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The Chinese Government’s Implementation of Soft and Hard Power Policies Within Xinjiang and Tibet to Encourage Assimilation

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Abstract


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Today there is an increasing unrest among the minority populations of China and the government enforces different policies both to encourage assimilation and enforce order within minority regions. My research compares two different minority regions in China, Xinjiang and Tibet, and examines Beijing’s education, language and religious policies within these two minority regions. Beijing uses special mechanisms to implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their relative power. I find that in order to achieve desired objectives, Beijing will either enforce strict laws or fairly lenient laws depending on the policy realm. I argue that Beijing uses a method of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ policies within the different realms. ‘Soft power’ policies are typically more covert in terms of their objectives and implementation. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to shift people’s mindsets. I use the term ‘hard power’ policy to describe more straightforward policies. These policies tend to use force or scare tactics to enforce the policy, such as bans and restrictions. Although there is no direct proof to explain why Beijing uses these distinct policy approaches, I speculate as to why Beijing utilizes these policies in different circumstances.
Introduction

On July 5th, 2009, a series of violent riots over several days broke out in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region’s capital city of Urumqi. The first day of the riots began as a peaceful protest with at least 1,000 Uighur nationalists. However, the peaceful protest quickly turned into a bloody and violent uprising. How did this peaceful protest escalate into a series of violent attacks between the Han ("ethnic Chinese") and the Uighur people? Rioting began when the Peoples Republic of China sent a large police force to Urumqi to disperse the protest and called for a full investigation of the Shaoguan incident in southern China that occurred several days before the riot. During this brawl, two Uighur men who worked in a toy factory were killed when a group of Han workers murdered the men on the basis of a rumor that the two Uighur men allegedly sexually assaulted a Han female worker (Wong, 2009). Once the Uighur in Xinjiang heard of the murders, they began peacefully protesting in Urumqi, demanding for official action over the unjust murders. No one can say who truly began the violence; the Uighur claim it was the police and the police claim it was the protestors. The PRC believed that the riots themselves were planned from abroad by the World Uighur Congress and its leader, Rebiya Kadeer (Wong, 2009). The Chinese government began researching an “anti-terrorist” law after the terrorist attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 and began developing the law after this riot since it was viewed as a terrorist attack.¹ For this reason, the actions of the police may have been more aggressive than necessary. There

were a total of 197 deaths, 1,700 reported injuries, and many destroyed buildings.\(^2\) Uighur exile groups claim that the Chinese government lessened the death toll for their own purposes and that there was in fact a much greater death toll. Following the riots, the PRC police force conducted a wide-scale sweep of Urumqi looking for any Uighur who was involved in the riots or thought to of planned the protest. Many men and women disappeared following this wide-scale sweep of the city. In the weeks following the riots, over 1,000 Uighurs were arrested and detained, mosques were temporarily closed and the PRC placed armed policemen within the city until January 2010. Many of the prisoners were faced with criminal charges and over 30 people faced execution.

There have been many riots within Xinjiang on the basis of unjust treatment of minority nationalities and fighting for religious freedom.

Many of the riots within Xinjiang are comparable to the riots that have taken place within the Tibet Autonomous Region. For example, in 2008, the Tibetans began a series of riots, protests and demonstrations within Lhasa, the capital city. The demonstration began as an observance of the Tibetan Uprising Day, a day in which the Tibetan people celebrate the 1959 Tibetan uprising against the presence of Chinese rule within Tibet. The demonstration quickly turned into a series of violent riots where monks and Tibetan citizens attacked Han civilians and created havoc within the city. The PRC police force promptly intervened to prevent even more damage and arrested and detained many Tibetan citizens. The Chinese government blamed these riots on

separatism and claimed that the Dalai Lama organized the protests. The Dalai Lama denied these accusations and blamed the riots on the widespread discontent among the Tibetan people. Like the Uighur in Xinjiang, many Tibetan rioters were arrested, detained and some were executed. These two examples of riots are not unique cases of protesting; in fact, there have been at least one riot each year in Xinjiang from 1988-2001. In addition, in 1996 and 1997 there was a riot nearly every month (see Appendix). The vast amount of riots presents a real problem for Beijing.

In regards to the national minorities in China, Beijing’s goals are to unify all minority groups under one nation. Beijing is trying to achieve unification by influencing all citizens to speak Mandarin, improving living standards, promoting Han culture, among other methods. However, many of China’s minority groups still remain unassimilated into Chinese society and the dominant Han culture. These minority groups are still not a fully integral part of the Chinese nation for many different reasons.

One concern about the lack of integration is that the Chinese government fears that a national security issue may arise if the minority groups remain unassimilated. In Xinjiang specifically, Beijing fears Uighur connection with Pan-Turkic culture across parts of Central Asia and its geographic proximity. The Uighur identity is associated with Turkic culture and this presents a problem for Beijing. Beijing clearly wants the Uighur people to see the positives of Han culture and is afraid that the Uighur will want to separate from China to connect with a culture more similar to their own. Another

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reason Beijing wants Xinjiang unified with the rest of China is because of its geographical
location. Xinjiang borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s location is extremely important for national
security because it serves as a buffer zone between China and these countries.

Beijing also worries a great deal about Tibet and how to unify its minority
nationality with the rest of China. The Chinese government fears that Tibetan identity
has an unbreakable link to transnational ties of Tibetan and other Buddhist cultures.
Today, the CCP and many Han citizens believe religion is a backwards notion. Tibetan
Buddhism is such a powerful part of Tibetan identity and it is for this reason that Beijing
fears both the lack of assimilation and even the threat of separatism. The Tibetan
people also have a powerful leader in the Dalai Lama and Beijing fears that he will unify
the people and seek greater autonomy. China wants to unify these groups under one
nation so there are no chances of separatism.

On the other hand, the CCP’s assimilation policies can create a backlash and
achieve just the opposite of its intended effect. Since many minority groups in China
perceive Beijing’s unification attempts as trying to erase their culture, many people have
participated in various forms of resistance. The most severe form of resistance are riots
and protests, while there are also more subtle forms of resistance like forming
allegiances and declaring loyalty to groups other than the government. The Chinese
government faces a major issue when dealing with promoting assimilation of minority
nationalities with China. Beijing knows that they must tread lightly when it comes to
assimilation policies. The process is a balancing act in that Beijing must allow the survival of minority cultural traits while still protecting the nation and not letting it become the basis for varying loyalties. The Chinese government must keep their interests the number one priority and it is extremely difficult to manage this balancing act. Beijing wants to improve the living standards of underprivileged minority citizens while also subtly altering their allegiance to China. How can China try and assimilate the minority nationalities without these groups reacting negatively? For example, if the Chinese government makes all minority schools celebrate a Chinese national holiday to introduce the minority students to Han culture, the minority groups could see this as an attempt to replace their own holidays. This balancing act is truly difficult and the Chinese government has created different systems in which they deal with this issue.

Beijing approaches assimilation differently depending on the policy realm. For example, the government does not handle religious policies and economic policies in the same manner. Within these varying realms Beijing uses special mechanisms to implement these policies. I categorize these different policy realms according to their relative power. To achieve desired objectives, the PRC will either enforce strict laws or fairly lenient laws depending on the realm.

I argue that Beijing uses a method of soft power and hard power policies within the different realms. Soft power policies are typically very subtle and more covert when implemented. Beijing uses the subtle powers of persuasion and positive incentives to shift people’s ideas and mindset. I use the term hard power policy to describe strict
policies that state clearly what the objective is. These policies tend to use force or scare tactics to enforce the policy. Bans and restrictions are also associated with hard power policies. This idea of soft and hard power policies is similar to the “carrot or the stick” idiom in that the soft power policies often use positive incentives and the hard power policies use strict restrictions with sanctions. Another difference between soft and hard power policies is the difference in flexibility. Hard power policies are generally inflexible because these policies use clear and distinct restrictions or bans that cannot be negotiated. Soft power policies are more flexible because the government is not as strict within its implementation. In Beijing’s case, education and language policies are two examples of soft power policies and religion is an example of a hard power policy. The government giving extra points to minority students on the Chinese college entrance exam, the *GaoKao*, is an example of a soft power education policy because it provides incentives for minority groups to want a proper education and participate in Chinese society. Banning pictures and religious icons of the Dalai Lama from Tibetan households are a hard power religious policy because there is a clear restriction. Another reason it is a hard power policy is because if Tibetan citizens are caught with these images, the government can use imprisonment as a form of punishment.

Although there is no direct proof that Beijing uses this distinction as a comparison of policies, I am going to take a stab as to why there are soft power policies and hard power policies. One possible explanation is that the Chinese government decides to use soft power or hard power policies depending on whether there is a threat or not. Two of Beijing’s greatest fears are threats to national security and separatism.
Religion presents a problem for the Chinese government in regards to both national security and separatist thoughts. If the government sees any signs of these threats, they will use hard power policies to eradicate the problem. Since China is a Communist nation, the government does not want a large religious presence that could potentially undermine their authority. Religion consists of hierarchical, organized groups that tend to have ambitious and influential spiritual leaders. The Chinese government fears these organizations because they worry that the people will look towards religious groups for different services that the government is supposed to provide; for example, education or monetary help. Beijing worries that the people will profess their allegiance to specific religious groups rather than to the government. Religion is a threat to the Chinese nation because religious follower’s loyalties to the organizations are very strong. This loyalty is so strong because people usually connect themselves to just one specific religion; there are rarely cases where someone professes allegiance to Roman Catholicism and Judaism. Different European nations experienced similar issues in history when the authority of the different rulers was challenged by large religious organizations like the Vatican. The Chinese government implements hard power religious policies to avoid these issues.

Education and language policies are soft power policies because education and language realms do not present as much of a threat. There are no threats when it comes to the use of language because there are few formal language organizations like religion that could undermine the government’s authority. Also, unlike religion, there is no limit to how many languages someone can speak and use; therefore, language does not
present a real threat. Education presents little of a threat because the school system is controlled by the government; therefore, there are few alternative and organized sources of formal education outside the purview of the CCP. Another reason that educational policies are soft power policies is because Beijing understands that most citizens want a decent education to improve their living standards so they will not jeopardize this. Soft power policies and hard power policies are implemented depending upon whether the government believes something to be a threat to their authority or national security. Beijing will use hard power policies when there are signs that a minority group’s loyalty and allegiance lies with a group other than the Chinese government.

**Case Study and Background**

For my thesis, I decided to look at two of China’s most controversial minority groups; the Uighur of Xinjiang and the Tibetans of Tibet. Both the Uighur and Tibetans pose a threat to China’s national security for different reasons. Beijing has implemented many different policies within Xinjiang and Tibet to promote Han culture and unify these groups with the rest of the nation. I use the distinction between soft power and hard power policies when comparing Beijing’s education, language and religious policies within Xinjiang and Tibet.

There are 56 recognized ethnic groups within China; the Han Chinese account for 91.59% of the overall Chinese population and the other minority nationalities make up
the 8.41% of the population. Although these groups make up a small percentage of the population, they are distributed extensively throughout the country. Most of the minority nationalities reside in the Southwest, Northwest and Northeast of China. I chose to research the Uighur minority in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the Tibetan minority in the Tibet Autonomous Region specifically. The Uighur are regionally concentrated within China’s West in the XAR and make up about half the population of Xinjiang. The XAR is an extremely important region because it borders Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India and has many natural resources. The Uighur minority are a predominantly Muslim community with ties to Central Asia. The Uighur language sounds more like the Turkish languages than Chinese. The Uighur, being Turkic, “are as physically distinguishable from Han as African Americans are from their European American counterparts” (Kaltman, 2007: 2). The Uighur identity is very much linked to Islam and the Uighur language. According to Eric Hyer, “Xinjiang is culturally, linguistically, and historically part of a Turkish civilization distinct from the civilization that developed in China. The Turkic-Muslims of Xinjiang have never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other minority nationalities in China have. The growth of Islamic nationalism as a transnational force makes this nationalist movement in Xinjiang especially challenging for Beijing” (Hyer, 2006: 80). Like Xinjiang, the Tibet Autonomous Region is also

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concentrated in the Western region of China and borders Nepal, India, Burma and Bhutan. Tibet is the traditional homeland of the Tibetan minority. Their language is classified as a Tibeto-Burman language because it most closely resembles the Burmese language. The major religion practiced is Tibetan Buddhism and it is extremely important to the Tibetan people since it is the number one characteristic that defines their identity. The Dalai Lama is the religious leader of Tibetan people and has been condemned as a terrorist by the Chinese government. Beijing fears that the Dalai Lama will organize the people and fight for greater autonomy or even separatism. The Uighur and Tibetans have unique identities unlike any other group of people within China. Beijing wants to incorporate these two minority groups into the Chinese nation to better their livelihoods and to protect Beijing’s interests.

Education

The Chinese government has promoted a good education system for both the Tibetan and Uighur population for multiple reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the Chinese want all citizens of China to have a proper education. The second and more debatable reason is that the Chinese government wants to influence the minds of the young minorities in order to bring more of a unity to the nation and convince the minority youth of the benefits of Han culture. Grose argues that “state-sponsored education has been a priority of the CCP in an attempt to unify all minorities in China into one Chinese nation” (Grose, 2010: 97). The Chinese government is willing to
implement soft power policies because the state controls the education system in all regions so it is less of a threat. Second, the Chinese government knows that most people want a better livelihood and the primary way to achieve that is through a decent education. Many scholars argue that by giving the minority citizens opportunities for a decent education, the Chinese government is portrayed as saviors; therefore, the government is able to sneak in some ulterior motives without being criticized. The government uses soft power policy techniques such as incentives and persuasion to achieve their goals.

The Chinese government has focused on improving the education standards for all minority nationalities for many years. Article 46 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China adopted in 1982 states that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to receive education. The state promotes the all-round moral, intellectual, and physical development of children and young people.”\(^5\) However, some scholars argue that “the ultimate goal for the PRC’s educational policy for minority peoples has been to integrate all ethnic groups into a single and unified socialist state” (Grose, 2010: 97). Grose argues that “state-sponsored education is one of the CCP’s most valuable tools for instilling minority students with ‘pro-Chinese’ principles” (Grose, 2010: 97). There can be no way of telling what the CCP’s primary goal is when dealing with educational policies. There is no denying the fact that the Chinese government wants to improve the education in all minority areas; however, the reason for wanting

to improve the education for minorities is debated among many scholars. Regardless of its ultimate objective, the Chinese government has implemented soft power policies when it comes to education policies because education does not pose a threat to China’s national security.

The Chinese government has implemented a number of preferential policies for minority students in Xinjiang. One of the biggest policies is the lowering of the standards on the college entrance exam (GaoKao) that minorities have to meet. This gives minority students a bit of an advantage over their Han peers when applying for universities in China. The CCP has also instituted a quota system at the universities in Xinjiang for minority students (Grose, 2010: 101). Uighurs who graduate from the min kao han Chinese boarding school and have two Uighur parents will receive 200 bonus points on their college entrance exam; those with one Uighur parent will receive 100 bonus points (Grose, 2010: 101). The CCP has also allocated several education subsidies to Xinjiang. In 2006, one education subsidy provided 10 billion RMB to rural areas in Western China to improve schools. The CCP is also encouraging Uighur parents to send their children to Chinese boarding schools in the Eastern part of China (Grose, 2010: 101).

Another preferential policy implemented in 2001 is called the “Xinjiang Class”, a program that funds middle school-aged students from Xinjiang, mostly ethnic Uighurs, to attend school in predominately Han populated cities located throughout Eastern China (Grose, 2010: 97). The Xinjiang Class was modeled closely after the program created in 1982 that funds Tibetan children to study at boarding schools in Eastern
China. The Xinjiang Class is a four year boarding school specifically designed to educate poor, Uighur youth from rural Xinjiang. This program was created to provide Uighurs with a more complete education and to have better qualified teachers. The first year is composed of preparatory studies meant to improve Chinese and English language skills, Math, Physics, and Chemistry. After the first year, the Uighur students begin their normal coursework for all of which Mandarin is the language of instruction (Grose, 2010: 101). The Administration Office of the Xinjiang Class selects students based on several criteria; a quota system based on ethnicity, residence, and the family’s finances. The second factor to being selected for the Xinjiang Class is by their performance on a test administered specifically for the Xinjiang Class, which costs about 35-42 RMB to take. Starting in 2007, applicants who participate in the “Loving my Chinese Nation” bilingual speech competition can earn 5-15 additional points on the exam. In addition, students from families who obey the birth control policy or students who are an only child will receive five extra points on exam. Finally, students applying for the Xinjiang Class must undergo a physical exam (Grose, 2010: 101). 80% of the Xinjiang Class’s students are from poor, rural areas. The stated goals of the Xinjiang Class are written under Article 1 of the Administration Regulations for the Xinjiang Class. This article states, “in order for Xinjiang to train qualified high school graduates who support the CCP’s leaders, love China, love socialism, defend the unity of China... and are determined to offer one’s self for socialist modernization construction , the Xinjiang Class must fully carry out the national education and ethnic group policies (and) carry out quality education” (Grose, 2010: 132). Grose acknowledges that the political goals seem to outshine the
educational goals. Grose also argues that the Xinjiang Class has done the opposite of its intended goals and “strengthened some Uighur students’ sense of ethnic identity and has accentuated the tensions existing between Han and Uighurs” (Grose, 2010: 98).

What are the real goals of the Xinjiang Class? Is it to truly provide a better education for the Uighur youth or is it to influence the young minds of Uighur children to support Han culture? The Chinese government desires achieving both goals. Wang Dan, an ethnic Han history teacher employed by Jiangsu Province’s Xinjiang Class School, confirms that one of his most important responsibilities is to cultivate nationalism among the Uighur students. He uses the “curious phrase qianyi mohua, which can be loosely translated as influencing someone without their knowledge, to describe his teaching objectives” (Grose, 2010: 102). Regardless of the CCP’s true intentions, the Xinjiang Class presents a great opportunity for rural, poor Uighur children to receive an education. The providing of the Uighur youth with an inexpensive education “has been portrayed in the Chinese media as the CCP acting as a kind parent” (Grose, 2010: 103). Many Uighur parents struggle when making the decision to send their children to a Chinese boarding school because they know that their child will lose a sense of their Uighur identity. Providing a good, inexpensive education for the Uighur youth is clearly a soft power policy implemented by the Chinese government because it is based on incentives and utilizes subtle persuasion to introduce Han culture to the children. The different lessons taught in the Xinjiang Class schools are selected to favor Han culture, history and language. Also, by providing a good education for the Uighur children, the
Chinese government hopes that the Uighur students will feel a sense of gratitude towards the Chinese government.

China’s education plans for Xinjiang have improved the education system immensely. Grose notes that “from 1982 to 1990, the percentage of China’s Uighur population who attended primary school increased from 37% to 43% and those who attended undergraduate college increased from 0.1% to 2.1%. During the same eight-year span, illiteracy within the Uighur population also decreased from 45 to 26.6%. Furthermore, by 2001, 97% of all ‘school-aged’ children in Xinjiang were enrolled in school, and 61.8% of total in-school students were minorities” (Grose, 2010: 99). By giving the Uighur population better educational opportunities, the Chinese government is able to make compromises. The Chinese government is able to select what is being taught within these schools to assist their unification goals. Selecting specific information to be taught in the Xinjiang schools are a great example of a soft power policy used by the PRC to influence the minds of Uighur youth to favor Han culture and language. The CCP also publicizes atheism and selected Xinjiang histories within Xinjiang schools. The Uighur students are taught what the Chinese government wants them to learn. This is extremely typical of any unitary education system. The Uighur youth are influenced by the lessons they are taught in school and there is a real fear that they will lose their Uighur identity.

Improving the quality of education in Tibet is a big priority for the Chinese government. Before 1950, Tibet did not have any schools for learning other than the
monasteries that only taught future nuns and monks the principles and teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. Chinese occupation brought education to the average Tibetan child. The Chinese government changed the definition of education for the Tibetan people. Before Chinese occupation, Tibetans believed that a proper education consisted of religious learning. Today, the Tibetan education system consists of language, history, mathematics, and science courses. Before, Tibetan education was controlled by the monasteries; today, the government has complete control and power over the education system which allows Beijing to implement soft power policies.

Beijing began developing the education system within Tibet by the late 1950’s and mid 1960’s. The first priority was to establish and fund primary schools for the Tibetan youth. In the late 1970’s, the TAR built four prestigious college-level institutions. Since there were new schools that provided a proper education, the Chinese government placed Han children living in the TAR within the same schools as the Tibetan students. This exposed the Tibetan children to Han culture. This is a soft power policy because the Tibetan children were introduced to Han culture at such a young age. The typical classes taught within these schools were language courses, science, math, history, agriculture, and Maoist ideas. By teaching Maoist ideology in the schools, the government is able to subtly introduce the Tibetan children to Communistic ideals. By the 1980’s, there were more state funded schools, more subsidies provided for the poorer students, and more schools that allowed boarding for the students who lived too far away to make the daily commute. The PRC created a program in 1982 that provided funding for Tibetan children to study in the Eastern parts of China. This program
provided rural or poor Tibetan children the opportunity to receive a proper education with all of the necessary materials and strong teachers. This is evidence of a soft power policy because the government provides Tibetan children with an opportunity to get a good, inexpensive education. The compromise is that these Tibetan children must travel and live in Eastern China for many years and cannot return home until the schooling is done. The Chinese government hopes by this time Han culture leaves a positive impression on these Tibetan students.

Even with the formation of a school system within Tibet, the 1990 Census calculated that 44.43% of Tibetans over the age of fifteen were illiterate, only 0.57% of Tibetans received a college education, only 2.12% received a high school education, only 3.85% received a middle school education and only 18.6% went to primary school (Grunfeld, 1996: 226). These figures are extremely low and the government truly wanted to increase the literacy rate among Tibetans. The Chinese government designated 1993 as the “Tibetan Education Year” and the Chinese press wrote that 67% of all school-age children were enrolled; however, the unbiased press wrote that poor transportation, few schools and poor conditions made the number lower (Grunfeld, 1996: 226). In 1994, the Chinese government stated they pumped 21.5 million RMB into education within the TAR.

However, some scholars argue that the education in the TAR schools focus less on providing a broad education and focuses more on teaching Tibetan children why Chinese occupation is good for their country. John Heath wrote that education today is
more focused with “political indoctrination” than with preparing the students to succeed in the future and become productive members among society. For instance, Heath also provided an interesting quote from a CCP member regarding China’s goal for the TAR education: “The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges…it lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to, or turn their hearts to, the Dalai clique, and whether they are loyal to…our great motherland” (Heath, 2005: 22). The Tibetan schools spend more time making the children read quotes by Mao Zedong and studying the policies of other Chinese leaders. Once again, this is evidence of a soft power policy used to influence the mindset of young Tibetan children. By teaching the children at such a young age the ideals and morals of Communism, the children may grow up with a more Han biased nature.

The Chinese government focuses much of their attention on improving the education system within Xinjiang and Tibet. The two main goals are to give minority students a better education and to introduce Han culture. Beijing approaches education policies with ease and uses soft power policies because the education system does not pose a threat to the government. Since schools are government provided, Beijing has complete control over the education system.

Language

The Chinese government uses soft power policies when dealing with language issues to covertly assimilate the minority groups into one unified state by teaching
Mandarin. Like in most countries, there are enormous gains for residents who can speak the dominant language; therefore, this provides great incentives for minorities to learn Mandarin. This creates the idea that Mandarin is more important and more useful than minority languages which allows the Chinese government to proceed with even more language policies that favor Mandarin.

Another reason that the PRC feel safe using soft power policies is because there are no limits placed on how many languages a person can learn or use. Since the minority groups are able to speak their native tongue, there is not as much unrest. Also, the government believes that minorities will not protest for the right to speak their language more freely. This idea stems from the fact that there are few organized groups or schools that support this notion of freedom of language. Therefore, there are no distinct leaders to lead any campaigns. Unlike religious groups, there is no freedom of language groups for citizens to connect with and belong to. This is because many organizations form because of specific ethnicity groups rather than solely for a common language. This lack of organization gives the PRC a sense of comfort and relief. The Chinese treat “religion and language as separate. It claims that language has not played a significant role in the emergence of violent militant actions organized by some religious groups” (Reny, 2009: 494). Finally, even though the PRC push the usage of Mandarin on all minorities to unite these groups into one nation, they do not feel that these minority languages are an obstacle to modernity and social advancement like they view religion.
The Chinese government has placed great importance on the preservation of minority languages. The Political Consultative Conference in 1949 declared that the People’s Democracy shall be the foundation for the national construction of the PRC. This Conference created a document called the Common Program which included Article 54 that stated simply that national minorities should have “freedom to develop their dialects and languages, and to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs.” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). However, this statement is extremely vague and does not include specific examples as to how these languages are to be preserved. According to Dwyer, this statement forgets to mention the fact that along with these preservation policies, the major minority languages in China’s Autonomous Regions are required to “share space and resources with Standard Chinese in the domains of government administration, the courts, education, and the media” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). Regardless, the Chinese government has implemented many different language policies within their Autonomous Regions to promote and preserve minority languages. Whether the preservation of these languages was actually the main goal of these policies is unknown.

The 1980’s were a period of enormous expansion of support for minority languages. Beijing and local governments established and revised different writing systems and created many new language materials and programs. In 1984, Article 37 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy stated that “schools where most of the students come from minority nationalities should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the media of
instruction. Classes for the teaching of Chinese (the Han language) shall be opened for senior grades of primary schools or for secondary schools to popularize Putonghua, the common speech based on Beijing pronunciation.” The local governments were instructed to give financial support to the compilation, translation, and publishing of teaching materials and publications in the languages of minority nationalities (Dwyer, 2005: 35). Article 38 encouraged literature, arts and news to be spoken and written in the minority language. This Article also supported the publication of nationality books and the preservation of nationality historical and cultural heritage (Dwyer, 2005: 11). Article 46 guaranteed “the citizens of every nationality the right to sue in their own nationality spoken and written language in carrying out litigation” (Dwyer, 2005: 11). Article 49 states that “cadres of Han nationality should learn the spoken and written languages of the local minority nationalities”. However, most scholars note that hardly any Hans learn more than “hello” (Dwyer, 2005: 33). By allowing the use of minority languages, the PRC is able to show their leniency and tolerance for minority cultures.

Since the PRC allows the minorities to speak their native tongues, the Chinese government uses this as a compromise to also introduce Mandarin. The early PRC language policy “was part of a broader economic and social development plan, which aimed to establish a new system of governance and society while also, crucially, building national unity” (Dwyer, 2005: 7). The implementation and promotion of Mandarin entailed massive propaganda campaigns to increase minority exposure to the standard

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Chinese language and reinforced the notion that the minority languages were not as important as Mandarin. The PRC’s language policies are a soft power policy in general because the government uses incentives and persuasion to influence the minority nations to speak and write Mandarin. By placing incentives like job opportunities for those who speak Mandarin, the government is able to exert their control and influence in a non-aggressive manner. Specific language policies in Xinjiang and Tibet reflect this idea that China’s government implements soft power policies to push the use of Mandarin on the minorities.

The early stages of PRC language policy in Xinjiang were lenient. From 1954-1986, Beijing established a language planning office called the Chinese Committee on Script Reform, later renamed the National Language and Script Working Committee. In Urumqi, the local branch was named the Autonomous Region Language and Script Working Committee. This committee employed linguists to reform the region’s Arabic-based scripts and published a flagship journal called “Language and Translation” in the five major languages of Xinjiang (Chinese, Uighur, Kazak…) (Dwyer, 2005: 16). Creating a special committee to develop and protect a minority language is a soft power policy because it shows signs of equality and gave the minority groups a reason to appreciate the government.

However, after the reform era of the 1980’s, the PRC began implementing language policies that leaned towards the importance of instructing Mandarin over the Uighur language. Although the use of minority languages for classroom instruction is
protected by the Chinese constitution, “the CCP promulgates the use of Mandarin in all social realms, and proficiency in Mandarin is a must for all minority students pursuing a college education” (Grose, 2010: 99). The Xinjiang Education Commission has gradually reduced Uighur-language instruction in all levels at school. Now Chinese is the language of instruction, and Uighur is looked upon as the second language (Dwyer, 2005: 38). In March, 2004, the Xinjiang Daily announced, “the CCP and regional government have decided that ethnic minority schools must be merged with ethnic Chinese schools and ethnic minority students must be mixed with ethnic Chinese students. Teaching should be conducted in Chinese language as much as possible...some small towns and counties, where conditions are ripe, must start teaching Chinese to first-grade ethnic minority students in primary school” (Dwyer, 2005: 38). Schools were used as the greatest integration tools for the minorities to become “hanified”. At the same time, teaching Mandarin to children at such a young age provides these students with a better opportunity to succeed later in life economically. Young Uighur students are exposed to Han culture, language, clothing, fads and other modern elements that can potentially influence a young Uighur to think Han culture is cooler. Combining Uighur and Han students into one schooling system is a great example as to how the PRC use soft power policies to try and integrate minorities into Han culture through subtle cultural persuasion.

Whether the ultimate goal of the PRC is to push the use of Mandarin on the Uighur or to preserve the Uighur language and culture is not clearly defined. However, I believe that by accommodating the Uighur’s linguistic claims in Xinjiang, the Chinese
government is able to sneak in a linguistic compromise that includes teaching Mandarin as well. By incorporating Mandarin into the daily lives of the Uighur, some scholars fear the Chinese language could possibly replace the use of the Uighur language. There is also the possibility that the Uighur will utilize both languages and will have the benefits of keeping their cultural identity and gaining more economic opportunities. According to Marie-Eve Reny, “the bilingual education policy appears to be an indispensable bargaining tool in the eyes of the central government” (Reny, 2009: 503).

The Uighur adults are exposed to the same subtle persuasions that Han culture and language are more important through networks of media and scholastic elements. Adults are influenced by Han culture and language since Xinjiang’s newspapers, the Xinjiang Daily and People’s Daily, are translations from Chinese editions of these newspapers. All cinema and television are legally required to be made into the Chinese language. If a film is designated for Xinjiang, then it will be dubbed into the Uighur language (Dwyer, 2005: 49). Beginning in 1999, all TV and radio broadcasts reduced their full Uighur language broadcasts to a maximum of eight hours per day; Mandarin is used for the other 16 hours of the day (Dwyer, 2005: 49). Since adults are no longer in school, they are not provided with as many opportunities to learn Mandarin as the young Uighur students. By incorporating Mandarin into media sources, the Uighur adults are exposed to the language in a way that gives them a chance to hear Mandarin every day. The Uighur adults may want to learn Mandarin as well to improve their living standards.
The “final step to monolingualism” was made in September of 2002, when it was decided that Xinjiang University would no longer offer courses in the Uighur language; even Uighur poetry is now taught in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005: 40). All university educators are required to have a high degree of competence in Mandarin (Dwyer, 2005: 40). Dwyer claims that the Uighur perceive this change to “monolingualism” as a cultural attack and has done the opposite of the PRC’s goal of integration because of resentment (Dwyer, 2005: 41).

Blaine Kaltman, author of the ethnography, Under the Heel of the Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China, noted that “although many Uighur accept the need to learn Mandarin as a prerequisite to the kind of education that will enable them to get a good job and have a better lifestyle, a large number of Uighur simply do not want to learn a language they consider to be imposed upon them by an alien regime” (Kaltman, 2007: 16). Kaltman illustrates the difficulty of Uighurs learning Mandarin by comparing how an Italian can learn Spanish more easily than Russian with the Uighur finding it easier to learn the languages of Central Asia than Mandarin. The Uighur language looks and sounds completely different than Mandarin, resulting in even more frustration for the Uighur population. Of the Uighur Kaltman interviewed in Urumqi, 65% resented the fact that they needed to learn to speak Mandarin in order to succeed financially (Kaltman, 2007: 16). Dwyer acknowledges the main issue of preserving minority languages for the PRC by commenting that “for modern China, which advertises itself domestically and internationally as a ‘unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation,’ transnational linguistic solidarities are potentially threatening to the concept of nationhood” (Dwyer, 2005: 31). To the PRC’s dismay, many Uighur feel that
the government has not addressed their language concerns and this may result in
actions of resistance (Reny, 2009: 505).

Tibet also faces similar obstacles in regards to the PRC’s language policies. In
Tibet, there was also a time of progressive thinking in regards to the preservation of the
Tibetan language. In the early 1980’s, written and spoken Tibetan was adopted as the
primary language in all legal matters (Grunfeld, 1996: 217). In 1983, Yin Fatang, the
former top official of the TAR, ordered that all cadres under the age of 50 learn to speak
Tibetan and that all government documents should be written in Tibetan (Grunfeld,
1996: 218). By stating that both the Tibetan language and Mandarin operate equally,
there is evidence that the PRC are trying to appeal towards the Tibetan people by
“allowing” them to speak their native tongue, but are at the same time pushing the
usage of Mandarin in everyday life. This is clearly an example of how the PRC language
policy is a soft power because it is a slow and gentle transition towards
“monolingualism”.

The Tibetan language was promoted within the education system as well. Books
used for instruction within the schools were to be written in the Tibetan language
(Heath, 2005: 23). Tibetan and Han children attended the same schools and by the late
1970’s, the children were instructed to learn each other’s languages and their classes
were taught in both languages. In 1976 Epstein observed that “on the playground, as
they ran about together they communicated in one tongue or the other, or a mixture of
both. We found it hard to distinguish them by nationality” (Epstein, 1983: 338). By
learning the Chinese language as well as furthering their own native language, the Tibetan children have more opportunities to get jobs in the future since there is a large Chinese presence in the TAR. However, today, the teaching of the Tibetan language is no longer a priority. From 1997 and on, grade one and up had to be taught in Chinese and the only course to be taught in Tibetan was to be a “Tibetan language” course (Heath, 2005: 22). Today, the Tibetan student enrollment is much smaller than China as a whole because the children struggle with learning Mandarin. According to Robert Barnett, the TAR Congress in May 2002 ordered that the Tibetan language should be protected; however, “these regulations only operate on a more theoretical level” (Barnett, 2008: 196). For example, the CCP ordered that there should be more children and science books written in Tibetan. The influence these books have on preserving the Tibetan language is next to nothing when Chinese is the working language and all street signs are written in Chinese. The importance placed on the Chinese language makes it extremely difficult for Tibetan students to go far in school and most of the time these students feel as if they are less important than their Chinese peers. This gives Tibetan students more of a drive to learn Mandarin so they do not have to experience any discrimination.

Similar to Xinjiang and the Uighur nationality, the PRC eventually changed their language policies to more Han intensified. Within Tibet, Chinese is the working language; therefore, all street signs are written in Chinese and all formal letters must be written in Chinese (Heath, 2005: 23). If a Tibetan wants to find a steady job within Lhasa or other major cities within Tibet, they must be able to comprehend Mandarin since all of the
companies are now Han companies. The PRC has proceeded with caution in regards to its language policies within Tibet. By allowing some usage of the Tibetan language, the government has not completely destroyed the language. The PRC use their “leniency” as a way to compromise and order the usage of Mandarin as well. This is a soft power policy because the PRC slowly eliminates the usage of Tibetan without being obvious. By replacing Mandarin as the language of instruction in schools, making the Tibetan road signs written in Chinese and providing incentives for those who comprehend Mandarin, the PRC are persuading the Tibetan people that Mandarin is the language to know in order to succeed financially.

The Chinese government utilizes soft power policies when dealing with language to unify the Uighur and Tibetans with the rest of Chinese society. Assimilation is very important to the Chinese because two of their main goals when dealing with minority nationalities are unification and national security. Beijing believes that by teaching Mandarin to young minority students and adults, these minority citizens will have more opportunities in life to succeed. Also, if most citizens speak one language, a nation will feel more unified in general. The CCP feel that soft power policies are the proper way to achieve the government’s goals of assimilation. Beijing uses soft power policies because language does not pose a serious threat to the government’s objectives. The first reason is that there are no limits as to how many languages a person can speak. Secondly, there are no organized groups fighting for language freedom that minority citizens can pledge allegiance to or challenge the government’s authority.
Religion

The PRC fears religion for many reasons and this fear drives all hard power policies implemented on both the Uighur and Tibetans. First, the PRC are weary of religion because there are hundreds of distinct religious organizations, like monasteries, that have a massive amount of followers. The Chinese government is afraid that the people will begin to rely on these organizations for services that the government should be providing; for example, providing food for the hungry, an education and monetary assistance. The PRC are afraid that citizens will profess their allegiance to these organizations and that the organizations will undermine their authority. Religious organizations also produce strong leaders that can influence the minds of the people. For example, in Tibet, the Dalai Lama is the most influential spiritual leader and most Tibetans are loyal to only him.

Second, Chinese Communist ideology believes religion is a backwards tradition and criticizes religion on the basis that it prevents the people from reaching modernity and progress. Grunfeld argues that Chinese Communists believe that religion prevents or distracts people from becoming rich because they spend their money on religious objects or donate money to religious organizations; “some poor people donate so much to the monasteries that they become welfare recipients; others are kept in perpetual poverty” (Grunfeld, 1996: 227). For this reason, the Chinese government tries to eradicate religion so that the citizens can focus on monetary development.
Third, the Chinese government understands that religion is the unifying measure for both the Tibetan and Uighur identity and can create separatist thoughts. Religion is considered by the CCP to be an obstacle to national integration and a potential source of local nationalism. Finally, the issue of national security is a big issue for the Chinese government and any signs of separatism or terrorism are a threat. It is difficult for the CCP to disassociate Islam and Tibetan Buddhism with political instability and separatism. For these four main reasons, the PRC implement hard power policies to control the use of religion within the XAR and TAR.

When the PRC declared both Xinjiang and Tibet as Autonomous Regions of China, they promised to preserve the culture and religion of the minority nationalities. In Tibet specifically, the PRC pledged not to alter the existing political and religious system when they wrote Article Four of the Seventeen Point Agreement; the document created in 1951 that secured Tibet as an Autonomous Region. Article Four also states that “the Central Authorities will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama” (Heath, 2005: 99). However, the PRC did not uphold this statement and the Tibetan’s religious leader, the Dalai Lama, has been deemed a terrorist by the Chinese government and stripped of his power. The Dalai Lama now lives in exile in India and can never return to his native land. By removing one of the largest aspects of Tibetan Buddhism, the objectives and goals of the PRC in regards to religion are clearly not preservation. In Xinjiang, the PRC also promised to preserve the culture, identity and religion of the Uighur. However, the Chinese government has used the worldwide fear of Muslim terrorists as a way to try to eradicate the Muslim faith from the Uighur
Why does the Chinese government dislike religion so much? Communist ideology in general does not believe in religion and finds religion to be a backwards notion. This ideology stresses that religion prevents societies from achieving modernization and progress. Religion is perceived as traditional and a tool of class oppression in Marxist thinking. It is for this reason and many others that the Chinese government has stepped up and cracked down on the freedom to practice religion in China. The practice of Islam in Xinjiang and the practice of Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet are no exception. The hard power policies on religion implemented in the XAR and TAR greatly restrict religious freedom.

Tibet’s culture is based off of Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhism has influenced every aspect of Tibet since the introduction and popularization of the religion as practiced by the 33rd King of Tibet in the 7th century A.D. Tibetan Buddhism is the prime characteristic that makes up the Tibetan identity and prevents the Tibetans from truly assimilating to Han culture. The Chinese government uses hard power policies because religion is the key component to the Tibetan identity and there is a fear that this will unify the Tibetan people to fight for their independence. This is one of the reasons that Tibetan Buddhism has been continuously under attack since the 1950’s.

The attack began when the Chinese government replaced the Dalai Lama and created an alternative base of power and authority within the TAR. The Chinese government still fears that the Tibetan people pledge allegiance to the Dalai Lama.

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Between 1950 and 1980 the CCP destroyed more than 6,000 monasteries and temples and by the end of the 1970’s, a total of only eight monasteries were still open and operating in Tibet, with less than one thousand monks still practicing. The other monasteries that survived China’s Cultural Revolution were converted to places for nonreligious use (Laird, 2006: 354). Thomas Laird stated “to decimate the monasteries was to strike at the heart of Tibetan culture” (Laird, 2006: 354). In addition, many of the adobe images of the Buddha were destroyed with pickaxes and the statues made out of copper were smashed and thrown into the river. The statues made of precious metals were shipped to China and used as monetary value (Laird, 2006: 346). Communists believe that religion prevents and distracts people from making money because they spend all of their earnings on religious icon statues, objects for religious festivals and towards rebuilding and supporting monasteries. This is a prime example for the PRC’s claim that religion prevents growth and progress. The Communist ideology that religion is bad for society creates even more of a reason to place hard policies on religious freedom. The Chinese government has implemented many different hard power policies to destroy Tibetan Buddhism and the role of religion for the Tibetan people.

In 1994, Chinese-dominated Democratic Management Committees (DMC’S) were set up to replace the traditional authority of abbots and lamas. Since committee members are selected by the local branches of the Beijing-based Religious Affairs Bureau, the Tibetan people have no say on what goes on in the XAR. The DMC’s restricts the amount of monks and nuns at each monastery and enforces the entry level age to a minimum of 18; the common age of entry prior to Chinese occupation was 7 (Heath,
Today, leading lamas are forced to retire at the age of 60, a prime time because of the wisdom they have gained throughout the years; this prevents “the direct teaching of their wisdom to the young” (Heath, 2005: 18). The youth of Tibet have also been prevented from learning the principles of Tibetan Buddhism because the teaching of religion is prohibited in school.

The government also controls how average day citizens practice their faith. Tibetans are not allowed to have religious artifacts, butter lamps, or pictures of the Dalai Lama in their homes. These numerous bans are examples of hard power policies because they are inflexible restrictions with a clear objective. During searches of citizen’s homes by the police, altars, religious paintings, butter lamps and statues have been confiscated and thrown away (Heath, 2005: 20). When a group of foreign journalists were traveling in Tibet during the 2000’s, they were asked by many Tibetans if they had pictures of the Dalai Lama in books and if they could see them briefly. The intensity to see images of the Dalai Lama clearly illustrates their lack of religious freedom. Today, if a Tibetan is caught watching a video of the Dalai Lama or has pictures of the Dalai Lama within their home, they are condemned to six years of imprisonment (Heath, 2005: 19). Using Imprisonment as a way to enforce the ban on Dalai Lama images is clearly an example of a hard power policy because it is a form of punishment.

In 1995, a Buddhist nun named Chuying Kunsang (19 years old) shouted “Free Tibet” on a street in Lhasa and was sent to the notorious Drapchi Prison for five years. Once she was released, she escaped to the West and told her story. She was given flyers in prison with China’s version of Tibetan history. She was told to write a report on Tibet’s history
and since she did not agree with the “facts,” she was tortured three or four times a year. Chuying said that “they wanted to brainwash me about history, and they used torture to do it” (Laird, 2006: 369). They put electric cattle prods on her hands, lips, behind and cheeks. This system is a clear example of propaganda enforced with torture. Chuying said that the Chinese guards “set up this system so that after the torture the prisoners would agree that Tibet was always a part of China” (Laird, 2006: 369).

The Chinese government also denied the Tibetan people a very important religious tradition when they chose a different Panchen Lama (second highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama) than the one recognized by the Dalai Lama. The real Panchen Lama (who was chosen by the Dalai Lama) and his family are nowhere to be found. The Panchen Lama chosen by the CCP is from the same village as the real one, but the “fake” Panchen Lama’s parents are recognized members of the Communist Party. This is evidence that the Chinese government is trying to undermine Tibetan tradition and the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader (Grunfeld, 1996: 244). In regards to the Chinese choice for Panchen Lama, Chen Kuiyan, the Communist Party Secretary of the TAR in the 1990’s, quoted that “a qualified religious leader should, first of all, be a patriot. Any legitimate religion invariably makes patriotism the prime requirement for believers. A person who is unpatriotic...cannot be tolerated by religion” (Heath, 2005: 19). The Chinese government fears any religious leader because of their popularity among the people. By replacing the real Panchen Lama with their own choice, the government is able to control the actions of this religious leader. The PRC has no reason to fear a religious leader under their control. The Chinese government has placed deliberate attacks on
Tibetan Buddhism and the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader. According to John Heath, “the underlying problem for the Chinese is that Buddhism unifies all Tibetans and in adversity it helps to encourage in them a sense of nationhood. It is the living symbol of Tibet as a whole and its culture” (Heath, 2005: 20). This “living symbol” is what Beijing fears about religion in Tibet and it encourages the government to use hard power policies to eradicate religion.

As of today, five to six hundred Tibetans are believed to be detained for nonviolent expression of their political or religious beliefs. There is no knowledge of the real number of prisoners because China does not allow any outsiders to visit its prisons on a regular basis. The average sentence for “political prisoners” in custody at the end of 1998 was seven years, but some Tibetans arrested for peaceful protests were serving much harsher sentences. Many prisoners also face torture, beating, unfair trials, detention and isolation. From the time Tibetans are taken into custody until their eventual release, they may be held in police lockups, municipal or county detention centers, labor camps, prisons…etc. Many of these peaceful protesters never see a courtroom and are never given the chance to fight for their rights. China’s Criminal Procedure Law permits police to detain and hold a suspect for months while an investigation is carried out; most of the time these “investigations” were never completed (Aaronson, 2000: 146). According to Jeffrey Aaronson, “at present, silence, prison, or exile are still the only options for Tibetan dissidents” (Aaronson, 2000: 168). These are clear examples of hard power policies because the government is using force, punishment, and scare tactics to try and destroy religion.
The Uighur identity is greatly linked to Islamic traditions and faith, and has never fully assimilated into Chinese culture in the same way that many other minority nationalities in China have. The cultural differences between the Uighur and Han have spurred the growth of Islamic nationalism in Xinjiang which presents a real challenge for Beijing. Beijing has created hard power policies to eliminate the importance of Islam within the Uighur culture. According to Hierman, “the intensified level of state repression in the region encouraged the formation of organized clandestine groups able to carry out violent targeted actions against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). Within the XAR, the Chinese government focuses on protecting national security and unifying the nation. The Chinese response to contentious religious events is the placement of hard power policies to eradicate the Muslim faith.

Beginning in the 1980's, the Chinese government focused on limiting the contact between Muslims in Xinjiang and the broader Islamic world. The Chinese government feared that the Uighur would associate themselves with the other Muslim nations and have separatist thoughts. In order to limit communication with other Muslim nations, the CCP in 1988 established that only hajj applicants aged 50 and older are allowed to go to Mecca on a pilgrimage. In addition, no Chinese citizens are given permission to study in either Iran or Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 121). These restrictions also included forbidding meetings between Muslim clerics and foreigners; as well as forbidding foreign preachers from entering Xinjiang. The bans placed on communicating with neighboring Muslims are a hard power policy because it is an inflexible restriction. The Chinese government has also prohibited the teaching of sensitive subjects such as the
doctrine of *jihad*, a Muslim holy war against everyone that is not Muslim (Craig-Harris, 1993: 121). Another subject never discussed is Uighur history for fear that it could stir separatist thoughts because there is debate as to whether China has rightful claims to the land and people of Xinjiang.

The 1990’s placed greater restrictions on Islamic education, and even the construction of mosques. Many of these restrictions spurred massive riots and protests; many of which became violent. For example, in April 1990, a riot broke out in the town of Baran because the entire town was angered by the sudden closure of a mosque. When the town rose in a rebellion against the Chinese, 50 pro-independence Uighur rioters were killed by police gunfire. The Chinese police say that they were secretly training for a “holy war” against the Han and were going to use weapons obtained from fellow Islamic members in Pakistan (Craig-Harris, 1993: 118). After this riot, “8,000 officials in rural work teams were dispatched...to stabilize the border regions and strengthen political organizations.” This action took place to weaken the Islamic organizations and strengthen the state’s control of Xinjiang (Hierman, 2002: 52).

The numerous amounts of riots in the 1990’s forced the government to enforce the Strike Hard campaign in 1996. This campaign is a great example of a hard power policy in that it was considered a severe religious repression campaign. This campaign was in response to Uighur nationalism and many executions and arrests resulted from this campaign. The Strike Hard campaign also created a massive propaganda campaign to link Uighur nationalists with the Al-Qaeda terrorists. Officials also announced that all
Islamic publications now needed state approval (Hierman, 2002: 56). This campaign and other drastic policies have deepened many of the Uighur’s hatred towards the Han. The “intensified level of state repression in the region encouraged the formation of organized clandestine groups that were able to carry out violent targeted actions against the state” (Hierman, 2002: 51). After September 11, 2001, the number of arrests increased sharply because of the fear of Islamic terrorism and Beijing pushed even further the massive propaganda campaign to tie the Uighurs to Al-Qaeda. The CCP claimed that more than 1,000 Uighurs had traveled to Afghanistan to train with Al-Qaeda and other Islamic groups (Kurlantzick, 2004: 141). According to Reny, the post-September 11th United States war on terrorism has “encouraged China to pursue its Strike Hard campaign against nationalist and separatist religious militancy in Xinjiang,” and has “further legitimized its repressive actions by linking them to the US war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan” (Reny, 2009: 510). One of China’s most important goals as a nation is national security and because of the world wide war on Islamic terrorism, the Chinese government has placed stricter policies on the use of religion in Xinjiang.

Today, the Chinese government focuses much of their attention on eradicating the Islamic faith from the Uighur in Xinjiang. The PRC go about this process with hard policies that essentially discriminates any Uighur engaged in religious activity. No Uighur citizen can be a CCP member if they attend prayers or religious instruction. This means

that no Muslim Uighur can participate in the government or the decision making process on the different policies implemented in Xinjiang. The Uighur population encounters “discrimination against those engaged in religious practice” and this discrimination “has been maintained in the Chinese job market” (Reny, 2009: 508). Different forms of pressure are put on Muslim Uighurs in order to discourage them from engaging in customs considered “Islamic” or practice their religion. Public sector employees are not allowed to wear clothing marked as religious, such as coverings for women or embroidered skullcap for men. The Muslim Uighur population “cannot find a job in the state or state-sponsored sectors of the Xinjiang economy” (Reny, 2009: 509).

By creating discrimination against those who practice Islam, the Chinese government creates a monetary incentive for the Uighur to not practice religion. Any form of purposeful discrimination is a hard power policy based on the emotional trauma and economic difficulties for those who experience the discrimination.

The government has also conducted severe monitoring of religious activities in Xinjiang. The CCP requires all Islamic organizations and places of worship to register with the Religious Affairs Bureau in Beijing (Kaltman, 2007: 127). Uighurs under the age of 18 are not allowed to receive any kind of religious instruction. In addition, all Islamic texts are under state control. The Ulama’s, the Muslim clergy who are trained in the study of Islamic sciences, are also controlled by Beijing (Reny, 2009: 509). Kaltman interviewed many Uighur in the capital city of Xinjiang, Urumqi, about the subject of religious freedom. Kaltman determined that “of the Uighur I interviewed in Urumqi... 82% responded negatively when asked about religious freedom in China. This negative view
was uniformly held by men and women of all ages, single and married, professional and nonprofessional alike” (Kaltman, 2007: 43). Kaltman also noted that most Uighur in Urumqi today only pray within their hearts as opposed to the mosques because of the need to do business for money and that they feel uncomfortable going to the mosques (Kaltman, 2007: 45). When Kaltman asked the Uighur in Urumqi about praying, religion, and mosque attendance, most Uighur “were completely unwilling to discuss it and seemed genuinely upset that I wanted to” (Kaltman, 2007: 52). According to Gladney, “China’s Muslims are clearly the most threatened in terms of self-preservation and Islamic identity” (Gladney, 2003: 451).

Religion is not favored in a Communist/Marxist society and the Chinese government wants to erase religion from Tibet and Xinjiang to assimilate the minority groups into Chinese society and to protect national security. There are numerous reasons as to why the Chinese government fears religion. One of the main reasons the PRC are afraid of religion is because they are nervous that minority citizens will pledge alliance to religious groups and will not be loyal to the Chinese nation. In order to prevent possible separatist thoughts, the government has implemented hard power policies. These hard power policies use force, bans and scare tactics to enforce Beijing’s main goal of eradicating religion.

Conclusion

The Chinese government is greatly concerned over the minority nationalities and whether these groups will assimilate to Chinese society because Beijing fears any signs
of threats to national security or separatism. The CCP believe if the minority groups were to assimilate to Chinese society, there may be fewer threats. Beijing must carefully approach their main goal of assimilation with minority nationalities in order to avoid discontent among the minority groups. This balancing act of trying to achieve Beijing’s main objective without angering the minority nationalities is an extremely difficult task.

The PRC has implemented many different policies in various realms in hopes of achieving a unified nation without encountering problems with the minority groups. I looked at education, language and religious policies specifically to show how the government is using these realms to accomplish their goals. Within these realms, I argue that Beijing uses a distinction between soft and hard power policies.

Soft and hard power policies are used by the PRC strategically. The government uses soft power policies when there is little to no threat to national security or signs of separatism. Hard power policies are used when the government feels there are possibilities of threats to the nation. Soft power policy techniques include positive incentives, subtle persuasion, flexible laws and more covert objectives. Hard power policy techniques include strict bans, clear restrictions, force, punishment, inflexible laws, and less covert objectives. In China, education and language policies are soft power for multiple reasons. One reason that education policies are soft power is because the government has complete control over the education system. One example as to why language policies are soft power is because there are no restrictions on how many languages a citizen is allowed to speak. One main reason that religious policies are hard power is because Beijing fears minority citizens will proclaim allegiance to an
organized religious group that could undermine the government’s authority. These
different policy realms seem to clearly indicate that Beijing uses different tactics
dependent on the government’s view as to whether something is a threat or not. The
Chinese government implements these policies to achieve their goals of assimilation and
the protection of a unified nation.
## Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Protest Description</th>
<th>Premeditated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Kazakh demonstration in Ghulja</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Demonstration in Urumchi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Demonstration in Beijing over a controversial book&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Demonstration in Beijing over a controversial book&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Demonstration/riot in Urumchi</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Demonstration in Yarkand&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Barren Uprising</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Anti-state disturbances in northwestern Xinjiang</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Bombing in Korla</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Insurgency in Tacheng</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Insurgency in Bole</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Tax drivers protest&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>February</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Bombings in Urumchi</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Spate of bombings in five locations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Demonstration in Lop Nor</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Kazakh demonstration in Ili</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Bombing in Kashgar</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Assassination attempt on Xinjiang Regional People's Congress chairman</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Bombing in Shache</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Bombings in Kashgar and four other cities</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Bombing in Hotan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September-October</td>
<td>Riots in Xining&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Bombing in Toquu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Student protest in Urumchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Three days of riots and demonstrations in Ghulja&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Riot in Hotan</td>
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</table>
A list of riots and protests within Xinjiang from 1988-2001. This chart outlines when and where the riots occurred and whether there was premeditated violence or not. There was at least one riot every year from 1988-2001 in Xinjiang.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Premeditated Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>February-April</td>
<td>Violent activities (assassinations, arsons, bombings) near Aqsu</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Bombing in Urumchi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Assassination of Islamic Committee leader</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Bombings in Kasa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Street fighting in several locations</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Assassination of pro-government mullah</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Bombing in Shayx</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Prison break, police clash</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Assault on government officials in Qagghi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Murder of four in Korla by settlers with plan to kill 40 more</td>
<td>Han</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Riot in Ghulja</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Assassination of Binglean head</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>February</td>
<td>Bombings in Urumchi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Bombing of arms factory</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Riot in Ghulja</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Assassination of a cadre member</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Assassination of a cadre member</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Assassination of four Chinese officials in Aqsu²</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Car bombing (two officials killed)²</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Bombings of railroad line from Korla to Kashgar²</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Riots in six cities²</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Series of bombings of government buildings²</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Assassination of Islamic Association member</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Assassination of head of Yecheng mosque</td>
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<td>January</td>
<td>Series of livestock poisonings</td>
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<td>February</td>
<td>Disturbance in Ghulja</td>
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<td>February/March</td>
<td>Bombings in Qagghi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Eight bombings in one day in Qagghi</td>
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<td>May</td>
<td>Arsons in Urumchi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Bombing in Khotan and Korla¹</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Murder of eight policemen in Kashgar¹</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Riot in Urumchi</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
<td>Bombing of bus in Changxi¹</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>July</td>
<td>Armed attack in Hotan</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>Armed attack in Lop Nor</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>Assassination of patrol station commander in Zapa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>October</td>
<td>Attack on commander of police station in Hotan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Riot between Muslims from Xinjiang and police in Shenzhen</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Riot in Urumchi</td>
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Bibliography


