examination of patriotism occurred around 80 years later, during the American Civil War.

The American Civil War saw the rise in what one commenter called “one of the first ideological armies in history.”²⁸ The reason for this description is that, unlike armed forces before and after them, both the Union and Confederate forces seemed to know and believed what they were fighting for. In well published accounts of modern wars, patriotism has not been a very compelling factor for the fighting men of the United States. On the other hand, modern research shows that those fighting in the Civil War carried a patriotic loyalty with them, and which they wore proudly.²⁹ Essentially, the Yankees were generally fighting to save the republic (except black soldiers fighting for emancipation), while the Rebs were fighting for independence from a tyrannical rule, mainly exemplified in the infringing on the right to keep slaves. The pride of the Yankees is admittedly harder to pin down than the Rebels, as they were generally not fighting for their homes like their enemies were. Additionally, their commitment to ending slavery was not as strong as the southerner’s commitment to keeping it. What has become clearer through research is that the soldiers were generally committed to the patriotic sentiment of preserving their country. To many, a peace with the South which saw the

²⁷ Purcell. *Sealed with Blood*. 73-74.

²⁸ James M. McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." In *The Civil War Soldier: A Historical Reader*, edited by Michael Barton and Larry M. Logue. New York, NY: NYU Press, 2002. 459. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt9qgfhv.29.pdf>.

²⁹ McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." 456-458

country split in half would be an “inglorious and shameful” peace.³⁰ This patriotism was often even exemplified by the Union Soldiers in the more Kleinig-esque form of a commitment to liberty, with soldiers holding debates with each other and actively reading the papers to stay up to date on their country and her wellbeing. While this type of patriotic belief was more often held by the wealthier officers in the army, the general commitment to saving the republic was arguably more widespread in the Union army than the commitment to keeping slavery was in the Confederate.³¹ This is not to say that the South did not secede and go to war with the expressed goal of keeping their slaves, as some contemporaries claimed, only that the patriotism and intentions of common Confederate soldiers was not as cut and dry as those of their slave-owning officers.

The patriotism of the Confederate soldiers is arguably more interesting to explore than that of the Union due to how fast it cropped up and the different levels which soldiers seemed to have. While southerners have always claimed uniqueness from the rest of the country, the patriotism required during war time had to be drummed up very quickly. Largely based around militarism, the Confederate States portrayed a war to escape Yankee tyranny, where it was the South’s God-given mission to save their way of life. It was also clear that, like during the Revolution, the South’s patriotism was sold at the pulpit.³² However, it was largely when the Northern armies came to enter Southern territory that the patriotism of soldiers skyrocketed. Now it truly seemed to them like a ‘war of Northern Aggression’. In addition to this, however, the war was now

³⁰ McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." In *The Civil War Soldier*. 462-464.

³¹ McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." In *The Civil War Soldier*. 466.

³² *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. 98.

about protecting their homes. An interesting development of this sentiment was that many Southern soldiers became disillusioned with their new government when they did not adequately protect their homes. In fact, this was a large reason for the Confederate Government to launch the Tennessee Campaign.³³ However, this is not to say that no soldiers believed in the cause, as many did truly surmise that the 'destiny of the south' and the causes it represented was worth dying for. Additionally, even more so than in the North, this sentiment was more prevalent in the officers. While the common soldier wanted to defend his family, the slave owning officer was much more committed to fighting to the death, even if it meant never seeing his family again. The connection between true Confederate patriotism and slave holding is of course strong, as slave holding rebels were around twice as likely to wholeheartedly support the war.³⁴ To be clear, racism and a dependence on the status-quo was obviously a factor in the patriotism of the common Confederate soldier, but to say it was the only factor in his mind is simply naive. Clearly the motivations and patriotism of non-slaveholding Confederate soldiers were often quite complicated, with aspects of racism, dependence on the subjugation and second class status of blacks, Dixie pride, and defense of the homestead all being factors in their loyalty. However, some claimed it to be so complicated, with none of the racist leanings being present. Given the rise in Confederate symbolism and monuments around 1900, many had the public believe that

³³ McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." In *The Civil War Soldier*. 462.

³⁴ McPherson. "On the Altar of My Country." In *The Civil War Soldier*. 466.

the war was only about individual and states rights.³⁵ Regardless, the Civil War also had very profound effects on patriotism of the post-war north as well.

As with the Revolution, the immediate post Civil War era was marked by a celebration and commemoration for those who had died. As early as 1866 a civic religion was being formed around the martyrs of Abraham Lincoln and the glorious Union dead. However, this is not to say that these were the only people credited with the victory. While the celebrations were largely based around military glory and the triumph of the Republic over those who would divide it, everybody celebrated their own role. Whether black or white, man or woman, immigrant or native, the people of the north celebrated their role in the victory.³⁶ However, the celebrations were quickly becoming more and more divided. As with dispelling the idea that every northerner was staunchly anti-Slavery, it is also important to make clear that they were not all desegregationist either. While obviously more so than in the south, the post war celebrations show how divided the north was as well. While there were some integrated festivities in the post war-north, many remained segregated. Generally, these celebrations were also divided on the lines of levity. The integrated celebrations were generally coordinated by white organizers and contained pomp and frivolity, with the red, white, and blue being prominent. On the other hand, African-American celebrations often contained ceremonies and reverence of the Republic and freedom, with more of air of respect and solemnity for what had been gained.³⁷ This is hardly that surprising,

³⁵ *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. 99.

³⁶ Earl F. Mulderink. “‘On the Altar of my Country’: Contested Commemorations of the Civil War.” In *New Bedford’s Civil War*, 201-218. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2012. 204-205. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt13x08tv.15.pdf>.

³⁷ Mulderink. “On the Altar of my Country” in *New Bedford’s Civil War*. 205.

since blacks had gained arguably the most important and fundamental right of humanity, while whites had simply retained what they already had. This is not to say that preserving the republic was not a vital and illustrious goal, only that black Americans had the heartfelt celebration of freedom as well. However, while black veterans were initially treated with the respect they deserved, as the years went by, a greater and greater divide emerged between the memories of the war in the minds of blacks and whites.

The commemoration of the war was a very important place from which blacks could show both their commitment to, and how they fought for, the liberty of the Union. African-Americans intended to show the country that they fought and died for the republic the same as whites, and were thus committed to keeping the freedom that had been won.³⁸ This commemoration was perhaps best exemplified in the veterans organizations which cropped up after the war, none of which were as prominent as the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). However, even this organization of brotherhood showed the cracks between white and black commemoration of the war. While ostensibly interracial and loyal to the constitution and freedoms granted therein (at least until the 1870s), the GAR remained *de facto* segregated in many places. Even worse than this is the fact that when black only lodges began cropping up, they received a fraction of the benefits and support of their white counterparts, with many failing.³⁹ While stories of brotherhood and respect between white and black GAR members remained, this substantive and effectual segregation showed the deepening divide between white

³⁸ Mulderink. "On the Altar of my Country" in *New Bedford's Civil War*. 212.

³⁹ Mulderink. "On the Altar of my Country" in *New Bedford's Civil War*. 210.

and black patriotism and commemorations of the war. The disrespect to black veterans was even worse. Veterans such as William Carey, first African-American Medal of Honor recipient, had to keep reminding the people of the United States of what they had fought for. Unlike many whites, black soldiers were fighting primarily for equality. Even when monuments to black soldiers were erected, such as the 'Robert Gould Shaw Monument', they were 30 years too late and featured a white man most prominently.⁴⁰ The divide in white and black post civil war patriotism only worsened over time, and by 1900 the Civil War was about largely about Republican reconciliation in the minds of white Americans, and not slavery. By this time, another test of American patriotism was about to begin.

Prior to the First World War, German Americans in the Midwest enjoyed a large amount of security in celebrating their heritage. Germans were well established in communities, and they were highly engaged in the community, owning businesses and churches. Their white, Christian values seemingly meshed well with other Americans, as the hit 'German Days' festivals prove. In McLean County, Illinois, said celebration was enjoyed by both Germans and non-Germans alike, with the colors of the fatherland adorning flags and bunting across the area.⁴¹ While this would change, the coming resentment of Germans in the Midwest was not immediate. In fact, following the break out of war in Europe, some local German-American newspapers still had free reign to

⁴⁰ Mulderink. "On the Altar of my Country" in *New Bedford's Civil War*. 214-215.

⁴¹ Tina S. Brakebill. "From 'German Days' to '100 Percent Americanism': McLean County, Illinois 1913-1918: German Americans, World War One, and One Community's Reaction." In *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, Vol. 95, No. 2, 148-171. Urbana and Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2002. 153. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40193520.pdf>.

criticize the British leaning consensus of national papers.⁴² However, when America entered the War in 1917, this began to change. With America now firmly on the side of the Entente Powers, the government had free reign to engage in wholehearted patriotic propaganda. Now America was charged with '100 Percent Americanism', which was quickly followed by suspicion of German-Americans and legislation. Arguably the most aggressively anti-dissidence law enacted was the Sedition Act of 1918, which helped to quell arguments against the war.⁴³ With this governmental pressure, the people of the midwest quickly began engaging in aggressive patriotism, while at the same time being fed images and stories of the Rape of Belgium and other German barbarity. Because of this, midwestern Americans began engaging in 'patriotic' flag ceremonies and xenophobic book burnings.⁴⁴ Former neighbors were treated with aggressive suspicion, such as a demand for church services and newspapers to be in English. The patriotic sounding rationale here was sadly familiar, with proclamations that 'the Constitution is in English, so should your papers'⁴⁵ sounding like it could either be from 1917 or 2017. Threats of violence and arson against Churches followed suit, with precious little condemnation from the government. This virulent anti-foreign, and specifically anti-German sentiment, insidious in and of itself, then fed into the post-war witch hunting of the First Red Scare.

America during and following the First World was beginning to reassess what freedom of speech meant. Perhaps, in the minds of some, unfiltered free speech was

⁴² Brakebill. "From "German Days" to "100 Percent Americanism". 155.

⁴³ Brakebill. "From "German Days" to "100 Percent Americanism". 157.

⁴⁴ Brakebill. "From "German Days" to "100 Percent Americanism". 160-162.

⁴⁵ Brakebill. "From "German Days" to "100 Percent Americanism". 162.

not exactly what the founders had intended, and loyalty may be a more important virtue to uphold. Because of this reassessment, aliens and the lower class largely became equated with radicals in the emergence of middle-class anxiety induced nativism.⁴⁶ The reason for this emergence was a mix of residual distrust of foreign sabotage from the War and the new fear of Bolshevism in the United States. Using new tactics and tools such as the Espionage Act, the government could now freely attack what it believed to be disloyal elements of the country, the main targets being labor and aliens. Moreover, these two groups were not attacked independently. This 'defense of American Liberty' ironically allowed for such gross attacks on that same liberty, such as the Palmer Raids. Ironically, Alexander Palmer actually started as a champion of the underdog. What pushed him to violate the rights of so many Americans was predominantly a recognition of the fears of the public and that they could be manipulated. By attaching himself to the patriotically wary sentiments of the common American and then further fanning the public's xenophobia, Palmer believed he could win the presidency.⁴⁷ The main conclusion regarding patriotism and xenophobia to be drawn from both the First World War and the First Red Scare are quite simple, if a bit disheartening. During crises, there are no real guarantees against government infringement of liberties unless resisted by the people. This means that, essentially, the burden of guilt is partially on the citizens when liberties are taken away, because ignoring xenophobic and nationalistic sentiment is a crime of inaction. Second, and connected with the first, if the citizen is not careful,

⁴⁶ John Braeman. "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty." In *American Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 16, 104-112. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964. 106. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2710832.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Braeman. "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty". 109.

the natural patriotism which emerges during wartime can quickly develop itself into a tool to take the very liberties it claims to protect.⁴⁸ It appears that, even if there was pushback against the First Red Scare, the American People did not learn their lesson, as the fundamental liberties of countless Americans were again stolen during the Second World War.

The internment of Japanese Americans was probably the most blatant infringement of American Liberties in history. What is interesting about the internment, however, is that it was not actually a very popular option immediately following Pearl Harbor. The normally unrestrained J. Edgar Hoover found that the link between Japanese-Americans and terrorism was limited, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was quick to say that these people were more at risk of white-Americans than the other way around, military leaders such as John DeWitt expressed their skepticism, and Congress was quite restrained in attempting to pass restrictive legislation.⁴⁹ What began to change the opinions of the government was heavy lobbying by anti-Japanese Groups such as the 'West Coast Coalition' (WCC). The WCC was a flagrantly racist organization, often advocating for keeping the Japanese out even after the war ended. The only thing the war changed with regard to the WCC and their policies was that they had free reign to express their views. Now, it was patriotic to try to protect the country from the

⁴⁸ Braeman. "World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty". 111.

⁴⁹ James McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" In *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 93, No. 7, 1785-1827. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia School of Law, 2007. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25050396.pdf>. 1807-1808. And McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" 1812.

Japanese.⁵⁰ It was largely because of this lobbying that the government and military made the switch to supporting internment.

When Executive Order 9066 was enacted, it was ostensibly race neutral, with Italians and Germans as possible targets, as well as the Japanese. However, the order quickly came to affect the Japanese solely, mainly because there was little support for the internment of the other two ethnic groups. The main reason for this was that the Italians and Germans were already assimilated and were not perceived to pose a threat.⁵¹ However, this is not true. Firstly, even though the Germans and Italians were in some ways more assimilated, this did not mean they posed a lesser threat than the Japanese. In reality, no group posed a threat to America, but only the Japanese were weak enough in the United States that they could be bullied. Second, the threat of invasion from the Atlantic was in fact more possible than the Pacific, with actual fighting on and off the east coast much more possible.⁵² While in some ways internment seems to resemble other crisis era actions, it should be noted that, despite what some revisionist historians claim, internment was not a natural extension of prewar suspicions. Rather, people with ulterior motives used an air of patriotism to exploit the crisis of World War Two to enact their racist policies.⁵³ (Whether this happens in other times such as today will be explored in subsequent chapters). During the next era in which American Patriotism was questioned, the Civil Rights Movement, the exploitation of crisis largely did not work and the movement was successful.

⁵⁰ McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" 1809.

⁵¹ McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" 1815.

⁵² McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" 1825.

⁵³ McDonald. "Democratic Failure and Emergencies: Myth or Reality?" 1826.

Despite what many people of the time alleged, the Civil Rights Movement was arguably one of the most patriotic crusade's in American History. In arguably his most famous speech, where he describes his dream for America, Martin Luther King Jr. evokes countless patriotic conceptions and symbolism. He goes on to describe the promise of the Revolution and the Civil War and the liberties therein.⁵⁴ His evocation of the founding fathers begs the question: Even if the founding fathers did not, are Americans patriotic enough to live up to the Constitutional principals of liberty, justice, and freedom?⁵⁵ Exactly opposite to the positive idea of patriotism evoked by MLK, whites across the country believed the ideals of America and the founding fathers to be on the side of segregation. In an incredibly sad but poignant example of this, at the funeral of sometimes overlooked Civil Rights leader Medgar Evers, police officers took the American flags away from black mourners.⁵⁶ In a much more political fashion than this type of heartbreaking racism, many also questioned the loyalty of black leaders *vis-a-vis* communism. The patriotism and loyalty of civil rights leaders was often challenged, with some going so far as to claim that their boldness showed that they were agents of the Soviet Union. Said civil rights leadership responded in arguably the most patriotic way; by stating that to win the Cold War and defend liberty, America must end segregation.⁵⁷ Many soon began to view the Civil Rights Leadership as new founding fathers, which begs an important question in pursuant to the previous one: If civil rights

⁵⁴ Michael Wayne. "The Civil Rights Movement." In *Imagining Black America*, 109-117. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014. 110-111. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt5vm2d8.9.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Wayne. "The Civil Rights Movement." 111.

⁵⁶ Wayne. "The Civil Rights Movement." 112.

⁵⁷ Wayne. "The Civil Rights Movement." 113.

leaders follow the words and ideals of the founding fathers, but pro segregationists follow the actual actions they took, who are the true patriots? In the minds of the civil rights leaders, in order live up to patriotism and the ideals of America, her citizens must charge themselves with enforcing equality.⁵⁸ The change that these leaders demanded was also shared by others not directly connected to the civil rights movement, but rather, the counterculture movement.

While the idea of the counterculture movement as a patriotic crusade may not seem very consequential, the question certainly deserves attention. Despite counterculture today being largely relegated to pop culture, there used to be a true rebellious and free spirit involved in it. With protesters and icons like Bob Dylan gaining much of their energy and methods from the Civil Rights movement, it is no wonder that it contained an air of patriotism, even if it did not always seem to do so.⁵⁹ The two main movements I wish to discuss are the East coast oriented Youth International Party (Yippies), and the San Francisco based hippie movements. The former, the Yippies, were the more protest oriented. Arguably their most prominent protest was at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The unrest, like the Civil Rights Movement before it, asked the question: Who were the patriots, the protesters who had previously desecrated the American flag⁶⁰ or the Chicago police and Mayor Richard J. Daley who opposed them?⁶¹ The movement on the West Coast was markedly more calm.

⁵⁸ Wayne. "The Civil Rights Movement." 116.

⁵⁹ Christopher Gair. "Introduction." In *The American Counterculture*, 119-138. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. 124. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.3366/j.ctt1r265j.9.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Garr. "Introduction." In *The American Counterculture*. 130.

⁶¹ Garr. "Introduction." In *The American Counterculture*. 129.

Exemplified by the experimentation with drugs such as LSD, the Grateful Dead, free love, and anti-bureaucracy, the west coast movement was much less a protest movement than an expression of freedom. In fact, after a noted activist became political at a Dead concert, Jerry Garcia expressed resentment, as the concert was not really meant to be overtly political.⁶² However, mainstream Americans still expressed disgust with the laziness of these young people who were apparently wasting the privilege they had been afforded and which previous generations did not have.⁶³ Again, who are the patriots; the people trying to simply live life without politics, or those standing up for ‘traditional American values’? Over time, generally, the traditional conservatism won out, and even got carried away in the following decades.

Right wing nationalistic movements in the United States were, in large part, both the culmination of years of conservatism and a response to liberal events such as the Civil Rights Movement. However, this is not very unique, as it is how most nationalistic movements form, including the Black Nationalism Movement in the United States (only this movement was responding to a rise in conservatism).⁶⁴ One of the first prominent far-Right conservative groups emerging in the late 1950s was the John Birch Society (JBS). While not overtly nationalistic, its existence arguably allowed for nationalistic groups to emerge. The stated goal of the JBS was to counter communism and labor, and to do this, they directly attacked Civil Rights leaders including MLK. To the JBS, Communism and Civil Rights were connected, with Communist agitation being the

⁶² Garr. “Introduction.” In *The American Counterculture*. 132.

⁶³ Garr. “Introduction.” In *The American Counterculture*. 127.

⁶⁴ Stuart A. Wright. *Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 44.

primary motivator of the marches. However, the idea of a connection was not even solely confined to the far-Right either, as by 1965, a majority of the county believed there to be at least some kind of connection. This was largely the reason why one could often see signs such as “Support your local police”, because not doing so meant helping communists.⁶⁵ (This particular signage is very similar to sentiments in modern America). The next groups to emerge were overtly nationalistic; Robert DuPugh and the Minutemen organization and its branch, William Potter Gale and the United States Christian Posse (USCP). While the former was an blatantly far-right paramilitary group, it was the latter which truly began to wholeheartedly delve into racism and anti-Semitism. With overlapping membership with the Ku Klux Klan, the USCP was concerned with gun rights, states rights, and white supremacy.⁶⁶ These far right groups claimed to be patriots defending Christian-American values against Civil Rights Leadership and ‘Jewish plots.’⁶⁷ This type of abhorrent ‘patriotism’ is unfortunately still in existence today, and arguably was the motivations behind monstrous acts from personal hate-crimes all the way to the Oklahoma City Bombing. These peoples’ views were mainly a response to an increasing multiculturalism in the United States brought upon by increased immigration.

Despite what the values of the United States have been stated to be in the constitution, and despite what some modern politicians will claim, America has never been as inclusive as it has claimed, and this is especially true towards immigrants. One

⁶⁵ Wright. *Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing*. 53-55.

⁶⁶ Wright. *Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing*. 61.

⁶⁷ Wright. *Patriots, Politics, and the Oklahoma City Bombing*. 62.

only need look at the Know-Nothing Party, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the Second KKK to see this.⁶⁸ It is important to note that, despite occasional serious and virulent xenophobia against white immigrants, there was still always a white verses non-white flavor to this. The implication here is that, while white immigrants have faced horrible persecution, as will be discussed in this section, they always were eventually able to merge with the accepted white-American spectrum. This was because poor white immigrants could identify more readily with elites, because they could be more easily assimilated by elite whites given their overt similarities, and because blacks had been persecuted for so long that racism against them had become ingrained in American society. Nativism in the United States was also always as much about poverty as it was about ethnicity. Two of the major immigration movements in the United States following the Civil War were between 1880 and 1924, and 1970 and 1998.⁶⁹ The first era saw a shift to Eastern and Southern European Immigrants, while the second, later era, saw a change to Central and South America, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia.

Unsurprisingly, the main similarity between these two eras of mass immigration to the United States, unsurprisingly, is that both eras contain an air of nativism and even white supremacy. Essentially, in each era, an immigrant could not wave the flag of his or her old nation. There are, however, many other similarities in the eras. Firstly, both saw

⁶⁸ Suzanne Shanahan and Susan Olzak. "Effects of Immigration Diversity.. The Effects of Immigrant Diversity and Ethnic Competition on Collective Conflict in Urban America: An Assessment of Two Moments of Mass Migration, 1869-1924 and 1965-1993". *Journal of American Ethnic History*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 41. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27502449.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Charles Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Action during Two Eras of Mass Immigration to the United States". *Journal of American Ethnic History*. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 10. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27502448.pdf>.

a massive change in the area of origin for the new immigrants. This means that it was both alarming to the existing population and harder to assimilate for the immigrants. This means that it is easier for the existing Americans to form a xenophobic identity, as new immigrants are seen as very different. While some in both eras blatantly espoused racism, challenging the intelligence and charging the new immigrants with vulgarity, others claimed economic degradation as their reasoning. (This was largely done in order to avoid the often taboo race issue).⁷⁰ Another similarity is, sadly, the violence immigrants faced in both eras. While the era between 1880 and 1920 saw massive lynch mobs and labor movements mobilized around violence towards immigrants, the era between 1970-1998 saw more personal, but often more violent and disturbing, hate crimes.⁷¹ The point here is that while the groups of immigrants faced somewhat different forms of violence, they both faced it in spades.

The latter had an exorbitant larger number of illegal immigrants than the former. During the earlier era, the main illegal immigration was the 'white slavery' trade in Eastern European women.⁷² In the later period, large numbers of Central Americans and East Asians entered the country illegally. While not actually changing the immigrants themselves, this vastly changes the arguments many make. A second difference is that the earlier group of immigrants faced discrimination that was enforceable by law. This entailed, among other things, literacy tests in voting and quotas in both schools and employment. This is not to say that immigrants in the latter era did

⁷⁰ Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 12.

⁷¹ Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 15.

⁷² Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 16.

not face legal discrimination, only that it was much more subtle, as unconcealed racial laws had largely become illegal by this point.⁷³ The final difference is the position of the United States in the world, as both a goal for immigrants and as a more inviting society. While the era after the Civil War and before the First World War saw a large influx of immigrants, this was largely because of the insular prosperity of the country. In fact, much of this period was marked by heavy isolationism. On the other hand the period between 1945 and 2000 saw the United States emerge as a much more global power. This globalism largely fostered immigration.⁷⁴ Given all of these differences, one may think that the nativism fostered in the two eras is dissimilar, but the same xenophobic concerns have come up time and time again in American history.

Nativism in both eras of mass immigration into the United States was fostered by the same quasi-patriotic misgivings. The first concern was based around political concerns. Essentially, nativist Americans believe that aliens were subversive. While this was first alluded to when the First Red Scare was discussed above, it has been much more far-reaching than that. In the earlier era of immigration, almost every group was connected to some form of conspiracy, no matter how convoluted. To many Americans, the Germans were spies of the Kaiser, Catholics were subversives of the pope, Italians were anarchists and criminals, and Jews were Bolsheviks. In the more modern era, this trend continued, with many equating Asians, Central Americans, and South Americans as contributing to the drug and criminality problem. There were even rumors that Mexican Immigrants were planting themselves in the Southwest in order to take it back

⁷³ Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 18.

⁷⁴ Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 19.

from the United States.⁷⁵ Another point that many made (more in the earlier era), was that these immigrants could not contribute to a democratic society, given that they were ruled by kings in Europe and are not accustomed to liberty.⁷⁶ Interestingly, there is a similar argument made about Muslim Immigrants today. Other nativist arguments revolved around economic issues. In both eras, people blamed immigrants for taking their jobs or lowering their wages. Both eras of nativists claimed that Immigrants would inevitably become economically dependent on the government. In the early era, this constituted entering poor houses and becoming public charges. In the later era it entailed allegations that immigrants inevitably file for welfare.⁷⁷ However, these economic arguments are usually easily countered, as many studies have shown mass immigration to be good for society. An interesting economic argument that has only cropped up in the later era of immigration is the ownership of businesses by immigrants in minority neighborhoods. These immigrants, often Korean, Indian, or Arab are frequently resented by the residents because they are not seen as giving back to the community.⁷⁸ As is clear, each of these nativist ideals, in some way draws from the patriotic concept of upholding democracy, rights, and freedom and defending ones fellow citizens. However, there are much more indefensibly xenophobic arguments based around the ‘social decimation’ of the United States.

In both eras of mass immigration to the United States, there have been some nativist arguments that revolve around perceived social issues caused by immigrants.

⁷⁵ Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 20-21.

⁷⁶ Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 22.

⁷⁷ Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 31.

⁷⁸ Jaret. “Troubled by Newcomers”. 27-28.

These arguments mainly revolved around the idea that they will eventually fracture America. These arguments always involve the conception that immigrants do not assimilate in American culture, and will eventually ruin it. This revolves around the differences in the cultures, ideals, and languages of the immigrants. While some like Teddy Roosevelt believed that Americanization of the immigrants could and should occur, others could not fathom this.⁷⁹ They even more thoroughly reject the idea of a multicultural America. This is why nativists and xenophobes of the early and late eras rejected the cultures of Eastern and Southern Europeans Immigrants, and South American and Asian Immigrants, respectively. An ironic point they make is that these new groups do not share the same history, and cannot appreciate what it means to be an Americans.⁸⁰ What is ironic about this is that many of those bemoaning new immigrants is that they are almost always descended from other immigrants, and thus cannot possibly claim American history if they disallow the new people to do so. What is sadly true about both these eras is, while there was certainly nativism during them, they also sparked massive increases in xenophobia in the years following. This idea implies that the era between 1998 and today has been increasingly nativist. The remainder of this essay will address this thesis.

⁷⁹ Shanahan and Olzak. "Effects of Immigrant Diversity". 45.

⁸⁰ Jaret. "Troubled by Newcomers". 19.

Chapter Two:

During the period between the Vietnam War and September 11th, 2001, the United States went through a few very important evolutions based upon conceptions of patriotism and xenophobia, which shaped its perspectives and actions in foreign and domestic policy. These positions formed the basis from which the United States attempted to grasp such a monumental tragedy 9/11. It is generally agreed that the Vietnam War challenged American ideas of exceptionalism and patriotism. While this is largely clear in the broad sense of the whole American zeitgeist, it should be clarified that the attitudes of common citizens were more complex. Regardless, the habitual and institutionalized rise of anti-patriotic attitudes, real or imagined, brought about a certain reckoning from the political Right, largely in the form of hawkish foreign policy, neoConservatism, and a return to traditional American values.

Responding to the much maligned 'Vietnam Syndrome' and apparent hedonism of the 1960s, the conservatives reasserted American Exceptionalism both abroad and domestically, best exemplified by the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The post-Cold War Era and Bill Clinton's presidency were in many ways a response to these trends in turn. His presidency saw a rise in more ethical and intentional foreign intervention and an ethnic makeup that was edging towards healthy diversity. In these ways, the post-Vietnam War era saw the eventual development of a largely purposeful patriotism where America's foreign policy was more careful and meaningful, and its domestic policy was inclining towards a multicultural state. However, these trends were largely bucked as a result of September 11th.

There is a generally accepted narrative that the United States during the Vietnam War became very unpatriotic. While this was in many ways the case, as with other ideas about history, this was not the only scenario. The accepted narrative is that the youth of America were divided in two, with some going off to fight, and others refusing. The latter in this scenario have been, and often still are, viewed later on as cowards, spoiled, and subversive to the war effort and America.⁸¹ However, this was not the case. While Vietnam was certainly a war fought by the poor American man (lower income Americans were twice as likely to die in the war than even middle class men),⁸² this is not to say that all middle and upper class young people avoided the war out of resentment for their country. While the anti-war movement was certainly led by the American youth including college students, many young people had no ill will towards the United States. Many middle class kids were actively patriotic and feared the communists like all 'good' Americans were suppose to be. However, this did not mean that they wanted to fight and die half-way across the world.⁸³ Additionally, many simply did not understand the War enough to be truly upset by it, leading to a resentment towards those protesting it so vigorously. These young people, combined with those who enjoyed counterculture but were apolitical, show that the Vietnam War narrative is much more complex than simply soldiers and unpatriotic subversives who hated the United States and were actively degrading it.⁸⁴ While the United States was arguably torn asunder in many

⁸¹ Paul Lyons, "Vietnam," in *Class of '66: Living in Suburban Middle America* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 72-73 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt14bsv09.7.pdf>.

⁸² Lyons, "Vietnam," in *Class of '66*, 74.

⁸³ Lyons, "Vietnam," in *Class of '66*, 78.

⁸⁴ Lyons, "Vietnam," in *Class of '66*, 82-83.

ways, it should not be conceded that those who did not support the war hated America, God, or Capitalism, as many revisionists often claim. Regardless, 'Vietnam Syndrome' was being rallied against by conservatives.

The term 'Vietnam Syndrome' refers to the the allegation by conservatives that, after the War, the political left were unpatriotic and were restraining the country from exerting its might abroad. While used in a pejorative sense by the political right, it may not have been such a bad development. Hereafter, when 'Vietnam Syndrome' is referred to, it will be referring to the more conscious patriotism following such a controversial conflict rather than the conservative insult it is implied to be. The reason this term entered the lexicon was that Vietnam, unlike any conflict since the Civil War, split the country.⁸⁵ (This does not contradict the previous paragraph, as, again, many on both sides were patriotic). In demanding an end to the war no matter the consequences, the American people damaged the pride and exceptionalism which had been building since the Second World War. This, in addition to the reckoning of Watergate, forced the United States to discuss national interests and actions in a different way.⁸⁶ While this was seen by many as defeatist, it was simply more cautious and pragmatic. While this was plausibly a positive and maturing development for the country, the conservatives did not see it this way, leading to decades of Republican exceptionalism. This is where American patriotism was after Vietnam: either judicious or neutered, depending on who one asked.

⁸⁵ George C. Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, ed. David L. Anderson (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2011), 410, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/ande13480.20>.

⁸⁶ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 411.

The patriotic sentiment of the United States, which lent itself to a willingness to assert the benefits of the democracy and capitalism abroad, was largely depleted after the Vietnam War. A quintessential example of this was the refusal to use military force during the Angolan Civil War under Gerald Ford. When the President contemplated intervention, Congress quickly denied him the possibility.⁸⁷ Up until the late 1980s, Democrats rejected intervention into countries which even resembled Vietnam. They viewed any such attack as both immoral and unnecessary. This type of military hesitation is largely what made the Republicans invent the term 'Vietnam Syndrome'. They viewed the flinching as risking a concession of the Cold War, loss of Superpower status, degrading of patriotism, and forfeiture of world leadership. This idea brought about vast historic revisionism of the War and the presumption that the United States was infallible, but merely handicapped by the unpatriotic.⁸⁸ This concept was part of the core rhetoric of Ronald Reagan.

Upon joining the Republican Party, Ronald Reagan became a standard bearer for American Conservatism. His right leaning rhetoric can be traced as far back as the 1960s, and more specifically, during the 1964 Presidential Election when he made his famous 'A Time for Choosing' speech in favor of candidate Barry Goldwater. In it, he rallied against what he saw as the most prominent issues facing the United States; mainly Communists, elites, and Lyndon Johnson's 'great society'.⁸⁹ His speech contained the patriotic hyperbole which defined Reagan's career, including his

⁸⁷ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 412.

⁸⁸ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 413-414.

⁸⁹ Bernard von Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties': The Rise of Ronald Reagan," in *Framing the Sixties: The Use and Abuse of a Decade from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush*, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), 29, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vk9gz.6>.

subsequent governorship and 1976 Presidential Run. In fact, one can see a development of further patriotic, jingoistic even, rhetoric. In his governorship between 1967 to 1975, Reagan championed against the lawlessness he saw in protests, at one point even threatening to criminalize them. In his view, the unpatriotic protesters had emboldened the Vietcong to continue the war against the United States.⁹⁰ During his failed 1976 Presidential run, Reagan continued this patriotic platform. Essentially, his campaign was run on a promise to end détente with the Soviet Union, which he was known for in retrospect.⁹¹ In this way, Reagan was reasserting American patriotism before he was even in the highest office in the land.

By his second run for president, Reagan had fully formed his practically nationalistic platform. By the 1980 Republican National Convention, he was arguing that virtually all of America's issues could be traced back to the liberalism and disloyalty of the 1960s. Despite losing her way, he was of the opinion that The United States could reassert her power and spirit abroad. Essentially, this was his main appeal as a candidate and first term President. Optimism and exceptionalism would purge the weakness and self doubt which he believed so embodied the 1960s.⁹² In his mind, America was entering an era of renewal. By his second term, it was his goal to make the people believe their country to be prouder and stronger than ever, with renewed military purpose and patriotism. This idea was embodied so enticingly by the slogan, 'Its

⁹⁰ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 32-33.

⁹¹ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 34.

⁹² Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 36.

Morning in America, Again'.⁹³ While this certainly appears to be a constructive goal, it had its chauvinistic and bellicose side in practice.

The issues with Reagan Era Patriotism are mainly regarding the refusal to admit the mistakes of the country in the past, and the denial of any legitimacy of any regime's claim to challenge the United States in the present or future. As argued above, the efforts of Reagan and other conservatives to distance America from the 'mistakes' of Vietnam era disloyalty led to severe revisionism of the era. The claims made ranged from saying there were no American War Crimes, to the argument that the war could have been won if the armed forces had been mobilized totally, early. Additionally, and more dangerously for the future of protesting other government actions, some claimed that it was a hostile media and anti-war movements which had lost the war for America.⁹⁴ In using undeniably patriotic rhetoric to attack free press and protesters, Reagan and the other conservatives set a very dangerous precedent for the future of this fourth estate. Unfortunately, many have adopted this tactic for use today as well. The other danger of Reagan Era Patriotism was the gung-ho attitude towards opposing those regimes which disagreed with the United States or apposed it ideologically.

In a post-Vietnam War Era world, resisting the democratic, capitalist system must have appeared attractive to many nations of the world. Reagan sought to put an end to this by employing patriotism. An ardent and steadfast patriot himself, he strove to increase the arms budget in a massive way, aid all anti communists, and end détente with Russia (as he promised in his campaign). While the latter of these goals arguably

⁹³ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 37.

⁹⁴ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 413.

did produce dividends in contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union, the former goals were more controversial, and at times, illegal. These were embodied by an attempt to increase nuclear forces in Europe, despite NATO not being entirely permissive, and increased aid to anti-communist insurgents, most notably to the Contra Rebels in Nicaragua.⁹⁵ Essentially, much of Reagan's patriotism revolved around justifying military action designed to disrupt the spread communism and, more importantly, ending the dreaded 'Vietnam Syndrome'. During his presidency, this was also seen in the support of the El Salvadorian Government in fighting Communist guerrillas during the El Salvadorian Civil War and the Invasion of Grenada in 1983.⁹⁶ Despite his actions, American patriotism had not yet reached pre-Vietnam magnitudes quite yet. For many, the war was still fresh in their minds and they were not ready to wave the flag so whole heartedly. This, in addition to the Iran-Contra Scandal and the tragic bombing of the Marine Corps Base in Beirut, Lebanon, meant that the American people were still sick with the unpatriotic 'Vietnam Syndrome'.⁹⁷ It became the task of George H.W. Bush to finally end this ailment.

Like his predecessor, Reagan, Bush Sr. sought to fully reinvigorate American Patriotism through militarism, and his biggest action therein was Dessert Storm. What separated Bush Sr.'s militarism from Reagan's was what would become know as the 'Powell Doctrine', named for then-General Colin Powell. Essentially this ideology was based around the ideas of full military force, only used as a last resort, and only if the

⁹⁵ "Ronald Reagan," in *Encyclopedia of Nationalism: Fundamental Themes*. Vol. 1 (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2001).

⁹⁶ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 414.

⁹⁷ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 415.

public supported it.⁹⁸ In this way, Bush Sr. waged a war on the Persian Gulf much different than Reagan ever did in any of the conflicts during his Presidency. It was the goal of Bush Sr. to ensure the American people knew that a Vietnam-esque quagmire could be avoided, and thus stopped short of entering Baghdad to overthrow Saddam Hussain or of supporting Shiite Militants. In doing this, it was claimed that 'Vietnam Syndrome' was "buried in the Arabian dessert".⁹⁹ Despite this claim was likely a bit premature (the American people continued worrying about intervention all throughout the 1990s), Bush Sr. and the immensely successful campaign led by General Schwarzkopf went a long way in reasserting patriotism as an important factor in American life. This type of red-white-and-blue rhetoric was also a main factor in domestic issues during the period of Bush Sr.'s presidency.

Even before the Persian Gulf War, Bush Sr. was using Patriotism to drum up support for himself. During the election of 1988, he was accusing his opponent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, of being unpatriotic. His claims to this were based around the facts that Dukakis was a member of the American Civil Liberties Union and that his wife, Kitty, was previously an ardent protester, possibly even a flag burner.¹⁰⁰ In addition to attacking his opponent's patriotic legitimacy, Bush Sr. promoted his own. He did this by building up issues such as the necessity for the pledge of allegiance in schools and criticizing the Supreme Court's decision that flag burning was legal, then claiming that in supporting the former and decrying the latter, he was the only

⁹⁸ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 415.

⁹⁹ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 416.

¹⁰⁰ John L. Sullivan et al., "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988," in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, No. 1, (Bloomington, IN: Midwest Political Science Association, 1992), 201, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2111430.pdf>.

true patriot and viable candidate.¹⁰¹ Whether this was scrupulous or not is somewhat irrelevant. By using this patriotic rhetoric, Bush was able to catapult himself to office. This showed that issues revolving around patriotic loyalty were viable issues to exploit in politics.¹⁰² Interestingly, in a report four years after the 1988 Election, some commentators still did not view the use of patriotism in politics as an issue.

The report entitled “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988”, by John L. Sullivan, Amy Fired, and Mary G. Dietz, cited multiple times above, is very useful in exploring the use of patriotism in a political way by George H.W. Bush. Essentially, they conclude the piece by discussing the fact that, given the precedent set by such politicians as Reagan and Bush Sr. in the Elections of 1984 and 1988, respectively, politicians knew how to use patriotism as a tool to win elections. In the words of the writers, said patriotism became a “symbolic cloak...in which political leaders seek to wrap themselves.”¹⁰³ They continue to argue that this use of patriotic rhetoric is in fact a bastardization of the traditional rebellious meaning of the term. Essentially, given that patriotism embodied rebellion against a tyrannical crown in England, it is misused in promoting conformity.¹⁰⁴ However, the essay ended on a somewhat optimistic note, with the authors believing politics had not yet become so adulterated to be a major issue problem. In their words, patriotism and actions

¹⁰¹ Sullivan et al., “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, 201.

¹⁰² Sullivan et al., “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, 202.

¹⁰³ Sullivan et al., “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, 231.

¹⁰⁴ Sullivan et al., “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, 207.

committed in the name of it was not yet “soundbite politics.”¹⁰⁵ This does beg the question of whether or not it became so in the subsequent years. The decade which ushered in the end of the Cold War provides very interesting examples on this question, and perhaps ushers in an era where patriotism is ‘soundbite politics’.

After the end of the Cold War, America had to find a new direction with which to mobilize patriotism. Without the Soviet Union as the enemy of liberty, a new type of patriotic jingoism gradually emerged in the 1990s: Militaristic exportation of humanitarianism. The main evolutions of this occurred in Somalia and Bosnia. The Somali conflict was an event which triggered a major development for the United States. After the Battle of Mogadishu, the people of the United States realized a few important facts: Firstly, that they could no longer afford to underestimate local nationalism, and second, that the United States could no longer serve as world police.¹⁰⁶ These realizations came from the anti-interventionism of the American people; arguably a resurgence of Vietnam Syndrome. This non-aggressive nature then leant itself to the American views on the Bosnian Conflict. Because of the evening news, people saw the tragic conflict happening in real time, such as the abhorrent Srebrenica Massacre, but because of the non-interventionism, they would not accept large scale conflict.¹⁰⁷ In an attempt to keep his distance to a degree, Bill Clinton only sanctioned air strikes. While this arguably led to a positive outcome, it can be argued that America ignored a different

¹⁰⁵ Sullivan et al., “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988,” in *American Journal of Political Science*, 231.

¹⁰⁶ Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 418.

¹⁰⁷ Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 419.

tragedy in an effort to remain anti-interventionist: The Rwandan Genocide.¹⁰⁸ Essentially, this type of humanitarian militarism is what American patriotism had become before 2001.

Interestingly, the desire to export American patriotic values changed political sides during Bill Clinton's presidency. Between Vietnam and the mid 1990s, it had mainly been the conservatives who had been attempting to spread capitalism and democracy abroad. However, during Clinton's presidency, it was mainly the democrats who sought to spread justice across the world and stop tragedy.¹⁰⁹ While these are different exports, they represent perceived American values. Arguably the most important example of this was the NATO intervention into the Kosovo War in 1999, given how close in time it was to September 11th. Essentially, in order to prevent genocide, NATO Forces led by The United States jumped into action, but in order to prevent quagmire, halted the intervention to airstrikes. In this way, the military actions by the United States in the late 1990s led to much more shrewd American intervention, with patriotism permitted for only humanitarian intervention, but still limited in order to avoid lengthy entanglement.¹¹⁰ Arguably, this is a much smarter form of foreign policy based patriotism. Although it had its issues such as the hesitation to intervene in Rwanda, it conceivably made the United States a much more judicious world leader. However, this was not to be, since September 11th allowed for the more conservative patriotism to thrive. Now Islam was the main adversary of traditional American values,

¹⁰⁸ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 416.

¹⁰⁹ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 416.

¹¹⁰ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 419.

rather than communism, as it had been previously. However, it can not be thought that only patriotism went through modifications between the Vietnam War and the 1990s, as ideas of race, nationalism, and social non-conformity did as well.

Like patriotism, the ethnic and social landscapes of America went through important changes between the 1960s and 2001, which decided how groups such as Arab Americans were viewed in the Twenty-first century. It is no big secret that the 1960s saw a rise in permissiveness and liberalism which later provoked a backlash from conservatives. What was less clear, but equally true, was that this backlash was forming very quickly even as early as the late 1960s, again signaled by the ascendancy of political leadership such as Ronald Reagan.¹¹¹ While the rise in neoconservatism was of course characterized by hawkish foreign policy—as mentioned above—it was also typified by a charge against social liberalism. Again, this is no big secret, but the rise in traditional values is essential in explaining America's relationship with race, and specifically with Arab-Americans in the twenty-first century. Politically skilled politicians like Reagan blamed social policies for all of the United States ills. While this worked in some senses in reinvigorating American confidence, it also divided the country along easily discernible racial, social and political lines which came to depend largely on one's perception of 'American values'. Arab and Muslim Americans were no exceptions to this, and their ideas of loyalty needed to be formed around the values idealized after the 1960s

In an effort to promise a return to order, neoconservatives rallied against President Johnson and capitalized on the apprehensions forming around the 1960s.

¹¹¹ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 28.

Attacking 'welfare queens' and protesters, there were clear arguments based around 'traditional American values'; aid values being economic self reliance and unquestioning support for American actions.¹¹² A main issue with these arguments was that they implied that all those who relied on more government assistance and who were unsupportive of American foreign actions were un-American. This meant that clear 'American verses un-American' social and ethnic lines were formed, which have lasted up to the modern day. These lines were especially exacerbated by the established political order leaning more Republican after Johnson.¹¹³ This type of American traditionalism continued up to the Reagan era, with the 1960s being blamed for all American problems.

With a rise in crime, hard drug use, and a decline in education, morality, and discipline perceived by conservatives in the 1980s, there must have been a reason. Believing that the social and political permissiveness of the 1960s was to blame for all these issues, Reagan argued that the decade of hedonism had devastated traditional Americanism.¹¹⁴ With campaigns such as 'Just Say No' under his wife Nancy, the Reagan Administration appealed to the conservative nature of many citizens while ostracizing those who did drugs as inherently wrong and immoral. In addition to this, Reagan sought to crackdown on crime and limit social freedoms. With his nomination of the heavily conservative Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987, he showed his intention to reestablish what he believed to be social order and traditional

¹¹² Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 30.

¹¹³ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 30.

¹¹⁴ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 41.

Americanism.¹¹⁵ During the same time, Reagan attempted to reestablish the role of religion in America.

Believing a permissive society was destroying America, Reagan championed reestablishing the rule of a few 'basic truths' that were being ignored. Seeing chaotic liberalism as the reason for problems in America ranging from laziness to the HIV crisis, he wanted to reassert American moral superiority.¹¹⁶ The issues with this are varied, but essential in understanding the country's contemporary racial and social issues, as well as its equation of Christianity with patriotism. Firstly, in describing homosexuals and drug addicts as inherently immoral, they become pariahs who did not represent America, but in fact degraded it.¹¹⁷ The former is inherently tied to race as well, as it is mainly poorer minorities who are victims of drug epidemics, such as during the crack epidemic.¹¹⁸ This set a dangerous precedent in differentiating races by morality, whether intentionally or as a product of systemic crackdowns on issues such as drug use. Additionally, the description of LGBTQ liberation as immoral brings up the other 'basic truth' which Reagan wanted to reestablish; Christianity as the fundamental standard-bearer for moral America. In equating Christianity with ethics, and then ethics with politics and social order, religion became a major factor in being an upstanding citizen of the United States.¹¹⁹ While Christianity has long been a factor in defining America,

¹¹⁵ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 38-41.

¹¹⁶ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 42.

¹¹⁷ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 41.

¹¹⁸ Roland G. Froyer et al., *Measuring Crack Cocaine and Its Impact*. (Boston: Harvard University Society of Fellows, 2006), 3, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/froyer/files/fhlm_crack_cocaine_0.pdf.

¹¹⁹ Bothmer, "Blaming 'the Sixties'," in *Framing the Sixties*, 43.

revising steps made in the previous decades towards religious cohesion certainly had a negative impact on the United States, which continued through the twenty-first century. This all had ramifications in the post September 11th era, where traditional values made a resurgence based around the ideals formed under Reagan, which then went on to define the lives of many Arab and Muslim Americans. What is interesting, however, is that despite many of these issues reemerging in the 2000s as hallmarks of conservatism, America saw the arguable development of a positive and healthy post-nationalism in the 1990s.

In 1997, Bill Clinton commissioned the report entitled “One America in the 21st Century: The President's Initiative on Race”, which provides vital information in assessing the situation of race in America just prior to 2001. Very established racial historians and professors took part in writing the report and painted a very honest and somewhat optimistic picture for the future of America. A discussion of this report is incredibly important as it shows what the American racial landscape was like just prior to 2001, and how America would have been a very different country in terms of race relations had 9/11 not occurred.

First contained in Clinton's initiative on race is a discussion of white versus minority opinions on racial questions facing the nation. The authors wrote that, essentially, white Americans have very different, often dated, views as compared to other ethnic groups. For many caucasian Americans, their assimilation had occurred generations ago, so their views were out of touch with modern society, specifically the fact that ethnic distributions were changing. This is evidenced by the fact that it was mainly people of color who used the government more instrumentally in addressing

discrimination.¹²⁰ This points to a general trend among white Americans; not active racism, but complacency and ignorance. In the report, studies showed that only 36 percent of caucasian Americans believed that there were still issues with race in America in 1997.¹²¹ What is contemporarily called 'white privilege' was then described as an ignorance of the subtle racism that occurs systematically on a daily basis. What is interesting is that this creates a unique situation for Muslim and Arab-Americans. Even in 1997, more than any other race, ethnic, or religious group, Arab and Muslim Americans faced active and pejorative racism, rather than inactive and subtle issues with 'white privilege' or ignorance.¹²² This is a trend which was only worsened by the events of September 11th, 2001. The report goes on to discuss the future of race in America rather optimistically in terms of multiculturalism; a future in which, by 2050, only 53 percent of Americans would be white.¹²³ Given this statistic, Was America ready for this eventuality? This also ties into the ideas of multiculturalism. With the report that America would only become more diverse in the coming decades, it is also implied that the issues surrounding race would no longer be localized to white and black Americans. It was of the opinion of the writers that the United States had not yet risen to that challenge, and needed to address the problems quickly. Their suggestions were meant to change America for the better, but were they heeded in a post September 11th United States?

¹²⁰ Steven F. Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century: The Report of President Bill Clinton's Initiative on Race* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 44.

¹²¹ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 45.

¹²² Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 45.

¹²³ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 51.

Before discussing whether the issues of race were addressed, it is important to discuss what the writers of the Clinton Initiative pointed to as the biggest issues. The first big issue the writers saw was the simplistic classification of race in America. The issues with this are varied, but the main problems come down to the fact that they are generally arbitrary, they get in the way of mutual understanding, and they often mischaracterize people.¹²⁴ These issues have always been particularly poignant when discussing broad groups such as Arab-Americans and Muslim Americans. The waters become very muddled when people focus on larger group distinctions and the differences between them. Healthy discussion of race is truly hard when characterizations and stereotypes are imprinted on groups.¹²⁵ This idea only worsened for Arab-Americans after September 11th. Another important issue which the authors saw was regarding the addition of vast numbers of new ethnic groups to the American landscape. Most research on race relations in America prior to the twenty-first century was regarding the systemic racism against black Americans by white. The report points specifically to the “Kerner Commission” 30 years prior.¹²⁶ While obviously a vital discussion to continue to have, it was important for the writers that discussions of other ethnic groups emerge as well. However, just prior to September 11th, important developments were occurring in regards to patriotism, xenophobia, and Arab and Muslim American Identity.

¹²⁴ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 51-52.

¹²⁵ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 73-74.

¹²⁶ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 53.

In the few years prior to 2001, a few very distinct forms of patriotism emerged in the United States. The three main forms which emerged in the post-Cold War nineties, and which have seen somewhat of a renaissance in recent years, are symbolic, environmental and iconoclastic. (There were a few others, but they were not polled as being very popular).¹²⁷ Symbolic patriotism appears to be the most nationalistic, where the patriot is one who views the most important aspects of the country as being its symbols; flags, colors, etcetera. Environmental patriots generally believe in the natural wonders of the country. This means that all who degrade said land with overdevelopment are not patriotic. Finally, iconoclastic patriots are those who believe that the spirit of a nation belong in its principals, such as those laid out in the constitution.¹²⁸ This is the patriotism most associated with the idea of 'Civic Nationalism' mentioned in chapter one of this thesis. It is the argument of the next chapter that Americans went from being more iconoclastically patriotic in the late 1990s to more symbolic in the time after September 11th, having regressed in this regard after 2001. However, patriotism was not the only American ideal that was arguably at a positive point during the late 1990s. The country had become a tenably post-National state, where ethnicity and culture did not halter a citizen's ability to identify as an American.

The post-nationalist America which emerged in the 1990s was one of multiculturalism and outward policy. However, this did not mean that the this concept did not contain any contradictions. Essentially, while breaking down nationalism and

¹²⁷ Sullivan et al., "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988," in *American Journal of Political Science*, 209-213.

¹²⁸ Sullivan et al., "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988," in *American Journal of Political Science*, 209-210.

integrating cultures in the United States during the 1990s was certainly an admirable goal, it still placed America at the forefront of the world stage. Essentially, in a post-national world, the United States had the ability and justification to export its values of diversity across the world.¹²⁹ This is essentially promoting a sort of American exceptionalism which had been seen before, except with different concepts such as democracy. In this image, the United States is unique amongst nations, absent of cultural struggles. Unfortunately, this was not truly the case.¹³⁰ Despite this glaring contradiction, this new Americanism was certainly a change from the traditional ideals of jingoism and spreading vague ideas of capitalism and democracy. This was best exemplified by the humanitarian foreign intervention largely exercised by the Clinton administration in Somalia and Kosovo. Despite this, after 2001, America began exporting the previously civilizing ideals it had before (which will be discussed in more detail later). In addition to American multiculturalism developing in the decades before 2001, specific consciousnesses of cultures were also emerging. Most notably, Arab-Americans were gaining a very significant foothold in American life.

Just prior to September 11th, a genuine Arab American identity was emerging. As with most other ethnicities in the history of the 20th Century United States, Arab consciousness in the country was being formed around a political cause. The cause which Arab Americans rallied around the the question of Israel, the real genesis of which

¹²⁹ George J. Sánchez, "Creating the Multicultural Nation: Adventures in Post-Nationalist American Studies in the 1990s," in *Post-Nationalist American Studies*, ed. John Carlos Rowe (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 40, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp2x2.6>.

¹³⁰ Sánchez, "Creating the Multicultural Nation," in *Post-Nationalist American Studies*, 41.

was arguably the Six-Day War in 1967.¹³¹ Prior to this conflict, Arab-Americans had largely been trying to assimilate and fit into society. However, through this conflict and the subsequent American support for Israel, Arabs in the United States gained a certain level of identity which made their experiences in the country more unique. By the 1990s, many Arab-Americans and scholars had recognized that they had “made a breakthrough.”¹³² This was celebrated through celebrations of Arab culture. Finally, it seemed, Arab-American children were beginning to be proud to identify as such in a way which differentiated them from other Americans.¹³³ This meant that not only were they a unique group in the American melting pot, but they could be politically active without being accused of being unpatriotic. In addition to the cultural and political consciousness being achieved by Arab Americans in the 1990s, major scholarship was also beginning to be dedicated to them, only to be halted by September 11th.

Just prior to September 11th, 2001, Arab Americans were finally receiving the scholarship they deserved. As mentioned, after the Arab-Israeli conflict began in earnest, Arab-Americans became quite politically active. In addition to allowing them to assert their cultural uniqueness, this activism also finally began paying dividends in terms of serious scholarship in the late 1990s.¹³⁴ While this can arguably be traced, at least in part, to more serious acts of violence such as the 1993 World Trade Center

¹³¹ Steven Salaita, *Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where it Comes From and What it Means for Politics Today* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006), 75.

¹³² Steven Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab Americans Before and After 9/11,” in *College Literature*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 150, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115271>.

¹³³ Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in *College Literature*, 150.

¹³⁴ Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in *College Literature*, 150.

Bombing, it can also be heavily traced to an realization of inherent connection with other minorities in the country. Many people began to realize that the orientalism which Arabs faced, mainly the sentimentalized image of Arab and Muslim culture, similarly set them back in society to how other groups had been.¹³⁵ (This is not to say that the actual actions of white Americans towards Arabs was close to the brutality of institutions such as slavery, only that they were being persecuted in way which resembled some people's ignorance of the lasting effects of slavery on African American's social standing in the country). Because of this demand for recognition, prior to 2001, Arabs were arguably about to become a political force in the country. However, after September 11th, it was the politicians and regular Americans who in turn began to demand what Arabs stood for in the country.¹³⁶ In this way, while Arab-Americans were arguably about to escape the periphery of society in the 1990s, they were forced right into the middle of it after September 11th, and not in a positive way.

The suggested solutions to issues with American race relations contained in the "Clinton Initiative on Race" are important to discuss as they show the progress the country was ready to make just prior to September 11th, and how much the current situation is a deviation from the projected course. It has taken the United States nearly two decades to finally attempt to reassess these ideas, and this is a slow process at that. The first suggestion is simply an enforcement of Civil Rights laws, as many Americans faced punishable and preventable discrimination. The reason this enforcement was often blocked, in the opinions of the authors, came down to a mixture

¹³⁵ Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 165.

¹³⁶ Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 149.

of lack of funding and data.¹³⁷ (Unfortunately, this trend only worsened after 2001). Another solution suggested by the authors of the report was simple education on race and race relations. All Americans should understand the all encompassing nature of the values of the country, but were often stifled in their education of this early in life. When discrimination and stereotypes are taught early on in children, they become incredibly hard to dispel later on. This becomes even worse when these stereotypes are ignored, or even encouraged by adults.¹³⁸ This encouragement could easily come from faulty patriotism. The final major solution suggested by the authors surround the relationship between minorities and law enforcement and authority figures. For society to be equal and effective, everybody must be able to trust the justice of the United States, but often cannot. Profiling and systemic issues with incarceration contribute to the antagonism between peoples.¹³⁹ The most visible example of this today and at the time of the report's authoring was the intrinsic racism of the American justice system towards blacks and latinos. This unfortunately remains a dire issue in 2018. In the same way today, Arab-Americans need to be able to trust the government, but often cannot. Essentially, the 'Clinton Initiative on Race' provided for a candid but hopeful exploration into the future of race relations in America.

The period from the Vietnam Era to the 1990s saw the rise and fall of both xenophobia and symbolic patriotism. Just prior to 2001, the Clinton administration arguably saw the emergence of a positive form of patriotism which dispelled racism and

¹³⁷ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 57.

¹³⁸ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 74.

¹³⁹ Lawson, ed. *One America in the Twenty-First Century*, 75-76.

encouraged multiculturalism. However, despite the trajectory of the nation being quite positive in the developing post-nationalist America, September 11th made the country veer off path, and towards racism and suspicion.

Chapter Three:

Just Prior to September 11th, patriotism and Arab and Muslim-American identity in the United States was reaching a healthy point, but the tragedy in New York and Washington D.C. completely shattered this. Prior to 2001, patriotism in the United States had emerged from the presidencies of Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton as an arguably positive force, despite years of back and forth, and despite the two Republican presidents' intentions to make it more nationalistic. While different people still had differing interpretations of the idea, it was generally forcing positive introspection. This is similar to the lives of Arab-Americans, who likewise were forming an important identity in the country. However, September 11th contained two additional casualties when the towers fell. In the immediate aftermath, very jingoistic and nationalistic opinions were voiced regarding the United State's role in the world as a benevolent leader, as well as Arabs' and Muslims' role in the country, respectively. Essentially American patriotism changed almost fundamentally. In the following months and years, distinct actions were made which reenforced these new ideas, and in turn provided for extremely severe appropriations of rights and justice. In addition to white America's views changing, Arab-Americans had to adapt to the new social order, and are continuing to do so today. Indeed, September 11th completely devastated the emerging positive patriotism and multiculturalism which had taken America so long to forge.

On September 11th, 2001, the United States and the world was changed in a way that will alter them for generations to come. Arguably the most effected Americans in the immediate aftermath, other than families of the victims and New Yorkers, were Arab and Muslim Americans. This was because these Americans felt not only all the

pain, grief, sadness, and anger which all other citizens felt from such a heinous act, but also fear and betrayal. Arab and Muslim Americans were in fear of reprisals for being the same ethnicity and religion as the attackers, and betrayal from both those of their own religion and by those Americans who participated in the hate crimes which inevitably did come.¹⁴⁰ Reported on October 6th, 2001, *The New York Times* claimed that “Perhaps hundreds of hate crimes have been directed at Middle Easterners, Muslims and Sikhs throughout the country since Sept. 11, crimes ranging from vandalism to verbal assaults to the murder of a Sikh restaurant owner in Arizona mistaken for an Arab.”¹⁴¹ It must be remembered that around one percent of the victims of the attacks were Muslim, which was also around the percentage of Americans who were Muslim total.¹⁴² Because of this, it was absolutely just for Muslim Americans to feel the same outrage as other citizens, if it had not been just before. In addition to this, it was also justifiable that Arab and Muslim Americans asked for calm amongst their fellow Americans.¹⁴³ Sadly, in the following months, this was not heeded.

In the months following September 11th, Americans found it difficult to temper their feelings. Some of the most spirited and violent hate crimes came in the first three months after the tragedy, and it was not only Arabs and Muslims who bore the brunt of

¹⁴⁰ Gregory Orfalea, *The Arab Americans: A History* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2006), 299.

¹⁴¹ Evelyn Nieves, “Slain Arab-American May Have Been Hate-Crime Victim.” *The New York Times*, October 6, 2001. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/91971411/6041D908FEF74A66PQ/1?accountid=14637>

¹⁴² Kamal Kobeisi. “Remembering the Muslims who were Killed in the 9/11 Attacks.” *Al Arabiya News*, accessed February 25, 2018. <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html>.

¹⁴³ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 301.

this. All people with brown skin color were victimized by hate and violence. On March 11th, 2002 the *New York Times* reported that “attacks on Asian-Americans, particularly Pakistani and Indian Immigrants, increased greatly in the United States in the weeks after Sept. 11...”¹⁴⁴ Even some groups who claimed to be defending their own faith, such as the Jewish Defense League, took part.¹⁴⁵ Few Americans were exempt from this hate, which also bled into a denial of civil rights. In the short time after 9/11, Arab Americans began being denied the basic entitlements of citizens, including but not limited to, the ability to become pilots, profiling at airports, color coding for danger on airplanes, and a general denial of service by businesses.¹⁴⁶ Muslims were feeling what *The New York Times* reported on April 25th, 2002, as “quiet but persistent discrimination against them in their everyday social transactions.”¹⁴⁷ Regardless of what a person or company believes to be justice for America, these were transparent denials of civil rights. Unfortunately, this did not matter at the time, and these slights were permitted to occur. In addition to general citizens, more public figures also took part in the assault and defense of Arab-Americans.

September 11th was an attack on all of America, its supposed ideals and its identity, no matter what some of those Americans think of them. Because of this, every American citizen had the right to react to it. The issue with this was, when many of

¹⁴⁴ “The Immigrants: More Insulted And Attacked After Sept. 11.” *The New York Times*, March 11, 2002. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/92208605/6041D908FEF74A66PQ/9?accountid=14637>.

¹⁴⁵ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 305.

¹⁴⁶ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 306-307.

¹⁴⁷ Susan Sachs, “For Many American Muslims, Complaints of Quiet but Persistent Bias.” *The New York Times*, April 25, 2002. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/92364719/CEDE5A5C0910491DPQ/2?accountid=14637>.

America's ideals are contradictory, depending on the citizen asked, there will be countless different reactions. To wit, there were countless different types of hate which many felt, and these are worth discussing. Essentially, xenophobia in the United States took a few different forms following September 11th. Exclusive xenophobia is where Americans believe that by dint of being different, Arabs and Muslims did not even exist in the imagined community. Possessive xenophobia is where a person believes that the outsider does not exist in the community, and is a subsequent drain on it. Finally, toxic xenophobia is where the American believes that the Arab or Muslim American does not exist in the community, and that they are in fact trying to undermine it.¹⁴⁸ While the former two are often more unthinking, or at least benign enough to not cause panic, the latter is extremely characteristic of the virulent hatred which Arab and Muslim Americans felt. For example, the beliefs that the building of a Mosque or wearing of a Hijab are antiAmerican are, by definition, toxic xenophobia. Because some believed these were threats to American freedom is a hatred which is extremely characteristic of Islamophobia.¹⁴⁹ It was through nationalist feelings that toxic xenophobia emerged in the United States.

Like with xenophobia, there are different forms of nationalism which emerged following September 11th. The first, more benign type is a type of everyday nationalism. This sentiment is taught early in life in schools with the pledge of allegiance. It is because of this nationalism that younger Muslim and Arab children become

¹⁴⁸ Rachel B. Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance: Toxic Xenophobia and Pedagogy of Resistance," in *The High School Journal*, Vol. 95, No. 1, *Education in a Post-9/11 Era: Remembering Pasts and Charting Futures* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 35, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41236886>.

¹⁴⁹ Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 35.

marginalized for being different. Additionally, because of the more extreme forms of nationalism, this is often overlooked.¹⁵⁰ This more extreme nationalism is when somebody uses patriotic sentiment to justify the civil rights violations against Arabs and Muslims in the United State.¹⁵¹ Both of these nationalisms feed on a certain imagined community, where the nation is never complete, but needs constant readdressing to decide who is to be excluded. In America, Muslims and Arabs have continually been excluded. A ban on mosques or a hijab is an extension of the orientalism which has characterized the United State's relationship with its Muslim and Arab citizens. As with the perceived colonial superiority of the past, western religious, moral and democratic superiority characterize American views on Muslims and Arabs. The main difference between now and then is that the groups are vilified as violent rather than romanticized.¹⁵² This plays directly into the role of patriotism in Islamophobia, given how dependent American patriotism became on religion and democracy, especially after September 11th.

Religious leaders, pundits, and politicians all quickly emerged following September 11th to join in the discussion on what was to be done about Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Sadly, but unsurprisingly, much of the discourse was very negative and in many cases was bordering on, or even crossing into, hate speech. Many religious leaders were very vocal in denouncing Islam as a rejection of American values. In connecting America and patriotism with Christian traditionalism, many

¹⁵⁰ Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 37.

¹⁵¹ Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 37.

¹⁵² Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 38.

religious leaders set Muslims apart from other Americans.¹⁵³ Politicians and pundits were arguably more virulent in their hatred, but many similarly relied on evoking the Judeo-Christian values so often associated with America and its allies. In 2002, House Majority Leader Dick Armey made headlines by calling for Israel to expel all Palestinians from the West Bank. While this may not inherently be violent, it would still be an ethnic cleansing of the region.¹⁵⁴ This abhorrent comment can be seen as an effort by Armey to pursue closer relations with Israel by espousing American hate against Arabs. Pundit Ann Coulter arguably adopted worse positions, but positions which were much more in line with Christian American values nonetheless. She called for America to enter Muslim countries and convert them to Christianity by force.¹⁵⁵ While this espousal for a new crusade was on its face negating traditional ideals of patriotism, and even those developed in the 1990s, they were reflective of what many Americans believed. In this way, it can be argued that this was the reemergence of a jingoistic patriotism not seen since years previously. Some, however, sought to support their fellow Americans.

On September 28th, 2001, *The New York Times* reported that “American Muslims and Arab groups have enlisted government officials, Islamic Scholars and even [the] teenage pop star [Mandy Moore] to combat what many fear could be a rising tide of harassment of hate.”¹⁵⁶ However, this support was often seen as unpatriotic in turn, or

¹⁵³ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 308.

¹⁵⁴ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 308.

¹⁵⁵ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 309.

¹⁵⁶ Susan Sachs, “Pop Star and Public Officials Join Campaign for Tolerance”. *The New York Times*, September 28, 2001. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/91876929/A860F1CAA11F418DPQ/1?accountid=14637>

elitist and out of touch with the views of common Americans.¹⁵⁷ While this shows that some tried to resist this in favor of a more inclusive national feeling, they were not very successful, and Arab and Muslim Americans had to ask themselves whether they could share in the collective American identity.

September 11th, like no other event before it, challenged the hegemony of the United States. The main responses to this were the seizure of civil rights under the guise of patriotism and protecting Americans, and war in the Mid-East and South-Central Asia.¹⁵⁸ The prevailing mentality of the country considered opposition to either of the measures a rejection of what the country stood for. The mentality was that, 'if the terrorists hate everything America stands for, and you disapprove of some of what it stands for, then you are on par with the enemy'.¹⁵⁹ The error with this idea is that America is a land of contradictions, and one can not possibly approve of all aspects of it. Regardless, for the first time since 1812, the war was on American mainland shores, which meant patriotism looked inward; for the first time in almost 200 years, Americans felt what other countries feel during war. This meant that the United States equated security with nationalism, and the return to simplistic peace with traditional Americanism.¹⁶⁰ This return to patriotic rhetoric not seen since Bush Sr. was marked by a massive change in what was being reported in regards to both foreign and domestic issues. At the time, controversial opinions were being rejected by more popular and

¹⁵⁷ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 310.

¹⁵⁸ Dana Heller, *The Selling of 9/11: How a National Tragedy Became a Commodity* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 78.

¹⁵⁹ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 81.

¹⁶⁰ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 79.

palatable ones inside of the country. When this happens, the rest of the world views a much different story than the United States was seeing.¹⁶¹ The further response to the attacks was the emergence of a largely binary system of good versus evil.

After September 11th, the rhetoric of the United States resembled that of the early Cold War. With the sole military superpower on the planet suddenly becoming a victim, a system emerged which viewed good and evil as absolutes. In this system, America represented a certain type of purity in the world, while terrorists and those who resembled them represented the absolute malice.¹⁶² This was similar to how Communists were seen around the 1950s. Further than this, the more Americans have rallied around the symbolism of America, the more they worry about somebody disrupting them.¹⁶³ Given the ethnic nature of much of this insularism, the people who would be suspected of disrupting the symbols would be those who did not resemble these traditional national values. While the obvious victims of this are Arab and Muslim Americans, it can arguably lead to more xenophobia against any minority. Overall, September 11th ushered in a new era for American history on both a personal and national level.

As well as the 'good versus evil' system which emerged, a binary system also emerged which claimed that America was the only legitimate state actor in the War on Terror. This was largely reflective of the trend of American policy of the time, where the country was taught to dig in and defend against an attack from all sides. Essentially, this

¹⁶¹ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 93.

¹⁶² Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 35.

¹⁶³ Jones, "Intolerable Intolerance," in *The High School Journal*, 36.

meant that while the United States represented state validity and law, its enemies were characterized by an anarchical chaos.¹⁶⁴ In this system displays of patriotic fervor become absolutely vital, and borders become the only protection from disorder. In this way, despite the fact that the hijackers entered the country legally, Americans espouse a sense of 'digging in' and protecting the country from the chaos brought in from abroad.¹⁶⁵ In addition to being a clear precursor to general xenophobia, it is also a fundamental change in the way American's relationship to the rest of world is viewed domestically. In the aftermath of September 11th, maps become three dimensional, with cultures and social groups becoming as important as other nation's borders. It then becomes the goal of America to ensure that this disintegration of boundaries does not occur domestically as well.¹⁶⁶ In this way, 'digging in' paradoxically has two effects: It creates an 'us verses them' mentality which manifests itself as state patriotism and reassurance of borders, while simultaneously deconstructing the concept of a state in general by creating actors who subvert and actors who uphold the nation on the inside.¹⁶⁷ In America, this had sweeping effects.

The threat of terroristic borderlessness became much more important in the minds of Americans than understanding nations and nationhood in the aftermath of September 11th. This mentality lead to an intrinsic dependence on the common iconography of America. Because of this, states which defended and bound their

¹⁶⁴ Stanley D. Brunn, ed. *11 September and Its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 88.

¹⁶⁵ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 89.

¹⁶⁶ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 91.

¹⁶⁷ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 91.

borders with both physical and symbolic nationalism were perceived as more resilient than those which did not.¹⁶⁸ When the territoriality of a state becomes more imperative to its citizens than accepting multiculturalism, minority cultures suffer. A poignant example of this is a discussion of the nationalities of those inside the Twin Towers. While it is certainly positive in many ways to say that, 'all were American citizens, regardless of ethnicity or race', it can also lead to a misleading picture of the event. When patriotism revolves around a white, Christian narrative, saying 'all were American' contributes to the idea of white, Christian victimization. Because of this, it becomes difficult to imagine any other race or religion being a victim. This is a part of the reason why, when sadness finally gives way to anger, all Arabs and Muslims are attacked being unAmerican.¹⁶⁹ All these developments in the patriotic consciousness had lasting repercussions on the nation, both in terms of creating a culture of white, Christian insularism, and in driving the actions of the nation both domestically and in foreign policy.

The immediate governmental and military reactions to September 11th were largely reflective of national attitudes. In the end, it was not Bush Sr. who was president when Vietnam Syndrome ended in the Arabian Desert, but rather, his son, when it ended in New York and Washington D.C. All of the emotional and intellectual arguments which had prevented the Presidents of the previous few decades from becoming embroiled abroad were forgotten, and patriotism became fashionable again. In this post September 11th time a country previously weary of their government was calling for

¹⁶⁸ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 92.

¹⁶⁹ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 93.

vengeance and justice.¹⁷⁰ Congress reflected this sentiment when they gave George W. Bush a 'blank check' in pursuit of doing so. More consequential than this, however, was that the American people were calling for intervention in South-Central Asia and the Middle East. Despite this, it should be said, some people were keeping a more level head and recalled that Afghanistan was a country which had defeated great powers before, just like Vietnam. However, this naysaying only provided fuel for Republicans who, when we became bogged down in the country in October, 2001, blamed the dissent.¹⁷¹ In this way, Vietnam Syndrome was reinvigorated and politicians were again claiming dissent to be unpatriotic. Given that the country is still embroiled in the area in 2018, it seems that the patriotic sentiment from the Republicans prevailed.

It was not long at all after September 11th that America was at war in Afghanistan. Despite initial setbacks, the initial campaign was quite successful. Like the success of Operation Dessert Storm in 1991, the toppling of the Taliban was proof enough for Americans that war worked again. In this way, the dreaded Vietnam Syndrome seemed to be dead. In addition to this, the early stages of the war seemingly proved that ground warfare could be won with few American casualties. These early successes reinvigorated Americans and made them believe that the unmitigated quagmires of the past were over.¹⁷² The fact that the government was able to convince the people of this so early on led to further developments in the war on terror. Soon, the American public was completely agreeable to intervention against terrorist or terrorist

¹⁷⁰ George C. Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, ed. David L. Anderson (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2011), 421, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/ande13480.20>.

¹⁷¹ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 422.

¹⁷² Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 423.

sponsoring states. Polls from 2002 show that people supported intervention in Iraq, Iran, and even against Islamic insurgents in the Philippines.¹⁷³ This was much hawkish than the nonaggression of the late 1990s, and was mainly spurred on by a reinvigorated jingoistic patriotism. This also had effects on the American consciousness regarding its past.

The reason for, and consequence of, the aggressive patriotism was the same toxic revisionism which occurred under Reagan. Again, people looked back at quagmires such as Vietnam with rose tinted glasses. This revisionism claimed that it was not possible for the United States to be so bogged down when it had the support of all citizens.¹⁷⁴ This mentality had major consequences for American foreign policy, with Bush believing that he could solve all of the issues in the Middle East which had been plaguing the free, democratic, and, whether he would admit it or not, Christian world. This was a step further than the Invasion of Afghanistan, which was at least given some reason by the Taliban harboring Bin Laden. After the Iraq war began, it was clear that the containment policy of the Cold War was gone, because in the new millennia, preemptive wars were the only way America could win. Essentially, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney likely more than the President himself, were dismantling the Powell Doctrine, ironically while Powell was Secretary of State.¹⁷⁵ In an effort to provide a final closure to the Vietnam Syndrome, the Bush Administration made ousting Saddam Hussein the center of their foreign policy goals. Initially, it worked, with the fall of

¹⁷³ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 422.

¹⁷⁴ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 422.

¹⁷⁵ Herring, "The Vietnam Syndrome," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 423.

Baghdad occurring only around a month after the start of the invasion. Akin the early successes in Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq showed to the American people that the country was strong again, and that military action was a viable first choice in foreign policy.¹⁷⁶ However, as the next decade and a half of war has proved, quagmires comparable to Vietnam were still entirely possible. The revisionist based domestic actions were similarly harmful.

Many citizens expressed inclusive opinions towards Arab and Muslim Americans in the aftermath of September 11th, including good will from politicians. In late September, 2001, John McCain claimed that “Violence or discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans is a betrayal of everything America stands for.”¹⁷⁷ However, the actions of the United States government and the general response was much more negative and reflected a desire for a return to normalcy. As stated, the national rhetoric response to the tragedy was one of increased patriotism, reflected in speeches of George Bush, the defense of the bombing of Afghanistan, and a rise in cultural comforts such as Norman Rockwell paintings.¹⁷⁸ However, this rise in American traditionalism was not as much a rediscovery of conservatism as it was a “flag-shrouded anxiety”.¹⁷⁹ These types of cultural assurances were representative of the anxiety induced patriotism, which asserted that, while American values are timeless, they were in

¹⁷⁶ Herring, “The Vietnam Syndrome,” in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, 422.

¹⁷⁷ “Radio Messages On Tolerance: Senator McCain Mr. Ashcroft Ms. Moore.” *The New York Times*, September 28, 2001. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/91870970/6041D908FEF74A66PQ/8?accountid=14637>

¹⁷⁸ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 80.

¹⁷⁹ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 81.

trouble. In this way patriotism represented a return to normalcy.¹⁸⁰ The government largely capitalized on this anxiety to assert the goals of the country, which made what would have once seemed like a domestic rejection of rights and justice much more palatable.

The United States following September 11th was essentially an uncovered nerve; quick to react and extreme in its retaliation. The main example of this was the PATRIOT Act, which was announced under the guise of protecting American values. In actuality, the act was the first step aimed at limiting American civil liberties.¹⁸¹ The first victims of this, were Arab and Muslim Americans, who became much more limited in expressing political opinions, especially regarding Palestine. If they did, they could be accused of anti-Americanism and even anti-Semitism, and targeted.¹⁸² However, the PATRIOT Act and other actions of the United States government were mainly efforts to reenforce the strong border rhetoric, which stemmed from an idea of protecting American values.

The post September 11th era made the effort to strengthen American borders, and make sure enemies could not longer get in, essential. This mainly entailed enhanced border security, such as with the PATRIOT Act, the Visa Entry Act and the tracking of foreign students. However, it also entailed reassessing the legitimacy of foreign groups' claims, and the necessity to be rid of them at any means necessary.¹⁸³ In seeking to protect American democracy, and humanity as a whole, the United States

¹⁸⁰ Heller, *The Selling of 9/11*, 84.

¹⁸¹ Steven Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab Americans Before and After 9/11." *In College Literature*, Vol. 32, No. 2, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 152, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115271>.

¹⁸² Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 152.

¹⁸³ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 90.

was shrewdly denying the other's claims to humanity.¹⁸⁴ In doing so, it set a dangerous precedent. While claiming Al-Qaeda operatives and the hijackers are state actors (or even have humanity) is not exactly correct either, delegitimizing their operations to such an extent allows for any recourse, no matter how dangerous or inhumane in turn. This rhetoric is why dangerous carpet bombing operations can occur in Afghanistan, and why people can be held indefinitely without trial in Guantanamo Bay.¹⁸⁵ Patriotic ideals are the main reason acts such as military tribunals for suspected terrorists on ships at sea could garner what *The New York Times* conceded was "broad public support".¹⁸⁶ By patriotically protecting American values, the government was able to justify many actions, including those which harmed civilians or were blatant human rights violations. Inside the United States as well, these ideas led to massive civil rights violations inside the United States.

When the PATRIOT Act was enacted in late October, 2001, it dampened all hope of a healthy relationship with Arab and Muslim Americans. Like with many other groups, the act had broad support in the Arab American community, who also saw it as a viable way to protect the country. However, it soon became clear that the Act was a major violation of Constitutional rights brought about by fear and anxiety.¹⁸⁷ More than this, the PATRIOT Act unjustly but unsurprisingly targeted Arab and Muslim Americans. With the description of all Al-Qaeda and Taliban Operatives as non-state actors, the United

¹⁸⁴ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 96.

¹⁸⁵ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 96.

¹⁸⁶ Matthew Purdy, "Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape." *The New York Times*, November 25, 2001. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/92098613/B2B3CFE520104268PQ/2?accountid=14637>

¹⁸⁷ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 311.

States allowed for the creation of largely mythical 'domestic terrorists' who, acting as a fifth column, theoretically endeavored to disrupt America and undermined its values. It was because of this that, between 2001 and 2004 alone, over 1000 Arab men were detained by the FBI, with some held indefinitely, and others being quietly deported.¹⁸⁸ Despite acts such as the Oklahoma City Bombing being carried out in the name of new patriotism, these groups do not face targeting as often. The only discernible reasoning for this discrepancy that can be described is that the Islamic Terrorists arguably provide support for a foreign enemy. However, is there any real difference between the groups other than the fact that one's goals are American and Christian based, and one's is foreign and Islamic.¹⁸⁹ Both can do the same harm domestically, but only one is targeted in such a way. Additionally, despite there being no justification for the murder of almost 3000 people, for the United States to deny any responsibility in creating either group through abandoning the Mujahideen after the Soviet-Afghan War and supporting Israel is foolish and detrimental to any effort to defeat them.¹⁹⁰ The encroachments continue from here, growing from civil to human rights violations.

The well publicized actions in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib highlight some of the worst human rights violations against detainees, but they were by no means the only ones. In the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, it has been alleged that similar torture has occurred. On April 3th, 2002, *The New York Times* reported that "dozens of Muslim men have been held in virtual secrecy after their arrests," and that

¹⁸⁸ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 97.

¹⁸⁹ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 312.

¹⁹⁰ Brunn, *11 September and Its Aftermath*, 100.

they “Civil Rights groups have complained that many detainees were not allowed to contact family members or lawyers after their arrests and that their haven been held under especially harsh conditions for people charged only with minor immigration violations.”¹⁹¹ Additionally, in the same article, it was reported that a judge had to intervene to assure the trials were open to the public, showing clear intentions of other authorities to clandestinely violate the rights of prisoners through acts such as private trials. Further, in this time, while some police refused to comply, as many as 18,000 men were brought in for questioning across the United States, with the definition of criminality expanding heavily.¹⁹² Additionally, because of this new lax definition of justice, search and seizures were becoming commonplace, where homes could be entered and possessions searched.¹⁹³ With the FBI monitoring small businesses and all of the rights violations mentioned above, by 2002, Arab and Muslim Americans began to realize that they were being targeted indiscriminately by these acts. The main question to be asked of this is; How should America respond with these issues of marginalization? Essentially, it is a question of scholarship on the issues, specifically by Arab-Americans.

Only just prior to September 11th, scholarship on Arab and Muslim Americans was finally emerging. However, after, they were shot from the periphery of society to the very center. Because of this, it became more important for Arabs and Muslims to integrate into American society and history (not necessarily assimilate, but cultivate their

¹⁹¹ Danny Hakim and Susan Sachs, “Judge Rules The Hearing For a Detainee Must Be Open.” *The New York Times*, 2002. <https://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/92215576/771098808AF4126PQ/1?accountid=14637>

¹⁹² Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 313.

¹⁹³ Orfalea, *The Arab Americans*, 314.

own hyphenated American identity), but was simultaneously more difficult to do so. In essence, it was vital for Arab and Muslim Americans to form a political identity, but could not for risk of being labeled unpatriotic.¹⁹⁴ Because of this, it is vital that more Arab and Muslim scholarship emerge, especially by Arab and Muslim Americans, and that it be more accepted. This serves the dual purpose of furthering knowledge on these important Americans, while also helping them become more accepted in the country. This will only come when Americans accept the dissent against the actions of the country. However, there are very challenging issues in this regard.

Unlike any other groups in the United States following September 11th, Arab and Muslim Americans were forced to think about their cultural allegiances. This was not because Arabs and Muslims were in any way against America, only that they were now on the periphery of society and had to decide whether they wanted to remain culturally distinct. The reason these groups of people were forced to tread lightly was that an “imperative patriotism” was dictating that all dissent was unpatriotic.¹⁹⁵ The impression of conformity was meant to generally aid the legitimacy of national efforts abroad and domestically. Essentially, the question of the day was, ‘Are you with America and God, or your own religion and culture?’. Along with being inherently xenophobic, this question is specifically Islamophobic. In declaring a divine interest in American interests, patriotism took on the traditional American values of Christianity.¹⁹⁶ Essentially, in using this question to quell any dissent, the United States essentially had the ability to claim

¹⁹⁴ Salaita, *Anti-Arab Racism in the USA*, 80.

¹⁹⁵ Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in *College Literature*, 155.

¹⁹⁶ Salaita, “Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism,” in *College Literature*, 154.

Christian civilization as a right to fix problems overseas without any general protest domestically. In this way, it was an 'imperative patriotism', as it became essential that racism be used to further goals abroad.¹⁹⁷ In the time following September 11th, Imperative patriotism further proved to be inherently connected to xenophobia.

In saying, 'If you do not like it', leave, imperative Patriotism directly lends itself to xenophobia. The reason it is, is that assumes the United States has a largely fixed identity, and any dissent, culturally, religiously, politically, or otherwise, forfeits one's claim to that identity. This only increased after September 11th, where the United States, emerged as having one way of life, which was iconographically patriotic, white, christian, and apolitical.¹⁹⁸ However, a lack of addressing previous issues leads to further xenophobic rhetoric. For example, the lack of white American addressing of slavery has had a direct impact on racism in the modern United States. The same goes for September 11th and Arab and Muslim Americans. In never truly addressing its issues with orientalism prior to 2001, America set itself up for xenophobia. Additionally, in not addressing the various issues with patriotism, America ignores the toxic expressions of racism which come from using it as an excuse.¹⁹⁹ This does not go for Arab and Muslim Americas alone, either, as the recent NFL protests have shown that the increasingly divisive patriotism has led to increasingly divided race relations.

For patriotism to regain any semblance of usefulness or positivity, it must reemerge as it existed prior to September 11th, but after the administration of George

¹⁹⁷ Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 155.

¹⁹⁸ Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 156.

¹⁹⁹ Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism," in *College Literature*, 158.

H.W. Bush. Historically, in the 21st century, Patriotism has had a direct role in informing islamophobia in the United States. In the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the American people, as a result of trying to understand what had happened, were very divisive in their reactions to the tragedy. However, quickly, a binary system of good and evil quickly emerged, where ethnic identity and patriotism became an important deciding factor. This, plus the idea of terrorists as illegitimate humans or state actors, meant that these distinct cultures tended to be regarded as illegitimate as well. The governmental response to September 11th was equally harmful. In using patriotic rhetoric to assert the goals of the state and further justify its actions, acts such as the PATRIOT Act and the undoubtedly superfluous and damaging Iraq War can occur. Patriotism can be a positive aspect of American culture, notably when its an all including, iconoclastic, willing to address its own faults, and healing. Essentially, if patriotism is aimed at upholding the ideals of justice, as with 'civic nationalism', it can be a positive. However, the aftermath of September 11th has proven it to be a largely symbolic and even toxic ideal which leads itself, whether directly or indirectly, consciously or subconsciously, to both xenophobic and repressive rhetorics.

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