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The Differing Effects of Mood Priming

On High versus Low Self-Monitors

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Abstract

The study investigated the influence of mood priming and how the influence could be different between high and low self-monitors. High self-monitors would exhibit more of a change in mood after the priming as compared to low self-monitors. Ninety-seven participants at Union College completed the self-monitoring scale, randomly underwent either positive, negative, or neutral mood priming, and then reported on their moods. There was a significant difference found between the moods of high and low self-monitors. Low self-monitors reported happier feelings in the positive mood condition as well as lower moods in the negative mood condition than high self-monitors.

The Differing Effects of Mood Priming on High versus Low Self-Monitors

Priming, according to Bicchieri (2006) is "...an increase in the speed or accuracy of a decision that occurs as a consequence of prior exposure to some of the information in the decision context, without intention or task-related motivations" (pg 71). In other words, priming involves introducing participants to a stimulus, which affects their reaction to a stimulus presented afterwards. Meyer & Schvaneveldt (1971) demonstrated the use of priming with a lexical decision task. Participants viewed two strings of letters simultaneously, with one string located above the other, and responded if the letter strings were words or not. The priming effect was shown when participants were able to respond more quickly if the two letter strings were semantically related words (i.e., participants were faster to answer that 'doctor' was a word when it was following 'nurse', compared to 'north' or the fictional word 'nuber'). The results of the experiment indicated that priming should be considered an automatic process, one that occurs unintentionally.

Priming can be expanded to influence the opinions of participants. Women exposed to gender-stereotypical commercials during priming were less willing to take a leading role in a subsequent project than women who viewed neutral commercials, or men in either condition (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005). Racial stereotypes have also been shown to increase in strength during priming.

Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997) presented a prime of words associated with either black or white colors outside of conscious awareness and then a target stimulus that required a word-nonword decision. The results of the experiment showed the effect of prejudice because the black primes showed stronger

facilitation to negative than positive stereotypic traits, and vice versa for the white primes. The priming demonstrated that racial prejudices can be strengthened through the effect of priming.

Mood priming is another subcategory of priming, and it is considered a popular and valuable tool used in many various psychological experiments. Researchers present participants with different stimuli (ie, a reading, photographs, etc) in order to target a certain state of mind. Bower (1981) demonstrated that both happy and sad induced moods boosted mood-state-dependent memory in affectively congruent situations. The experiment showed that mood induced participants had higher memory recall for similarly emotional childhood events than participants in a neutral mood. In other words, participants who experienced induced happiness had an easier time recalling happy memories from childhood than the participants who did not have an induced mood. The participants demonstrated emotional congruence between the induced mood and a naturally occurring mood. Data from the first two studies done by Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans (1992) similarly suggested that laboratory induced moods have similar effects to natural moods in a college student population. An induced mood therefore should have the same impact as a naturally occurring mood.

The induced mood of participants can have a significant impact upon their behavior, performance, and feelings. Fisher & Marrow (1934) showed that participants in the negative mood condition had slower reaction times in a free association task. Participants were submitted to a hypnosis procedure in order to induce mood and then completed a timed association task with words that were

either without strong mood associations, pleasant, unpredictable, or unpleasant. The times were then compared across the different induced mood conditions. Data from the timed task showed that on average, participants in the negative mood condition responded more slowly than the positive mood condition participants or those in the neutral while the participants in the positive condition were faster than those in the neutral. The induced negative mood led to a feeling of lethargy in the participants such that they were not able to perform the task as quickly as those experiencing a positive mood.

Further experimentation has shown that participants who experienced induced moods exhibited altered behaviors. Matheny & Blue (1977) had three different conditions for participants, including elation, depression, or neutrality. In a comparison between pre- and post-test scores on timed activities, elation-condition participants had higher reaction times than those in either the neutral or depression conditions. Overall, participants in the depression condition reported that the induced mood procedure hurt their writing speed, decision time, and reaction time, while the participants in the positive mood condition found the treatment to be helpful.

Mentally, participants who experience mood induction reported changes in their locus of control (Natale, 1978). According to the research, participants completed the Locus of Control Scale, went through a mood induction procedure, and then filled the scale out a second time. The pre-post test changes showed that elation led to a higher sense of internality, depression to a higher sense of externality, and no change in the neutral condition. In other words, participants in a

negative mood are much more likely to blame the environment or other outside factors for influencing their lives, rather than accepting the responsibility.

One of the most well established methods intended to induce different mood states comes from Velten (1967, 1968). In the experiment, 100 undergraduate students completed the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility to demonstrate the baseline of suggestibility. The participants were then randomly assigned to one of five conditions including control, positive mood, negative mood, simulated elation, and simulated depression. The participants in the elation or depression conditions viewed sixty statements intended to produce an altered mood, while those in the neutral condition simply read sixty facts. After completing the mood induction, participants completed a variety of timed tasks in order to monitor their reaction time. Results from the experiment indicated that the participants in the elated condition performed tasks more quickly than both the neutral and depression conditions, and then neutral condition outperformed the depression condition. Similar results were found in terms of decision time, and word association reaction time. The depression condition participants were slowed down by the sad thoughts while those in the elation condition had improved work ethic and could complete tasks at a more efficient pace. The results showed the effectiveness of the inducted mood states.

Past research (Goritz & Moser, 2006) has shown that mood induction is less effective online rather than in person regardless of type of induction utilized. The three types of mood priming included the Velten technique, photographs, and autobiographical recall, with comparable results across the different conditions.

Data revealed that while participants in the negative mood condition had an overall lower mood than those in the control group, there was not a significant mood difference between those in the control group and those in the positive mood condition. Several factors may account for the difference but it is likely that the online version is simply not as refined as the practiced paper method. While negative mood could be successfully induced in the online experiment, positive feelings were not reliably recorded.

However, Verheyen & Goritz (2009) also tested the effectiveness of mood-induction in an online environment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four different conditions. The experiment included eight different groups of participants within the four different conditions. Two groups were control, two were aimed at inducing a negative mood, and the other four were geared towards inducing a positive mood. The increased number of participants in the positive conditions allowed the researcher to try a greater variety of positive mood inducing techniques. The results showed that participants in the positive condition reported higher moods were that were significantly different from the neutral condition, though not as different as between the neutral and negative conditions. In other words, positive moods could be induced through online techniques, but the positive feelings were not as strongly different from neutral as the negative feelings.

Based upon the past research, mood-induction has shown to be an effective technique for altering the emotional mindset of a participant. The effect of induction is true for all, but it may be more likely or more effective for some participants than for others based upon different personality factors. One factor

potentially influencing the mood priming could be self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is the practice by which people may observe and control their expressive behaviors and social presentation (Snyder, 1974). Expressive control of behavior is commonly used in everyday social interactions as a way to convey internal status with nonverbal cues, including facial expressions, gesticulations, and posture. The famed actor Sir Tyrone Guthrie (Forsyth, 1976) believed that such expressions facilitated communication; that acting was simply an extension of the control. As such, expressive control can be used to not only boost social actions, but also to hinder them through deceit and lying.

Past research has shown that different people have different levels of expressive control (Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Siegman & Reynolds, 1983). Logically, it makes sense that some people would naturally make better actors than others, simply because they have higher control over their expressions. One theory to explain the individual differences in levels of expressive control is Snyder's theory of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring concerns the extent to which people purposefully develop a public façade and the consequences of that decision (Gangestad & Snyder, 1991; Snyder, 1974, 1987). Snyder believed that stable individual differences exist in the extent to which individuals routinely monitor their impressions to others. He believed that some people, known as high self-monitors, are those more concerned with expressive self-presentation. Other people, those known as low self-monitors, do not engage in expressive control.

Snyder (1974) developed a continuum scale to measure self-monitoring. In the study, 192 Stanford University undergraduates answered forty-one true/false

self-descriptive statements. The statements were concerned with five different items, including concern regarding social appropriateness of one's appearance, attention paid to social comparison cues, the ability to control or modify expressive behavior, when that ability is applicable, and the cross-situational consistency of expressive behavior. Based upon that study, sixteen of the forty-one tested statements were removed because they were not substantially supported by the data. The original self-monitoring scale therefore consisted of the remaining twenty-five true/false items that demonstrated validity. Follow-up studies were conducted with different groups of participants in order to validate the self-monitoring scale. The results showed that theater actors scored higher than and psychiatric ward patients scored lower than university students, consistent with the self-monitoring hypothesis.

The original twenty-five statement scale was later modified to only include eighteen items (Snyder, 1987). The removal of seven items increased the reliability of the self-monitoring scale without diminishing from its established intrinsic validity. Deleted items included those such as *I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am* and *In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what other people expect me to be rather than anything else*. The statements removed from the scale consisted of those that did not statistically discriminate well between the more moderately scoring high and low self-monitors, such that the revised scale demonstrated a higher internal consistency (coefficient alpha = .70) than that of the original (.66). On the eighteen item scale, low self-monitors agree with statements such as *I have trouble changing my behavior to suit*

different people and different situations and I would not change my opinion (or the way I do things) in order to please people or win their favor (Snyder, 1974, 1987).

High self-monitors are likely to agree with statements such as *I would probably make a good actor* and/or *In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons* (Snyder, 1974, 1987).

Participants with a score greater than or equal to eleven on the eighteen-item scale are considered high self-monitors and those scoring less than or equal to ten are considered low self-monitors (Snyder, 1987). Gangestad & Snyder (1985) estimated that college students with a score of eleven or higher had over a .5 probability of belonging to the category of high self-monitors. A purer sample of data would consist of those found only in the upper and low quartiles (participants scoring thirteen and over for high self-monitors; seven and below for low self-monitors).

Individual differences in self-monitoring are measured by the self-monitoring scale, first developed by Snyder in 1974. High self-monitors are those likely to exhibit 'chameleon' behaviors – they have a heightened ability to perceive social clues and react correspondingly. They may have different groups of friends in different contexts, and may themselves appear to be different persons in varied settings (Snyder, 1974). The behavior could stem from a desire to behave in a manner appropriate to the current social situation. High self-monitors are willing, and able, to project an image to impress or blend in with others. As such, the high self-monitors continually regulate the social environment and therefore engage in a high level of expressive control. Low self-monitors, in contrast, do not exhibit the

same urge to demonstrate situationally appropriate behaviors. Rather, they express their own inner thoughts and feelings with their behaviors.

Earlier research suggests that high self-monitors are more influenced than lows by environmental and external cues. Snyder & Monson (1975) studied participants in either a public or private discussion condition where the public condition was monitored with a video camera, microphone, and a one-way mirror while the private condition had only a table and chairs. Participants in the public condition were told that the videotaped conversation would be used as an in-class example. All participants obtained a booklet of four hypothetical choice situations to be discussed with the rest of the group and they were specifically told that they did not have to reach a consensus. It was predicted that high self-monitors would conform to the majority opinion more in the private condition than in the public one because they would have a more immediate reference group available. In close company, the high self-monitors would feel more pressure to adhere to the norm than amongst larger crowd. Results were consistent with the hypothesis; low self-monitors were consistent across the conditions while high self-monitors conformed more in the private than public condition.

Klein, Snyder, and Livingston (2004) studied the relationship between personality and situational adaptability in terms of the moderating role of an audience on prejudice. The researchers hypothesized that “individual differences in sensitivity to situational cues, or concerns with social appropriateness” would be a strong moderator of expressing prejudice (Klein, Snyder, & Livingston, 2004, pg 301). Participants completed the self-monitoring scale as well as a scale measuring

their levels of prejudice towards homosexuals. Several weeks later, the same participants returned to take part in a seemingly unrelated study. The participants were told to fill out a questionnaire on the couples, and that they would be discussing their answers afterwards with either a tolerant, intolerant, or no audience. The results showed that overall, high self-monitors more frequently expressed prejudice when expecting an intolerant or no audience, and were less likely to express prejudice before a tolerant audience compared to low self-monitors.

Differing levels of self-monitoring also plays a role in adolescents' susceptibility to peer pressure. A longitudinal study (Perrine & Aloise-Young, 2004) administered the junior self-monitoring scale, a self reported history of smoking habits, and measures of both active and passive peer pressure to the participants. A follow up survey of the participants found that high self-monitors who considered smoking to be a normative behavior were more likely to become smokers than those who did not find it a normative behavior. The decision to become a smoker was not dependent upon normative beliefs for low self-monitors. High self-monitors reported a higher likelihood to submit to peer pressure when they considered smoking to be a normal activity than low self-monitors. The reported scores from the study indicated that high self-monitors were more vulnerable than lows to the influences of their peers.

High self-monitors are also less likely to demonstrate high attitude-behavior consistency than low self-monitors. Snyder & Swann (1976) monitored how participants formed judgments of liability in court cases. The participants reported

on their attitudes about affirmative action two weeks before the experiment was conducted. During the study, participants read a case and then recorded a verdict as a simulated juror. Results showed that the attitudes reported by high self-monitors in the preexperimental session were not good indicators of their verdicts. The results presumably differ because the high self-monitors modified their statement to fit in with the immediate social situation. In contrast, low self-monitors indicated verdicts that were consistent with their reported beliefs. That is, the low self-monitors were less affected by the environmental cues involved in the simulation than the high self-monitors.

Based upon the research of mood priming and self-monitoring, low self-monitors may be less influenced by the mood induction when compared to high self-monitors. Since mood priming relies upon participants picking up on social clues and reacting accordingly, high self-monitors are likely to be receptive to adapting to the proposed emotional climate while low self-monitors should be more resistant to internal mood shifts based on changes in the external environment. It is hypothesized that high self-monitors will experience a greater amount of emotional change based on mood induction in comparison to low self-monitors.

Method

Participants

Ninety-seven undergraduate students at a private college participated in the experiment in exchange for class credit or cash. Four participants were eliminated from the data sample for completing the experiment incorrectly. The sample included 67 females and 26 males. The average age of the participants was 19.59

years. They voluntarily chose to complete the experiment through Union College. Participants signed up online through www.freud.union.edu.

Materials and procedure

The study consisted of a combination of a handwritten and computerized assignment. Deception was used in the introduction to the study in order to reduce the possibility of participants responding inaccurately. Participants were informed that the experiment would be testing differing factors on memory capabilities to disguise the true hypothesis. There were three possible conditions; a control group that read a neutral mood induction, a positive mood induction, and a negative mood induction for both high and low self-monitors, creating a total of six different groups. Participants were assigned randomly to one of the conditions based upon their Freud timeslot. The experiment took one half-hour to complete and was always run in three consecutive blocks. As such, they had an equal chance of being assigned to any of the three conditions. Each participant filled out the self-monitoring scale developed by Snyder and Gangestad (1986). The scale included the items listed in Appendix A.

After completing the self-monitoring scale, participants began the computerized section of the study. The next part of the experiment consisted of the mood priming, developed from the Mood Induction Procedure by Velten (1967). All participants saw the following instructions: "A series of statements will appear onscreen. I will take the time to read the statement in my head, and then I will read it out loud once. I will then go over the statement again and again in my head and concentrate my full attention on it. In doing so, I will always attempt to respond to

the feeling suggested by each statement. I am letting myself be receptive to these feelings.”

Each item for each condition came up on screen for fifteen seconds. After a brief pause, the next item appeared. During this time, participants had no control over the progression of the experiment. The positive, negative, and neutral mood induction statements can be found in Appendices B, C, and D, respectively.

Next, the participants presented with a list of emotional words. Participants indicated to what extent they were currently feeling each emotion on a 1 – 5 item scale where 1 indicates *very slightly* or *not at all* and 5 indicates *extremely*. The positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) used in the study was based off of Watson & Clark (1988). A list of emotion words used in the experiment can be found in Appendix E.

Participants will finally be asked to write down as many of the mood statements as they can recall, as per the deception. Upon completion of the memory task, participants were debriefed on the study.

Results

The self-monitoring scale was scored in accordance the description established by Snyder and Gangestad (1986). If the answer of the participant matched the key's answer (found in Appendix A), then one point was awarded. If the answer was different, then the participant did not receive a point on the item. The points were added up for all eighteen items. As per the recommendations of Snyder & Gangestad (1986), those with a score of eleven or higher were classified as

a high self-monitor while those with ten or fewer points were considered low self-monitors.

To determine the mood of each participant, the negative emotion words on the PANAS scale were first negatively scored. For example, if a participant had answered "Irritable" with a 4, then it would be reverse scored as a -4. The positive affect was calculated by adding together the scores on each of the positive words and the negative affect by adding together all of the negative word scores. The overall mood score was calculated by adding together the positive affect and the negative affect (i.e. $+30 + -25 = 5$). The average mood scores for participants in each condition can be found in Table 1. Higher scores on this index indicate more positive moods.

In order to examine the effects of mood priming on high and low self-monitors, overall mood scores were submitted to a 2 (High and Low Self-Monitors) x 3 (Positive, Negative, or Neutral Prime Condition) ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant main effect for condition, $F(2,87) = 19.5, p = 0.00$ and a significant self-monitoring x mood priming interaction, $F(2, 87) = 3.83, p = .025$. The main effect for self-monitoring was not significant, $F(1,87) = 0, p > .05$.

Follow up tests on the condition main effect indicated that the mood of those in the Positive Prime condition was significantly more positive than the mood of those in the Negative Prime Condition, $t(87) = 6.65, p < .05$. Similarly, participant mood was significantly more positive in the Positive Prime condition than in the Neutral Condition, $t(87) = 4.21, p < .05$, and the mood of those in the Negative Prime

condition was marginally less positive than the mood of those in the Neutral Condition, $t(87) = -1.82, p = .07$.

A breakdown of the significant interaction indicated that, in the Positive Prime condition, low self-monitors reported being in a significantly *more positive mood* than did high self-monitors, $t(87) = 2.02, p = .046$. Conversely, low self-monitors in the Negative Prime condition reported being in a *more negative mood* than did high self-monitors, although this effect did not quite reach statistical significance, $t(87) = -1.88, p = .06$. A significant difference did not exist between High and Low self-monitors in the Neutral Condition $t(87) = -.14, p = .89$.

Discussion

The results indicate that overall, low self-monitors were more influenced by the mood induction than the high self-monitors. While the data failed to support the original hypothesis, significant results were found between differing levels of self-monitoring.

The results could be due to different levels of self-awareness between the self-monitors. Self-awareness is a component of self-consciousness that describes the individual's understanding of his or her own internalized state (Wheeler, Morrison, DeMarree, & Petty, 2007). As low self-monitors are more in touch with their internalized states than high self-monitors, they may have been able to more accurately identify the different feelings from the mood induction. The higher level of self-awareness from the low self-monitors would explain the wider range of scores as they could understand and interpret their inner status. High self-

monitors may have had a smaller range of responses because they were less self-aware and therefore could not report their emotions as strongly.

Searle (1998) recognized that consciousness, or self-awareness, could be an intentional decision. In that explanation, the mood induction used in the experiment could have triggered a vague emotional response in the low self-monitors. Such feelings would have been inconsistent with their prior internal state and thus caused a disturbance. As the induced mood feelings were brought into consciousness, the brains of the low self-monitors may have made the commitment to reinforce the internal state with beliefs and memories that further enhanced the mood priming. In other words, the consciousness of the environmentally induced feelings led the low self-monitors to reinforce the feelings based upon internalized personal experiences. In contrast, high self-monitors would have been more accepting of the cues from the environment and not felt the impulse to intentionally justify the emotions.

Past research supports the theory that low self-monitors have higher levels of private self-awareness than high self-monitors. Low self-monitors, when focused on their own private self, had better access to their own self-awareness (Webb, Marsh, Schneiderman, & Davis, 1989). High self-monitors performed better when focused upon a public self-awareness. The data may have suggested that high self-monitors would experience more mood induction in a one-on-one setting while the low self-monitors were able to respond in accordance with their internalized states in the private computerized cubicles.

There were several other smaller discrepancies within the current experiment. Data were inconsistent with past research regarding the online effect of mood induction. In the original experiment, positive mood was not statistically significant from neutral mood, but it was possible to successfully induce a negative mood (Goritz & Moser, 2006). The current research supported a significant positive mood induction compared to the neutral and negative conditions but not a difference between the negative and neutral. It could also be argued that the mood induction was not truly considered online, as there was temporary face-to-face interaction between the participants and the researcher. A second explanation for the results could be that the neutral condition had an overall more positive mood than negative ($M = 5.75$), indicating that the participants were generally happier people. The elevated average could indicate that the neutral mood priming was ineffective as a controlled baseline measure of mood.

Similarly, there is not research to support the idea that the shortened version of the Velten mood induction technique was equal across the conditions. For the large number of participants used in the experiment, it was not a practical option to test individually in a face-to-face setting. A baseline study should be completed to study the effect of the abbreviated mood induction to ensure that the results were due to equal priming. In a future replication of the experiment, the full Velten procedure should be run on the participants. While it would increase the length of the experiment, it would provide a more accurate view of the induction.

The current experiment could also be changed to include a task before the induction intended to measure mood. For example, research shows that

participants may perform more poorly on a Stoop test when they are in a positive mood (Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Inclusion of the task before the Velten mood induction would give a better picture of change in mood without the participants developing response bias. The mood analysis task would provide a baseline in order to measure the effectiveness of the induction for both high and low self-monitors. In those ways, future reliability and validity could be ensured.

One additional variable to be considered in the future would be the role of gender on the effect of mood induction and self-monitoring. The current study included a disproportionate number of females to males. Future studies should take into account the overall role of emotionality in regards to males and females and how that could influence the mood induction.

Future research in the interaction of mood priming and self-monitoring could include different types of induction for the different levels of monitoring. As priming is commonly used in psychology research, the experimenters would no longer be able to assume that the effects would be equal on all participants. Researchers hoping to induce a certain mood in their participants may have to consider the implications of self-monitoring and the moderating effect that it may have on the priming.

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Table 1.

	Low Self Monitors	High Self Monitors	Overall Average
Positive Condition	21.38	13.57	18.26
Negative Condition	-2.89	4.40	0.32
Neutral Condition	5.42	6.08	5.75

Average Participant Mood Scores

Appendix A

Self Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986)

1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people (F)
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like (F)
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe (F)
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information (T)
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people (T)
6. I would probably make a good actor (T)
7. In groups of people, I am rarely the center of attention (F)
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons (T)
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me (F)
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be (T)
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor (F)
12. I have considered being an entertainer (T)
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting (F)
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations (F)
15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going (F)
16. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should (F)
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end) (T)
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them (T)

Appendix B

Positive Mood Inducing Statements (Velten, 1967)

1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day
2. I do feel pretty good today, though
3. This might turn out to have been one of my good days
4. I feel cheerful and lively
5. My parents are pretty proud of me most of the time
6. I'm glad I'm in college – it's the key to success nowadays
7. I'm pleased that most people are so friendly to me
8. It's encouraging that as I get further into my major, it's going to take less study to get good grades
9. This is one of those days when I can grind schoolwork with practically no effort at all
10. If I set my mind to it, I can make things turn out fine
11. I feel enthusiastic and confident now
12. There should be opportunity for a lot of good times coming along
13. I'm full of energy, and am really getting to like the things I'm doing on campus
14. I'm able to do things accurately and efficiently
15. I know good and well that I can achieve the goals I set
16. I feel so vivacious and efficient today – sitting on top of the world
17. In the long run, it's obvious that things have gotten better and better during my life
18. I know that in the future I won't over-emphasize so-called "problems"
19. I'm feeling amazingly good today!
20. I feel that many of my friendships will stick with me in the future
21. I can find good in almost anything
22. I feel highly perceptive and refreshed
23. In a buoyant mood like this one, I can work fast and do it right the first time
24. Life is so much fun; it seems to offer so many sources of fulfillment
25. I can make decisions rapidly and correctly, and I can defend them against criticism easily
26. Life is firmly in my control
27. This is great – I really do feel good. I feel elated about things
28. This is just one of those days when I'm ready to go!
29. I feel like bursting with laughter – I wish somebody would tell a joke and give me an excuse!
30. God, I feel great!

Appendix C

Negative Mood Inducing Statements (Velten, 1967)

1. Today is neither better nor worse than any other day
2. However, I feel a little low today
3. Every now and then I feel so tired and gloomy that I'd rather just sit than do anything
4. Too often I have found myself staring listlessly into the distance, my mind a blank, when I definitely should have been studying
5. It has occurred to me more than once that study is basically useless, because you forget almost everything you learn anyway
6. I've had important decisions to make in the past, and I've sometimes made the wrong ones
7. I do feel somewhat discouraged and drowsy – maybe I'll need a nap when I get home
8. There have been days when I felt weak and confused, and everything went miserably wrong
9. I've had daydreams in which my mistakes keep occurring to me – sometimes I wish I could start over again
10. I'm getting tired out. I can feel my body getting exhausted and heavy (21)
11. At times I've been so tired and discouraged that I went to sleep rather than face important problems
12. My life is so tiresome – the same old thing day after day depresses me (24)
13. I want to go to sleep – I feel like just closing my eyes and going to sleep right here
14. I'm not very alert; I feel listless and vaguely sad
15. I've doubted that I'm not a worthwhile person
16. It often seems that no matter how hard I try, things still go wrong
17. I've noticed that no one seems to really understand or care when I complain or feel unhappy about myself
18. I'm uncertain about my future
19. Things are worse now than when I was younger
20. I feel tired and depressed; I don't feel like working on the things I know I must get done
21. I feel horribly guilty about how I've treated my parents at time
22. Things are easier and better for other people than for me
23. It's so discouraging the way people don't really listen to me
24. I've felt so alone before, that I could have cried
25. My thoughts are so slow and downcast I don't want to think or talk
26. Life seems too much for me anyhow – my efforts are wasted
27. I have too many bad things in my life
28. I don't want to do anything
29. All the unhappiness of my past life is taking possession of me
30. I want to go to sleep and never wake up

Appendix D

Neutral Mood Priming Statements (Velten, 1967)

1. Japan was elected to the United Nations almost fourteen years after Pearl Harbor
2. We have two kinds of nouns denoting physical things: individual and mass nouns
3. Saturn is sometimes in conjunction, beyond the sun from the earth, and is not visible
4. Some streets were still said to be listed under their old names
5. There is a large rose growing near Tyer, Texas
6. Many states supply milk for grammar school children
7. The machine dominated county posts for as long as anyone could remember
8. The Orient Express travels between Paris and Istanbul
9. When the Banyan bent down under it's own weight, its branches began to take root
10. The Hope Diamond was shipped from South Africa to London through the regular mail service
11. The ship was ancient, and would soon be retired from the fleet
12. Slang is a constantly changing part of the language
13. There are some forms in which no oath is required
14. Intramatics finds mates for the lonely
15. 99.1% of Alaska is owned by the Federal government
16. Two men dressed as repairmen will appear shortly after the van pulls up
17. The wood was discolored as if it had been held in a fire
18. A light was noticed in the dark outside, and it moved eerily towards the house
19. Provoked arousal and orientation are accompanied by steeper negative shifts
20. The names on the Christmas mailing list are alphabetically ordered
21. Significantly, these changes occur during the full moon
22. The map would prove useless as a beginning guide
23. Black and white pictures are arranged in ten sections
24. The notice made it clear that coffee breaks were being limited
25. The doorkeeper was dressed in red
26. The organization depended on the people for support
27. It was their sixth consecutive best seller
28. The merger did not change the company's policy
29. Utah is the beehive state
30. A free sample will be given to each person who enters the store

Appendix E

Emotion Words (Watson & Clark, 1988)

Interested (+)	Irritable (-)
Distressed (-)	Alert (+)
Excited (+)	Ashamed (-)
Upset (-)	Inspired (+)
Strong (+)	Nervous (-)
Guilty (-)	Determined (+)
Scared (-)	Attentive (+)
Hostile (-)	Jittery (-)
Enthusiastic (+)	Active (+)
Proud (+)	Afraid (-)