

Democratization and Social Movements: An Analysis of Elites and Masses in Democratic Transitions

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ABSTRACT

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Over the past several decades there has been an influx of countries becoming democracies. Post-communist Eastern Europe, developing Africa, and Latin America are only three regions that have been working towards democratic governments, some being more successful than others. There are many theories that attempt to explain why some countries are able to successfully transition to a democracy while others fail. In my senior thesis, I focus on elitism versus the power of the masses.

For most of transitology history, elites have been viewed as the prominent actor in democratization. However, the role of the masses has been focused on more and more as time passes. I examine the histories and democratization processes in South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, to determine the influence mass mobilization and elites have in democratic transitions. Mass mobilization is my independent variable, the variable that I am studying to see its impact, or lack of, on democratization processes in various countries.

While the two theories do divulge prominent ideologies, I find that consensual elites and social movements are both not necessary for a democratic transition, but the democracy will most likely succeed in the long run if they are present. Therefore universalism is more supported for the transition process, while in order to consolidate there are certain preconditions that a country must reach first before attempting to democratize. Also, in order for a democracy to be successful it needs

involvement from both the elite population and the average citizen.

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Introduction

If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did, and it never will.

Frederick Douglass, Canandaigua NY, 3 August 1857

This quote by Frederick Douglass represents the intense struggle to get rid of oppressive leaders that deprive their citizens of freedom. It is not easy to get rid of a powerful leader as we saw in the recent protests in Egypt to force Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak out of office, but nonetheless it is essential to engage in this moral or physical struggle in order to reach a democracy. Abraham Lincoln gave another great quote in the 1800s about democracy: “The ballot is stronger than the bullet.” When populations rise up against their government, many times they have to resort to physical violence. However, their end goal is to ensure their voices are heard on an every day basis in a peaceful way, through democratic elections. Lincoln’s idea that the ballot is stronger than the bullet is constantly being supported by current situations like Egypt and Tunisia.

Unfortunately, the process of becoming a democracy is not as simple as it may seem. Is democratization a unilateral process or chaotic? Does there have to be a distinct beginning and end to a democratic transition? Can every country become a democracy if they are determined enough or are there preconditions? Does a country need to be a state, reach a certain level of economic development, or have a unified culture before democracy is possible? Does there have to be consensus and agreement between elites? How do the elites transform into a consensual elite group? Are elites the only people that matter in national decision-making or do the masses

have a prominent role? Is it only important to have social movements before the transition begins to promote change, or do they need to continue throughout the transition? This thesis will work towards answering these questions by examining theories and applying them to three relevant and modern case studies.

For several decades, academics have been studying the process of countries becoming democracies from either authoritarian rule or dictatorships. The interest in this subject grew when there were waves of democratization in Central America and post-communist Europe in the 1990s. One of the main questions that was proposed was how are these countries becoming democracies? Many academics came up with their own theories to this question and answers ranged from the involvement of elite negotiations to a certain level of economic development. The academic world has had theories about democracy for such a long time, and I will test a few of them in modern examples to see if they still apply today.

My thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter deals with theories about the process of becoming a democracy. I first discuss preconditionalists versus universalists and then move on to the debate about elites versus the masses. Some believe that elites are the only drivers in national outcomes and that the elites must come to a consensus or agreement before a democracy can successfully emerge. Others argue that social movements are an important factor in the successes of democratic transitions. For the next three chapters on the case studies, I focus on the elites versus masses debate.

I chose South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti as my case studies because they all tell a different story about democratization. My second chapter is on South Africa and it

discusses the history of the country from its colonization in 1652 to the mid-1990s when it transitioned to a democracy. South Africa had a relatively straightforward democratic transition with a definitive start and end point of the transition and an obvious elite negotiation period, but other factors such as intense ethnic divides make it an interesting country to study.

The third chapter is on Serbia, a post-communist country with deep political divisions. Serbians take politics very seriously making it difficult for all the elites to come to an agreement. Serbia had a very different path than South Africa to democracy and did not have a distinct beginning and end point of its transition because of its membership in Yugoslavia until 2006. I focused on the difficulty the masses faced to oust their dictator from power and the short-termed alliances between elites. However, since Serbia also had a successful transition, this similar ending makes it an interesting case to study.

Haiti is studied in my fourth chapter and two democratic transitions are examined from the past twenty years of Haiti's history. Haiti's first transition after ousting Duvalier was successful but failed in the consolidation phase during Aristide's rule. The second transition from 2004-2006, once Aristide was forced out of power, is also studied to compare the two transitions and how Haiti progressed as a nation to be a more successful candidate for democracy in the long term.

All three countries had a successful transition to a democratic government but their distinct histories and situations made them interesting and relevant to study. The goal of my thesis is to see if there is a common theory that explains why these three countries with such different pasts and transitions were all able to transition to a

democracy. I hypothesize that the democratic process is a lot more chaotic than theories will make you believe and therefore there is not one single theory that can be applied to all the case studies used. In addition, I believe that the contemporary theory concerning the importance of social movements in transitions, in addition to elite negotiations, will be supported.

Chapter 1

The Theory of Democratization

The process of democratization, or the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes, has been studied since the 1970's and has resulted in many theories. Some believe that there are preconditions to a successful transition and countries cannot become a democracy without first achieving a certain level of stateness, economic development, or cultural cohesion, while others believe that any country can become a democracy without meeting preconditions. Another debate discusses elites versus the masses as the prime drivers of democratic transitions. The most prominent theoretical disagreements will be examined in this chapter, but first let me define key terms that will be used throughout this paper.

Democratization is the transition from an authoritarian, totalitarian, or other nondemocratic regime to a democracy. Democracy has been, and is still presently, a difficult term to define and to categorize countries as such. According to Francisco Gonzalez and Desmond King, an ideal democracy has free and fair participation and contestation and a wide protection of civil rights provided by the jurisdiction, presence, and authority of the state.¹ The level of democracy a state possesses varies and is measured by research institutions like Freedom House based on characteristics including fair electoral processes, political participation, freedom of expression, personal autonomy, the functioning of government, and rule of law.² A democracy involves more than liberalization; it requires governance by the people. More specifically, it demands open contestation over the right to win control of the government, which in turn requires free competitive elections. A transition can be defined as the time between the breakdown of the dictatorship and the conclusion of

¹ Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King, "The State and Democratization: The United States in Comparative Perspective" (*B.J. Pol.S* 34, 2004), 193, 195, 201.

² Freedom House. Received 4 May 2010. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1>

the first democratic national elections. The consolidation of a democracy occurs after the transition to a democracy; it is the process of adaptation of democratic structures and norms, which come to be accepted and valued in themselves.³

Preconditionalists vs. Universalists

Preconditionalists

The debate between preconditionalists and universalists is one of the most well known and discussed in transitology. Many political theorists believe that a democracy generally emerges from a particular set of conditions and experiences and that it is difficult to have a successful democratic transition without such preconditions. Universalists on the other hand believe that any country can become a democracy as long as they are persistent. This debate is a question of whether democratization is an outcome of actions or conditions, or perhaps both. The following are a few examples of preconditions that a country must acquire before a transition is possible: stateness, cultural unity, and socioeconomic development. This view was dominant in the 1950's and 1960's.

Stateness

State building is the process of building up institutions of coercion and coordination, such as the function of bureaucracies, the identification of citizenship, and the building up of legitimacy. "When there are profound differences about the

³ John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

territorial boundaries of the political community's state and profound differences as to who has the right of citizenship in that state", a stateness problem arises.⁴

According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved. In other words, a sovereign state is a prerequisite to democracy.

For most of history, stateness was not considered an issue for democratization. In Latin America and Southern Europe all countries that attempted democratization were uncontested states. However, post-communist Eastern Europe, including Romania, Serbia, and the Baltic states, presented a different situation. The redrawing of borders, brutal expulsion and marches, Nazi and Soviet expansion, and the demise of Austro-Hungarian and Soviet empires exemplify problems of stateness. Many people could have been citizens or subjects of three or more states during their lifetime without ever moving from their birthplace.

Linz and Stepan argue that citizenship and boundaries are the key issues that must be solved to become a state and then a democracy. In a democracy, it is necessary to be able to define the demos, or the people who are being represented by the democracy. Therefore it is crucial that a state is present to certify citizenship, since without citizenship a democracy is impossible. In Southern Europe and Latin America, there was no question of citizenship because the state was perceived as legitimate and nationality laws had defined citizenship before nondemocratic rule arose and was maintained under authoritarian rule.⁵

⁴ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 16

⁵ Ibid. 28.

In Eastern Europe it was, and still remains, difficult to become a state because each nation is multinational, multilingual, and multicultural. It must be agreed upon who will be considered a citizen and who will not, which is very difficult when there are so many different cultures and view points involved. Generosity moments, according to Robert Hislope, could be one way to aid in the unification of a nation-state. A generosity moment is when dominant ethnic groups in multiethnic societies decide to accommodate minorities. It is hypothesized that “a generous, liberal approach towards minorities is the best way to ensure a peaceful transition, earn the democratic consent of minorities, and secure the legitimacy of the state.”⁶ Even though this situation is not successful in all cases and is greatly impacted by structural factors and leadership variables, generosity moments are one way in which to include minority groups within the nation-state.⁷

Furthermore, Linz and Stepan argue that a nation must have a determinate domain to become a state. Robert A. Dahl is quoted in the book by Linz and Stepan, “The more indeterminate the domain and scope, the more likely that the unit would, if established, become embroiled in jurisdictional squabbles or even civil wars.”⁸ Once a border is established, a country can define which people inhabit the area and can work towards nation building, or how a country perceives itself, in addition to state building. And only then can the nation move towards democracy building.

Another concern that must be addressed is the legitimacy of state institutions. Political institutions, such as the judiciary and police, must be respected and deemed

⁶ Robert Hislope, “The Generosity Moment: Ethnic Politics, Democratic Consolidation and the State in Yugoslavia (Croatia), South Africa and Czechoslovakia” (Democratization, Vol. 5 No. 1, Spring 1998), 64.

⁷ Ibid. 84.

⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 29

as legitimate and effective in order for a country to be able to transition to a democracy. The people need to be confident in their leaders and their government and feel secure in their country before a democracy could be successful.

Culture

While some believe that politics is the driver in transitology, others believe that culture must be included in the analysis. It is important not to treat culture as the sole causal factor, however, but focus on “how cultural factors intersect with political, social, and economic forces to produce specific outcomes in specific places and time periods.”⁹ Culture concerns values of tolerance, deference and belief and how these beliefs bind people together in a meaningful way. However, since it is subjective, it is always changing, especially since culture must be learned.¹⁰ Culture has enormous power to shape individual perceptions and behavior but also has the power to unify and mobilize entire societies.¹¹

Recent strains of theory divulge beliefs that the collectively shared ideas, beliefs, values and identities societies embrace and by which they define themselves must be widespread in a nation-state before regime transitions can occur and be successful. It is important to construct a strong and cohesive national identity among the population, especially in a multi-ethnic area. Therefore, a common culture and nation building is necessary and could be argued that it goes hand-in-hand with state building for a future stable democracy.

⁹ Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 195

¹⁰ Ibid. 87.

¹¹ Ibid. 88.

However, one criticism involves the difference between political culture and general culture. Does a country need to have a consensus on what the acceptable culture is statewide, or must only the political culture be considered, such as tolerance and deference to authority? It can be argued that unless political culture is specified, the cultural argument would not be justified because many countries, such as the United States, is a mixing-pot of cultures but everyone agrees upon the general rules of politics and political culture. Lim argues that culture cannot be considered on its own but merely helps determine the choices of political leaders.¹²

Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl question whether or not Eastern European countries and democratization should be comparable to Southern European and Latin American democratization because of their drastically different backgrounds, stateness, and culture.¹³ The four differences that Schmitter and Karl discuss are the points of departure in socio-occupational structure, the extent of collapse of the old regime, the role of external actors, and the sequence of transformative processes. Post-research, Schmitter and Karl believe that Eastern European “regime change can be – at least initially – treated as conceptually and theoretically equivalent to those that preceded them. Furthermore, it can be expected that they face the same range of possible outcomes...”¹⁴ Even though they have the same possible outcomes, it is argued that because of their extremely rapid, non-violent, and definitive transitions their consolidations will be lengthy, conflict-driven,

¹² Ibid. 194.

¹³ Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” (Slavic Review, Vol. 53, No.1, Spring, 1994), 173-185.

¹⁴ Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists,” 184-185.

and inconclusive. The Eastern European countries will have a more difficult time than Southern Europe and Latin America in deciding on the appropriate type of democracy and will most likely end up as an unconsolidated democracy. In conclusion, Schmitter and Karl believe that despite the differences in stateness, culture, and other factors, Eastern European democratization can still be compared to other transitions.

Economic Level

Another precondition that Przeworski, Limongi, and Lipset argue is important in the democratization process is the economic level of the country in question. Some theorists argue that the economy must reach a certain GDP before it is eligible to be a democracy and others believe that the country's money must be equally distributed through capitalism to be a democratic contender. Timothy Lim argues, "The transition to democracy happens because modernization creates new economic, social, technological, and political conditions that 'primitive' or pre-modern political systems (for example, dictatorships) are simply unable to handle over the long run."¹⁵

Przeworski and Limongi argue that there is a specific GDP marker that a country must pass to ensure a successful democratic transition. Even though a democracy can be initiated at any level of development, the richer the country the greater its chances for survival. Also, if a country succeeds in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations.¹⁶ Through extensive research they have pinpointed the threshold of democracy at \$4,115 per

¹⁵ Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics*, 164.

¹⁶ Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49.2 (1997): 177.

capita income. Up until this GDP marker, the regime in place is unstable and will react well to a democratic transition. After \$6,000 democratic transitions are less likely. Furthermore, if a country transitions to a democracy and has a per capita income greater than \$6,055, its democracy will not fail during consolidation and the higher the per capita income the more likely it will succeed as a stable democracy.¹⁷ Friedman agrees with Przeworski and Limongi that more developed countries are more stable and more likely to get a long. Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory" argues that any country with a McDonalds, and therefore developed enough to support a McDonalds, will not war against other countries with McDonalds.

The reason that a more economically developed country is a better candidate for democracy is based on the development of a middle class. A middle class is considered stable, as opposed to having only elites and a working class, and will therefore stabilize the system and make a democracy possible. Furthermore, income can be considered a proxy for education; more educated people are more likely to embrace democratic values and understand the importance of political participation.¹⁸ Even though it is uncertain what type of role the economy plays in democratization, it appears to have a large impact on deciding whether or not a democracy will succeed.

Universalists

As discussed earlier, Timothy Lim states that it is analytically foolish and naïve to believe that a democracy is possible anywhere, anytime, as long as people

¹⁷ Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts", 165.

¹⁸ Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts", 166

want it.¹⁹ Underlying structural conditions and processes are unavoidable and vitally important to understand before experimenting with democracy transitions. However, despite Lim's strong opinions, many theorists do believe that preconditions to democracy do not exist. In opposition, some transitologists believe that a democracy can emerge in all sorts of ways and settings without preconditions. For example, universalists believe that a country does not need to have a certain level of economic development to succeed at a transition to democracy.

According to Giuseppe Di Palma, any nation state can become a democracy through diffusion and implementation. In other words, many diverse democratic countries have tested political institutions, practices, rules, and procedures and then borrow them from each other to govern themselves. Political actors in transition to democracy go to this pool of previously tested political procedures to select and improve upon before adopting for themselves. Therefore, as long as democracy appears as the most attractive future regime, the people of a prospective country can become worthy of democratization by simply wanting it. To make democratic regimes attractive, crafting must occur by changing the word choice used to describe democracy to get people interested and engaged. For example, instead of saying that democracy's weakness is that no one wins; one must convince their country that democracy's strength is in fact that no single group will determine outcomes so everyone will have a voice.²⁰ In conclusion, democratic transitions can occur anywhere with no preconditions for the economy or society as long as the people view the idea of democracy positively and are willing to try it.

¹⁹ Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics*, 170

²⁰ Giuseppe Di Palma. *To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).

Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (1986) agree with Di Palma that politics, or the will to get things done and the autonomy of humans, can lead a state to a successful democracy. According to O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, the transition from an authoritarian regime is not linear and is extremely uncertain. The outcome, the number of payers, the rules, and everything else involved gets created as the "game" continues on. They use the metaphor of a multi level chess board to describe the "game" of democratic transitions where each move has unknown consequences and could potentially lead to a win. Only after a transition ends will people begin to trust each other and work together in a political democracy.²¹

The wave of global democratization during the 1970's was used to support universalism because dozens of countries became democracies without acquiring presumable preconditions. Even though many countries deserted their authoritarian regimes during this time, by the end of the interwar period all Eastern European countries failed to consolidate their democratic regime except for Czechoslovakia. This wide failure of democratic transitions questions the success of universalist thought. One possible explanation for this failure is that there is value behind certain preconditions and that the Eastern European countries were not able to achieve stateness, cultural consistency, or appropriate economic levels before attempting to democratize.

²¹ Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

Criticism

Sheri Berman argues in her article “How Democracies Emerge” that both preconditionalists and universalists are misguided. Both theories surmise that democratic transitions are smooth, either after achieving the necessary preconditions or by merely setting their mind to it. However, Berman studied the histories of modern well-functioning and stable democracies, such as England, the United States, and Scandinavia, and discovered that most democratization stories have struggle, conflict, and violence. “Democracy developed in various ways and in various local contexts across Western Europe. But it never came easily, peacefully, or in some straightforward, stage-like progression.”²² All types of countries can become democracies but even the best-positioned ones struggled in the process.

By studying modern and successful democracies of Western Europe one can see that they did not have a smooth transition to democracy. The French Revolution of 1789 brought an end to one authoritarian regime, but within ten years Napoleon Bonaparte became the military dictator by coup. Within this decade, attitudes changed even though a democracy did not last. When Louis XVIII took over he increased suffrage and equality before the law and created a constitution with a 2-chamber parliament, but the society was still extremely divided. After the 1830 civil war Louis-Philippe Orleans came to power and created a liberal authoritarian regime. The Revolutions of 1848 resulted in presidential elections where Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte won in 1848 but his term resulted in a populist-authoritarian system when he attempted to have his term of office and powers extended. With the first World

²² Sheri Berman, “How Democracies Emerge: Lessons from Europe” (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 1, Jan 2007), 37.

War approaching, there was already rising political discontent and political mobilization, and deepening social division; changes had occurred but no full democratic transitions.

World War I started a democratic wave across Germany, Austria, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Hungary, and more European countries, but war also brought challenges to the new democratic regimes such as economic devastation, inflation, reparations, political divisions, and national humiliation. Most new democracies, including France, Italy, Germany, Spain and Austria, were weak or failed later.²³ By the mid-1940's Britain was the only country against the Nazi's in Europe and democratization failed in Europe. Post-WWII brought upon the perfect conditions for democracy such as the authoritarian regimes were crushed and discredited, the United States as the worlds strongest democracy made clear commitment to political and economic reconstruction, European publics recognized democracy as its best option, and past liberal and democratic components were reclaimed and built up. However, democracy was unsuccessful in most post-Communist countries. Many people would argue that if a country is unable to sustain and consolidate their democracy during their initial attempts, democracy will never be successful in their country. Berman takes a different point of view.

Berman argues that just because a country today is not following a gradual, liberal path to democracy does not mean that it will not succeed in the future. "Problems and failures can be seen as integral parts" of the transition process and can even be argued to make it a stronger democracy when it begins consolidation because

²³ Ibid. 37.

the population has already changed their attitudes.²⁴ Even successful democracies today, including France and England, had turbulent histories. Berman argues that it makes sense that young democracies today are weak, ineffectual, illiberal, or violent because it is a long painstaking process that is not linear. It took France 150 years to become a democracy so it is important that we do not discourage countries that do not follow a gradual, liberal path to democracy. In conclusion to Sheri Berman's argument, both universalists and preconditionalists are wrong because they fail to look at the full history of today's strong democracies. If these theories looked into the histories, they would find that all new democracies are weak and illiberal and will most likely fail in the short run, but over the long run ideas and values change and democracies are more likely.

Sheri Berman brings a very important issue to the table that most, if not all, democratic transitions are not smooth and linear. Countries that have violence and may not succeed the first time can still be successful in the future. However, many scholars may argue that universalists and preconditionalists do not say that it will either be an easy straightforward process or will be unsuccessful. Research shows that preconditionalists believe that it is impossible to democratize without obtaining certain preconditions before hand, not that if they have these conditions that the process will be linear and smooth to a successful democracy. The universalists have the same certitude when they say that any country can become a democracy if they are crafty, autonomous, and determined, it just might not be smooth. Guillermo

²⁴ Ibid. 38.

O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead blatantly state in their article that the process of democratization is not smooth or predictable.²⁵

Elites vs. Masses

Another way of organizing the various theories surrounding democratization is elitism versus the power of the masses. Some transitologists believe that political elites have the most impact on democratization while others believe that pressures from below, or public mass involvement, are the key factor to a successful democratic transition.

Elites

The idea that elites are the only drivers in national outcomes has been the dominant point of view for the majority of the transitology theory life span. The elite theory has been studied by many political scientists including Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels who argue that the organized minority have the power and accessibility to societal resources to impact political outcomes. Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy goes even further to say that even democratic states will eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies.

John Higley and Michael Burton are two transitologists who believe that democracies succeed only when the political elites work together and compromise and that the masses do not have any influence on transitions. They argue that the reason that countries with extremely similar population sizes, economic development levels, class structures, ethnic complexions, and religious and cultural patterns have

²⁵ Guillermo O'Donnell, et al. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. 1986.

major differences in their politics is because they have different types of political elites.

The political elite consists of thousands of people who hold top positions in powerful organizations and movements who participate in or directly influence national political decision-making. This includes top business, government, military, party, union, media, and religious leaders, among others.²⁶ Another way to define political elite is the group of people who affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. There are four types of political elites, according to Higley and Burton, and each type of elite corresponds to a type of regime. Elite integration, how elites structure and characterize their internal relations with each other across faction barriers, and elite differentiation, the process through which elite groups become more numerous, diverse, and functionally specialized, are used to classify these elite groups.²⁷

The first type of elite is a divided, disunified elite. There is violence and distrust across factions resulting in low interpersonal relations or cooperation. Members don't agree to appropriate political conduct, also called the 'rules of the game'. Furthermore, many elite fear that they will lose everything if the other party wins and, therefore, resort to extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests, including methods of killing and imprisonment. Since there are strong barriers between factions and few elite groups to represent the people, weak integration and narrow differentiation lead the regime to be unstable and unrepresentative. Coups or revolutions happen frequently and democratic processes

²⁶ John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations" (International Review of Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001), 181-199.

²⁷ Ibid.

tend to break down over time. Regime instability can be described as “when government executive power is subject to irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely expected seizures by force.”²⁸ Peter McDonough provides one example of a disunified elite: Brazil between 1972-1973 when the factions included military-governmental, economic, the church, and urban labor.²⁹ Bernard Brown and William Schonfeld provide other examples in their own studies of France. France in the 1960’s and 1970’s is another example. In the mid 1960’s elites didn’t agree on basic political institutions and in the 1970’s there were no ties between elites across factional lines.³⁰ Disunity is actually the generic condition of national elites and is considered by Higley and Burton as “the modal pattern of western politics.”³¹

The second type of elite is an ideologic elite. This is when all elite factions publicly support the same policies and ideology and most elites are members of the same party or movement. The elites are connected to other elites through this dominant party and there are no regular seizures of government. The elites have many relations between each other and across faction barriers resulting in a strong elite integration, but narrow differentiation because of the single party domination. The ideologic elite results in a stable but unrepresentative regime, for example the communist USSR, communist China, and Nazi Germany.

A fragmented elite is labeled the third type. In a situation where there is weak integration but wide differentiation, the elites have split up into so many different

²⁸ John Higley and Michael G. Burton, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns” (American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, February 1989), 20.

²⁹ John Higley and Michael G. Burton. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns”.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

groups but they refuse to cooperate with each other. This results in an extremely confusing political arena because there are so many different groups trying to be heard and have an impact on political outcomes but refuse to work together. The regime at stake is labeled as unstable and representative. The past three types of elites and regimes, if considered democratic, must be labeled as illiberal democracies or pseudo-democracies.

The fourth type of elite is called a consensual elite. Elites make an effort to agree on the roles of the political game while still holding different ideas and values. They do not push their disagreements to violence once they agree to abide by common codes of political conduct and there is an extensive web of interpersonal relationships over all factions. This results in a stable, representative democracy. Democracies can be composed of many different things, but what is indispensable is a consensually unified elite. A consensual unified elite is a precondition for, but not a guarantee of, a stable democracy.³² A consensual elite can originate from being a former colony or being territorially dependent on an existing consensual elite state. For example, the elites in the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and Tunisia became consensually unified once the British rule left. However, presently colonialism is not as common and therefore consensual elites do not originate but must be created through transformations from other elite types.

As described earlier, countries with similar characteristics frequently have different politics because of their elites' behaviors and classification. In addition, even though economic development, class structures, and other social issues may

³² John Higley and Michael G. Burton. "Elite Settlements." (American Sociological Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, June 1987), 295-307.

change, the established elite type and their practices persist until a profound crisis or event triggers an elite transformation. In other words, until an event occurs that forces political elites to reevaluate their behaviors towards each other, the elite type, and therefore regime, remains the same. For a democratic transition to be successful, elites need to transform into consensual elites through one of two processes: elite settlement or general elite convergence.

Elite settlements are relatively rare events that occur when warring national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements. This results in the creation of patterns of open but peaceful competition, based on the norm of restrained partisanship among all major elite groups. The elites work to transform an unstable political regime of frequent seizures of government power to stable regimes that open up the possibilities for a democracy. Elite settlements occur in two types of situations. First, when there is a costly and inconclusive conflict where no group is the clear winner. Since everyone has lost, elites are willing to compromise. The English civil war in 1688 between the Tories and Whigs and the Columbian civil war in 1957 between the conservatives and liberals are two such examples. The other situation that paves the way for an elite settlement is a major crisis. This usually involves the head of state, policy failures, power abuses, or personal weaknesses that make the elite discontent. One example is Venezuela in 1958 when there was a sharp economic downturn and the military dictator Perez Jimenez tries to extend his tenure. In order for elite settlements to be successful they must be carried out quickly, usually within one year of its emergence. Even though elite settlements are rare, within the

context of what other processes are available to create a consensual elite, an elite settlement is the most likely process.

Elite convergence is another possible process to create consensual elites. Elite convergence is also referred to as a 2-step elite transformation. In the first step, some warring factions collaborate in electoral politics to mobilize a reliable electoral majority. They begin to win elections repeatedly and therefore protect their interests. In step two, the elite factions that oppose the coalition of step one tire of losing elections. They realize that they cannot gain government power any other way, such as force, so they accept democratic rules of the winning coalition to have a chance to represent their own ideologies in the political realm. This results in a consensually unified elite as well but does not happen as quickly as an elite settlement.

Higley and Burton argue that elite settlements are a crucial development in democratizations. For example, without the settlement in 1688-1689 another civil war would have erupted in England. The settlement also secured the upper-class control of the regime, avoided future civil wars, revolutions, and coups, led England's rise to world domination, and led to a peaceful evolution to democracy. Higley and Burton assert that it does not matter if peasants are strong or weak; the key variable for political stability and eventual peaceful democratization is the unification of previously disunified elites. Democratic transitions cannot be predicted or explained in terms of social, economic, and cultural forces because elite settlements are the result of relatively autonomous elite choices.³³

Elites also have a strong impact on the success of the consolidation of democracies and their potential breakdowns. If the elites are disunified, it is more

³³ Ibid.

likely that the democracy is only temporary and will revert back to authoritarianism.³⁴ However, if the elite are consensually unified than the consolidation of a democracy is more likely. Since elites have influence on national outcomes regularly and substantially, they are the only ones that can make effective change on issues such as unemployment in post-industrial states.³⁵

Higley and Burton argue that mass movements and the public do not have a significant impact on regime transitions without the help from elites. Unless mass movements are directed by acknowledged leaders and organized they will dissipate or be suppressed. Any movement must have elites to be successful. Even if an unorganized popular force somehow succeeds in toppling a regime, they most likely will not establish a stable regime. Democratic stability depends on agreements that can be struck only among elites representing rival organizations and popular groupings.³⁶

According to Higley and Burton, not only do mass movements not have a strong force in democratization, but also neither does other preconditions. Many preconditionalists believe that democratization is only achievable when a nation state has reached levels or statuses in economy, culture, or other aspects of the state. However, Higley, Burton, and Gunther argue, “stable democracies do not emerge simply by writing constitutions, holding elections, expanding human rights, accelerating economic growth, or exterminating leftist insurgencies. The vital step is

³⁴ John Higley and Michael G. Burton. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns”.

³⁵ John Higley and Michael G. Burton. “Elites, Mass Publics, and Democratic Prospects in Postindustrial Societies.” (International Review of Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1999), 221-237.

³⁶ John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, p 10

the consensual unification of previously disunified elites.”³⁷ Elite transformations usually occur from internal situations and contingencies, therefore Western countries can do little to promote stable democracies where they do not now exist. In many cases, like Iraq, it can be argued that the US weakens prospects of democracy by exacerbating elite disunity. First you need to get a democracy, and then work on economic equality, human rights, and other aspects of a well-functioning democracy to succeed in consolidation.

Masses

On the other side of spectrum, Sidney Tarrow wrote a book entitled *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* in 1998, which discusses the important role of social movements in contentious situations. He argues that contentious politics is triggered when political opportunities change and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack resources on their own. When these actors are supported by dense social networks and motivated by action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to social movements.³⁸ Social movements, as defined by Tarrow, are “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.”³⁹

The social movement theory, the belief that social movements and mass mobilization have a great impact on political decisions and democratization, has many imbedded concepts. One concept is resource mobilization, which is based on the assumption that social movements can be explained largely in terms of individual

³⁷ John Higley and Michael G. Burton. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns”, 29.

³⁸ Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.

³⁹ Ibid. 4.

action and decisions, resulting in most of the basic dynamics of social movements to be similar. Tarrow argues that this focused too much on internal aspects of the movements and didn't touch upon cycles of mobilization. The new social movement theory focuses on opposite issues of that of resource mobilization theory, such as global trends. However, its weakness is that it focuses too much on the broad, global issues and ignores the variations in the character of movements.

The political opportunity structure, presented by Tocqueville, is the most recent concept and arguably the most effective. The political context and structure is valued in this concept and it states that revolts occur, not when people are most oppressed or best represented, but when a closed system of opportunities has begun to open up.⁴⁰ Examples of a political opportunity include when major conflicts within political elite offices that challengers can take advantage of or when levels of access to institutional participants have begun to open up.⁴¹ A new wave of mobilization will occur when costs and risks of collective action decrease and potential gains increase. "Mass outbreaks of collective action are best understood as the collective responses of citizens, groups and elites to an expanding structure of political opportunities."⁴²

Contentious politics has always been present where there is human society. However, in such early human societies, such actions "usually expressed the claims of ordinary people directly, locally, and narrowly," responding to immediate grievances without being organized.⁴³ This usually resulted in brief spurts of hostility intermittent with periods of passivity. Sometime during the 18th century, a new and

⁴⁰ Ibid. 18.

⁴¹ Sidney G. Tarrow, "Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe", (PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1991), 14.

⁴² Ibid. 13.

⁴³ Ibid. 66.

more general repertoire of collective action developed in Western Europe and North America.⁴⁴ Hand in hand with state-building, social movements gained strength and became broad, national movements. This can be explained by the growth of print and association as the state became more secure and powerful; movements learned to use pamphlets, other forms of print, and association to their benefit. The state became the target of national movements as well because it was a unified, single entity that had power to make war, provision cities, and raise taxes. Contentious politics has a strong relationship with the necessary development of citizenship, therefore “[contentious politics] can never be fully suppressed without endangering democracy itself. What this means is that contentious politics forms around the armature of institutional politics, and rises and falls with the rhythm of changes in political opportunities and constraints...”⁴⁵

One difficulty of studying social movements is that it is not easy to identify particular movement actions as the cause of a specific outcome. In other words, it is difficult to know whether or not a social movement had the outcome it intended.⁴⁶ However, it can be argued that the mere presence of social movements is important for democratization to be successful. Whether or not the leaders take into consideration the specific concerns the people are representing, the people must feel like they have a say in the outcome of their country and feel connected to each other as a nation. Social movements also break down the legal, bureaucratic, and ideological barriers. “Movement participation is not only politicizing; it is empowering, both in the psychological sense of increasing willingness to take risks

⁴⁴ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 66.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 67.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 162.

and in the political one of affording new skills and broadened perspectives.”⁴⁷ Once social movements could spread quickly over time and space it became ways for ordinary people to advance collective claims against powerful opponents.⁴⁸

Each culture has its own typical mode of movement depending on what will work best to get their views across. For example, the English sign petitions and the French protest in the streets. Individuals and groups will take advantage of the political opportunities available to use the mode of mobilization that works most effectively in their society and government. They work with elites and each other to make change.

Sidney Tarrow and many other political theorists who believe in bottom-up theories do not discount the impact that elites have on political outcomes. Instead, they argue that elites are not the sole driver for political changes; mass mobilization, when instituted at optimal times during times of expanded political opportunities, can have a large impact on political outcomes as well. For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States had a large impact on African American civil rights and civil liberties. Social movements are critical for progressive social change and can have a large impact through the use of mobilizing structures, framing ideology, and solidarity.

Nancy Bermeo believes that mass mobilization is extremely important in the process of democratization, even if it is characterized as extremism. Many moderation theorists believe that “radical popular organizations threaten democratic transitions if they don’t moderate their demands and behavior as the moment of elite

⁴⁷ Ibid. 166.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 197.

choice approaches.”⁴⁹ In her article “Myths of Moderation”, Bermeo argues that even though extremism can be a potential barrier to democratization in some scenarios, extremism can also foster the discussion of democratization.

The moderation argument states that if there is too much popular mobilization or pressure from below, the changes for a democracy can be spoiled. This argument is supported by many prominent political theorists including Terry Karl, Myron Weiner, Sam Huntington, and Daniel Levine, who all believe that a conservative, elite-driven regime change is more likely to result in a successful democracy. In other words, “if a transition is to be carried out successfully, the ‘threat from below’ must be somehow moderated.”⁵⁰ Samuel Valenzuela argues that the “ideal mix for democratization is high labor mobilization at certain critical moments or the breakdown of authoritarian institutions, followed by restraint when the political agenda shifts in favor of redemocratization.”⁵¹ Mass mobilization is effective and essential, but is dangerous if it continues too long or with too much intensity. For example, if violence occurs, a dictatorship is likely.

Bermeo’s study of Portugal, Spain, Peru, the Philippines, and South Korea, disproves the moderation argument. In all of these countries there were radical pressures from below, radical provisional governments, armed movements, violent strikes, and riots, among other forms of extremist mass mobilization during their transitions away from authoritarian regimes. In many of these countries there was actually high worker mobilization when the first democratic elections were held and

⁴⁹ Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions.” (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No 3. Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow., Apr. 1997), 305.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 306.

⁵¹ Ibid. 307.

by looking at strike data it is apparent that a successful transition to democracy does not require moderation on the part of the working class.

During transitions there are three scenarios that can occur in relation to elites and extremist mass mobilization. First, if pivotal elites forecast extremist victory, they will reject democracy because they see it as an intolerable threat. This happened in China in 1989. The second scenario, which occurred in Peru in 1977 and Greece in 1975, is when elites forecast extremist defeat and moderate victory in the elections they may accept democracy because it's a way to escape public unrest. The third scenario is if elites forecast extremist defeat and their own victory in elections, they may accept democracy as a form of legitimacy for themselves. This happened in Portugal in 1974 and Spain in 1976. In Peru, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, elites saw democracy as a solution to the problem of extremism rather than a problem in itself. After calculating risks, polls have been used to indicate that the current elites would either win the election or that their moderate party would defeat the extremists. "Moderation is not a prerequisite for the construction of democracy; the parameters of tolerable mobilization are broader than we originally anticipated."⁵² Democracy can be created despite extremist demands and high mobilization; high mobilization can in fact aid in the emergence of democratization.

Case Studies

Timothy Lim's book, *Doing Comparative Politics: An Introduction to Approaches and Issues*, explains the various methods for picking case studies for a comparative analysis. The Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD, MSD) is based on

⁵² Ibid. 314.

finding two or more very similar systems or countries to compare political, social, demographic, economic, and cultural aspects. According to Lim, "...the important point is that the characteristics the systems share in principle can be held constant and can therefore be considered irrelevant in explaining a particular social or political phenomenon (the dependent variable) that occurs in one, but not both cases."⁵³ The goal of the comparative analysis would be to find the significant dissimilarity between the two systems, which would be labeled as the independent variable.

In the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD, MDS), the researcher finds two systems that are different in almost every respect, except for the variable under investigation. One difficulty researchers face when using MDSD is that it cannot adequately deal with multiple causations. In other words, there is no way to presume that a certain phenomenon is necessarily the product of one and only one cause. Different causes may produce the same or similar results, and different combinations of cases may produce the same result.

For both MSD and MDS, the researcher then distinguishes if the case studies have similar or different outcomes. Therefore, there are four variations of characterizations, MSD with similar outcomes (MSD-SO), MSD with different outcomes (MSD-DO), MDS-SO, MDS-DO.

I followed the Most Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes, MDD-SO, in the selection of my case studies. I wanted to have three countries that had extremely different backgrounds and transition characteristics but similar outcomes for democratic transitions, in this case all successes. My goal is to find what was similar between the countries that made them have similar outcomes despite their

⁵³ Timothy C. Lim, *Doing Comparative Politics*, 34.

varied histories and transition processes. In order to accomplish this, I need to follow the MDD to find the significant similarity between the systems, which would be labeled the independent variable. The countries I have chosen are South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, countries that have all accomplished a democratic transition despite differing situations.

For most of transitology history, elites have been viewed as the prominent actor in democratization following Higley, Burton, and Gunther's theory. However, the role of the masses has been focused on more and more as time passes. The purpose of my thesis is to examine the histories and democratization processes in each of the three countries to determine the influence mass mobilization and elites have in democratic transitions. If social movements and other forms of mass mobilization do not have a prominent role in the transition, are there other theories that could be used to explain the countries outcomes? Therefore, mass mobilization will be my independent variable, the variable that I am studying to see its impact, or lack of, on democratization processes in various countries.

Chapter 2

Democratization in South Africa

Introduction

South Africa's history is tumultuous from the time it was colonized by the Dutch East India Company in 1652 until the mid-1990s when it became a democratic state. South Africa's democratic transition can be argued to begin at many different times or historic events, but for the purposes of this paper the transition began at the change in presidential power in 1989. As Peter Willem Botha's successor, F.W. de Klerk became president in 1989 and was determined to end South Africa's violence through negotiations. The democratization process ended at South Africa's first free election on April 29, 1994 when Nelson Mandela was elected president.

During these five years, and before, social movements and elite negotiations had a major impact on moving the country forward, leaving political discrimination behind. However, one question that will be explored is how much impact did each of these factors have on the democratization process and was one more effective than the other? Also, how can this case study be characterized or defined by the theories described in the previous chapter? Did it become a democracy through elite settlements, the two-step process of democratization, or the role of mass mobilization? By looking at the history of South Africa, from its colonization to the first free election in 1994, the role of social movements and elites will be discussed.

South Africa is a strong example for this thesis because it follows the Most Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes. The qualification for Most Different Systems in this analysis is that each case study has a different history, culture, economy and society than the others. Also, it adheres to the similar outcomes aspect of the model because South Africa, along with the other countries, was

successful in its democratic transition. My goal is to divulge whether the presence of social movements or elite negotiations had a greater impact on democratic success in South Africa.

Demography

The demography of South Africa during the democratic transition is important to discuss in order to understand the population's actions for social movements and negotiations. The distribution of ethnic groups is important for this case study because of the multi-ethnic characteristic of South Africa and the societal challenges it creates. Another significant demographic characteristic is the unemployment rate because it tends to correspond with individuals' feelings of despair and likelihood of acting out.

In 1994, throughout all of South Africa, there were 30.7 million blacks divided into eight tribes. The whites constituted five million and were divided into either Afrikaners or English. The colored people made up 3.3 million and the Indian population was 1 million. There were smaller populations as well including Chinese that are not counted in these numbers. When divided into provinces after the re-organization of the state in the early 1990's, the demographics were as followed⁵⁴:

	Area (sq. mi)	Population (in millions)	Literacy Rate	Unemployment rate	Income per capita
Northern Cape	140,286	.8	67.6%	16.7%	\$796
Western Cape	49,943	3.6	71.9%	13.3%	\$1,163
Eastern Cape	65,858	6.7	67.7%	23.6%	\$377
North West	45,822	3.5	62%	22.3%	\$497
Orange Free State	49,963	2.8	62.1%	15.3%	\$672
KwaZulu-Natal	35,312	8.5	65.1%	25.2%	\$531
Pretoria/Witwatersr	7,241	6.8	69%	16.6%	\$1,387

⁵⁴ U.S. News & World Report, April 25, 1994.

and/Vaal					
Northern Transvaal	46,168	5.1	61.1%	24.8%	\$201
Eastern Transvaal	31,581	2.8	59.1%	16.3%	\$601

It is important to point out that in KwaZulu-Nata and Northern Transvaal, the provinces with the highest unemployment rate, had 82.3% and 98% black population respectively.⁵⁵ The unemployment rate was very high in South Africa and most of those unemployed were blacks. This could be one reason blacks were willing to join protests and trade unions.

History of South Africa⁵⁶

Colonization and Creation of Hostility (1652-1948)

The relationship between the Africans, Dutch (Afrikaans), British, and other ethnicities started with the colonization of the southern tip of Africa by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1652. The Dutch forcefully took land and livestock from many African groups, including the Khoisan and San, resulting in guerilla warfare against the Dutch colonists.⁵⁷ The anger and resentment between the white and black populations had begun.

Other foreigners began to come to Cape Town to work as immigrants or slaves from Europe, India, and other countries during the 1600s and 1700s. Class structure began to be noticeable and colonization expanded dispossessing the Khoisan of more land and livestock forcing the natives into slavery. In 1795 the British conquered the Cape starting a war in the early 1800s and securing the land for the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Unless noted otherwise, information in this section came Robert Ross *A Concise History of South Africa* or Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*.

⁵⁷ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

British. By the end of the 1800s, gold and diamonds were found on the banks of the Vaal River. Even though it helped the area's economy, racial bifurcation of the industrial labor force was established. White workers had higher positions than blacks, which created a large entrenchment of the color bar in the labor force. When the Chinese came over to work in the mines this social structure was enforced.

On May 31, 1910 the two colonies, the Cape and Natal, and the two republics, Orange Free State and Transvaal, came together as a unified country, South Africa. South Africa had high hopes for the future with Louis Botha as their prime minister but soon became further divided by classes and race. In 1912, the South African Native National Congress (later called African National Congress, ANC) was formed to protect and enlarge the rights of the black population. Around the same time, English middle-class citizens formed the National Party (NP). Later, the NP conjoined with the Purified National Party, made up of Afrikaner nationalists, to form the Reunited National Party in 1934. This new National Party believed in a white South African nation that could only be created if there was parity between the Dutch and English in terms of access to power and resources. The NP would later become the governing party in South Africa for forty-four years and instill apartheid, a tragic future that was not anticipated by the black population.

The political party in power, the South African Party, began to exclude blacks from the body politic and created permanent subordination. The Black Land Act of 1913 was one of the first anti-African legislation establishing clear legal distinctions between African Reserves and white farming areas. Africans were no longer allowed to purchase land within white areas and vice versa, resulting in 87% of the country

being considered white land. Sharecropping was also made illegal which redefined blacks on white-owned land as servants degrading blacks into poverty. This led to a national political movement led by communists and the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU) to gain back land and status for laborers. This was the first movement to unite large numbers in virtually all parts of the country to fight local issues under a common national leadership, but the movement was never united enough for substantial success.⁵⁸ Women also began to lead demonstrations surrounding the ICU based on their discontent of the male dominated political society.

In the 1919 election, the South African Party leader Jan Smuts became president by defeating his opponents of the National Party, Labor Party, and the Irredentist British of Natal. Smuts was the leader of the South African Party once Botha passed away and he began introducing major segregationist measures.

As whites became more comfortable with their status they began testing their power. In 1922 mine owners attempted to reduce their labor costs by replacing whites with cheaper black workers. White job security decreased and white workers fearing the social encroachment this might have on their lives, protested in the Rand Rebellion.⁵⁹ The government crushed the rebellion through the declaration of martial law; the mobilized army and militias killed 200 people, including innocent, black bystanders. A compromise was reached that supported white workers but hurt the job security of blacks.

⁵⁸ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*.

⁵⁹ South African History Online. "Liberation Struggle". Received December 15, 2010.
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/liberation-struggle/1_1910_1924.htm#rand

Residential segregation began in 1923 with the Natives Urban Areas Act that forced Africans, Indians, and other ethnic minorities to the outskirts of cities so they would not live in close proximity to whites. According to Colonel C.F. Stallard, “South Africa’s towns were for the whites, and that blacks were only to be there in so far as they were ‘ministering to the white man’s needs’.”⁶⁰ Even though the South African Party lost in the election in 1924, the situation did not improve greatly. The Nationalist and Labor Parties created a coalition government with J.B.M. Hertzog as its prime minister. Their goal was to protect civilized labor, meaning those who had conformed to European standards of living.

In 1934 two rival parties, the South African Party and Nationalist Party, united and became the United South African National Party (United Party). A faction of Afrikaner nationalists, led by D.F. Malan, refused to accept the merger and maintained a remnant of the National Party called the Purified National Party. The Purified National Party, or simply the National Party, believed in Afrikaner nationalism and the segregation of blacks in society. The ANC Youth League was created in 1944 by Anton Lembede, A.P. Mda, and Nelson Mandela to revitalize a dying, pro-black institution and turn it into a mass party protest.

Trade unions began to grow and strengthen in the mid 1900s and showed their discontent in the government. In August 1946 a mineworker’s strike brought 60-70 thousand mineworkers under the African Mine Workers Union demanding better food and a wage increase. The strike was terminated by the state and the trade union collapsed. Black trade unions were not recognized by the government until the 1970s but they still worked diligently to demonstrate their concerns.

⁶⁰ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*, 98.

The early history of South Africa is important in demonstrating how deep the ethnic conflict is in South Africa dating back several hundred years. This section did not cover all aspects of political and social unrest, but provided a summary to show its origin. As time progresses, especially through the apartheid, this hostility continues and grows steadily worse.

History of Apartheid (1948-1989)

The apartheid is remembered as a time period of roughly forty years that attempted to reduce ethnic minorities, especially Africans, to the dregs of society through legal segregation. However, this is also the time that the South African population began moving forward toward democracy, demonstrated through vibrant social movements.

The apartheid began in 1948 with the election of the National Party led by Dr. Malan. The slogan of the National Party was “apartheid” which meant separateness. This entailed the recognition and separation of specific groups of people and emphasized the importance of the various nations and ethnicities of South Africa. Some National Party followers wanted to completely separate blacks and whites because they believed long term white power wouldn’t be able to survive with the growing African population. Others just wanted to be assured the black labor would be cheap and disciplined. This disagreement was minute and the universal belief of white supremacy quickly surfaced through legislation.

The first discriminatory legislation was the Mixed Marriages Act in 1949 forbidding people to inter-marry between ethnicities. In 1950 several acts were

passed including the Population Registration Act, the Immorality Act, the Group Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, and the Urban Labor Preference Policy. These pieces of legislation worked to assign people to national categories, to forbid intercourse between ethnicities, to ban communism, and to prohibit Africans entering towns until all those already there had gotten jobs in the white labor market. In 1952 the Native Laws Amendment Act granted certain Africans rights of permanent residence in cities. Also, the Abolition of Passes and Documents Act required all Africans to carry a 'reference book' or pass that noted their employment history and residence rights.

The National Party won consecutive elections and in 1958 Hendrik Verwoerd became president. Following his party's ideology, he attempted to pervade all aspects of South African life, including the media. Verwoerd wanted to deny South African nationality for non-whites; by allowing African groups to develop their historic homelands according to their own traditions, he stripped them of their citizenship. These territories were controlled by chiefs who answered to the national government. Rural uprisings ensued but were violently suppressed by the government.

Social Movements

In addition to these rural uprisings, there were other forms of opposition against apartheid that ranged from bus boycotts to marches. Many political parties grew out of distaste of the apartheid, including the African National Congress, formerly the South African Native National Congress formed in 1912, and the South African Communist Party. The African National Congress (ANC) adopted a

Freedom Charter and created the slogan “The People Shall Govern” to guide them in their opposition pursuits. Many people who distrusted any white involvement split off from the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The ANC and PAC had major campaigns against the Abolition of Passes and Documents Act, one resulting in a massacre on March 21, 1960. The Sharpeville Massacre originated from a PAC campaign that encouraged PAC supporters to voluntarily leave their passes at home and offer themselves up for arrest at the nearest police station. Despite the non-violent nature of the campaign, armed policemen dispersed the demonstrators. Sixty-nine people were killed, most with gunshots in their backs. This event had severe consequences for the National Party because it showed unnecessary brutality by the government and resulted in the involvement of international organizations like the United Nations Security Council.⁶¹ Another PAC demonstration in Cape Town on April 6, 1960 ended in the arrest of their leader Philip Kgosana and the banning of the PAC, ANC, and other opposition organizations.

The ANC and PAC went underground and continued to show their animosity through military resistance. The ANC’s military group was named Umkonto we Sizwe and the PAC had their military group Poqo. Nelson Mandela of the ANC and PAC leadership went abroad to gather support, but on his return Mandela was arrested, tried for treason, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island.

⁶¹ South African History Online. “Sharpeville”. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/sharpeville/menu.htm>

In 1966 Hendrik Verwoerd, the current National Party leader and South African president, was assassinated. Verwoerd was succeeded by Balthazar Johannes Vorster who continued and intensified the repressions. The economic recession in 1973 made things harder for Africans and forced thousands of them to leave their farms and move into city slums. Apartheid opposition grew due to economic troubles and continued discrimination; Africans felt that they had nothing to lose.

One way Africans demonstrated their anger and frustration with apartheid discrimination was involvement in trade unions. The South African Congress of Trade Union (SACTU), formed in the early 1950s, became the leader of the antiapartheid struggle in the labor movement. Until the government recognized black unions in 1979, they were competing on an unfair playing field with pro-apartheid unions. Other black anti-apartheid unions were the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), and the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). By the end of the 1980s, work unions increased in popularity because they could be used to safeguard jobs. Unemployment was high so any job security was important. The National Union of Mineworkers succeeded in organizing migrant workers and in 1987 declared allegiance with the ANC and made Nelson Mandela its honorary life president. Black trade unions were extremely active; there were 1148 strikes in 1987. The largest trade union strike was led by the National Union of Mineworkers lasting three weeks and involving 250,000 miners.⁶² By 1990, the Congress of South

⁶² Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000.

African Trade Unions (COSATU) joined thirty-three unions together and had more than one million members.⁶³

In addition to workers, the youth were key players in the liberation struggle. Most opposition during the apartheid was generated by youth, mostly young men. The pupils were dissatisfied with the education system and the high unemployment level after graduation. “The Conga-like toyi-toyi dance of the ‘youth’ at UDF and other ‘radical’ gatherings during the 1980’s was at once a metaphor for the unifying aspirations of the front and a potent psychological means of achieving that solidarity, at least among the participants.”⁶⁴ The Black Consciousness Movement was formed by student Steve Biko and comprised of black South African university students. This movement stressed the individual responsibility for liberation and realized it could not be hasty when seeking confrontations with the government. In 1973 the movement received working class support and strikes broke out in Durban displaying industrial and school unrest. Soon after, when education of the Afrikaans language in school was forced upon all students, the students organized uprisings in protest in Soweto. The peaceful demonstrations began in the winter of 1976 but on June 16, 15,000 youths were met by armed police. Two young black students were savagely killed, publicly demonstrating the brutality of apartheid. Soon after, the youths went on rampage again and two whites were killed. The Soweto Revolt spread all over South Africa and was put down harshly by the government. Some youths fled and joined the ANC and were recruited into their military resistance group. The ANC

⁶³ Library of Congress. “A Country Study: South Africa – Trade Unions”. Received December 15, 2010. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/zatoc.html>

⁶⁴ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*, 172.

was rebuilt from this student involvement and continued to show their anger and discontent with the South African government and societal structures.

On top of student and working-class involvement, the women's struggle was prominent in the 1950's. Thousands of black, colored, and Indian women joined the Defiance Campaign in 1952 challenging apartheid laws. In 1954 the Federation of South African Women was established and brought together women from many political parties under one common goal. On August 9, 1956, the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW) organized 20,000 women to march to the government buildings in Pretoria to present a petition against the carrying of passes by women. This famous march became known as the Women's March. The FEDSAW instituted the women's anti-pass campaign, the Women's Charter, and their famous march to Pretoria, which became benchmarks in the struggle and continued to inspire decades of women until democracy was finally realized in 1994.⁶⁵ Other women's anti-apartheid organizations included the ANC Women's League and the National Council of African Women.

Social movements and uprisings continued as political leaders changed positions and new legislation was passed. In 1978, Vorster resigned from Prime Minister and became president. P.W. Botha, the current head of the National Party in the Cape Province, won Prime Minister. Botha introduced a program called "Total Strategy" in the efforts to contain communism and keep the apartheid. The government was afraid of the blacks gaining power and influence, but was less intimidated by the other ethnic minorities. Therefore, in 1984 coloreds and Indians

⁶⁵ South African History Online. "Women's Struggle". <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/womens-struggle/index.htm>

were given a formal say in the ruling of the country through a tri-cameral parliament. Angry about rent increases and the persistent exclusion of blacks in government, residents of Johannesburg started a violent uprising against the government that spread across the country. This disturbance was called the Vaal Triangle Riots, and was brutally shut down by the police. In the township of Langa, twenty people were gunned down at a funeral procession demonstrating the brutality of the event.⁶⁶

The persistent exclusion of Africans in government led to United Democratic Front (UDF) protests. The UDF was a non-racial anti-apartheid coalition of about 400 civic, church, students, workers, and other organizations on the national, regional, and local level, formed in 1983. The UDF united its 3 million members over the slogan “UDF unites, Apartheid divides”. Once the UDF was banned in 1988, the South Africa Mass Democratic Movement became the informal coalition of anti-apartheid groups. The MDM organized a campaign of civil disobedience in anticipation of the upcoming national elections in 1989. Defying regulations, several hundred black protesters entered whites-only hospitals and beaches. Throughout the month, people of all races marched peacefully in cities all over the country to protest police brutality and repressive legislation.⁶⁷

Despite original intentions to have peaceful social movements, brutal violence erupted towards both blacks and whites so that the government put many districts under state of emergency. Throughout the 1980’s the UDF supported armed resistance campaigns. The government was not about to be passive, therefore, the security forces became the true rulers of South Africa. Widespread shootings against

⁶⁶ Bill Keller. “The South African Vote: History; South Africa’s Long Journey: From Violence to Cooperation” The New York Times. April 24, 1994.

⁶⁷ South African History Online. “Liberation Struggle”.

demonstrators occurred as well as assassinations of prominent opponents. The UDF and sixteen other organizations were banned in 1988 crushing this revolt.

Not every social unrest account during the apartheid years has been discussed, but these social movements were signs that the apartheid regime would not be able to maintain its oppressive rule without massive resistance.⁶⁸

Elites

Not only did mass movements have a large impact on the forward movement of the country, but elites began to be involved in the idea of reform by the late 1980's. In 1984, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, met with Botha and advised him to release Nelson Mandela, which he promptly refused. However, Botha was interested in Mandela's political perceptions for South Africa's future because Mandela was still the majority of the opposition's leader. The Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee, organized for two people to meet with Mandela at the Pollsmoor Prison. At the first meeting with Lord Bethall, Mandela stated that, "the armed struggle was forced upon us by the government..."⁶⁹ Mandela was told by the Minister for Law and Order, Louis le Grange that talks with the ANC could continue in the future but the government would not agree to all Mandela's conditions. One condition set forward by the government was that if the ANC stopped guerilla warfare and entered the political arena, than the government would negotiate with the ANC; Mandela refused to agree to these terms. In the second meeting with Samuel Dash, the Chief Counselor to the US Senate Watergate Committee, Mandela laid out

⁶⁸ South African History Online. "Black Consciousness".
<http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/black-consciousness/biko/biko-frameset.htm>

⁶⁹ Tom Lodge. "Mandela: A Critical Life." Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006. p 156.

the ANC's essential requirements for political settlement. These included a unified south, no artificial homelands, black participation in central parliament, and one-man one-vote on a common roll.

On January 31, 1985 Botha made an offer at Parliament that if Mandela renounced violence he would be set free. However, Mandela refused this offer because he cared more about others freedom than his own. The organization of the people (the ANC) was still banned, so until it was legalized they would continue to fight for freedom. A few months later Mandela wrote to Minister Coetsee requesting a meeting, but Coetsee refused to see him in jail. When Mandela was in a hospital for an operation, Coetsee visited him and had a formal meeting. On return to the Pollsmoor prison, Mandela was provided with his own rooms making him more approachable by the government. Meetings up to this point were kept secret from other ANC members.

Mandela began meeting a more diversified group of people in 1986 beginning with members of Commonwealth Eminent Person's Group and Coetsee on May 16. Mandela said that if authorities withdrew soldiers and police from townships than the ANC might suspend violence.

On December 24, 1986 Mandela was driven around Cape Town and he was able to see the racial difference in living conditions between blacks and whites. Throughout 1987 Mandela continued meeting with Coetsee and in May 1988 Mandela began a series of forty-seven meetings with a special committee constituted by Coetsee. This committee was created because the government wanted more representation before any further discussions. Coetsee would chair the committee and

members would include senior prison officials and Dr. Neil Bernard the head of National Intelligence Service.

At the end of 1988 Mandela was hospitalized for tuberculosis and later moved to a bungalow on Victor Verster prison grounds where he could entertain visitors in private. Finally, on July 5, 1989 Mandela met with President Botha. Mandela's objective was to bring the government and ANC to the negotiating table to talk about the black population's desire for majority rule in a unitary state, white's minority requirements to not be controlled or dominated, and that the ANC would not renounce violence, abandon communist allies, and give up aim of majority rule. The government made demands that were unacceptable to the ANC.

In addition to private discussions between Nelson Mandela and a few National Party representatives, the ANC and UDF began having influence on internal political developments. The White House of Assembly conducted general elections in may 1987 and the National Party won 52 percent of the votes while the Conservative Party won 26 percent. Many Afrikaners wanted to return to apartheid while many white business, community, and religious leaders wanted to end apartheid. These left-wing supporters accepted that radical change was absolutely necessary and started to take initiative themselves. They recognized they needed Mandela and the ANC in order to get a peaceful solution to South African problems. A group of white South African business leaders took a trip to Lusaka, Zambia to meet with Oliver Tambo and other ANC leaders. In 1986 a documented calling for Mandela's release was circulated by the Broderbond, and in 1987 the Progressive Federal Party leader Van Zyl Slabbert led a delegation of fifty Afrikaner intellectuals to Senegal for talks with ANC leaders.

The ANC welcomed these discussions because they did not see a government overthrow as possible because their Communist allies were failing. The USSR urged ANC leaders to negotiate with apartheid leaders.

When President Botha had a stroke in 1989, he gave up his leadership of the National Party to lessen his responsibilities while still remaining State President. The National Party elected Frederik Willem de Klerk as its new leader. However, the division between party leader and presidency meant that neither Botha nor de Klerk could exercise any real power. In the September 1989 elections, the National Party retained Parliamentary power, but de Klerk was elected president over Botha. This change in power marks the beginning of the democratization process that will last for the next five years.

In reflection, the apartheid time period left South Africa in disrepair and increased the chances for reform of some kind, whether or not it would be democratic. Violence was rampant throughout the entire country creating fear and disruption. In the mid-1980s, over 25 percent of black deaths were unnatural cause by homicide, gangs, or other similar reasons. High alcoholism and drug use were a result of the widespread feeling of hopelessness of life. The distribution of income was very unequal as well, being closely correlated with racial status. In 1983, the disposable income per capita for Asians was 37 percent of that of whites. Coloreds were at 26 percent of that of whites, and Africans were between 6-22 percent depending on whether they lived in cities or rural townships. Nearly 2/3 of Africans (4/5 of the Africans living on Reserves) were in dire poverty and in the early 1970's the richest 20 percent of the South African population owned 75 percent of the

country's wealth. The level of inequality kept increasing from the 1970s-80s and the unemployment rate was 39 percent. Lastly, the apartheid caused education quality to decrease. Schools stressed rote learning, not independent or analytical thinking, which is not effective in creating a dynamic labor force. Many youth challenged the political system using the slogan "Liberation now! Education later!"⁷⁰ Even though their actions were understandable under the current circumstances, there were horrific costs later when there was an entire generation with poor education.

The apartheid provided an environment that stimulated violence, discontent, and the necessity for reform. Not only were blacks angry and involved in mass mobilization, but many white elites were willing to meet with ANC party leaders to discuss reform, setting up a receptive environment for the transition process.

Election of de Klerk to Election of Mandela (1989-1994)

Once de Klerk came into power he recognized that he must negotiate with legitimate black leaders and begin a comprehensive reform of the government and country as a whole. He stated, "there was no other alternative for South Africa. We were on the road to total confrontation, which would have annihilated everything which has been built up in this country."⁷¹ Violence and social movements forced a transition into action.

De Klerk's first actions included announcing that all apartheid law will be repealed, lifting economic sanctions, and releasing political prisoners. De Klerk began by releasing eight political prisoners, including leading ANC figures Walter

⁷⁰ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*.

⁷¹ Bill Keller. "The South African Vote", 3.

Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada. Also the bans on the ANC, the South African Communist Party, the Pan-African Congress, and all other organizations were to be lifted. In August 1990, the police and military intelligence units who implemented covert operations like arson, intimidation, and assassination against ANC and other groups, were disbanded. The most influential of de Klerk's actions, however, was the release of Nelson Mandela on February 11, 1990 from the Victor Verster prison after 27 years of imprisonment. Mandela's presence signaled the genuine beginning of the process of transition by which South Africa could start to rid itself of its apartheid past.⁷² Mandela's intention was to continue the armed struggle and to create sanctions until a democracy was in place; for the first time in many decades, South Africans had hope for their future.

There were many influential circumstances causing the de Klerk and other white leaders to abandon apartheid. For example, the white population decreased and the black population increased throughout the apartheid years making black unrest a more pressing issue. The blacks were becoming a more powerful economic force, moving up in business positions, and millions were attending school. The black population was now a force to be reckoned with. Furthermore, the arms embargo and trading boycotts made the decline of the South African economy more urgent. The failing economy put white prosperity in jeopardy and there was a lot of unrest in the 1980s. Revolts in reserves and threats from ANC guerillas resulted in many economic, military, and moral consequences. Also, the collapse of communism changed Afrikaner perceptions of their opponents believing that the ANC would be

⁷² Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*.

weaker with no further Soviet support for the ANC armed insurgency.⁷³ Radical solutions were needed and political reform was the only answer. “At all events, there is no doubt that de Klerk and his fellows calculated that they could control the process of transition in such a way as to guarantee their own interests, and probably to maintain their rule.”⁷⁴ In addition to their hope to keep power, the white government would also gain respect from leading countries like the UK and the US if they showed democratic prospects.⁷⁵

The transition period between February 1990 and April 1994 was bloody and chaotic. There was heavy violence in the townships, which the ANC suspected the government was promoting. It turned out that the ANC accusations were true and the Inkatha received 250,000 rand from the South African police to carry out anti-ANC activities.⁷⁶ Also, both leading parties, the ANC and NP, had internal factions. Some ANC supporters were not willing to reconcile peacefully over past injustices. Other militant black consciousness leaders rejected Mandela’s proposals for multiracial government and demanded black control over future decision-making institutions. Some NP supporters wanted de Klerk to step down, while others pressured him to move more boldly toward multiracial government.⁷⁷ Furthermore, once all opposition organizations were legalized in February, violence erupted across the country. The ANC, UDF, and COSATU fought the Inkatha in Natal and by August the fighting spread to Transvaal.⁷⁸

⁷³ Tom Lodge. *Mandela: A Critical Life*.

⁷⁴ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*, 185.

⁷⁵ Tom Lodge. *Mandela: A Critical Life*.

⁷⁶ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*.

⁷⁷ Library of Congress. “A Country Study: South Africa”.

⁷⁸ Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*.

Questions of politics and governance were brought up, such as who would rule the country? In whose interests? What would be the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the country? First, constitutional continuity was decided upon which meant that whatever was agreed upon must be enacted by South African Parliament. Also, the government that would come out of the transition was to be, in all respects, the lawful successor of the one that went into the process. It was also decided that the transition process must be completed within five years, before the next parliamentary elections. Despite the appearance of cooperation, all the groups involved in the process of negotiations were ready to use force in addition to bargaining. Excluding the Democratic Party, all other parties had their own private, clandestine army to make sure they got what they wanted.⁷⁹ According to Higley and Burton, the beginning of this transition was not an example of a consensual elite, but most likely a fragmented elite because of its weak integration and wide differentiation. The elites have split up into so many different groups but they refused to cooperate with each other.⁸⁰

Not knowing how the population truly felt about the transition to democracy, de Klerk called a general election over the population's feelings about the creation of a new constitution by the conservative party. Eighty percent of registered white voters showed up, and 68.7 percent of them voted pro-reform, giving de Klerk the consent needed to continue with reform plans. Starting May 2, 1990, representatives from the ANC and the government had secret meetings to discuss conditions for starting formal constitutional negotiations. The Groote Schuur Minute was produced

⁷⁹ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*, 186.

⁸⁰ John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations" (*International Review of Sociology*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001), 181-199.

at these negotiations, which called for the release of political prisoners and to allow exiles to return. Throughout this time de Klerk kept repealing apartheid legislation, including the 1953 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act. Now beaches, benches, restaurants, bathrooms, hospitals and all other public places were open to all ethnicities.⁸¹

In June 1990 de Klerk and Mandela met for the first time. On August 6, 1990 the two leading parties met again in Pretoria where Mandela announced that he was ending the armed struggle. A truce was made between the government and the ANC even though many groups in South Africa were still at war. Mandela soon afterwards met with the Zulu leader Buthelezi in an effort to comfort Zulu fears of ANC domination.⁸² Mandela knew that they must not ignore the reality of ethnic groups still prominent in South African society while creating the new constitution and government.

By June 1991, most apartheid restrictions had been abolished except for several political legislations. When de Klerk addressed the radical rights of the National Party in Ventersdorp, home of the militant Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), there was a violent street battle outside the building during his speech. The fight was between police and armed AWB who wanted to stop the rally. This was the first time that South African Police used armed force against white demonstrators. This battle showed the uncertainties that the AWB felt going under black rule. They were afraid they would be subordinate to blacks and demonstrated that they were not going to make transitioning easy for the ANC and National Party unless their needs

⁸¹ Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*.

⁸² Library of Congress "A Country Study: South Africa".

were met as well. The National Peace Accord was signed by 27 delegates of political organizations and national and homeland governments in September 1991. This accord set the codes of conduct for all parties in the process, including the police.⁸³

December 20th was the beginning of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which brought together the government and eighteen political parties to sign a Declaration of Intent. Mandela was present at these talks because he was now President of ANC. The declaration was a commitment of all parties to “an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship... free from apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination.”⁸⁴ They agreed to an interim government for the transition period and an elected constituent assembly to serve as the National Parliament. However, at CODESA’s second meeting in May 1992, talks collapsed. The National Party wanted a veto over any decision made by the Constitution Assembly and disagreed on power sharing, majority rule, and centralized power. The ANC refused to accept these alterations and started a campaign, supported by the SACP and COSATU, of rolling mass action to force government concessions. As a result of mass action the Boipatong Massacre and Bisho Massacre occurred in June and September 1992 respectively, when the government met the demonstrators with force.

The Boipatong Massacre happened on June 17, 1992 when de Klerk visited the settlement. His presence made the Zulu residents angry, especially because he had a large police contingent with him. The police in armored vehicles began to fire and killed many people. It was widely believed that the police were involved in

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Roger B. Beck, *The History of South Africa*, 186.

supporting the Zulu's and other anti-ANC groups to hinder the democratic transition. This massacre and the supposed police involvement prompted Mandela to break off formal talks with the government for nine months. The ANC threatened to withdraw entirely unless the government made greater efforts to end violence and to curtail covert police support for the Inkatha Freedom Party.⁸⁵ The event also reconfirmed the necessity of ANC's mass action campaign so the campaign continued through July. In the beginning of August, there was a general boycott for two days that hurt the failing economy even more. In September, the ANC tried to extend the mass action campaign to the homelands. On September 7, the ANC sponsored a march to Bisho, the capital of the Ciskei territory, to overthrow the regime of Brigadier Oupa Qozo in order to hasten the re-incorporation of Ciskei into the republic. The police open fired when the marchers broke through police barriers and 29 people were killed, 200 wounded.

The breakdown of CODESA, the Boipatong massacre, and the Bisho massacre forced the National Party and the ANC to realize that a negotiated settlement had to be found. However, it was decided that this negotiation must be made in private by leaders and then presented as a finished product to their supporters. In September 1992, Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC Security General, and Roelf Meyer, the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, met for nineteen days to create an agreement that CODESA never could. On September 26, Mandela and de Klerk signed a Record of Understanding, a document showing that the ANC agreed to resume negotiations once the government agreed to release more political prisoners, fence migrant hostels that housed many ANC supporters, and prohibited the carrying

⁸⁵ Library of Congress. "A Country Study: South Africa".

of traditional weapons. The ANC accepted the sunset clauses, which safeguarded white civil servant jobs and allowed for a coalition government. Any party with 20 percent or more of the national vote would have a Vice President in the coalition government and cabinet seats were distributed to parties with more than five percent of the national vote. Also, Mandela and de Klerk agreed to establish a constitutional assembly to construct a final constitution and a five-year transitional Government of National Unity. However, this compromise was only between the ANC and National Party, excluding smaller parties. In retaliation, Buthelezi the IFP leader formed a new alliance called the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG). This included nineteen organizations, including the IFP, Afrikaner People's Union, and the White Conservative Party, who wanted to protect ethnic rights of minorities such as the Zulu and whites.

A negotiating council of twenty-six parties met at the World Trade Center outside Johannesburg April 1, 1993. The negotiation continued despite many disturbances such as an assassination and an armored car being driving into the World Trade Center. At the end of the council, the negotiation included the type of government that would be installed, the division of South Africa's provinces, and how to safeguard previous government employees. First, it was agreed upon that a constituent assembly would be elected and for the first years after the election there would be a Government of National Unity in which all parties who had over five percent of the vote would have ministerial office and in which a 2/3 majority was needed to write the constitution. The assembly would have full legislative powers

except for a few safeguards.⁸⁶ Secondly, the organization of South Africa's provinces would need to change to provide more equality in voting. The ANC wanted a central government but the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party wanted regional governments so they could control many sectors of society without controlling the central government party. The ANC agreed to provincial governments but realized how the country was currently split up was ineffective because it was too unwieldy. Therefore, South Africa was re-divided into nine provinces. Thirdly, there was the issue of white workers in the government and how to make sure unemployment and unrest rose in the white population. Forty percent of employed Afrikaners worked for the government and a huge constituency of South Africans and Bantustans were in the civil service, police, and defense forces. Similar to the sunset clauses mentioned previously, it was decided that for ten years after the transfer of government all state employers had job stability. Every party agreed to the interim constitution except for the Conservative Party, Inkatha, and the KwaZulu government who walked out of the meetings. This interim constitution was adopted by the tri-cameral parliament in December 1993 meaning that constitutional continuity was achieved. Furthermore, the date was set for the first universal election in South African history for April 27-29, 1994 when the population would vote on a new constituent, legislative assembly, and president.

The interim constitution took effect and caused immediate discontent. According to the constitution, seven million people who were part of the Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda Bantustan populations were reincorporated into South Africa. However, Lucas Mangope, the leader of the Bophuthatswana's said

⁸⁶ Robert Ross. *A Concise History of South Africa*.

they would not participate in the elections. Mangope finally consented when his people demonstrated their desire to vote in a four-day protest. Following Mangope's lead, the Ciskei ruler resigned on March 22 allowing his group to vote on election day as well. However, Buthelezi still opposed the constitution and refused to participate in the election unless the Zulu Kingship and territory had status and a guarantee that the Inkatha wouldn't be discriminated against in the new government. After the Inkatha conducted a mass march to the national headquarter of the ANC, de Klerk and Mandela agreed to their terms and Inkatha was added to the ballot.

The last obstacle that the ANC and National Party had to deal with was the Afrikaner nationalists and rough neck racists of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB). The ANC met with Afrikaner nationalist General Constand Viljoen established volkstaat, the establishment of self-determination for the Afrikaners minority in accordance with federal principles, in the effort to preserve Afrikaans religion, culture, and language. Viljoen eventually agreed to participate in the elections after the AWB was defeated in an armed disagreement with the Bophuthatswana. Viljoen recognized that participating in the election would be the best way to achieve his objectives.

In the days leading up to the election there was violence. On April 25, a car bomb in Johannesburg killed nine people, and on the day before elections started on April 26 there was a car bomb in Johannesburg airport injuring thirteen people. However, on the election days there was no violence allowing twenty million people to vote.

April 27-29, 1994 was the first democratic election that South African history had seen. The elections ran relatively smoothly despite many allegations that some local powers stuffed or hid ballot boxes and the results had to be determined by negotiation in some areas. As a result, the ANC won 62.65 percent of the vote, barely missing the 2/3 majority needed to write the constitution on its own. The ANC also got seven out of nine provinces, losing the provinces that were mostly countryside. The Inkatha won 10.54 percent of the national total winning control of KwaZulu-Natal. The National Party won 20.04 percent of the vote and was able to nominate de Klerk as one of the Vice Presidents. The ANC was not able to secure 100 percent of the votes because some people feared that the party was godless and violent, they distrusted its candidate for premier, there was widespread worry about job security, and they disliked the ANC's habits of deference. Nonetheless, on May 10, 1994, Nelson Mandela took oath as President of South Africa, with de Klerk and Thabo Mbeki as his Vice Presidents.

Conclusion

South Africa is a country familiar with strife, starting from its colonization in 1652 by the Dutch. Controversy grew and was at its height during the apartheid in the mid-1900s. Through social movements and political unrest, however, the public displayed its anger and desire for change. Once the ruling government realized that the country would not be able to survive in the present situation, it looked towards democracy. From 1989 to 1994 South Africa turned its future around by negotiating

a government that represented all the people. In spite of adversity, the strong willed country embraced its past in an effort to democratize.

I am not only interested in the success of South Africa, but in the process the country took to democratize. Was it solely elite driven following Higley and Burton's theories, or did the masses play a role in the outcome? By first examining the elite negotiations and then mass mobilization leading up to and during the transition, it will be discovered whether South Africa can be applied to one of the theories presented by Higley, Burton, Gunther, Tarrow, or Bermeo.

The elites in South Africa began negotiating privately years before the official transition began in 1989 when de Klerk became president. President Botha had begun making preliminary advancements towards a democracy by opening up to Nelson Mandela, leader of the opposition. But these actions were stalled before any real improvement could be made. De Klerk on the other hand, made strong efforts by making his negotiations public as well as private. He released many political prisoners and continued discussions with Mandela and other political party leaders. Mandela began to take a lead role in transition coming up with his own terms and reaching out to leaders, like Buthelezi, on his own to make peace statewide.

However, do these actions fit into the clean-cut categories prescribed by Higley and Burton? Higley and Burton argue that first the elites must become consensual through either elite settlement or general elite convergence, to have a chance at successful democratization. In order for a group to be considered consensual elites, they must make an effort to agree on the roles of the political game while still holding different ideas and values. They do not push their disagreements

to violence once they agree to abide by common codes of political conduct and there is an extensive web of interpersonal relationships over all factions. The elites in South Africa did agree to the rules of the political game, but not immediately.

Nelson Mandela was still encouraging armed resistance against the National Party until certain conditions were met in favor of the ANC. The ANC and the National Party were the first two elite groups to agree to civil political rules when Mandela announced that he was ending the armed struggle in 1990. However, other political parties and elites were not as supportive of the new environment. For a while, most parties had their own private, clandestine armies to make sure their concerns were considered. The National Peace Accord between 27 delegates in 1991 set the codes of conduct for future political interaction. Even though there is violence up until the election and some leaders refused to participate in the election until a few days prior, the election still had all major political parties on the ballot with an agreement to democratic political rules.

How did the elites transform into a consensual elite group? The elites did not come to a conclusive decision that they would all follow the new political rules at one specific meeting. Does that mean that an elite settlement did not occur because it was not a distinct turning point, or can elite settlements happen over a period of years? Higley and Burton argue that speed is a key feature in settlements. “It appears that elite settlements are accomplished quickly or not at all... In none of the cases under discussion did a settlement take much longer than a year.”⁸⁷ They clarify that an elite settlement does not have to be complete and secure within the year, but the initial

⁸⁷ John Higley and Michael G. Burton. “Elite Settlements.” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (June 1987): 299. The cases under discussion refer to England, Sweden, Colombia, and Venezuela.

settlement must be consolidated within that time frame. If the initial settlement was between Mandela and de Klerk, it could be argued that the settlement happened within one year, but it could also be argued that agreements between the two parties happened much earlier between Mandela and Coetsee during Botha's presidency and didn't end until August 1990 when Mandela agreed to stop armed resistance. Even then, the last of the elites didn't agree until 1994. The elites did complete their democratic transition in five years, but it does not make the requirements set up by Higley and Burton. It appears that South Africa made a series of elite settlements culminating in a success. South Africa may be one of the first countries that succeeded at an elite settlement that took more than one year to consolidate, or an elite settlement is not the correct category in which to place South Africa.

Another possibility is that South Africa went through a general elite convergence. An elite convergence happens in two steps and is a slower process than settlements. First, some warring factions collaborate in electoral politics to mobilize a reliable electoral majority. After several successful elections other elite factions, who originally challenged the coalition and democratic rules, agree to participate in the democratic election so they can continue representing their own ideologies. In South Africa, there were no elections that occurred in between the last apartheid election and the first national democratic election. However, a convergence fits South Africa in other aspects such as having two warring factions negotiate first and the other parties follow at a later time.

South Africa could also be described as a generosity moment, according to Hislope. A generosity moment is when dominant ethnic groups promote dialogue

and cooperation with minorities to meet their demands.⁸⁸ South Africa had extreme ethnic violence approaching the democratic transition including massacres and ethnic wars in the reserves. During the transition, anti-system and semi-loyal parties were co-opted, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Zulu, or marginalized like the Afrikaner Resistance Movement.⁸⁹ However, the ANC began to talk with elites from parties other than the National Party. Not only did the ANC appease white interests through the sunset clause, but Mandela worked with every major South African political figure during the transition, except for the neo-Nazi leader. Mandela said, “It is true that our policies are nonracial, but let us be realistic about it. There are different ethnic groups in this country and ethnicity – especially because of the policies of the government – is still a dangerous threat to us.”⁹⁰ Yugoslavia had recently fallen apart because separate nationalities had been forced together, and South Africa was determined to not succumb to the same fate. If the ANC did not take into account Zulu interests, the Zulu could have initiated many political problems.⁹¹ The ANC and NP elites worked together to provide opportunities for all ethnic groups in South Africa allowing it to move forward towards a democracy.

The South African case does not flawlessly fit either type of process described by Higley and Burton, raising the question if it is unique in this matter or if there is a pattern. It is evident that elite involvement was an imperative part of the democratization process, especially the involvement of all ethnic minorities.

⁸⁸ Robert Hislope. “The Generosity Moment: Ethnic Politics, Democratic Consolidation and the State in Yugoslavia (Croatia), South Africa and Czechoslovakia”. *Democratization*, Vol. 5 No. 1 (Spring 1998): 64-89.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ John Battersby. *Zulu Chief Exploits Tribal Divisions*. The Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 1992.

⁹¹ Ibid.

However, what was the role of the masses? Is a consensual elite all a country needs to succeed? Or does mass action play a vital role in showing the elites what the people want and the direction that the country must proceed? It was shown that there were many social movements and discussions between elite members before the democratic transition even occurred, which demonstrated to the government that change was inevitable.

However, is it important to have social movements before the transition begins to promote change, or do they need to continue throughout the transition? It is very possible that without the social movements throughout the apartheid, the National Party would have been able to continue ruling. The demonstrations, marches, and revolts forced the ruling government to reconsider the future of South Africa to prevent complete chaos and failure. De Klerk knew that the National Party would not be able to keep ruling unilaterally for very much longer and therefore looked towards democracy as a way to maintain some power in the future.

Social movements during the transition were also important because they kept the transition on the right path. Without the Boipatong Massacre and other protests and violence, minority groups might not have been equally represented and the ANC and National Party could have created their own government. According to Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, Imraan Valodia, and Elke Zuern, social movements played an integral role in the outcome of the transition.

Since the 1970s [there has] been a heightened level of social organization in South Africa, especially in urban areas through the activity of unions and civics. Social movements in South Africa played a vital part in precipitating and defining the terms of the transition to democracy, and indeed the liberation movement was arguably one of the quintessential social movements of the 20th

century. The ANC, UDF, COSATU, NGO's and civics formed a collective mass of democratic energy which – in combination with economic difficulties, external political pressure, and changing geo-political circumstances – resulted in the negotiated revolution of the early 1990s.⁹²

Through the research performed, it is clear that both social movements and elites influenced the transition, and the combination of both enabled South Africa to be a successful case. In this situation, both social movements and elites were needed to produce the democratic outcomes. This conclusion cannot be applied to all case studies, so these same questions will also be considered in the case studies of Serbia and Haiti.

⁹² Richard Ballard, Adam Habib, Imraan Valodia, and Elke Zuern. "Globalization, marginalization, and contemporary social movements in South Africa".

Chapter 3

Democratization in Serbia

Introduction

As a post-communist country, Serbia has a very different history than South Africa. Serbia's challenging issue was not ethnic divisions, but political ones. Once communism failed in 1989, signified by the fall of the Berlin Wall, Serbia's internal political strife became rampant. Serbia was part of a large Yugoslavia until 1992 when Yugoslavia split up violently leaving only Serbia and Montenegro in the Federation of Yugoslavia. Then, early in the new millennium Serbia and Montenegro joined together in a Union, which lasted three years until 2006, when both countries became independent.

Throughout this time, Serbia's politics were infiltrated with killings, uprisings, political purges, and short-termed alliances. Slobodan Milošević, who some believe was one of the worst dictators in the world, was President of Serbia from 1989 to 1997 and the President of the Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000.

One question that will be examined is when did the democratic transition take place in Serbia? Unlike South Africa, Serbia does not have a distinct beginning and end point of its democratic transition. After giving a brief chronology of Serbia's history from 1989 to the present, possible transition dates will be investigated. Figure 1, Serbian and Yugoslavian Leaders, is provided on page 162 as a visual aid for the confusing political history of Serbia. Also, elite involvement and social movements will be examined to determine if one or the other has a greater effect on democratization success.

Serbia is being used as a case study because it provides a dissimilar background and presents alternative issues to South Africa. Since Serbia is a post-

communist country, it has a very different background than other countries worldwide, dealing with issues of stateness, economy, and political disruptions. This provides a way to examine how social movements and elite negotiations affect political transitions differently than in South Africa. Serbia, along with South Africa and Haiti, fits the MDD-SO model by having a very different and controversial background, but having a similarly successful transition.

History of Serbia

The Rise of Milošević (1987-1997)

Milošević began showing tendencies of a dictator before he was inaugurated as president in 1989. Milošević became a member of the Communist Party in the 1980's and immediately began attacking Serbian leadership who disagreed with his views of nationalism. One of his first targets was Dragiša Pavlović, president of the Belgrade Party, who criticized government policies in public and denounced Serbian nationalism.⁹³ In 1987, someone shot four of Pavlović's comrades and wounded six others. Anyone who became associated with Pavlović, or any other of Milošević's enemies, had to tread carefully. Ivan Stambolić, an old friend of Milošević, sided with Pavlović and both Pavlović and Stambolić were forced to resign from politics.⁹⁴ In December 1987, Milošević gained power over the Serbian Communist Party in an intra-party coup without elections or political participation of people outside the

⁹³ Slovoljub Djukic. *Milošević and Marković: A Lust for Power*. McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal: 2001.

⁹⁴ Slovoljub Djukic. *Milošević and Marković: A Lust for Power*.

leadership of the party.⁹⁵ Milošević, however, attempted to show that he was pro-democratic by addressing a large gathering in the summer of 1988. The gatherings, called “rallies for truth” or the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” were held throughout Serbia and were to promote nationalism and keep Kosovo part of Serbia. In Milošević’s address, he stated that he believed that these demonstrations were a democratic reaction. However, as time progressed, it became clear that Milošević only supported demonstrations that promoted his own ideologies and he condemned all other public actions of speech and assembly.⁹⁶

Soon after, there was a revolt of Kosovo Serbs intending to halt Serb emigration from Kosovo and change Kosovo’s constitutional status in Serbia. This turned into a political free-for-all; it was the first time that Milošević discovered the power of nationalism and Serbian nationalism became a concern. Milošević was called a Bolshevik for trying to prevent the collapse of another communist regime. Despite these uncertainties by the people, Milošević became president of Serbia in 1989 because popular elections were never held.⁹⁷ Not long after, on October 17, 1989 the Yugoslav Party had a meeting of the presidency and tried to vote Milošević out of office but was unsuccessful.⁹⁸

A month later the Berlin Wall fell and Milošević appeared to still be the sole, uncontested leader.⁹⁹ Milošević called for a congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to revote for the party leadership because the Communist Party of

⁹⁵ Eric G. Gordy. “The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives.” The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, 1999.

⁹⁶ Slovoljub Djukic. Milošević and Marković: *A Lust for Power*.

⁹⁷ Eric G. Gordy. “The Culture of Power in Serbia.”

⁹⁸ Slovoljub Djukic. Milošević and Marković: *A Lust for Power*.

⁹⁹ Ibid

Yugoslavia was at an end, at least under that name. Milošević hand-picked most of the delegates to ensure he would win; however the Slovenian leadership was against him and actually walked out of Congress to show their discontent.¹⁰⁰ Most of the public was by this time against communism and demanded reform, especially because of the recent hyperinflation.¹⁰¹ In response, the Communist Party of Serbia was renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and Milošević managed to keep the communist party's organizational influence and co-opt much of the opposition.¹⁰² The SPS party became nationalistic; Milošević was desperate to weaken potential reform that would threaten the communist's monopoly of power.¹⁰³ In early 1990, opposition parties began appearing and a law was passed in July allowing multiple party elections. Milošević's main opposition came from the Serbian Resistance Movement and nationalist governments in other surrounding republics. In September 1990, the SPS created a new constitution that would be used until 2006.

Opposition parties began demonstrating their abilities in November 1990. The parties declared an election boycott and an anti-election campaign to discourage people from voting in the December elections. The largest opposition party to the SPS was the Serbian Renewal Movement led by Vuk Drašković who advocated extreme national positions. There was also the Democratic Union led by Vojvodina Magyars, the Civic Alliance, and the Democratic Party.

In the December elections in 1990, opposition parties did participate and resulted in no convincing victory or defeat for the present ruling regime. The SPS

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Eric G. Gordy. "The Culture of Power in Serbia."

¹⁰² Slovoljub Djukic. Milošević and Marković: *A Lust for Power*.

¹⁰³ Eric G. Gordy. "The Culture of Power in Serbia."

won 46.1 percent of the votes, which were the most votes won even though it was not the majority. Even though opposition representatives were in parliament, the parliament was not democratic because of corrupt elections. Also in 1990, Milošević appointed the next Yugoslavian president and prime minister, Dobrica Ćosić and Milan Panić respectively. Despite Milošević's plan for picking these individuals, Ćosić and Panić began denouncing Milošević's autocratic rule and presenting resistance. Milošević refused to resign his position and became on bad terms with both Ćosić and Panić; he tried to oust Panić twice without success. Finally, in 1992, Milošević replaced Ćosić and Panić with Zoran Lilić and Radoje Kontić.

After Milošević reconfirmed his presidency in 1991, rallies and mass protests broke out which he quickly banned. Beginning on March 9, students protested in response to the exclusion of opposition parties from TV news coverage and that the state TV presented one-sided stories on national conflicts. They demanded the resignation of the state TV station directors.¹⁰⁴ However, the students could not develop into a new balance of political forces to present strong competition to the SPS. The limit of their success was in exposing the regime's failure of legitimacy. Since demonstrations were banned, police were brought in from all over the country to attempt to prevent people from assembling. Despite police attempts, 100,000-200,000 gathered in Republic Square in Belgrade. Water cannons, clubs, and tear gas were used against the students and many arrests were made, including Drašković being sent to prison. For four days, people gathered on Terazije square in another urban neighborhood to voice their concerns. Speakers climbed up onto the fountain to address the crowd. They called themselves the "Terazije Parliament" and formed a

¹⁰⁴ Eric G. Gordy. "The Culture of Power in Serbia."

list of demands to the government, including the release of demonstrators from prison including Drašković; the resignation of Minister of Police, Minister of Interior, and Director of RTB station; and unimpeded operations of their own student radiobroadcasts. The government met all demands. The media portrayed these demonstrations as violent, but it was in fact the police that brought the violence.

In response to the student protest, Milošević started a pro-regime demonstration on March 11 at Ušće. The Women's Movement for the Preservation of Yugoslavia invited people to come support the President and Serbia. Several thousand SPS supporters came, but significantly less than student demonstrations across town. The student demonstrations and the intense military response showed that there was no toleration for rallies and defeated the possibility of a democratic transition in the near future.

The Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj was formed in 1991 and Šešelj became Milošević's favorite opposition politician. In the 1991 elections, Šešelj was elected into Parliament defeating his opponent in the Democratic Party with his extreme nationalist positions.¹⁰⁵

On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia and war started. Over the next two years, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up as wars were fought and Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent. Macedonia left Yugoslavia peacefully. War with these countries was an opportunity for Milošević to brand making all opposition forces as traitors. In 1992, the two remaining republics of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, formed a new federation called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

¹⁰⁵ Eric G. Gordy. "The Culture of Power in Serbia."

Serbians were still not happy with Milošević after Yugoslavia broke up. In 1992, there was a huge student protest, supported by faculty, at the University of Belgrade. Faculty and students decided they had to say “Enough!” to everything that was going on, including the Bosnian War and UN resolutions and sanctions excommunicating Serbia from the world community. The first phase of the protest was tens of thousands of students protesting for twenty-six days. They took over classrooms and auditoriums on the university campus, private businesses lent electronic equipment, and political speakers came. Mass gatherings held in the Student Square and political marches also occurred during this twenty-six day period. Their demands included disbanding the National Assembly and the government of Serbia because of their incompetence, and the resignation of Milošević. None of these demands were met during this time, however it showed that there were thousands of citizens with the same ideology. On August 5, 1992, the government passed a law taking over control of the University; this only made students more persistent.¹⁰⁶ Other forms of protest were also used: pacifists held demonstrations praying for Milošević’s resignation and citizens protested the Siege of Sarajevo by marching past Milošević’s headquarters. Armed vehicles and police suppressed demonstrations and protests like those just mentioned.

In the 1992 parliamentary elections, SPS won 28.8 percent of the votes and the SRS won 22.6 percent. However, at this time, the SRS and SPS were allies, which allowed the SPS majority control. In the Serbian presidential elections the same year, Milošević won 2.5 million votes and Panić, the previous prime minister of

¹⁰⁶ Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic. “Enough! Student Protest ’92: The Youth of Belgrade in Quest of Another Serbia.” *The Anthropology of East Europe Review*, Vol. 11 Issue 1-2. Spring-Fall 1993: 108-116.

Yugoslavia, won 1.5 million votes. Panić did well considering his campaign lasted only one week and Milošević had control over the media.

Opposition grew especially through the Democratic Party (DP). Dragoljub Mićunović, as the Democratic Party's first president, hoped to provide a strong and unified opposition against the SPS. However, the Democratic Party had internal disputes and therefore split up into four parties. One party that resulted was a continuation of the Democratic Party but with different leadership. Zoran Đinđić was a major supporter of Mićunović before the 1992 elections, however, after a poor number of votes and winning only a small number of seats in the Serbian and Yugoslav parliaments, Đinđić exploited the internal discontent to oust Mićunović. For the 1993 elections, Đinđić took office of party president for the Democratic Party.¹⁰⁷ Dragoljub Mićunović took over one of the factions named the Democratic Centre. Another faction of the DS was the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Vojislav Koštunica; he didn't make allies with other opposition groups because he wanted to stay "ideologically pure" making him not a large threat.¹⁰⁸ The last faction was the Liberal Party led by Nikola Milošević and Kosta Čavoški. There were up to 130 parties formed in Serbia, however there was too much internal strife between the parties to unite and present a strong opposition to Milošević and the SPS.

In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, SPS won 36.7 percent, Democratic Movement of Serbia coalition 16.7 percent, and the SRS 13.9 percent. Even though the SPS won more votes than the previous election in 1992, the SRS was not an ally anymore because of the weakening relationship between Šešelj and

¹⁰⁷ Institute for Building War and Peace (iwpr/beta) "Zoran Djindjic: Pragmatic of Machiavellian?" The Serbian Opposition: 1-10.

¹⁰⁸ Slovoljub Djukic. Milošević and Marković: *A Lust for Power*: 91

Milošević. Milošević hoped that the organized-crime boss and paramilitary commander Željko Ražnatović-Arkan would get enough votes to become his next ally after SRS, but Arkan didn't receive enough votes to even get one parliament seat. From this election, Milošević's SPS party did not have parliament majority. In January 1996, all opposition parties walked out of the parliament chamber because they all agreed parliament was no longer functional and declared they would hold their own parallel parliament.¹⁰⁹

The largest parties, including the Socialists, the Yugoslav United Left led by Mijana Marković, the SRM led by Drašković, and the Radical Party led by Šešelj, set the political tone. However, Milošević slowly began to purge Serbian leaders of the opposition and his own party to maintain control. First, Šešelj and members of his party were removed from parliament after insulting Mirjana Marković, Milošević's wife, and were later arrested. Second, Drašković was beaten and arrested after he led a protest and was not released until several months after when he was on the brink of death. Not only did Milošević begin to target his opposition, but also members of his own party the Socialist Party. He got rid of Borislav Jović, Mihajlo Marković, and Milorad Vučelić at the Socialist Party Congress in March 1996.

In 1996, the Prudent Revolution began, led by Koštunica and Đinđić. Its first effort was to form the Zajedno Coalition, or Together Coalition, to bring together many different opposition parties under one goal. Đinđić and Drašković were the

¹⁰⁹ Eric G. Gordy. "The Culture of Power in Serbia."

leaders of Zajedno, but Koštunica refused to partake in the coalition because he did not trust Drašković.¹¹⁰

At the 1996 municipal elections, Zajedno won in the second round of local elections in fourteen of the most important cities and towns in Serbia. However, Milošević refused to recognize this victory.¹¹¹ To defend the opposition's victory, demonstrations spread across many municipalities in Serbia led by Zajedno. In Belgrade more than 100,000 people gathered each day supported by Drašković and Đinđić. Students joined the rallies and at the end of each day, marchers gathered in Republic Square where Drašković, Đinđić, and Vesna Vesic, encouraged peaceful tactics. These demonstrations went on for weeks and there was also a "Serbian Air force" when thousands of paper airplanes were launched at the RTB studios. Milošević refused to address the demonstrators saying that they promoted non-democratic ideals and should not be supported by a democratic government.¹¹² Police reinforcements were sent to Belgrade to stop the demonstrations. The state finally yielded to protestors and international pressure to recognize the results and Đinđić became the first democratically elected mayor of Belgrade on February 21, 1997.

Even though it appeared that that many opposition parties were beginning to work together, Zajedno disbanded in June 1997. This could have been caused by Drašković's statement that he could achieve future victories without the coalition.¹¹³ Another possible reason for the coalition breakup is that Đinđić did not follow

¹¹⁰ Damjan de Krnjec-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution." *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 12, Number 3, July 2001: 96-110.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Slovoljub Djukic. Milošević and Marković: *A Lust for Power*.

¹¹³ Damjan de Krnjec-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution."

through with their negotiations and did not support Drašković in the presidential elections. The opposition self-destructed.

In July 1997 Milošević reached the end of his second and last term as Serbian President. Determined to not reach the end of his political career here, he ran and was elected for President of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in very corrupt elections where his supporters watched all voters to ensure they voted for Milošević. He was inaugurated on July 27, 1997. Elections for presidency and parliament in Serbia were now open since Milošević's end of term. Koštunica and Đinđić boycotted the elections unless certain conditions like fair media coverage were met. Drašković came in third place in the presidential elections, after Milošević's supported candidate Milan Milutinović and Šešelj. Drašković believed he lost because of the boycott led by Koštunica and Đinđić and he wanted revenge. Drašković, joined by the SPS and SRS, voted to remove Đinđić as mayor. In a presidential runoff election Šešelj won, but the SPS candidate was declared President because of "phantom votes" from Kosovo. For parliament, Milošević needed a coalition partner and looked to Drašković, who agreed but subsequently lost all popular support for future elections.¹¹⁴

Montenegro began to sever economic ties with Serbia by forming a new economic policy, adopting the Deutsche Mark for currency, and carrying out pro-independence policies. In November 1997 there were bitterly contested elections in Montenegro that were declared free and fair by international monitors. Milo Đukanović became Montenegro's president but Milošević formulated a campaign to undermine his government.

¹¹⁴ Damjan de Krnjec-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution."

There were many deep social divisions in Serbia pertaining to the political party individuals supported. For example, there was an age discrepancy. The older generations supported the SPS and young individuals supported opposition parties like SPO, DS, and SRS. There were also divisions based on where people lived, for example urban or rural areas. Rural areas tended to support the SPS more because they would benefit the most from communism and socialism. Another prominent social division was between education levels. The more education an individual had, the more likely they would support opposition groups instead of the SPS; in other words, support for SPS decreased with education.¹¹⁵ This made any type of unification difficult because citizens in the same family would disagree on party ideologies. Also, many people did not welcome the introduction to democracy because they saw it as the “break up of Yugoslavia” and an “anarchy”.¹¹⁶ Since people did not see democracy as an attractive future regime, Giuseppe Di Palma’s idea of crafting would have to occur by changing the word choice used to describe democracy to get people interested and engaged.¹¹⁷

The Fall of Milošević (1997-2001)

The Kosovo issue became more prominent in 1997 when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started armed resistance. Their main goal was to secure independence for Kosovo.¹¹⁸ The KLA rebelled against Serbian rule a year later and

¹¹⁵ Eric G. Gordy. “The Culture of Power in Serbia.”

¹¹⁶ Ibid: 57.

¹¹⁷ Giuseppe Di Palma. *To Craft Democracies: an Essay on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).

¹¹⁸ U.S. Department of State. “Background Note: Serbia.” Last modified September 13, 2010. Received 17 January 2011.

Serb forces launched a brutal crackdown.¹¹⁹ Milošević instructed police and military forces against the KLA which led to atrocities against civilian noncombatants. Many ethnic Albanians were displaced from Kosovo or killed by Serbian troops and police.¹²⁰ In response to Milošević's brutal treatment of Kosovo, NATO bombed Serbia for 78 days, which set back the economy and crippled civilian infrastructure.¹²¹ The United Nations Security Council authorized an international civil and military presence in Kosovo under UN auspices and a resolution called for UN interim administration of Kosovo. The UN also authorized an international civil presence to facilitate a process to determine Kosovo's status. International forces, including the UN Mission in Kosovo and the NATO-led security force KFOR, moved into Kosovo.¹²² In 1999 Kosovo was made a UN protectorate under the UN Mission in Kosovo.¹²³ Both Đinđić and Koštunica supported Milošević's goal to preserve Kosovo within Serbia but opposed the full-scale organized displacement of Albanian peoples of the region. Đinđić and Koštunica continued to work hard to oust Milošević from power since there was still a huge disagreement among elites about the Kosovo issue and other national concerns.

Opposition grew as the 2000 Yugoslavian Presidential elections drew near. Milošević continued to dominate organs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavian government. His party, the SPS, did not have majority in either the federal or Serbian parliaments, but it dominated the governing coalitions and held all the key

¹¹⁹ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified November 4, 2010.

¹²⁰ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹²¹ Damjan de Krnjec-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution. *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 12, Number 3, July 2001: 96-110.

¹²² U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹²³ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified November 4, 2010. Received 19 January 2011.

administrative posts. Also, Milošević had control over the Serbian police, a heavily armed battalion of 100,000 men responsible for internal security and had committed serious human rights abuses. In May 2000, Belgrade citizens protested against the Serbian government's takeover of the city's independent Studio B TV station. This protest was put down by brutal police repression.¹²⁴

Milošević decided to call the elections early because he believed he would easily win since the opposition had never showed lasting cooperation and success in the past. He set the date for September 24. The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), a coalition of 18 parties, became the lead opposition to Milošević. Koštunica accepted the DOS invitation as their presidential candidate and Đinđić became his campaign manager. Koštunica worked to travel and visit all of Serbia meeting with citizens individually and at rallies. The independent media and the Otpor (Resistance) Student Organization were both very helpful in supporting Koštunica's campaign.¹²⁵ Serbians saw Koštunica as the first viable opposition alternative to Milošević.

Koštunica was victorious at the September elections, however Milošević and his party claimed that Milošević had won. The regime once more was not obeying its own electoral laws.¹²⁶ The DOS called for a strike and massive demonstration in the center of Belgrade on October 5 unless the regime recognized Koštunica's victory. More than half a million people from Belgrade and surrounding municipalities gathered in front of the government buildings. The Čačak mayor and Belgrade mayor

¹²⁴ "Zoran Djindjic: Pragmatic of Machiavellian?" Institute for Building War and Peace (iwpr/beta). The Serbian Opposition: 1-10.

¹²⁵ Damjan de Krnjovic-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution.

¹²⁶ Damjan de Krnjovic-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution."; U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

both arrived on bulldozers. The demonstrators stormed the buildings despite the teargas from police.¹²⁷ By early evening the opposition controlled everything of importance and Koštunica finalized negotiations with Milošević.

The DOS was a broad coalition of 18 anti-Milošević parties and was short lived. However, it showed determination and cooperation in 2000 and forced Milošević to step down from Yugoslav President on October 5. Koštunica was joined by Zoran Đinđić as Prime Minister of Serbia and Koštunica brought an end to international isolation by gaining membership of the UN, OSCE, IMF, Council of Europe, and other organizations. Sanctions from the US and EU were lifted and secured financial aid from international agencies and governments.

This election is seen by many as the turning point for Serbia and Yugoslavia. The election led to the defeat of illiberal political forces and a victory for liberal opposition.¹²⁸ According to Freedom House, Yugoslavia went from being not free to partly free after the 2000 elections.

However, this election was not the end of all Serbia's problems. Turf wars and gangs took at least 30 lives in 2000, including three paramilitary warlords and one Defense Minister.¹²⁹ These secret gangs have become more dangerous in the past decade when sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia. Of the people who were killed included Vladan (Clubs) Kovacevic, the best friend of First Son Marko Milošević, shot and killed 1997; Zoran (Rifle Butt) Todorovic, head of First Lady Mirjana Marković's Yugoslav Left Party, killed 1997; Zeljko (Arkan) Raznatovic,

¹²⁷ Damjan de Krnjovic-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution."

¹²⁸ Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 No. 4 October 2006: 5-18.

¹²⁹ Rob Nordland. "'The Sopranos' of Serbia." *Newsweek*. October 9, 2000. Received 1/20/11.

notorious war criminal, killed January 2000; Bosko Perosevic, a top official of Milošević's own Socialist Party, killed April 2000; Zivorad (Zika) Petrovic, Yugoslav Airlines president and one of Slobo's childhood friends, killed April 2000.¹³⁰

Finally, on April 1, 2001 Milošević was arrested and charged with misuse of state funds and abuse of office.¹³¹ By getting rid of Milošević, Serbia showed its determination to reintegrate with the international community.¹³²

Strains in the DOS rose especially on the topic of where Milošević should be tried in court. Koštunica believed that Milošević should be brought to trial in Belgrade before domestic courts to bring back legitimacy and trust to the judiciary system. He supported cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but wanted to limit this cooperation. Đinđić on the other hand believed Milošević should not serve his sentence in Serbia even if he was tried in the country. They should let the Hague take him; they are strong and Serbia is weak and therefore must agree to the Hague's terms if Serbia is to survive and prosper.¹³³ Another issue that the elites disagreed on is what to do with the future of the Yugoslav Federation. Koštunica and Đinđić both agreed that comprehensive reevaluation is needed for the constitutional relationship between Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Vojvodina, but did not agree with what the reevaluation would hold.

Yugoslavia held their first democratic elections in 2000. However, Serbia was not an independent country and must therefore continue progressing to be considered its own democracy.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹³² Sanja Pesek and Dragana Nikolajevic. "Nations in Transit 2010: Serbia." Received 1/20/11.

¹³³ Damjan de Krnjivic-Miskovic. "Serbia's Prudent Revolution."

Democratic Growth (2001-2010)

In June 2001, Đinđić overruled the Constitutional Court in Belgrade and authorized to send Milošević to the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. Political tension opened up because Koštunica still did not agree with Đinđić's decision. Two months later, Koštunica's DSS pulled out of the Serbian government as the split with Đinđić deepened.¹³⁴ In November and February a new assembly of the province and a new president were elected, respectively.

Milošević was tried in the Hague on charges of genocide and war crimes in February 2002. In March, heads of federal and republican governments signed the Belgrade Agreement setting forth the parameters for a redefinition of Montenegro's relationship with Serbia.¹³⁵ The same month, Serbian authorities issued arrest warrants for Serbian President Milan Milutinović and three other top Milošević aides, including former Interior Minister Vojislav Koštunica. In the spring of 2002, the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) announced its plan to send back ethnic Serbs internally displaced persons to Serbia.

By the middle of 2002, Koštunica and Đinđić were openly at odds. Koštunica's party had withdrawn from all DOS decision-making bodies and was trying to get early elections to the Serbian Parliament in an effort to force Đinđić out of office. Political stalemate continued until the end of 2002 and reform initiatives stalled. In June, all 45 deputies belonging to the DSS walked out of Serbian Parliament in continuing rift with Đinđić.¹³⁶ As the year continued, two rounds of

¹³⁴ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹³⁵ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹³⁶ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

voting for the republic presidency failed because of insufficient voter turnout, since Serbian law requires at least 50 percent participation of registered voters.¹³⁷

Đinđić was openly cooperating with the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and began arresting people indicted for war crimes who sought refuge in the country.¹³⁸ In January 2003, Milan Milutinović, the former Serbian President from 1997 to 2002, surrendered to the Hague tribunal where he pleaded not guilty to charges of crimes against humanity.¹³⁹

Serbian and Montenegro decided to create a looser connection between the two states and formed the Union of Serbia and Montenegro in January 2003. One month later, the Yugoslav parliament approved the Constitutional Charter for the Union. The new charter devolved most federal functions and authorities to the republic level. The office of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, held by Koštunica, ceased to exist once Svetozar Marović was elected President of Serbia and Montenegro. The charter intended to stabilize the region and also stated that in three years the two republics could hold referendums to decide whether or not to keep the Union.¹⁴⁰

On March 12, 2003, the Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić was assassinated in Belgrade because of his anti-crime measures. The newly formed union government acted swiftly and called a state of emergency. They cracked down on organized crime leading to the arrest of more than 4,000 people. The assassination of Đinđić

¹³⁷ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹³⁸ Ibid

¹³⁹ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹⁴⁰ BBC News. "Serbia country profile." Last modified 4 November 2010. Received 20 January 2011

showed dangerous divides within and between Serbia's ruling political and security elites.¹⁴¹

Zoran Živković, Vice President of Đinđić's DS party, was elected Prime Minister in 2003 but government scandals led to an early election to replace him.¹⁴² The November presidential elections for the Republic of Serbia were invalid because of lack of voter turnout.¹⁴³ The inconclusive parliamentary elections in December marked the start of prolonged coalition talks because it was unacceptable to not get enough voters for every election. Serbia had been in a state of political crisis since the overthrow of Milošević. The reformers had been unable to gain control of the Serbian presidency because three successive presidential elections had failed to produce the fifty percent required turnout. Đinđić's assassination was yet another major setback.

The parliamentary elections held on December 28 resulted in the pro-reform coalition of four parties winning 49.8 percent of the vote and 146 parliamentary seats. The coalition included the Democratic Party of Serbia led by Koštunica, the Democratic Party, the G17 Plus group of liberal economics led by Miroljub Labus, and the Serbian Renewal Movement/New Serbia (SPO-NS). They also had support from the Socialist Party of Serbia. Koštunica, the former Yugoslavian President, was named Prime Minister.¹⁴⁴

In March 2004 war crime trials open in Belgrade and six Serbs appeared in court charged with killing two hundred civilians in the Croatian town of Vukovar in

¹⁴¹ Sanja Pesek and Dragana Nikolajevic. "Nations in Transit 2010: Serbia."

¹⁴² U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹⁴³ Ibid

¹⁴⁴ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

1991.¹⁴⁵ In June, the Democratic Party leader Boris Tadić was elected Serbian president. He defeated nationalist Tomislav Nikolić and Tadić pledged that he will steer Serbia towards joining the European Union.¹⁴⁶ Tadić's election improved Serbia's political and international prospects and was the first presidential election for several years that was considered legitimate. Also, the election law was changed so a valid election could have less than fifty percent turnout rate.¹⁴⁷

Starting in February 2005, Montenegro suggested that the Union of Serbia and Montenegro end early.¹⁴⁸ Koštunica rejected this idea and continued supporting the three-year wait period before referendums are called. During the year, eight former secret police officers were jailed for murder of Serbia's former president Ivan Stambolić in 2000, who was president from 1985-1987.¹⁴⁹ After several months, Koštunica agreed to begin to discuss a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. However, this agreement was called off because Serbia failed to arrest several war crimes suspects.¹⁵⁰

In 2006 several important events occurred. First, Milošević was found dead in his cell in the Hague. Secondly, on May 21, Montenegro voted for full independence in their referendum with 55.4 percent supporting the initiative.¹⁵¹ On June 3, Montenegro declared independence through a peaceful separation. Two days later, Serbia declared independence. This was the first time Serbia had been an

¹⁴⁵ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹⁴⁸ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ BBC News. "Serbia country profile."

¹⁵¹ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

independent state under its own name since 1918. Serbia kept the Serbia and Montenegro Union's memberships in all international organizations and bodies.

A referendum was held in October about a proposed draft of the new constitution of Serbia. The majority of the electorate, approximately 3.4 million people, voted to accept the country's first new constitution since the days of Milošević. Also, the constitution declared that Kosovo was an integral part of the country. Kosovo's Albanian majority boycotted the ballots, but, "in a rare share of unity, all the main political parties had backed the draft constitution."¹⁵² However, since barely more than fifty percent of the Serbian electorate took part in this constitutional referendum, it showed that there is still indifference, disillusionment, and elite division, which persistently troubled political life. Nonetheless, this was a significant turning point in modern Serbian history.

In the January 2007 elections, Boris Tadić's party doubled its representation in parliament and confirmed the pro-reform and pro-European stance of parliament. This was the first parliamentary election since the break up of the union with Montenegro. The ultra-nationalist Radical Party did receive some support on the ballots but still did not win enough seats to form a government.¹⁵³ This showed that Serbia could handle being a democracy on its own without Yugoslavia or Montenegro. In the May 2007 elections, the government formed a coalition with the DS, DSS, and G17 Plus. Koštunica was chosen to continue as Prime Minister.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Nick Hawton. "Rare Unity Over Serb Constitution." BBC News, Belgrade. October 30, 2006. Received 19 January 2011.

¹⁵³ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

Also in May, twelve people, including commanders of a special police unit, were found guilty of Đinđić's murder.¹⁵⁵

At the beginning of 2008, there was a run-off presidential election in which Tadić defeated Radical Party candidate Nikolić and was re-elected President of Serbia. Only a few days later, there was a unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence resulting in weeks of crisis. The United States officially recognized Kosovo's independence the next day, followed by seventy-nine other nations. Serbia, however, continued to reject Kosovo's independence.¹⁵⁶ The governing coalition collapsed in the wake of Kosovo's independence in March. Prime Minister Koštunica of the DSS demanded the DS, which held governmental majority, to restructure the government contract including the annex according to which Serbia can continue European integration exclusively with Kosovo as its integral part. The DS and G17+ parties refused. Koštunica was forced to resign on March 8, 2008 and he asked Tadić to call early parliamentary elections.

The pre-term parliamentary elections were held on May 11, 2008. The Democratic Party coalition, with the message "for a European Serbia", won 39 percent of the vote and 102 seats in Parliament. The coalition included the DS, G17+, SPO, LSV, and SDP parties. They were also allies with the SPS-led block, the Hungarian coalition, and the Bosniak List for European Sandzak. The Radical Party (SRS) had 29.1 percent of votes, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 11.3 percent, Socialist Party (SPS) 7.9 percent, and the Liberal Democratic Party, Hungarian Party, Bosniak List for European Sandzak Coalition, and Albanian Coalition each came

¹⁵⁵ BBC News. "Timeline: Serbia." Last modified 4 November 2010.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

under 6 percent. This election was the first time since 2000 that a single party, in this case the DS, controlled the presidency, the premiership, and a working majority in parliament.¹⁵⁷ Both the presidential and parliamentary elections were deemed fair and free.

In July 2008, Mirko Cvetković was sworn in as the new Prime Minister and led the coalition government bringing together the pro-EU Democratic Party and the nationalist Socialist Party. Also in July, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was arrested in Belgrade by Serbian security forces. However, Serbia would not be able to join the EU until two war crimes suspects are captured, including the former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić. In September, Radical Party deputy president and two-time presidential candidate Tomislav Nikolić split from the SRS and formed the Forward Serbia caucus, or Serbian Progressive Party (SNS).¹⁵⁸

The government in 2009 passed many important laws including a statute that defined and expanded Vojvodina's autonomy, legislation to improve conditions for NGO's, and to improve relations with the US and EU.¹⁵⁹ Other improvements were in civil society, local governance, and national democratic governance. Parliament passed the Antidiscrimination Law, the Law on Associations, the Law on Transfer of Jurisdiction from National Municipal government, and the Law on Financing of Political Organizations.¹⁶⁰ In December, SNS won a victory over the DS in a Belgrade municipality showing the party's consolidation.

¹⁵⁷ Freedom House. "Map of Freedom in the World: Serbia (2010)." Received 17 January 2011.

¹⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Serbia."

¹⁵⁹ Freedom House. "Map of Freedom in the World: Serbia (2010)."

¹⁶⁰ Sanja Pesek and Dragana Nikolajevic. "Nations in Transit 2010: Serbia."

By looking at Freedom House's studies, Serbia's electoral framework is still weak and behind European standards; its electoral process is a 3.25 out of 7. However, in 2010 it lowered both its political rights and civil rights levels to a 2.¹⁶¹ Serbia has been considered an electoral democracy since its independence in 2006 and has been working towards consolidating its democracy ever since. Presently, NGO's, human rights defenders, and citizens have more favorable conditions to work in since the Law on Association and the Antidiscrimination laws were passed.¹⁶² Trade unions are still marginalized but the workers' movement is gaining momentum in its demands for decentralization and the fight against corruption. Kosovo still presents a potential region of instability for Serbia and other Balkan states.

Conclusion

The democratic transition time period of Serbia is under dispute, specifically concerning when it started its transition and when it officially became a democracy. It is widely accepted that Serbia is undeniably an electoral democracy in 2010 by states and well-known non-governmental organizations worldwide, like Freedom House. However, when did it begin its transition? When did it have its first free democratic election? How did elites and social movements play a role in this transition?

Transition Period

As defined by Francisco Gonzalez and Desmond King, a democracy is a government that has free and fair participation and contestation, and a wide protection

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

of civil rights.¹⁶³ A country can be labeled a democracy without possessing high levels of political participation, personal autonomy, or other democratic characteristics. Freedom House labels some countries as only “partly free”, as opposed to “free”, while still calling them democracies, for example Yugoslavia was labeled partly free and an electoral democracy in 2002.¹⁶⁴ During the phase of consolidation, a country can progress to be more free and get a better rating on the protection of political rights and civil liberties. The consolidation of a democracy is the process of adaptation of democratic structures and norms.¹⁶⁵

As I previously mentioned, it is accepted that Serbia is a democracy now and that it is working to consolidate its practices. However, when did Serbia officially become a democracy? By working backwards, the democratic transition time period will be determined by first finding when it became a democracy and then when the transition started.

A democratic transition period is from the breakdown of the dictatorship to its first democratic national election. The first democratic national election that was held in Serbia was actually when Serbia was still part of Yugoslavia in 2000. When the Yugoslav Presidency was up for reelection, Koštunica ended up winning the majority of votes ousting Milošević from power. Even though Milošević first refused to accept this result, after mass demonstrations and the storming of government buildings, he renounced his title. Newspapers and NGO’s all over the globe were

¹⁶³ Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King, “The State and Democratization: The United States in Comparative Perspective” (*B.J. Pol.S* 34, 2004), 193, 195, 201.

¹⁶⁴ Freedom House. “Country ratings and status, FIW 1973-2010.”

¹⁶⁵ John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

congratulating Serbia on its impressive performance of the popular support pushing the country to a democracy.¹⁶⁶ However, Serbia was still a member of Yugoslavia, and the election was not for Serbian representatives. Therefore, it can be argued that Yugoslavia became a democracy in 2000, but Serbia did not.

In 2006, when Serbia became an independent country after both Montenegro and Serbia seceded from the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia had its first presidential and parliamentary elections. Even though Serbia technically had democratic elections previous to this date, it was not an independent country and therefore could not be considered a democracy. Therefore, Serbia became a democracy in 2006 after it gained its independence.

The next question is when did the transition begin? According to definition, the beginning of a transition is at the breakdown of dictatorship. For Yugoslavia, Milošević lost power and Yugoslavia had their first democratic election at the same election. Also, it is apparent from the chronology that there had been vital elite negotiations and social movements moving the country towards democracy before the dictator was removed. The beginning of the transition could be argued to be when the first major social movement occurred showing discontent with the present ruler in 1992 at the University of Belgrade. It could also be argued to begin with the first major elite negotiations in 1996 with the formation of the “Together Coalition.” Furthermore, the transition could simply be between the 2000 election day and when Milošević was officially ousted as President of Yugoslavia. However, this last

¹⁶⁶ Doug Bandow. “Democracy came to Yugoslavia despite, not because of, U.S. police.” CATO Institute. November 8, 2000. Received 20 January 2011; Ivo H. Daalder. “He’s Gone: The End of the Milošević Era.” October 15, 2000. Received 20 January 2011.

possibility is difficult to argue because this took place in one month, and it actually reverses the definition order of a transition, having the election take place first and the removal of the dictator afterwards. I believe that the beginning and end of Yugoslavia's transition is the 2000 election. The numerous events that could be signified as the beginning and end of Yugoslavia's transition are displayed in the table below.

Year	Part of Transition	Event
1992	Beginning	The large student protest "Enough" at the University of Belgrade that lasted several weeks. Faculty, local businesses, and other citizens joined the protest and supported it in other ways by providing food and electronic equipment. This is the first major social movement against the dictator Milošević.
1996	Beginning	The beginning of the Prudent Revolution by the formation of the Zajedno "Together" Coalition. This was the first major elite negotiation under Milošević that proved to be partly successful by winning the 1996 municipal elections. It showed that the opposition political elites understood that they must work together to overthrow Milošević.
2000	Beginning	The 2000 election ousted Milošević from the Yugoslav Presidency. When Milošević didn't recognize Koštunica's win, there was a massive protest that forced Milošević to resign.
2000	End	The 2000 election were the first democratic national election for Yugoslavian President. Koštunica won the election as representative of the DOS coalition.

In Serbia's case, the beginning of the transition could be argued to be one of the above choices for Yugoslavia, especially when Milošević was overthrown. Another option for the beginning of the transition is when Milošević was arrested in 2001 demonstrating the true end to any interference from their past dictator. Until he was arrested, he could still have reentered politics or caused further social damage in

Serbia hindering its democratic efforts. I would argue that the beginning of the transition is when Milošević was actually overthrown in 2000 because even though he could have politically acted until his arrest a year later, he did not. The overthrow of Milošević truly signified the turning point for Serbia and Yugoslavia alike. From this point forward, Serbia's transition will be described as from the fall of Milošević in 2000 to 2006 when Serbia gained independence. The events of Serbia's democratic transition are described in the table below.

Year	Part of Transition	Event
2000	Beginning	The 2000 election ousted Milošević from the Yugoslav Presidency. When Milošević didn't recognize Koštunica's win, there was a massive protest that forced Milošević to resign. The dictator was overthrown.
2001	Beginning	April 1, 2001 Milošević was arrested and charged with misuse of state funds and abuse of office. By getting rid of Milošević, Serbia showed its determination to reintegrate with the international community. Milošević can no longer make any impact on Serbian politics.
2006	End	Serbia and Montenegro split and became their own independent countries. Serbia had its first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections.

Other people may argue that Serbia has not been able to become a democracy yet and is still in transition. It is very difficult in this scenario to tell if Serbia is transitioning or consolidating. However, it very widely accepted that Serbia is a democracy and is in its democratic consolidation phase currently.

One author argues that post-communist countries as a group had interesting democratic transitions because of their specific and similar histories of communism. Most, if not all, or post-communist countries had electoral revolutions. Also, since the military was not politicized, electoral outcomes determined political outcomes.

For example, when liberal opposition won an election, democratization directly followed. The elections during the communist period actually helped the population develop a clear distinction in the public mind between “us” and “them”. The population in post-communist countries were also very well educated having up to 10 years of schooling, unlike in Sub-Saharan Africa where the average is three years, leading to more support in opposition groups. Also, international donors like the US and EU focused on post-communist countries with helpful investments in civil society, opposition groups, and the media to enable a faster transition.¹⁶⁷

Now that the transition has been determined and analyzed, the theoretical question of the role that elites and masses play will now be discussed in the context of Serbia’s democratic transition. It is important to clarify that Serbia’s transition, not Yugoslavia’s, will be discussed in relation to the role of elites and social movements. However, since Serbia was a part of Yugoslavia and the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, many of its historical events are intertwined with Yugoslavia’s.

Elites

The political elites played a significant role in the democratic transition of Serbia in the early twenty-first century. The opposition elites, including Drašković, Đinđić, and Koštunica began negotiating many years before the transition started. They formed many coalitions, some lasting, others falling short of making an impact like the Zajedno coalition in 1996. However, the opposition began to strengthen over the next few years. Đinđić and Koštunica led the Prudent Revolution and Drašković

¹⁶⁷ Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik. “Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions.” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17 No. 4 October 2006: 14

supported the opposition campaign as well. In 2000 the DOS led a coalition of eighteen parties to the polls for Yugoslavian presidency. Koštunica and Đinđić were working side-by-side, despite their many disagreements, to overthrow Milošević. After Milošević's defeat on October 5, 2000, Koštunica became Yugoslav's president and Đinđić became the Prime Minister of Serbia. However, these two leading men began to disagree more and more over the next few months. By 2002, they were openly at odds and trying to force each other out of their respective offices. For many elections after the overthrow of Milošević, the population had difficulty bringing enough people to the polls. However, after Đinđić was assassinated, Koštunica was able to work openly with the Democratic Party, the G17+ party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, and the Socialist Party of Serbia. Serbia progressed further once Tadić was elected president in a fair, valid, and democratic election. Serbia was well on its way to becoming its present independent democracy after 2006.

However, do these actions fit into the clean-cut categories proscribed by Higley and Burton? Higley and Burton argue that first elites must become consensual through either elite settlement or general elite convergence, to have a chance at successful democratization. In order for a group to be considered consensual elites, they must make an effort to agree on the rules of the political game while still holding different ideas and values. Once Milošević was taken out of power and into custody, it was possible for political rules to be agreed upon universally by the other elites. However, the agreement was only between pro-reform elites. People were too angry towards Milošević and his party to consider allowing them into the new government for several years, but eventually the SPS did become an ally to the ruling democratic

coalition. Therefore, the elites in Serbia did become a consensual elite since they openly disagreed with each other about issues like where Milošević should have his trial, but they acted under democratic rules.

The next question is whether they became consensual through an elite settlement or a general elite convergence? There was not a single document or event that brought all elites together. First, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia worked together through Đinđić and Koštunica. Then more and more parties joined their coalition to form the 18-party Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition for the 2000 elections. Once this coalition died due to growing arguments between Đinđić and Koštunica, new coalitions had to form resulting in the newest group including G17+, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and others. It appears that since the 2000 elections, the elites have been working under democratic rules, despite personal disagreements. Therefore, Serbia might best fit under the title of general elite convergence since the opposition parties demonstrated their ability to work together first at the 2000 election and the Socialist and Nationalist parties joined later after several presidential and parliamentary elections because it was clear that they would no longer gain sole power. It is difficult to assign Serbia to a specific category, however, because it is unclear exactly how Serbia's elites began to negotiate and resulted in a democracy. The events are all recent making it more difficult to gather all the relevant information at hand.

Masses

In opposition to Higley and Burton's belief that elites are the only drivers in national outcomes, Serbia's history has demonstrated that the masses have a major influence as well. As described by Doug Bandow, "democracy has come to Yugoslavia through the efforts of the Serb populace, not those of Western policymakers. The next American president should recognize the obvious limits of U.S. influence."¹⁶⁸ The Serb peoples came out on several occasions to voice their frustration and anger towards Milošević in rallies and demonstrations. Finally culminating in the hundreds of thousands of citizens gathering in Belgrade in 2000 and forcing Milošević to resign by storming the government buildings on foot and bulldozer. Progress must be made by the native populations, not by international force or influence.

Similar to South Africa though, the social movements were the most massive and influential when the dictator was still in power, before the official democratic transition began. The social movements demonstrated that the people were not happy and that the government must focus on the citizens desires in order to gain public support. Especially in post-communist states, the people felt a strong connection to other opposition supporters; there was a mutual feeling of "us" against "them". Once the dictator was overthrown, they did not feel that they must show their support or discontent through mass protests on the streets. Instead, they took to the polls. Đinđić saw voting, not street demonstrations, as the best way to unseat Milošević and therefore believed that the main goal should be to go to the polls united and defeat the

¹⁶⁸ Doug Bandow. "Democracy came to Yugoslavia despite, not because of, U.S. police." CATO Institute. 8 November 2000. Received 20 January 2011.

ruling coalition.¹⁶⁹ This attitude continued after Milošević's resignation, making coalitions very important in Serbia in the new millennium. For many elections after the overthrow of Milošević, the population had difficulty bringing enough people to the polls; this is also a form of political action because the people did not support someone enough to compel them to vote. Serbs take politics seriously and will vote or act based on their personal values and motivations.

In Serbia it is made clear that both elite negotiations and social movements play an integral part in democratization. However, social movements were mostly used during the dictatorship to show the attitudes of the masses, and through voting once democratic principles were adopted. The movements led the country to the democratic path and enforced the beginning of the transition. It was then up to the elites to make sure the country stayed on the democratic path and worked toward EU membership and better relations with the US.

¹⁶⁹ Institute for Building War and Peace (iwpr/beta). "Zoran Djindjic: Pragmatic of Machiavellian?" The Serbian Opposition: 1-10.

Chapter 4

Democratization of Haiti

Introduction

Haiti has struggled to be independent and democratic since its colonization by the French in 1697. First, Haiti gained its independence in 1804 but has since been governed by dictators and had foreign involvement negatively impacting Haiti's transition to democracy. Many argue that Haiti has never become a democracy and is still working towards that goal presently. Others believe that after dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier was ousted in 1986 the democratic transition began. The military took control over the government until, by popular demand, a democratic election took place in 1990. Unfortunately, the elites were not consolidated and international actors had alternative plans for Haiti, so the democracy failed to consolidate under Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Haiti's second democratic transition began when Aristide was overthrown in 2004 and ended when René Préval was democratically elected in 2006.

As a case study in this thesis, Haiti provides an interesting example for democratic transitions. In the past twenty years, Haiti has had two transitions, one that is still being consolidated presently. This allows me to have two modern case studies to research within one country. Also, since Haiti failed in its first democratic consolidation, I am able to examine what factors of the transition helped or hindered its democratic experiment and what Haiti can do during its second democratic attempt to make it successful.

In this chapter, I will cover Haiti's history from its colonization in 1697 to its present situation in 2011, focusing on the Duvalier and Aristide regimes and the democratic transitions that occurred in their wakes. Even though Haiti's democracies are being, and have been, tested during its consolidation phase, I focus on the actual

transition phase and what allowed it to succeed or fail as time passed. By looking at social movements that erupted by the people and negotiations between the Haitian elites, it can be investigated whether one or the other had a more prominent impact on the success of Haiti's democratic transitions.

Haiti follows the Most Different Systems Design with Similar Outcomes with South Africa and Serbia. The qualifications for the model in this analysis is that each case study has a different history, culture, economy, and social aspects but still is successful in their transition experience. Therefore, since Haiti has a very different background than the other two case studies, involving colonization, a poor economy, lack elite populations, and extremely active foreign involvement, it fits the MDD system. Also, Haiti has had successful democratic transitions twice in the last twenty years, even though it failed to maintain it in the 1990s and is still working to consolidate its most recent democratic government from 2006. Haiti fits the design used in the thesis very well and provides more than one transition to study making it a more useful case study to determine the positive and negative effects that elite negotiations and social movements have on the success of a democratic transition.

History of Haiti

Haitian Colonization, Independence, and Dictatorship (1697-1957)

By starting with the colonization of Haiti in 1697, the international and domestic relationships with France and French-speaking Haitians can be clarified. In 1697, the Treaty of Rustic divided the island of Hispaniola between the French and Spanish. The French got the western third and named it Saint Domingue. French

colonists arrived, established plantations, and Saint Domingue became the richest French colony in the new world because of their sugar, coffee, and indigo exports. Slaves were brought from Africa and they were treated brutally; one-third of newly imported Africans died within a few years.

Slavery and agricultural dominance continued in Saint Domingue for a century. In 1791 there was a turn of events when a slave revolution, led by Toussaint Louverture, exploded in the northern plains and spread to the rest of the colony. A year later, the French government tried to reestablish control by beginning to build an alliance with free blacks in search for additional civil rights. In 1793, slavery was abolished in Saint Domingue. A few years later in 1801, Toussaint Louverture, the former slave made guerrilla leader, conquered Haiti and proclaimed himself governor-general of an autonomous government over all Hispaniola. He helped Saint Domingue achieve peace and drove out the Spaniards and English. However, the French were not happy with Louverture's action and imprisoned him. After his imprisonment, slavery was reestablished by the French in Saint Domingue. In 1802, the French led by Napoleon's brother-in-law Charles Leclerc attempted to conquer the colony's interior but failed.

Finally, in 1804, Saint Domingue became independent. Jean-Jacques Dessalines defeated the French at the Battle of Vertieres for emancipation and independence and declared himself emperor. The nation was called Ayiti, or Haiti, and was the only nation to be born from a slave revolt. However, independence did not come without a heavy price; Haiti had to pay France for its own independence hurting its economy drastically for years to come.

However, independence did not mean peace and calm for Haiti. Dessalines was assassinated in 1806 and Haiti was divided into a black-controlled north and a mulatto-ruled south.¹⁷⁰ In 1818, President Jean-Pierre Boyer reunified the two parts of Haiti and ruled until 1843 when he was ousted after losing elite support.

Time passes and in 1915, the United States invaded Haiti in response to black-mulatto friction. The disturbance began in March when General Vilbrun Guillaume Sam took the oath of office. On July 27, he executed 167 political prisoners. Popular outrage provoked mob violence in the streets of Port-au-Prince and angry citizens found Guillaume Sam at the French Embassy, tore him to pieces, and paraded his body around the city. This disturbed the US and spurred them to swift action.¹⁷¹ The US thought that this uneasiness endangered its property and investments in the country. The US occupied Haiti on July 28 and within six weeks US representatives controlled Haitian customs houses and administrative institutions. Admiral William Caperton declared martial law in 1915 that lasted until 1929. This is one of the United States' first involvements with Haiti based on US objectives.

During its military rule, the US dismantled the constitutional system and reinstituted virtual slavery to build infrastructure, including road and bridge building, disease control, school establishment, and a communications system.¹⁷² Approximately 3,000 Haitians were killed during this period of infrastructure building. From 1915 to 1934 the US military controlled most of the Haitian government. United States representatives had veto power over all governmental

¹⁷⁰ BBC News. "Haiti Country Profile." BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

¹⁷¹ Global Security. "Occupation of Haiti (1915-34)." Global Security, [online], published on 6 May 2005, accessed 11 February 2011.

¹⁷² Ibid.

decisions and the marine corps commanders served as administrators in the provinces. Haitians only had control over local institutions. Having the US military occupy Haiti led to protests and several episodes in which Haitians were killed by US army soldiers or marines.

Occupation had several effects on Haiti, both positive and negative. Constructively, occupation greatly improved infrastructure and public health in the country. Negatively, violence erupted and society dwindled. In 1918 there was a rebellion of up to 40,000 citizens and 2,000 Haitians died.¹⁷³ Order was imposed by white, racist foreigners, and the marines established Jim Crow standards. Whites did not recognize mulatto elites as superior to blacks, which is how society had been set up for decades. Also, this intolerance led to racial pride and further segregation between the blacks, whites, and mulattos.

When the US marines left, they left Haiti in control of the military Garde d'Haiti, therefore still maintaining fiscal control until 1947. These national guards ran the country by violence and terror after the US left. In 1941 Elie Lescot became president but was ousted by a coup in 1950 when he tried to change the constitution to allow his reelection. General Paul Magloire led the coup and ruled until 1956 when he himself was forced out by general strike and another military coup. Voodoo physician François Duvalier, later known as Papa Doc, seized power in the military coup with US support and legitimated his power in an election a year later.

¹⁷³ OnWar.com. "Haitian Rebellion Against US Occupation 1918." Wars of the World, [online]. Published 16 December 2000, accessed 22 February 2011.

Duvalier's Reign (1957-1984)

The presidential elections held in 1957 reconfirmed François Duvalier's power in Haiti. The elections were difficult to organize but the military junta finally took responsibility to regulate them. Elections were set for September 22 and in the ten months before the election many presidential candidates came forward, including François Duvalier, Louis Dejoie, and Daniel Fignolé. Duvalier was the former minister of health and labor and had massive support among the blacks. He was a strong believer in the rights of the Haitian black majority and his goal was to advance black interests in the public sector. Their campaigns were bitterly fought and by the time of the election there were only two effective candidates left, Duvalier and Dejoie.¹⁷⁴ Duvalier's campaign speeches stressed the need for economic equality and for improved conditions of the exploited masses. Duvalier also guaranteed freedom and protection to trade unions.¹⁷⁵

The election resulted in Duvalier receiving 697,884 votes, Dejoie had 266,992 votes, and Jumelle had 9,980 votes. All senate seats went to supporters of Duvalier because Dejoie was unable to get a majority vote in any department.¹⁷⁶ On October 22 Duvalier was inaugurated as Haitian President.

Duvalier worked towards a 'new equilibrium' in the country. There was a major shift in power from the established, predominantly mulatto elite to a new black middle class, who was to act in the interests of the mass of peasants and workers from

¹⁷⁴ David Nicholls. *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979: 208

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 210.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 209.

which its members had emerged.¹⁷⁷ However, Duvalier did not necessarily have the interests of Haiti in mind despite his campaign promises and goals. First, in 1964 Duvalier declared himself president-for life and established a dictatorship with the help of his newly formed Tonton Macoutes militia. The Tonton Macoutes was an organ of repression and was also a means of recruiting support throughout the country.¹⁷⁸ Duvalier turned them into his personal paramilitary force that functioned to counterbalance the regular armed forces and whose members infiltrated and spied upon the military. By infiltrating the armed forces and purging officer corps, Duvalier minimized the Haitian military capacity for autonomous action during his rule and ensured he would not be overthrown by a coup.¹⁷⁹

After forming his personal militia, he worked towards securing his power by eliminating any opposition and restricting army officers, Roman Catholic hierarchy, the US embassy, and trade union leadership. First, he concentrated seven years of his term on eliminating potential opposition. His electoral competition from the 1957 election was eliminated; Dejoie was forced into exile and the Jumelle brothers went into hiding.¹⁸⁰ Other opponents were powerful members of the business community in Port-au-Prince. However, Duvalier made strikes ineffective because of the ruthless action by the Macoutes in forcing open the doors of closed businesses, thus leaving them to be looted.¹⁸¹ In addition, by creating a support network of the black rural middle class, he restricted growth of moderate opposition because it is usually the

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. 212.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. 215.

¹⁷⁹ Richard Snyder. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 4. July 1992: 381

¹⁸⁰ David Nicholls. *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*: 215.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. 217.

middle class that would support such opposition. He gained their support by penetrating civil society and using his personal paramilitary organization.¹⁸²

To further stabilize his regime, he restricted army officers and eliminated church involvement. He believed the church was a center of opposition to his regime and therefore had a constant feud with the Roman Catholic hierarchy from 1959-1966.¹⁸³ Also, Papa Doc worked to restrict the US embassy and other foreign involvement. Foreign aid was cut off to Haiti making his actions independent of foreign pressures for political reform.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, the US was not opposed to Duvalier because he appeared to be willing to cooperate with American interests in the country and to support US police in the international field.¹⁸⁵

Lastly, to ensure there could be no mass opposition, Duvalier restricted trade union leadership. Union participation was low anyway, but grew less appealing over the years. In November 1960, the Union Intersyndicale d'Haiti (UIH) joined in support of a student strike and protested against the arrest of student leaders, but with little effect. Many leading unionists were arrested, others went into exile. The UIH and the Federation Haitienne des Syndicats Chrétiens (FHSC) continued to exist as independent bodies and a number of successful strikes were organized by their constituent unions. However, in December 1963, the UIH was dissolved by the government and its leaders were arrested. A few weeks later, the FHSC was also

¹⁸² Richard Snyder. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." 388

¹⁸³ David Nicholls. *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*: 217.

¹⁸⁴ Richard Snyder. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships."

¹⁸⁵ David Nicholls. *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti*: 219.

dissolved. After this time, only unions who supported the government were allowed.¹⁸⁶

Since Duvalier worked so hard to consolidate his power, there were no opportunities for the masses during his rule to protest or show discontent. However, unlike some people believe, Duvalier was not a fascist or totalitarian. He did not impose upon the country a total ideology and did not dominate the whole life of the average citizen. However, it was by no doubt that his rule was ruthless and dictatorial.¹⁸⁷ Duvalier had iron rule during his presidential term. He gave the mass of peasants the sense that they were important citizens by calling peasants from remote villages to see and talk to him in the palace. He remained in power for so long because of his “ruthless suppression of opposition groups... his shrewd knowledge of the mentality and customs of the Haitian peasants, and his recognition of the key role played by the middle class...”¹⁸⁸ There was little to no opposition to his regime among the masses. The only opposition that remained was the light-skinned elite, but they were prepared to compromise after they became convinced they could not overthrow the government.¹⁸⁹

When François Duvalier died in 1971, Jean-Claude Duvalier took over from his father at nineteen years old. François had named him his successor as president-for-life and the transition was smooth and successful.¹⁹⁰ Almost immediately, Jean-Claude, or commonly known as Baby Doc, began unraveling all the hard work his father accomplished to secure their power. After marrying into a mulatto family, he

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 218.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. 213.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. 237.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. 237.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. 239.

excluded the black elites from his patronage circle and favored the mulatto commercial elites.¹⁹¹ The black elites had originally been the core of the regime's support during his father's regime. The middle class patronage network from Papa Doc unraveled making it difficult for Baby Doc to penetrate and control society.

However, the opposition did not come from the newly excluded black elite. All of their leaders had been killed or exiled so they lacked the necessary leadership and organization.¹⁹² There were no viable revolutionary or moderate opposition organizations in existence that could take advantage of the government's weaknesses and create a broad coalition against Baby Doc.

Another result of shifting his support to the mulatto elite was that Duvalier had to increase his dependence on foreign aid allowing the US to have more influence over Haitian activities. Once a country is dependent on aid from other countries, there are many more positions and opinions that must be taken into consideration before actions can be made. Baby Doc experienced this international influence and it was what ultimately threw him out of power several years down the road.

As stated before, the opposition did not come from the black elites, but rather the military. The weakness of civilian groups cleared the way for military's seizure of power in 1986. A group of army officers disliked Baby Doc from the beginning of his rule. Chief-of-staff Henri Namphy began a military opposition by recruiting support in the ranks of former officers dismissed by Duvalier. Segments of armed forces regained capacity to act autonomously against the present dictator when they

¹⁹¹ Richard Snyder. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." p 390

¹⁹² Ibid. 390.

couldn't against Papa Doc.¹⁹³ The US helped military conspirators by promising concessions to those who helped get rid of Duvalier. General Namphy then used these US concessions to persuade Macoutes leadership to abandon Duvalier.¹⁹⁴

Jean-Claude Duvalier, himself, brought about the destruction of the dictatorship his father worked so hard to instill. He not only alienated the black elite and increased dependence on US aid, he also loosened his grip on the military. The Roman Catholic Church gained more power during the economic crisis and led many popular uprisings between 1984-1986. Duvalier couldn't contain the unrest because of his lack of control over society. Furthermore, the US used its leverage to push Duvalier out of office and helped the military gain control. The US had been secretly negotiating with the military and on January 29, 1986 the US announced withholding \$26 million of aid to protest Duvalier's brutal response to the popular protests over the past two years.¹⁹⁵

1st Transition (1986-1990)

The first successful democratic transition in Haiti was from 1986 to 1990. On February 6, 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier was ousted after protests and was exiled to France. He was taken from Haiti on a US Air Force C-141 and the US was able to find and support an acceptable replacement for Duvalier, Lieutenant-General Henri Namphy. Unlike the peaceful transition from father to son rule in 1971, this was a violent transition of neopatrimonial rule to military rule. During Baby Doc's term, there was an increase in military autonomy and withdrawal of elite support for

¹⁹³ Ibid. 390.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

Duvalier enabling the military to use this autonomy to turn against Duvalier and fill the political gap.¹⁹⁶ Without moderate and revolutionary political organizations or the Macoutes, the military was able to seize state power unchallenged. The US helped solidify the armed force's control by sending arms and aid.¹⁹⁷

After Duvalier, a series of military coups reshuffled the government several times before the 1990 elections. Not only were military coups prevalent, many massacres also occurred during this transition phase. From July 1 to 3 in 1987, army soldiers killed twenty-two workers on strike in the harbor of Port-au-Prince. The strikers were part of a broader movement for democracy.¹⁹⁸ Also, the three hour long St. Jean Bosco massacre took place at one of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's parishes. These massacres showed that the Haitian people were still greatly oppressed, despite getting rid of Duvalier, but were unable to successfully rise up against those in power. Social movements and protests were not used very widely and were brutally suppressed by the armed forces.

In March 1987 a new constitution was created and received overwhelming support by Haiti's population. This constitution was formed because of international pressure and was therefore structured like the French constitution. It recognized a president to be elected for five years, an elected parliament composed of a 27-member senate and an 83-member house of representatives, and a presidential appointed prime minister.¹⁹⁹ General elections were planned for November 1987 but

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. 387.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Jean-Philippe Belleau, "Massacres perpetrated in the 20th Century in Haiti." Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, [online], published on 2 April 2008, accessed 10 February 2011.

¹⁹⁹ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2002)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

were aborted after dozens of inhabitants were shot in the capital by soldiers and Tonton Macoutes members and scores of people were massacred around the country. In a second attempt, elections were held but were fraudulent and military-controlled. They were boycotted by opposition candidates and the elected President Leslie Manigat was overthrown only a few months later in the June 1988 Haitian coup d'état when he sought to assert his constitutional control over the military. Brigadier-General Prosper Avril, who had led the coup, installed a civilian government under military control and led the regime until March 1990. In 1990, the civilian and military elite facing considering foreign pressure and anxious to end the country's isolation in a growing democratic world, finally decided to tolerate fair elections.²⁰⁰

Aristide's First Term with Military Interruption (1990-1995)

On December 16, 1990, more than three million peasants and workers came out to vote for Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former populist priest.²⁰¹ International observers regulated many polling booths to discourage violence or fraud. Even though the vote counting was chaotic, the results were clearly in favor of Aristide. He won more than 2/3 of the vote and his closest opponent polled less than thirteen percent.²⁰² The day after the election, exultant voters flooded the streets dancing. Abroad, Aristide's election was seen as a major step forward for a country that had

²⁰⁰ Pamela Constable. "Haiti's Shattered Hopes." *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 1. January 1992: 42

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

never known democracy. His popularity and legitimacy were undeniable and foreign democracies had no choice but to welcome him.²⁰³

Before Aristide even was inaugurated, he had to deal with coup attempts. In January 1991, former Tonton Macoutes leader Roger Lafontant seized the interim President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot and declared himself President. After Lafontant attempted to declare martial law and large numbers of Aristide's supporters filled the streets in protest, the army crushed the incipient coup.

On February 7, Aristide began his five-year term of office. Immediately, Aristide began working on substantial reforms, which brought passionate opposition from Haiti's business, military, and political elite. First, he turned over his monthly salary to the government, disdained traditional politics, and attempted to run the country based on popular, participatory support from the poor. He filled the 6.4 million poor citizens with a fire for justice and freedom.²⁰⁴ However, Aristide's ideas were threatening to the privileged way of life that other parts of society had long enjoyed.²⁰⁵

Secondly, Aristide worked to cleanse the nation of the corrupt, oppressive remnants of the Duvalier era through the moral movement called Lavalas. Targets included former members of the Tonton Macoutes, other Duvalier supporters, and the smuggling rackets operated by the army.²⁰⁶ Government agencies were purged of suspected Macoutes and administrative positions were filled with Lavalas

²⁰³ Ibid. 42-43.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 43.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

militants.²⁰⁷ He was also determined to force the exploitative rich to change their ways.

Third, Aristide chose his friend René Préval as Prime Minister, which deteriorated the president's relationship with political elites. Aristide passed over prominent rivals when filling the premiership and other posts. Marc Bazin from the National Agriculture for Democracy and Progress party and Louis Dejoie from the National Agriculture Industrial Party, who won second and third places respectively in the election, were not appointed as prime minister or any other political role. Not only did Aristide not use opposition leaders in his new government, he also didn't use legislators from his own electoral coalition. The National Front for Change and Democracy party began to distrust Aristide and Aristide's relations with parliament became tense. In the end, Aristide chose his close friend René Préval to be prime minister. Opponents soon accused the two of conspiring to control the legislature.²⁰⁸

Aristide ruffled other feathers as well. At first, Aristide was on good terms with the military, but then numerous officers were demoted and replaced and plans were made for a new civilian police force. This brought resentment and fear among the security forces and rumors began of a military coup.²⁰⁹ Also, by raising minimum wage in Haiti, Aristide made tensions grow with the US who wanted to keep wages low for consumer purposes in the US.²¹⁰ The United States felt that a democracy in Haiti was a threat and the US planned to undermine its democracy and independence.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 44.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. 45.

²¹⁰ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film. 2005. DVD F1928.23.A75A75 2005

Aristide brought in formal elements of democracy, like parties, institutions, and the separation of powers, but did not get rid of core politics of Duvalierism or legacies of slavery that cultivated hatred and mistrust. In the end, opposition grew too strong and on September 30, 1991 Aristide was overthrown in a coup d'état led by Army General Raoul Cédras. On October 1, Raoul Cédras installed the military, or “de-facto”, regime.²¹¹ The Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the coup and the United Nations set up a trade embargo. However, George Bush Sr. announced that the US would violate the embargo by exempting US firms.

A campaign of terror against Aristide’s supporters was started by the brutal Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and Emmanuel Constant, a CIA asset.²¹² Army soldiers, former Macoutes, and groups of armed men chased and killed members and alleged members of the pro-democracy movement. More than 1,000 poor blacks were murdered in the following weeks.²¹³ Within a few days, the national legislature declared Aristide’s office vacant and named a new president and prime minister, restoring real power to the army officers and wealthy mulatto families that had previously controlled the country under Baby Doc.²¹⁴

After a few years, foreign powers began supporting Aristide again and conspired on how to return him to power because he appeared to be a better option for stability in Haiti than the present situation. Also, the majority of Haitians wanted

²¹¹ Jean-Philippe Belleau, “Massacres perpetrated in the 20th Century in Haiti.” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence.

²¹² Noam Chomsky. “Made in America A Century of US Intervention and Subversion Culminates in Haiti’s Latest Coup.” Index on Censorship 2. 2004.

²¹³ Jean-Philippe Belleau, “Massacres perpetrated in the 20th Century in Haiti.” Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence.

²¹⁴ Pamela Constable. “Haiti’s Shattered Hopes.” 41.

Aristide back because he provided them with jobs and sent their children to school.²¹⁵

In 1993, the UN imposed sanctions after the military regime rejected an accord facilitating Aristide's return. Then a year later, an American team, under the direction of the Clinton administration, successfully negotiated the departure of Haiti's military leaders and the peaceful entry of US forces under Operation Uphold Democracy. This paved the way to restore Aristide as president. Clinton came up with conditions Aristide must adopt if he returned, including the adoption of program proposed by Marc Bazin, the defeated US candidate in the 1990 elections.²¹⁶ In October, Aristide returned to Haiti to complete his term of office protected by US and UN forces.²¹⁷

One of the first things Aristide and his Lavalas party did in office was to disband the Haitian army and establish a civilian police force to take over internal security functions. This police force, the Haitian National Police (PNH) was trained by the US Justice Department but was a disappointment over the years because of increased corruption in its ranks.²¹⁸ This shift in armed forces was made before the June 1995 parliamentary elections. International observers questioned the legitimacy of the June elections and Aristide's supporters fell out among themselves. The Lavalas movement remained firmly behind him, but Aristide's previous supporters from the 1990 election, including the FNCD, claimed fraud and boycotted the runoff elections. In the end, Lavalas still won an overwhelming parliamentary majority.²¹⁹

²¹⁵ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film, 2005.

²¹⁶ Noam Chomsky. "Made in America A Century of US Intervention and Subversion Culminates in Haiti's Latest Coup."

²¹⁷ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2002)."

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Préval in Power (1995-2000)

In December 1995, presidential elections were held. René Préval, who was Aristide's prime minister in 1991, was nominated as Lavalas's presidential candidate. With Aristide backing him, Préval won 88 percent of the popular vote, despite FNCD and other major opposition parties boycotting the election.²²⁰ Aristide peacefully handed over power to Préval who took office on February 7, 1996. The UN had slowly replaced US troops with UN representatives over the past months but the UN had planned to withdraw all of its troops by the end of the month. However, the PNH clearly lacked the competence to fill the void, therefore, at Préval's urging the UN extended its stay with a decreased number of troops.²²¹

By September 1996, Préval continued with Aristide's original goal of dismissing all military and security forces. The two Lavalas party leaders believed that abolishing the army was necessary because the military did not support democratic attempts and encouraged military coups. Préval had purged much of his security force because they had been involved in the murders a month earlier of two politicians from the right wing Mobilization for National Development party.²²² However, by not having an army or police force, security problems grew rampantly in the country.

Politics in 1997 became deadlocked, lasting until 1999. It began when the April senatorial elections had irregularities and were not immediately solved. In June, the current Prime Minister Rosny Smarth resigned because of growing criticism of the government's economic policies. The ongoing election dispute originated from

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Ibid.

April meant that parliament would not approve of the new prime minister to replace Smarth.²²³ In addition, Aristide announced an alliance with other congressional groups to oppose Préval's economic reform plans.²²⁴ The political deadlock led to dramatic political violence across Haiti. There was the murder of an opposition senator, rising corruption, and the frequent indiscipline of new police force members. The police force had been created from scratch in Haiti where there had been tenuous civic traditions and where the sustainability of post-Cédras administration of justice reform was doubtful. In 1999, Préval declared that parliament's term has expired and he began ruling by decree following a series of disagreements with deputies. Hurricane Georges made social matters worse when 80 percent of the crops were destroyed making hunger rise in Haiti.²²⁵

The new millennium brought more parliamentary and presidential elections to Haiti. The parliamentary elections were held in May and Aristide's party won 26 of the 27 Senate seats. Eight of these seats were disputed however because of electoral fraud. These seats did not get majority vote so there should have been a run-off election, but since Aristide claimed they had received enough votes to bypass a run-off election, it was declared that he "stole" the seats. Aristide lost his credibility during these elections because of his manipulation attempts. The 2000 parliamentary elections were used against Aristide in the subsequent presidential elections. However, this allegation was not enough to persuade people against Aristide and boycott the elections. Aristide won the presidential elections with an overwhelming

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

92 percent of the vote. The US, Canada, and European Union refused to send observers to the sham November elections, which may have had a negative effect on the outcome.²²⁶

Aristide's Second Term (2000-2004)

Despite Aristide's overwhelming support by the masses, opposition parties worked to create an alternative government before Aristide was sworn in on February 7, 2001, but were unsuccessful.²²⁷ Aristide had a dissolving country on his hands when he was inaugurated as president. First, the infrastructure was not seen as legitimate in Haiti. The judicial system was corrupt and dysfunctional, especially in rural areas. There was also a large case backlog, an outdated legal code, and poor facilities. Without a prominent police force and army to maintain control, mob violence and armed gangs became security threats in urban areas. Increased drug trade and local narcotics consumption was believed to contribute to violence.²²⁸ Also, legal rights were not enforced. Unions were too weak to engage in collective bargaining and organization was difficult because the unemployment rate was so high.²²⁹ The masses still supported Aristide because he represented hope for the poor people of Haiti; but would Aristide be able to deliver to his people over the next five years?

Starting in early 2001, hostility grew rampantly. Gérard Gourgue led more than 1,000 members of Haiti's disbanded military in a march through downtown Port-

²²⁶ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2002)."

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

au-Prince, demanding the reestablishment of the army and Aristide's resignation.²³⁰

In July, men in army fatigues killed four police officers when they stormed a police academy and police station demanding loyalty to the nonexistent army.²³¹ The attackers then fled to three more towns in a central province and killed two more policemen. The small but growing demand that the army be reconstituted reflected the collective insecurity felt by Haitians and popular anger of the PNH's ineffectiveness.²³²

Also in 2001, the parliamentary elections were deemed fraudulent, especially because several elected national legislators were in the pay of the Colombian drug cartels. In response to the fraudulent elections, a 15-party opposition alliance, called the Democratic Convergence was formed and named Gérard Gourgue as their symbolic provisional president.²³³ The Democratic Convergence was angry because the lack of government services and the collapsing economy, and therefore kept pressure on Aristide to resign.²³⁴ This is the largest opposition coalition created in Haiti against their political leader. However, the arrests of prominent opposition figures and attacks on their followers hurt efforts to bring the warring political factions into agreement.²³⁵

Despite the formation of an opposition coalition, Haitians did not feel that their discontent was being heard. In November 2001, a general strike by the political opposition shut down Haiti's second largest city, Cap Haitien, and reflected unrest

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ BBC News. "Haiti Country Profile." BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²³² Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2002)."

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

throughout the country.²³⁶ A month later, armed gunmen tried to storm the presidential palace only to be repelled by police and palace guards. At least thirteen people were killed.²³⁷ In support of Aristide, Brignol Lindor, the new director of Radio Eco 2000, was stoned and hacked to death in December by a pro-Aristide mob.²³⁸

Faced with increasing crime, Aristide disregarded mob rule.²³⁹ Instead, Aristide declared that people caught committing crimes did not need to go to court to be judged, they were just declared guilty. This “zero-tolerance for criminals” legislation led to increased lynching and torturous crimes, but street crime dropped by 60 percent.²⁴⁰ At the end of 2002, Freedom House described Haiti as not free and was rated as a 6 out of 7 for political rights and civil liberties.²⁴¹ One major reason for these ratings was that the country had become a dictatorship with monopolized power and the opposition Democratic Convergence refused to cooperate with Aristide’s efforts to create a coalition that would satisfy the reservations of the US and OAS. Also, Haiti’s people were among the poorest in the Western Hemisphere at this time.

In the next year, a UN force was sent to help stabilize Haiti. The UN authorized a dispatch of 6,700 soldiers and 1,600 police.²⁴² On September 22, Amiot Métayer, leader of the Gonaïves Resistance Front, was found murdered. Métayer had

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Freedom House. “Freedom in the World –Haiti (2003).” Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁴² BBC News. “Haiti Country Profile.” BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

long supported Aristide but many of his followers now accused the government for being involved in his murder.²⁴³ Again, Aristide lost crucial support. Despite the efforts of the UN, Freedom House did not change its ratings for Haiti's political rights and civil liberties from the previous year.²⁴⁴ Political violence increased dramatically as Aristide's supporters battled opponents on a regular basis in the streets of Port-au-Prince. Opposition groups continued to insist on the Aristide's resignation and the 2004 parliamentary elections did not look promising.

In the first two months of 2004, celebrations marking 200 years of Haitian independence are marred by violent uprisings against Aristide. Rebels seized towns and cities and dozens of people were killed. On February 5, the Gonaïves Resistance Front, led by Wynter Etienne, seized control of Haiti's fourth largest city and burned a police station, freed prisoners, killed four people, and wounded twenty in clashes with the police.²⁴⁵ The Gonaïves Resistance Front, previously called the Cannibal Army, used to be allied with Aristide but turned on him when their leader Métayer was murdered.²⁴⁶ Other opposition leaders have also demanded Aristide's resignation and accused the government of incompetence and corruption.²⁴⁷ Aristide refused to step down before his term ended in 2006 and defended his government saying that it was making progress.²⁴⁸ Five days after the Gonaïves Resistance Front revolt, government forces regained control of three of the twelve towns taken over by army

²⁴³ The Associated Press. "Rebels Take Over Haiti's Fourth-Largest City." New York Times. February 6, 2004.

²⁴⁴ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2004)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁴⁵ The Associated Press. "Rebels Take Over Haiti's Fourth-Largest City."

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

uprisings.²⁴⁹ In Cap-Haitien, Aristide loyalists roamed the streets beating and shooting people they believed to be opposed to the president. Civic opposition groups in Port-au-Prince led marches calling for Aristide's resignation, but distanced themselves from the uprisings and condemned the violence. This bloody rebellion and pressure from the US and France forced Aristide out of power on February 29. Aristide claimed that he was kidnapped from Haiti on a U.S. plane because he was not told where he was going and was coerced into leaving his country. However, U.S. representatives disagree with Aristide's statement of kidnapping despite the truth of U.S. transportation from Haiti.²⁵⁰

Brief Analysis of the First Transition

It can be argued that Haiti did not become a true democracy during this first transition because it was recovering from a neopatrimonial dictatorship, and it is more common for democracies to transition from a party based authoritarian rule. However, according to Richard Snyder, "democratization can occur in countries ruled by neopatrimonial dictatorships after an intervening period of a more institutionalized authoritarian rule like military dictatorship in Haiti."²⁵¹ Haiti took an indirect transition to democracy but still reached the same destination as other countries. Also, this transition had several of the typical characteristics of a transition, such as a definitive starting point when the dictator was overthrown, and an ending point of the first democratic elections. Even though I am using the overthrow of Duvalier as the

²⁴⁹ Lydia Polgreen. "Haitian Forces Battling Uprising Report Retaking 3 Towns." New York Times. February 11, 2004.

²⁵⁰ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film. 2005.

²⁵¹ Richard Snyder. "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships." 395

starting point, others may argue that the start of the transition must not begin until the overthrow of the military rule. However, in response, I would argue that there was no true overthrow of the government, but similar to South Africa there was a time period when someone, or in this case the military, in power decided a democratic election was necessary to move the country forward.

As it was briefly discussed in the introduction, Haiti failed to consolidate this democratic transition in the oncoming years when Aristide took power. However, in hindsight, this outcome could have been predicted because of Haiti's economic situation, its lack of stateness, and its high level of foreign involvement. Each of these reversal indications in Haiti's democratic process will be briefly explained before continuing on with the second democratic transition.

Economy

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that there is a specific GDP marker that a country must pass to ensure a successful democratic transition. Even though a democracy can be initiated at any level of development, the richer the country the greater its chances for survival. Also, if a country succeeds in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations.²⁵² Through extensive research, Przeworski and Limongi pinpointed the threshold of democracy at \$4,115 per capita income.

Haiti's economy had been suffering for many years when it attempted its first democratic transition and has often been labeled as the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere. It can be argued that ever since Haiti was forced to pay 90 million gold

²⁵² Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49.2 (1997) 155-183.

francs to France for their independence in 1825, Haiti has been financially unsound. In 2004 Aristide tried to convince France to give Haiti reparations for this unnecessary money transfer two centuries ago.²⁵³ The GDP in Haiti in 1990 was \$380 per capita and about 85 percent of the population lived in absolute poverty.²⁵⁴ Also, the unemployment rate has been between 50-70 percent during Aristide's rule. Therefore, even though Haiti was able to transition to a democracy in 1990 through democratic elections, it was unable to sustain this democracy because it was unable to generate enough development.

Stateness

State building is the process of building up institutions of coercion and coordination, such as the function of bureaucracies, the identification of citizenship, and the building up of legitimacy. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, a democracy is impossible until the stateness problem is resolved.²⁵⁵ For Serbia and other Baltic States, stateness was concentrated on citizenship and formation of concrete borders. However, in Haiti the main concern is the legitimacy and proper functioning, or lack thereof, of infrastructure and bureaucracies.

Once in power, Aristide focused on securing his own political power through extralegal means instead of concentrating on legal institutionalization. This had many negative effects on the progress of democratic consolidation as can be seen in the

²⁵³ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film. 2005.

²⁵⁴ CIA World Factbook. "Haiti Economy – 1990." 1990 CIA World Factbook, [online], published on 7 February 2003, accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁵⁵ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

Freedom House analysis of Haiti in 2004.²⁵⁶ First, the rule of law was extremely low. There was no guarantee of security and justice by the police and judiciary. The criminal justice system lacked training, and judges were often corrupt and incompetent. Furthermore, the appointment of Calixte Delatour in October 2002 as justice minister, who had a notorious Duvalierist past with paramilitary connections, strained the credibility of Aristide's commitment to equal justice. The legal institutions did not protect Haitian citizens resulting in low legitimacy.

Another freedom that was not protected was the freedom of association. Even though it was legally protected, opposition groups were physically suppressed. Aristide partisans and the national police violently suppressed demonstrations. Among those demonstrations that were violently defeated were those organized since late 2002 by the Civil Society Group coalition of 184 opposition NGO's. Demonstrators were arrested and detained without trial. Opposition rallies were also suppressed by the Company for Intervention and Maintaining Order (CIMO), a US special force. The *chimères* regularly attacked and tortured protestors in mass demonstrations especially on university campuses. Also, the poor economy prevented few, if any, labor actions. Only 3-5 percent of the Haitian labor force was organized in trade unions.

Furthermore, Haiti had no checks to ensure that police forces respected citizens' physical and psychological integrity. There was no system of redress for rights violations and with Aristide's 'zero-tolerance' policy the police ran rampant with brutal murders.

²⁵⁶ Freedom House. "Countries at a Crossroads – Haiti (2004)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

In order to improve the stateness of Haiti, it was recommended by Freedom House that domestic election observers be well trained and organized. Also, political parties need to be encouraged, strong political parties are needed to transcend the influence of single individuals, and funds must come from a variety of people other than the individual leader. Lastly, the government must not interfere with media.²⁵⁷ Haiti became a democracy when it got rid of its dictator, but since it was a failed state and the situation only grew worse under Aristide, it was unable to consolidate.

Foreign Involvement

Another indication for reversal was the overwhelming amount of foreign involvement in Haiti. The United States gave millions of dollars in aid to Haiti every year, which should have helped Haiti get back on its feet. However, the reason the US provided so much aid was because it had a large interest in Haiti. The US imported a lot of goods manufactured in Haitian sweatshops; therefore when Aristide wanted to raise the minimum wage, the US became wary. Also, the US did not want a popular democracy in Haiti because it would limit its own power in the country. Since the US was financially invested in the country in other ways, the US had a strong impact on Haitian rulers. If a Haitian leader did not agree with the United States' economic conditions, the US could threaten to dispose of the leader unless they cooperate with US interests, which is what happened to Aristide.

The first time Aristide was elected, he did not have time to better the economy and infrastructure of Haiti before he was exiled by the US nine months after he was inaugurated. Aristide was the only democratically elected president to be forced into

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

exile by a sovereign state.²⁵⁸ Since Haiti was unable to consolidate its democracy due to poor economy, lack of state qualities, and overwhelming foreign involvement, it made a second attempt once Aristide was driven from power again in 2004.

2nd Transition (2004-2006)

Once Aristide was forced out of power in 2004, an interim government took over under Boniface Alexandre. In June the first UN peacekeepers arrived to take over security duties from the US-led force and to help flood survivors from the May flood that killed 2,600 people.²⁵⁹ September saw another flood following tropical storm Jeanne killing nearly 3,000. Further unrest grew when levels of deadly political and gang violence rose in the capital. Armed gangs loyal to former president Aristide are said to be responsible for many killings. International donors pledged more than \$1 billion in aid, but this could not end all the instability in Haiti. According to Freedom House, Haiti was labeled not free in 2004 and decreased in its political rights ranking to 7, the lowest possible.²⁶⁰ The political rights level declined because the lack of democratically derived sovereign authority resulting from ousting Aristide, the imposition of an ineffective interim government, and the deployment of an international security force. Its civil liberties ranking stayed the same at 6 because press freedom improved dramatically after the fall of Aristide despite other issues that worsened.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film. 2005.

²⁵⁹ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁶⁰ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2005)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁶¹ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

The year 2005 saw further unrest. In April, prominent rebel leader Ravix Remissainthe was killed by police in the capital and hurricane Dennis killed at least 45 people in July. Freedom House levels of political rights and civil liberties remained the same as the previous year.²⁶² Violence grew as the interim government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and an ineffective UN peacekeeping force struggled to move Haiti towards its first democratic election in more than five years. More than thirty candidates sought the presidency in elections to be held in February of the next year. Aristide was still a popular figure among the population but his party was accused of violence. René Préval, frontrunner and former president, benefited from an upsurge of political support from the poor.²⁶³

On February 7, 2006 René Préval and leader of the Front For Hope party was elected President, despite uncertain elections and popular demonstrations. Initially the elections were not seen as complete and run-off elections were proposed. However, Préval's supporters took to the streets rejecting these initial results. Préval said that fraud was being used to deny him a first-round victory. Préval won 51 percent of the vote and was declared victor after officials agreed to discount thousands of blank ballot papers.²⁶⁴ Préval promised to tackle social inequalities and to create jobs, and even before his inauguration he visited potential donor countries in pursuit of aid. Parliamentary elections were also successful this year and a democratically elected government, headed by Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis, took office.

²⁶² Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2006)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was still in Haiti, having been there since the 2004 Haiti Rebellion. Democratic rule was restored in 2006, but bitter divisions persisted. The economy was still in ruins, unemployment was chronic, international aid was seen as key to recovery, and there was a huge wealth gap between impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the French-speaking minority.²⁶⁵ Everyone in Haiti and the world were wondering whether Préval would be able to consolidate this newly formed democracy, unlike his predecessor and friend Aristide several years before. According to Freedom House, Haiti improved its democratic ratings in 2006.²⁶⁶ It was now considered partly free and increased its political rights rating to 4 and civil liberties rating to 5. Haiti received better ratings because of the elections held for the first time in over five years, beginning the process of establishing a democratic government. However, street violence persisted despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force and additional international donor pledges of \$750 million in aid.²⁶⁷

Haiti in the present day (2006-2011)

Briefly, the current situation of Haiti will be discussed since the end of the transition in 2006 to provide a background on Haiti's present situation. The end of 2006 saw the launching of an UN-run scheme to disarm gang members in return for grants and job training. Also, the US partially lifted its arms embargo, imposed in 1991.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2007)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

In January 2007, UN troops launched a tough new offensive against armed gangs in Cité Soleil, one of the capital's largest and most violent shantytowns.²⁶⁸ Unfortunately, tropical storm Noel triggered mudslides and floods.²⁶⁹ Préval's government made some progress in improving security, combating police corruption, and stabilizing the economy, however his relations with parliament grew tense.²⁷⁰ Préval also pleaded for continued international involvement and the UN agreed to extend its peacekeeping mission until October 2008.²⁷¹ Freedom House did not change its political rights and civil liberties rankings for Haiti in 2007, but it did award an upward trend arrow because of improved political stability and greater security in urban areas.²⁷²

Food riots began in April 2008 and in response the government announced emergency plans to cut the price of rice. Also, that same month, parliament dismissed Prime Minister Alexis. The next month the US and World Bank announced extra food aid totaling \$30 million. In response to President Préval's plea for more police to help combat the wave of kidnappings-for-ransom, Brazil agreed to boost its peacekeeping force.²⁷³ In the early fall, three hurricanes and a tropical storm killed 800 people and Michele Pierre-Louis succeeded Jacques-Édouard Alexis as

²⁶⁸ BBC News. "Haiti Country Profile." BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁶⁹ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁷⁰ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2008)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ BBC News. "Haiti Country Profile." BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

prime minister.²⁷⁴ Freedom House did not change its democratic ratings from the previous year because the parliament had forced Prime Minister Alexis out of office, then rejected Préval's two initial nominees to replace him until Michele Pierre-Louis was approved.²⁷⁵

In May 2009, former president Bill Clinton appointed a UN special envoy to Haiti. Also, in July the World Bank and International Monetary Fund canceled \$1.2 billion of Haiti's debt, 80 percent of the total, after judging it to have fulfilled economic reform and poverty reduction conditions. A few months later, Pierre-Louis was dismissed as Prime Minister because she was accused of failing to make sufficient progress in setting Haiti on a path of economic recovery. Also, Haiti's senate voted to dissolve Pierre-Louis' cabinet amid a power struggle that threatened to undermine efforts to attract foreign investment to the country. In October, Jean-Max Bellerive was appointed Prime Minister by President Préval after Pierre-Louis was dismissed. Bellerive is trained as an economist and has experience in public administration. He was an official in the administration of Aristide and was the minister of planning and external cooperation under Pierre-Louis.²⁷⁶ Since there were turbulent politics in 2009 and there was a vote of no confidence by parliament to force Pierre-Louis from prime minister, Freedom House did not change its democratic rankings from 2008.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁷⁵ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2009)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

²⁷⁶ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁷⁷ Freedom House. "Freedom in the World –Haiti (2010)." Freedom House, [online], accessed 10 February 2011.

The year 2010 was strenuous for Haiti, making it very difficult to consolidate its democracy. First of all, a large earthquake hit Port-au-Prince in January killing tens of thousands of people. There was also a cholera outbreak killing more than 2,500 people.²⁷⁸ The presidential and parliamentary elections that were due to be held in February were postponed until November because of the extreme social upheaval from the earthquake.²⁷⁹ In March, international donors pledge \$5.3 billion for post-quake reconstruction but popular anger grew over the slow pace of reconstruction six months after the earthquake.²⁸⁰ The November elections were inconclusive and a second round was postponed until 2011 because of a disagreement over which names should appear on the ballot.²⁸¹ Recently, in 2011, former president Jean-Claude Duvalier returned from exile, and faces corruption and human rights abuse charges.

Conclusion

Haiti has had a very tumultuous history beginning with its colonization in the late 1600s. Controversy grew under the Duvalier leadership in the mid 1900s and only became worse as the country tried to transition to a democracy under Aristide. Haiti has tried twice in the past two decades to become a democracy, but has been unsuccessful thus far during consolidation. By looking at both transitions, and the

²⁷⁸ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ BBC News. "Haiti Country Profile." BBC News, [online] published 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

²⁸¹ BBC News. "Timeline: Haiti." BBC News, [online], published on 3 February 2011, accessed 13 February 2011.

elite negotiations and social movements involved, it will be determined which precondition has the most impact on a successful democracy.

The First Attempt

The first democratic transition was from 1984-1990, beginning with the overthrow of Jean-Claude Duvalier by the military, and ending with the democratic elections in 1990 with Aristide's win. The elites and any negotiations they took part in will be discussed first. As previously explained, the Duvaliers got rid of all opposition leaders through killing or exile. Therefore there was no leadership or organization among the revolutionary and moderate opposition. This opened the doors to military rule directly after Duvalier. Even by the time of the election in 1990, there was not enough elite leadership to provide alternative options. There was military coup after military coup during the transition and only when the civilian and military elite faced foreign pressure, did it decide to tolerate democratic elections. Through my research, I could not find a document or formal agreement that led to the agreement of democratic rules or the elections. Also, there was not a strong coalition for the elections. Aristide had support from his own party, Lavalas, and the National Front for Change and Democracy, but this coalition soon disintegrated when Aristide did not reward his supporters with governmental positions.

According to John Higley and Michael Burton, a political elite consists of thousands of people who hold top positions in powerful organizations and movements who participate in or directly influence national political decision-making. This includes top business, government, military leaders, party, union, media, and religious

leaders, among others.²⁸² Since only the military elite had any substantial input in the outcome of the country, it was not a strong government decision because it did not have the support of all elites.

Higley and Burton describe four types of elites. One type is a consensual elite, which is needed to become a successful democracy. It can be argued that Haiti, going into the 1990 democratic election, did not have a consensual elite and in fact had a divided or disunified elite. A disunified elite is described as having violence and distrust across factions resulting in low interpersonal relations or cooperation. Members don't agree to appropriate political conduct, also called the 'rules of the game'. Many elites fear that they will lose everything if the other party wins and resort to extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests, including methods of killing and imprisonment. Since there are strong barriers between factions and few elite groups to represent the people, weak integration and narrow differentiation lead the regime to be unstable and unrepresentative. Coups or revolutions happen frequently and democratic processes tend to break down over time. This describes Haiti's political situation in 1990 very well.

It could be argued that in order for a country to become a democracy, it must have a consensual elite. However, this is a false statement. To become a democracy elites can fall under any of the four categories described by Higley and Burton: disunified, ideologic, fragmented, or consensual. However, it is true that in order to consolidate into a sturdy democracy, a consensual elite made through either elite settlements or elite convergence is a precondition. Haiti is an example of a country

²⁸² John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations" (International Review of Sociology, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2001), 181-199.

that did not reach a consensual elite before democratic elections but was aiming towards an elite convergence over several elections to consolidate successfully. Haiti only had military elite representation during the first transition and therefore could not create a full-fledged democracy in 1990. However, by having a democratic election it bides the time for other elites to gain strength and sign on to the government agreement of democracy. However, the elite convergence was never completed for several reasons. One is that as the elites grew more powerful during Aristide's rule, more resentment grew and changes of power were frequent and violent since they had not previously agreed to the democratic rules. Another reason is that Aristide did not follow through with his promises of equality and economic reform. Lastly, the United States' intervention interfered with Haiti's future before any real progress could be made.

The other aspects of transitions that must be discussed are social movements. There were very few social movements or protests during Duvalier's rule or the military's interim government. During 1984-1986 the Roman Catholic Church led several popular uprisings, which Duvalier could not contain because of his lack of control over society. However, in comparison to South Africa and Serbia, there were very few social movements because of the previous dictators' control. Unlike the other two case studies, Haiti did not need strong social movements to oust their dictator because they had a large, foreign, superpower, the United States, to support them in this endeavor. Therefore, foreign bodies took over most of the responsibilities of the masses.

Since the masses were not completely invested in ousting their previous dictator and moving towards a democracy, it can be argued that it hurt Haiti's future. The Haitians were not committed and consensual to a specific goal of democracy and therefore could not demonstrate their needs and desires to the government through social movements or protests. Social movements, as defined by Tarrow, are "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities."²⁸³ During this transition, Haitian's did not have many social movements, which appear to be necessary in order to create a government that is accepted by the entire population, elites included.

The Second Attempt

The second transition was from Aristide's exile in 2004 to the presidential elections in 2006. The bloody Haitian rebellion and US-led power forced Aristide out of power on February 29, 2004. For the next two years the interim government, led by Boniface Alexandre, guided Haiti towards their first democratic elections in many years. Haiti had had democratic elections since 1990, however many of these elections were seen as inconclusive or fraudulent. As the 2006 elections approached Haiti and foreign powers alike were optimistic but unsure of what the outcome would entail.

During Aristide's rule, Haiti's elites could thrive with no military to suppress them. A fifteen-party opposition alliance called the Democratic Convergence formed against Aristide in 2001. The Democratic Convergence was angry because of the

²⁸³ Sidney G. Tarrow. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4.

lack of government services and the collapsing economy, and therefore kept pressure on Aristide to resign.²⁸⁴ This was the largest opposition coalition created in Haiti against their political leader. However, the arrests of prominent opposition figures and attacks on their followers hurt efforts to bring the warring political factions into agreement.²⁸⁵ This coalition showed agreement between warring elites before the 2006 presidential elections.

Once the elections arrived there were more than thirty candidates of different parties seeking the presidency. This was a drastic change in participation from political elites especially with all thirty of them agreeing to the democratic rules and joining the election ballot. Initially, Lavalas refused to participate in the elections unless Aristide was allowed to finish his term in Haiti and political repression and imprisonment of its members stopped.²⁸⁶ However, Lavalas finally agreed to participate in the elections and only won .68 percent of the votes.²⁸⁷ There does not seem to be a formal agreement between the elite groups, but elections were conducted relatively smoothly and without fraud. It is difficult to say whether the Haitian elites went through an elite settlement, elite convergence, or neither, before becoming a consensual elite. However, it does appear that they were a unified elite in agreement over democratic principles and rules before the 2006 elections.

Social movements and protests increased in Haiti during the second transition, compared to the first democratic transition. In November 2001, a general strike by the political opposition shut down Haiti's second largest city, Cap Haitien, and

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ *Aristide and the endless revolution*. A Nicolas Rossier film. 2005.

²⁸⁷ Wikipedia. "Template: Haitian presidential election, 2006." Accessed 19 February 2011.

reflected unrest throughout the country. In addition, protests grew into a revolution in 2004 forcing Aristide out of power, which spurred the beginning of the democratic transition. By the masses demonstrating what kind of government they did not want, it helped the elites and incoming leaders to formulate a new government to satisfy the masses. Unlike the first transition, the Haitian people had responsibility in the overthrow of their dictator and were only aided by the US and France through international pressure for change.

The second transition was very different from the first one, which signifies that this transition may be able to consolidate over the next several years. Natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake played as major setbacks in the consolidation process by making economic development difficult and allowing unrest to grow throughout the country. However, because there were more elites involved in this transition and social movements played a role in the ousting of the previous dictator, there is a good chance that Haiti will become a full-fledged democracy through this transition or the next one if Haiti continues to improve its democratic ratings.

Conclusion

One of my initial hypotheses for this thesis was that the democratic process is more chaotic than theories depict and therefore not one single theory can be applied to all countries. Secondly, I hypothesized that social movements, in addition to elite negotiations, are important in the democratization process. After listing my main conclusions, I will go through each of them in more depth. The five main conclusions that I reached in my thesis are as follows:

- 1) Democratization it is not a linear process and is very difficult to follow because of the various backgrounds and factors that can make it a success or failure.
- 2) Every case study cannot completely fulfill all aspects of a theory. There is more than one theory that can apply to each country.
- 3) Globalization makes democratic transitions very difficult because foreign interests play a part in who and what type of government is installed.
- 4) It is very difficult to get rid of a dictator. The dictator in power must be willing to give up his or her power to work towards a democracy with the opposition.
- 5) In order for a democracy to be successful it needs involvement from both the elite population and the average citizen. The masses need to demonstrate to the elites what is necessary for the future government in order to gain majority support.
- 6) Consensual elites and social movements are both not necessary for a democratic transition, but the democracy will most likely succeed in the long run if they are present. The universalists point of view is supported in this aspect because it is possible to transition and have democratic elections without successfully meeting preconditions first; however, the new democracy will most likely not last without meeting certain preconditions.

My first conclusion is that democratization is not an easy process to follow, especially when looking at complex case studies. Each individual country has a different background, history, economy, culture, and society; therefore it is difficult and nearly impossible to attribute one specific cause to a successful or failed democratic transition. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead argue in their book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* that transitions from an authoritarian regime are not linear and are

extremely uncertain.²⁸⁸ Throughout history, democracies would not form in a straightforward, stage-like progression. This reasoning is made more prominent when looking at the case studies I chose to research; three completely different countries in different parts of the world. Since each country has such a different history and society, each of their experiences is different and therefore do not follow a predetermined route of a successful transition.

My second conclusion deals with two separate issues. First concerns with the difficulty to apply one conclusion to every case study. During my research phase on democratic theories, in most articles and books that I read, academics made it seem that their theories were simple and could be applied to all case studies. However, this could not be done without concept stretching. For example, Higley and Burton argue that in order for a democratic transition to be successful, elites need to become consensual through one of two processes: elite settlement or general elite convergence. They provide detailed accounts of successful and failed transitions, based on whether or not they had a consensual or disunified elite.

When analyzing my own three case studies, Higley and Burton's theory was not easily applicable. The real-life application of theories is difficult and most countries do not fit nicely into a theoretical box. By studying the elitist theories and specific cases of elites in South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, it is clear that it is difficult to put real life situations into clear-cut categories. In all three case studies, there was at least one characteristic of elite actions that could not be considered either an elite settlement or elite convergence. For example, in South Africa, there appeared to be

²⁸⁸ Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

an elite settlement because all of the elite groups were consensual before the first elections, however it took much longer than the designated time Higley and Burton put forth as an appropriate length for an elite settlement to be successful. Therefore, South Africa's elite settlement was successful despite it taking several years instead of several months.

In addition, Figure 2 demonstrates that many different theories can be applied to my case studies but often fails to work for all three. Furthermore, by using the Most Different Systems model, it is impossible to determine the one and only factor that led to a success or failure for democratic transitions. It could be a culmination of several factors that led to each success, such as elite involvement, social movements, high economic levels, or legitimate state institutions.

My third conclusion is that globalization makes democratic transitions difficult. Globalization has positive and negative effects on economies, societies, cultures, and democratic progression. For example, it can have a positive impact on cultures when individuals embrace other cultures more openly, but can also lead to the loss of many traditions. When dealing with globalization's impact on democratic progression, one must take into consideration the influence strong states have on weaker ones. The United States impact on Haiti is a great illustration of this point. Since the US is geographically close to Haiti and has many economic interests in the country, the US purposely destroyed Haiti's efforts to become a democracy in the 1990s. A democratic state in Haiti would not be beneficial for the US therefore it worked with the military and business elites to keep the country from progressing to a representative state. By exiling Aristide and supporting the military coup, the US

played an important role in Haiti's failure to consolidate its democracy. Afghanistan is another country that has been influenced by foreign interests. They have been forced to accept democratic values when it could be argued that its population was not ready. It has been proven over and over that a democracy must be formed from inside the country; outside investors will not progress a country faster or further towards a democracy.

My fourth conclusion deals with how difficult it is to get rid of a dictator. Most theories make it seem that once preconditions are met or when there is universal consent to form a democracy, a democratic transition instantly begins. However, this was not the case in Serbia and, in the very recent case, Egypt. In Serbia, Milošević was determined to remain in power. When he could no longer rule Serbia he became president of Yugoslavia. Student protests at the University of Belgrade, political opposition groups, the Prudent Revolution, demonstrations, and marches went on for years without Milošević giving up power. Finally, at the uprising on October 5, 2000, hundreds of thousands of people stormed the government buildings and physically forced Milošević out of power. Similarly in Egypt, protests went on for weeks without Mubarak showing signs of stepping down. There were tens of thousands of people in the streets of Egypt asking Mubarak to leave the presidency and allow for democratic elections. He was resilient and had support of other dictators in the Middle East and Northern Africa, but finally relinquished his power. Even though the masses and opposition elites might be ready to progress to a democracy, they must first overcome the obstacle of the present dictator or authoritarian leader who is worried for his own life and future power.

My last two conclusions deal with the theories of elitism and the masses. My fifth conclusion is that social movements and the actions of the average citizen are just as important as those of the elites, and that a country needs involvement from both elites and the masses in order for a democracy to be successful. Recently, the masses have been studied in more depth and academics now believe that they have more impact on national decisions than originally perceived. Several academics, including Sydney Tarrow and Nancy Bermeo, have been focusing on how the masses affect national outcomes. When I began brainstorming for my thesis, I kept returning to the Civil Rights and women's movements in the United States in the 1960s and 70s and how they had such a positive impact on moving the country towards a more democratic government by extending suffrage to African Americans and women. The masses were able to rally together and show their discontent with their present leadership and government. They were extremely successful and led a major change in national suffrage and protecting other basic rights. In the end, I did not use the United States as a case study and focused on the actual transition to become a democracy, not the consolidation phase. Through the case studies I did research, the masses proved they were powerful by forcing their dictators out of power and showing the elites what the public wanted in their future government. It is also vitally important that the citizens felt they had a say in the outcome of their country and felt connected to each other as a nation.

In both South Africa and Serbia, there were major protests and social movements during the repressive regime, either the apartheid in South Africa or under Milošević in Serbia. These demonstrated to the present leader and the

opposition elites that change was inevitable and the people were not willing to continue living under the present conditions. Social movements break down the legal, bureaucratic, and ideological barriers allowing the movements to become ways for ordinary people to advance collective claims against powerful opponents. Violence from rebels and the police caused even more discontent and anger towards the regime and resulted in national instability. These social movements and revolts demonstrated that the masses demanded change and they would not rest until their needs were met, which involved the ousting of their present leader and a democratic election.

Haiti is an interesting case because it shows what happens to a country when the masses do not partake in social movements and other mass actions. During the first transition, Haitians were still oppressed by the government and military, therefore social movements and protests were not used very widely and brutally suppressed by the armed forces. Haiti was still able to get rid of Duvalier because of the United States involvement, but foreign involvement can be seen as a disadvantage to Haiti in the long run. The Haitians were not able to show their commitment to democracy, if they were in fact committed, during the first transition so they were unable to gather support for this endeavor. In addition, they did not demonstrate their needs and desires to the government through social movements or protests so the new government that formed did not know exactly what the masses expected from their leaders. The first transition was successful, but the new democracy failed to consolidate.

By the time the second transition began in 2004, Haiti had had more time to grow and develop. Social movements and protests had increased since the first

transition. The masses were in fact the ones who forced Aristide out of power to begin the democratic transition. Since the masses demonstrated their needs and expectations for the government, the elites were able to formulate a government that could satisfy the masses. Social movements are important before the transition to show the present dictators or authoritarian leaders that the people had had enough and were willing to put their lives on the line for a better future. However, the importance of social movements does not end once the oppressive leader is out of power; the masses must continue demonstrating their ideas and beliefs to make sure the new government evolves into what the public wants. Since they have not been democratically represented in the past, they have no way to show their leaders what they require other than by taking to the streets.

In all three of these cases, South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, not only were there peaceful social movements, there was also physical violence leading to political instability and the necessary change in power. Between peaceful movements and violent protests a change of power was necessary and elites had to act in order to keep some power, and democracy was often an inviting option. In addition, all three countries support Nancy Bermeo's argument that extremist mobilization can in fact foster the discussion of democratization, not hinder the process like many academics believe.²⁸⁹ Social movements and riots grew to such an extent in Serbia that government buildings were taken by storm on foot and by bulldozers. Instead of halting the transition, it encouraged the country to move forwards in solidarity

²⁸⁹ Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions." (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No 3. Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow., Apr. 1997), 305.

towards a better future. If the masses were held back and their actions moderated, Serbia might not have begun their transition in 2000.

Social movements are also extremely important because they verify the unification of the people towards a common goal and raise the people's feeling of self-importance in their country. In order for a democracy to be functional, the majority of the population must be involved in voting for their representatives and also play an integral role in local politics. If the people do not rally together before the democratic government is solidified, it will be more likely the government will fail because the people do not realize their own importance in their new government and country. Through the research performed, it is clear that both social movements and elites influence transitions and that the combination enable countries to be successful.

My sixth and final conclusion is that consensual elites and social movements are both not necessary for a democratic transition, but a new democracy will most likely succeed in the long run if they are present. The debate that I focused on in this thesis is whether the elites have all the influence in national decisions such as transitioning to a democracy or if the masses have a large influence as well. Figure 2 illustrates these conclusions.

It is made clear through the case studies I researched that elites are very important in democratic transitions. In South Africa, the two most prominent elite parties led by Nelson Mandela and De Klerk worked together for years to come to an agreement to follow democratic rules and who would have power. In Serbia, the opposition elites to Milošević's presidency began negotiating many years before the

transition started through the formation of coalitions. The elites were considered consensual by the end of the transition period and worked under democratic rules despite personal disagreements.

Both South Africa and Serbia had consensual elites when entering their first democratic elections making it seem that a country needs consensual elites to become a democracy. However, Haiti's democratic experience demonstrates that this is not true, and that a consensual elite is only needed to consolidate, not to have a successful democratic transition. Haiti's first transition did not have many elites negotiating because Duvalier had seen to it that all opposition elites were not a threat to his rule. Therefore, only military elites were present, thus the military coup and reign during the transition phase. Since not many elites were available for initial negotiations, when they began to gain power during Aristide's rule they showed their discontent, which was one factor that resulted in Haiti's failure to consolidate its democracy. By the second transition in the 2000s, the elites were able to gain power and support during Aristide's terms and all thirty parties agreed to the democratic rules and to be part of the election ballot in the 2006 elections. So far, Haiti has still had difficulty consolidating its democracy, but not as much from internal strife from elites as from natural disasters.

In all three of these cases, elites have played an important role in the democratic transitions, but more significantly in the consolidation phase. Elites do not have to be consensual to become a democracy and a democratic election can happen even if the elites are still disunified or not represented at all, like in Haiti. However, it is much more likely that a democracy will be successful in the long term

if the elites become consensual either before the democratic elections through an elite settlement, or over several elections through an elite convergence.

Because I used MDS-SO, it is almost impossible to determine the cause of success in these three countries because it can be attributed to many factors. Therefore, it cannot be concluded if it is elites or social movements that are needed for a successful transition since in the cases of both a successful transition and progressive consolidation, South Africa and Serbia, the countries had both a consensual elites and presence of social movements. However, it can be stated that consensual elites and social movements are not necessary for a democratic transition to be successful, but can predict the success of the consolidation phase. Second, it can be concluded that the presence of elites and social movements come hand in hand with each other; if there is enough freedom in the country to have elite representation there is also enough freedom to allow social movements and mass protests, and vice versa.

Elites and the masses are important, but not necessary to become a democracy. This follows the universalist view that any country can become a democracy through democratic elections if there enough motivation and desire, but in order to sustain the democracy and consolidate, the country must reach certain preconditions such as high economic level, stateness, consensual elites, and involvement of the masses. In the theories discussed, it must be specified whether the preconditions were for countries to transition to a democracy by having democratic elections, or to sustain a democracy over a certain number of years through consolidation. Also, it is important to emphasize Sheri Berman's argument that

young democracies today, including South Africa, Serbia, and Haiti, are weak, ineffectual, illiberal, or violent because it is a painstakingly long process that is not linear.²⁹⁰ It took France 150 years to become a democracy so it is important that we do not discourage countries that do not follow a gradual, liberal path to democracy.

My study has obvious flaws because of my short time-span to do research and the lack of resources available. One important fact to understand is that every one of these case studies is still working to consolidate. Therefore, even though they had successful transitions, measured by having a successful democratic election, they could still fail as a democracy in the future before they fully consolidate. Also, it is undecided when a country has fully consolidated; it may be an ongoing process for all democracies.

One way to advance this study is to look at several countries that have a similar background, for example post-communist Europe countries, that have different outcomes, either successful or failed democratic transitions. Another option for picking case studies are countries that have gone through more than one transition attempts, have strong elite involvement, but lack involvement of the masses. The dependent variable would be the presence of elite negotiations, and the independent variable would be the presence of social movements, for both successful and failed transitions. This way, it could be determined if indeed social movements can be considered a determining factor for successful transitions. However, it could be the case that there are not enough situations with similar backgrounds to enable this study.

²⁹⁰ Sheri Berman, "How Democracies Emerge: Lessons from Europe" (Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 1, Jan 2007), 38.

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Figure 1: Serbian and Yugoslavian Leaders

Date	President	Prime Minister	President of Serbia/Montenegro	
1989	<div>Milosevic - May 8,1989- July 23, 1997 [League of Communists of Yugoslavia, then switches to Socialist Party of Serbia]</div> <ul style="list-style-type: none">The pan-Yugoslav League of Communists of Yugoslavia was dissolved in January 1990 into 6 political parties (one for each republic), in Serbia that was the Socialist Party of SerbiaApril 28, 1992 Yuguslavia dissolved entirely, Serbia and Montenegro entered into a new union	Stank Radmilović December 5, 1989 – January 15, 1991 [Leauge of Communists of Yugoslavia then Socialist Party of Serbia]	Was Yugoslavia	
1990		Dragutin Zelenović – January 15, 1991 – December 23, 1991 [Socialist Party of Serbia]		
1991		Radoman Božović – December 23, 1991 – February 10, 1993 [Socialist Party of Serbia]	Dobrica Ćosić – June 15, 1992 – June 1, 1993 [Independent]	
1992				
1993			Zoran Lilić – June 25, 1993 – June 25, 1997 [Socialist Party of Serbia]	
1994				
1995				
1996				
1997		Dragan Tomic - July 23, 1997 – December 29, 1997 [Socialist Party of Serbia]		Slobadan Milošević – July 23, 1997 – October 7, 2000 [Socialist Party of Serbia] <ul style="list-style-type: none">March 31, 2001 – was arrested
1998		Milan Milutinović - December 29, 1997 – December 29, 2002 [Socialist Party of Serbia]		
1999				
2000				
2001		Milomir Minić – October 24, 2000 – January 25, 2001 [Socialist Party of Serbia] <ul style="list-style-type: none">Interim after Marjanovic’s resignation	Vojislav Koštunica – October 7, 2000-March 7, 2003 [Democratic Party of Serbia]	
2002		Zoran Đinđić – January 25, 2001 – March 12, 2003 [Democratic Party – Democratic Opposition of Serbia] <ul style="list-style-type: none">Part of Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalitionAssassinated by members of the Special Operations Unit and the Serbian mafia		
2003	Natasa Mičić (acting president) - December 30, 2002 – February 4, 2004 [Civic Alliance of Serbia]	Nebojša Čović (acting)– March 12-2003 –	Svetozar Marović – March 7, 2003 – June 3,	

		<p>March 17, 2003 [Democratic Alternative]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition 	<p>2006 [Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> State Union of Serbia and Montenegro dissolved on June 5, 2006
		<p>Žarko Korać – March 17, 2003 – March 18, 2003 [Social Democratic Party]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Part of Democratic Opposition of Serbia coalition 	
		<p>Zoran Živković – March 18, 2003 – March 3, 2004 [Democratic Party]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During term, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia was disbanded leading to new elections 	
2004	<p>Dragan Maršićanin - February 4, 2004 – March 3, 2004 (acting president) [Democratic Party of Serbia]</p> <p>Vojislav Mihailović (acting president) - March 3, 2004 – March 4, 2004 [Serbian Renewal Movement]</p> <p>Predrag Marković (acting presiden) - March 4, 2004 – July 11, 2004 [G17+]</p> <p>Boris Tadić - July 11, 2004 – present [Democratic Party]</p>	<p>Vojislav Koštunica – March 3, 2004 – July 7, 2008</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2 terms, switched in late 2007 first ended due to constitutional reform and later because of DS-DSS schism of SAA treaty Kostunica became first prime minister of independent Serbia during his first term 	
2005			
2006			
2007			
2008			
2009		<p>Mirko Cvetković – July 7, 2008 – Present [Independent]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Endorsed by the For a European Serbia coalition led by the Democratic Part 	

Figure 2: Theory Application to Case Studies

Theory	South Africa (transition 1990-1994)	Serbia (transition 2000-2006)	Haiti (1 st transition 1984-1990, 2 nd transition 2004-2006)
Preconditionalism: a democracy cannot emerge until a country meets certain conditions or experiences			Did not reach any preconditions for the 1990 election but was still able to form a democracy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stateness: a country must build up institutions of coercion and coordination, such as the function of bureaucracies, the identification of citizenship, the building up of legitimation, and creation of distinct state borders. 	✓ Stateness was not considered an issue in South Africa. They had enough legitimacy in the states institutions.	✓ Serbia and many other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe had to improve the legitimacy of their state institutions, define citizenship, and define their borders, before they could become a democracy. Succeeded.	Haiti did not improve the legitimacy of their institutions before either elections in 1990 and 2006.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture: It is important to construct a strong and cohesive national identity among the population, especially in a multi-ethnic area. 	✓ Conflict between blacks and whites. Mandela worked to reduce the fears of whites by having De Klerk stay as his Vice President.	✓ Difficult to create a national identity because Serbia kept changing its borders, but once Yugoslavia broke up Serbia was able to formulate a national identity.	Conflict between whites, mulattos, and blacks.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic Level: a country must have at least \$4,115 per capita income 	GDP per capita in 1994: \$3,546.67 ²⁹¹	GDP per capita in 2006: \$3,453.28 ²⁹²	1990 GDP per capita: \$416.99 ²⁹³ 2006 GDP per capita: \$573.70 ²⁹⁴
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elites: elites are the sole influence for national decisions 	✓ Elite negotiations between Mandela, De Klerk, and the rest of the political parties before the	✓ Every political party, including Milosevic's, agreed to participate in elections.	1990: only military elites were in existence ✓ 2006: all political parties,

²⁹¹ NationMaster.com. "Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (1994) by Country." Accessed on 28 February 2011.

²⁹² NationMaster.com. "Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (2006) by Country." Accessed on 28 February 2011.

²⁹³ NationMaster.com. "Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (1990) by Country." Accessed on 28 February 2011.

²⁹⁴ NationMaster.com. "Economy Statistics: GDP (per capita) (2006) by Country." Accessed on 28 February 2011.

	elections		including Aristide's Lavalas, participated in elections
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Masses: the masses have a strong influence in national outcomes 	✓ Social movements and violence during apartheid forced De Klerk to work with Mandela to create a democracy	✓ Many social movements, protests, and revolts – got rid of Milosevic by storming government buildings.	1990: no strong social movements, all suppressed by police ✓ 2006: many social movements and forced Aristide out of power by a revolt
Universalists: any country can become a democracy as long as they are persistent; their actions are more important than meeting certain preconditions.			✓ Haiti was able to become a democracy, but not consolidate it.