

6-2014

Soccer Violence: An Examination of Hooliganism and Violence Against Referees in Latin America and Worldwide

Dean Constant

Union College - Schenectady, NY

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses>



Part of the [Sports Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Constant, Dean, "Soccer Violence: An Examination of Hooliganism and Violence Against Referees in Latin America and Worldwide" (2014). *Honors Theses*. 501.

<https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/501>

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact digitalworks@union.edu.

Soccer Violence: An Examination of Hooliganism and Violence Against Referees in
Latin America and Worldwide

By Dean Constant

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
Honors in the Departments of Psychology and Latin American Studies

Introduction

A soccer referee's job is both physically and mentally taxing, as the referee typically runs between 9 to 13 kilometers per game, while making more than 130 calls (Gabrilo, Ostojic, Idrizovic, Novosel, & Sekulic 2013). On one hand, it is very difficult to make every correct decision with the game developing at a sometimes-frantic pace, while also having to run to follow the action. Perhaps the most challenging aspect, however, arises from the referee's task of having to make decisions that go to the contrary of one team. Referees are told to remain impartial and to avoid letting the pressure of the team's fans and players affect how they call the game (Groot, 2005). Referees receive the ire of fans, coaches, and players and are seldom celebrated or lauded for their efforts. It is hard to fathom why a person would subject themselves to a job with such harsh criticism and stress.

One such referee is Octavio Jordao da Silva Catanhede Jordan. The 20 year-old referee was working an amateur game in the small rural community of Centro do Meio in Brazil's northern state of Maranhao on June 30th, 2013 (Collman, 2013). The young referee made a decision during the game to give a red card to 31 year-old Josemir dos Santos Abreu. Red cards are a controversial ruling in soccer not only because they eject the player from the current game and the proceeding match, but also due to the fact that they force a team to play the remainder of the game a player down. Red cards are highly protested by the recipient team and their fans due to the significant effect it has on the outcome. Aware of the basic repercussions, the young man issued the card to Abreu. What ensued after the decision is almost incomprehensible.

Upon receiving the ejection, the infuriated Abreu threw the young referee to the ground. As he came to his feet, Jordan pulled a knife that he was carrying and stabbed

Abreu in his chest, and Abreu died while traveling to the hospital. Upon pulling the knife on Abreu, the other players and spectators stormed Silva, promptly tying him up by his extremities. Luis Moraes Souza, the only person later detained in the incident, hit Silva on the head with a spike and broke a bottle on the young man's face. Following that, one spectator took a knife, the same one used by Silva when he stabbed Abreu, and stabbed Silva in the neck. Francisco Souza, Luis' brother, then utilized a sickle, cutting off Silva's legs, arms, and head, which he then placed on a spike in the middle of the field. Although it would appear to resemble more closely a scene from William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*, this executioner style murder of Silva occurred after the issuance of a red card in an amateur soccer game in Brazil. While the police chief Valter Costa said that this was an isolated incident, in his statement he elaborated that all those who witnessed the act will be prosecuted, as it said "We will identify and hold accountable all those involved. A crime will never justify another." (Collman, 2013).

A clarifying point should be made regarding this incident. While this barbaric incident occurred in part as a response to a red card issued in a soccer game, it is not appropriate to suggest that soccer itself is the sole determinant of the chaos that ensued. Violence that occurs within the context of soccer matches is not because of the game itself, and this paper will examine the forces surrounding the game that can result in its violent aftermath. In this instance, although many questions can and should be asked to comprehend the nature of the incident, perhaps the most important is why did Silva feel it necessary to carry a knife with him? Although it is impossible to determine the specific circumstances that led to his decision to bring a knife along with him, this could be connected to the fact that referees in amateur matches are not as well policed as their

professional counterparts, and therefore must police both the field and its surrounding atmosphere (Springer 2013). Springer hypothesizes that maybe the desire or need to police both the players and the crowd was the reason Silva felt it necessary to carry a knife with him. While the reason behind his decision to carry a knife with him can never be fully understood, it is not outside of the realm of possibility that he carried the knife in the event he felt threatened.

Even though questions surrounding how this brutality arose, the event draws attention to the fact that soccer violence needs to be examined. Soccer violence is rampant in Latin America, as it is in other parts of the world, due in part to the notion of Hooliganism, a term that originated in England (Foer, 2005). It would be too simple to attempt to attribute this incident and others like it merely due to violent actions of fans. Rather, it is important to examine the various group dynamics at play that cause crowds to react with such fervor to a ruling by the official.

In this paper, violence that occurs in the realm of soccer will be investigated. In particular, the paper will aim to offer reasoning as to what causes lie behind the violence aimed at referees, authority figures within soccer. After a brief examination of hooliganism and its presence worldwide, violence towards referees will be reviewed. Being that various societal pressures surrounding soccer impact the game, and its outcomes and interpretations, the notion that soccer itself can be seen as a metaphor for society will be addressed. Due to the inaccurate perception that all violent acts related to soccer occur in Latin America, this paper will examine instances of violence in soccer worldwide to dispel the prevailing stereotype, as well as those in Latin America to provide insight on what specific cultural and sociological factors may lead to these violent acts. In addition, social

psychological factors regarding crowd behavior and attitudes towards authority will be reviewed to further understand why the violence surrounding soccer, but not caused by it, exists throughout the world. Finally, this paper aims to offer possible methods to mitigate the violence amongst spectators, as well as towards referees, which will advocate for further research related to this overlooked phenomenon.

Hooliganism

Although there is no adequately established definition for hooliganism, the phrase encompasses violent, destructive behavior performed by a group of people (Foer, 2005). Within the context of soccer, it pertains to legion of supporters that show their support by more than just cheering for their team. Hooligan groups, also known as “barra bravas” or “barras de hinchas” within Latin America, and ultras in other European nations, can be viewed as gangs that find it necessary to fight legitimately for their team’s honor, often battling against the opposing team’s gang (Mason, 1996). Well-known Argentine writer Robert Arlt offered one of the first descriptions of the barras in 1967, as he discovered that these groups “went on punitive expeditions in the stadium, spreading terror with their artillery of bottles and bombs of oranges” (p. 106). Arlt continues describing the group’s activities as burning the benches of the popular sections, as well as infiltrating the field of play to attack their rival fans. He later postulates that these groups are comparable to a mafia, as he states that they are, “a small organized group whose armed sallies and fiery eruptions gave them some notoriety, prestige and honor.” Upon a simple examination of hooliganism, it becomes quite evident that the fans who join these gangs have a very strong personal connection to a team that they associate with their identity. However this

personal identity or connection with the team does not alone separate them from the ordinary fan. Franklin Foer chronicles his discussion with a non-hooligan fan of Rangers FC in Scotland, who told him, "I love Rangers football club. If I had to choose between my job and Rangers, I'd choose Rangers. If I had to choose between my wife and Rangers, I'd choose Rangers." (p. 42). This is important to examine because, while both hooligans and the traditional fans may have the same strong connection to their team, what separate the two are the violent transgressions by the hooligans.

Though the typical hooligan is depicted as a very violent, depraved individual, it is worth noting that there is a range in the degree of violence and fighting in which a classified hooligan may partake. Foer referred to this notion as the "continuum of hooliganism," with on one end existing the thuggish image that is so commonly depicted in cinema (p. 42). Foer writes of this minority of hooligans, "Although they'll profess love of club, beating the shit out of people (including fellow fans) is their telos." It is important to recognize that for this class of hooligan, the love of club and soccer is secondary to the hooligan's love for fighting. While this hooligan receives more attention in our pop culture, such as the film *Green Street Hooligans*, the more prototypical hooligan is part of a supporter's club, as opposed to a firm or barra brava. In describing this class of hooligan, Foer writes, "They are not innately violent men. They hold down good jobs and have loving families. But like much of Britain, when vast quantities of lager courses through them they can become a bit brutish." (p. 43). In this case, the distinction between the two hooligans is related more to intention. Both classes of hooligans may throw punches and engage in violent behavior, but the prototypical hooligan does not premeditatedly engage in violence.

To understand the nature of this hooliganism phenomenon, it is essential to observe hooliganism's bloodied history. Hooliganism can be traced originally to England. According to Foer (2005), a death toll greater than 100 during the 1980s had led many to believe that England produced the most violent fans in the world. He later asserts, however, that the violent component of soccer in British culture has also permeated the soccer cultures in Latin America, Africa, and throughout Europe. One of the more significant events in hooliganism history occurred in 1989, when 95 fans at a Liverpool-Nottingham Forest match were asphyxiated against a fence, due in part to an overcrowded terrace (p.95). This allowed then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who viewed hooligans as "the enemy within", to act upon her disdain for hooliganism. After the incident, government required stadiums to switch from standing terraces to the contemporary seating stadiums that exist in most sports arenas today. Thatcher also sought to deter the violence occurring within the stadiums, and implemented the use of video cameras to capture these fights that might have previously occurred within the stadium walls. These changes altered the type of fans attending matches, as now wealthier fans and even women felt welcomed by the stadiums safer atmosphere (p. 96). Despite policemen surveying the crowd with handheld cameras, the hooligans have still found a way to combat with their opponent's hooligans (p. 97). As opposed to fighting within the stadiums, hooligans will now converse with their opposition's leader to orchestrate a common meeting place (p. 101). Even though measures have been made to dissuade hooligans through more organized interventions, it appears that hooligans themselves have been willing to sacrifice their spontaneity in order to maintain their battles.

Similar to the Liverpool-Nottingham Forest tragedy, Latin America itself had its own intervention in their history, aimed to deter hooliganism and violent crowd behavior. The infamous event occurred in a match following the 1924 Olympics, in which Olympic champion Uruguay played Argentina in Buenos Aires. After a mere five minutes of play, the players were forced to walk off the field due to excessive crowd encroachment (Mason, 1995). Prior to scheduling a replay of the match, it was decided that a 12-meter fence would be erected around the perimeter of the field. This fence was the first to be built to protect the players and referees from the spectators. As Mason notes, this fence became the staple for many South American stadiums, but had a deleterious effect on the perception of Latin American soccer throughout the world. He writes, "It became a symbol, suggesting that the South American football crowd was more volatile than its Western European or North American counterpart." (p.34). The construction of fences ingrained in many minds the notion that violence related to soccer might be at its worst in Latin America, even if it does exist throughout the world. This belief, however, is not always explicitly noted. It should not seem merely accidental that when Margaret Thatcher called hooliganism, "A disgrace to civilized society," she was likely referring to the epidemic as a disgrace to her own country, whereas perhaps being more tolerable or expected in other parts of the world that might be deemed less civilized (Foer, p. 13). Despite its prevalence throughout the entire world, it is quite apparent the violence tied to hooliganism is associated as being more common in Latin America (Mason, 1995).

Before moving on from the incident between Argentina and Uruguay, it is imperative to examine how the violence surrounding an international contest is different from hooliganism between clubs from the same city and/or league. To begin with, the

nature of the contest between the two nations is markedly different than a match between domestic clubs. Janet Lever examined these contests, writing, "At the international level especially, sport is mock war. To win a game is to "kill" one's opponent symbolically. War and sport are alike in that both stir our loyalties and passions." (p.29, 1995). Similarly, George Orwell famously declared international sport as, "war minus the shooting." (p.30). International contests in this sense constitute more than just two teams competing against each other. Rather, international sport or soccer can occasionally take on political implications between the competing nations.

One poignant example of a contest taking on political implications can be examined in the 1969 World Cup play-off between El Salvador and Honduras. In the time preceding the contest, there was animosity between the countries because of the large number of Salvadorians crossing over into Honduras for work (p. 30). Due to the threat of Salvadorians taking jobs from Hondurans, the Honduran government instituted a policy nationalizing properties once owned by Salvadorians, a policy that sparked great outrage. With this political context in mind, it is not surprising that riots followed games played in both El Salvador and Honduras. Despite having the National Guard on site for the second leg in El Salvador, who was armed with sub-machine guns, fighting ensued in the streets following the game resulting in two deaths and dozens of cars damaged (p.203-204, Taylor, 1998). What is particularly intriguing, however, is that diplomatic relations between the nations were broken less than a week after the contests. Merely two weeks later, El Salvador sent tanks across the border into Honduras. Fighting ensued between the two countries for a month's time, with casualties estimated between 4,000 and 6,000, as well

as over 50,000 people being displaced from their homes (p. 204). Historians have since hailed this incident as the “Soccer War.” (p. 30, Lever).

When talking about the “Soccer War”, it is imperative to understand that in this case the playoffs, by themselves, were not the cause of the war. In this scenario, Taylor recognizes that the political context may have precipitated the war, but he writes, “The fact remains that the war did break out over a football match” (p. 204). While a case can be made to undermine the game’s degree of influence in this war, it cannot be denied that the conflict between the nations prior to the contests could have permeated the contests, ultimately leading the nations to wage an actual war against one another. Lever reiterates this notion, as she writes that the “Soccer War” demonstrates, “how ritual conflict can lose its game character and how fighting nations—those most in need of the integrative benefits of sport—are least likely to get them.” (p. 149). In this sense, the war is another example that soccer does not alone provoke violence; rather, soccer’s domain can exist as a metaphor for society.

Another international rivalry that bears mentioning is the tumultuous rivalry between Argentina and England. While there are various games worth examining, the most significant contest between the two nations was the 1986 World Cup Quarterfinal. Argentina won the contest 2-1 en route to their second World Cup title behind two goals from their superstar Diego Maradona. Although his second goal, in which Maradona dribbled over half the pitch and beat six players on his path, was awarded goal of the century by FIFA in 2002, Maradona and that contest are better for known his first goal, infamously called the “hand of god” goal. With a loose ball lofting towards the goalie and Maradona running in pursuit, Maradona jumped up and scored the goal with his hand,

simulating a header as his head and fist were mere centimeters apart. In speaking after the match about the goal he scored with his hand, Maradona famously said, "Maybe it was a little bit the hand of Diego, maybe a little bit the hand of God." (p. 60, Taylor). Despite the fact that the move was illegal, and replays days later clearly documented that Maradona had used his hand to score the goal, the goal ended up deciding the contest and eliminating England from the World Cup. In speaking about the goal since, Maradona wrote in his autobiography, "I sometimes think I preferred the one with my hand...It was a bit like stealing the wallet of the English." (p. 127, 2007). Similar to "Soccer War," the political subtexts surrounding this game cannot be overlooked, as Argentina and England had previously fought in the Falklands Islands War in 1982. From this perspective, it could be viewed that this contest was more than a game for Argentina, as it represented as opportunity for retribution. Maradona observes the significance, writing, "it was as if we had beaten a country, not just a football team....Although before the game we said that football had nothing to do with the Malvinas [Falklands] war, we knew they had killed a lot of boys there, killed them like birds. And this was revenge." (p.128). Here again, it is worth noting that political factors themselves are not separate from soccer, and they often enter into the domain of soccer, or sport in general for that matter. Therefore, whenever England and Argentina play each other, it is impossible to overlook or undermine the political background and its influence in the game, and how it is perceived by the nations.

Returning now to hooliganism and violence between clubs, it is essential to examine what factors outside of the sport define the most polarizing rivalries. One factor that can lead to such outright hatred for the rival is an association between club and social class, and the discrepancy between the respective social classes of each club (Taylor, 1998). In

this context, there is no greater rivalry than that of the Buenos Aires clubs Boca Juniors and River Plate. To provide a context for those unfamiliar with Argentina's "superclásico", the match between Boca Juniors and River Plate, it is different than most sporting rivalries throughout the world, as it could be more aptly compared to "India-Pakistan" (Lozada, 2002). Unlike in other sports, where it is not out of the ordinary for fans to change the teams they support, Argentine fan identifications are fixed. As Mason notes, there is an expression in Buenos Aires that, "you can change your wife but your mother and your football club you cannot." (p. 98). These clubs represent particular neighborhoods, and these clubs exist as an extension of the neighborhood. In this rivalry, ever since River Plate's decision to move their stadium from the Boca, a more impoverished community, to a more affluent sector of Buenos Aires, Mason writes that their matches, "became confrontations between the rich and the poor." (p. 97). River Plate's reputation as the team of the aristocrat was further solidified by their spending habits, as they were dubbed "Los millonarios" (the millionaires) based on their spending spree to acquire new players following a particularly poor season in 1932 (p. 57). On the other hand, the dockside area of Buenos Aires that Boca Juniors represent is the poorest district in Buenos Aires, where approximately a quarter of its population lives below the poverty line (p. 49, Taylor, 1998). These social class differences are even reflected in the attitudes that the fans have towards their team's style of play, as Taylor adds, "The Boca fan wants you to transpirar la camiseta [soak the shirt in sweat]. River fans no. They want to see you play. Nutmegs, flicks, passes, while Boca fans are more after strength and character." (p. 48). Each club has its share of passionate fans, but on occasion their passion can lead them to behave uncharacteristically. As Boca Juniors President of Marketing Orlando Salvestrini, "the passion of our supporters

is such that there is always the danger that it can boil over and become dangerous and there doesn't seem to be a logical explanation for this type of behavior." (Wilde, 2009) Typically, these superclásicos have violence stemming from the conclusion of the matches, as the fans' passion can turn violent. As Lozada examined in his first superclásico, the day following the match it was reported that a fight that broke out between River Plate fans and the police left sixty-two people injured. However, not all these violent instances are without casualties. One such instance would be when the notorious Jose Barritta, leader of the Boca Juniors barra brava called "La doce" (the twelfth), went on trial with eight accomplices for "allegedly leading an ambush of guns towards River Plate fans in 1994, killing two of them" (Taylor 51). While it is not a fact that most fans are proud of, it is accepted that a certain degree of violence is associated with the rivalry's magnitude.

Another factor surrounding the context of one of the most passionate rivalries in the world is religion, which can be observed in the rivalry between the Glasgow clubs of Rangers and Celtic, known as the "Old Firm" match. Much like the Boca Juniors and River Plate, the violence and animosity between the two clubs from the same city is intertwined to an association that transcends soccer. Foer writes that the basis of this rivalry, in which a fan could be killed for wearing the opposition's jersey, "is an unfinished fight over the Protestant Reformation." (p. 36). Historically speaking, the influx of Catholics into Glasgow occurred when many Irish Catholics, seeking to avoid the potato famine, fled to the Scottish capital because they could not afford tickets to other destinations, such as Boston or New York (p. 44). As a result of this new dynamic, Catholics and Protestants began attending separate schools in Glasgow, and similarly, formed separate soccer clubs. In this rivalry, Celtic has been associated with Catholicism, and in their hatred of their protestant rivals,

have been known to chant at these games, “Fuck the Queen. Orange Bastards.” (p. 50). On the other side, Rangers represent the Protestants, with fans that don orange shirts and other orange colored paraphernalia to celebrate the ejection of the Catholic monarchy in 1688 by William of Orange, referred to these fans as “King Billy” (p. 36). Similar to their Catholic rivals, the most common cheer of the Protestant Rangers is “Fuck the pope!” (p. 59). In spite of this bitter animosity, tied inextricably to historic religious tensions, each club has been known to have players of the opposite religion. Foer addresses this discrepancy, writing “Championships mean more than religious purity.” (p. 39). Interestingly enough, Scotland has more or less relieved itself of public religious discrimination (p. 57). However, this animosity between the clubs lives on to this day.

With a bitter rivalry based on divergent religions, it comes as no surprise that the fans of both clubs have had a history of violence. The same city that harbored Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson of the Scottish enlightenment also contains one of the most violent rivalries in all of sports (p. 37). Foer examines one particular incident following a match in May 1999. In the few hours following the game, he documents the police record describing how Rangers fans shot a crossbow in the chest twenty-one year-old as he was leaving a Celtic pub, as well as stabbing a sixteen year-old boy in the chest, stomach, and groin who had viewed the game in an Irish pub (p. 37). For all Scotland’s attempts to suggest that the religious discrimination has vacated their society, the violence and occasional deaths in relation to “Old Firm” matches suggest that the underlying religious affiliations may still have at least a partial influence over the actions of the club’s fans.

When examining the violence entrenched in the Rangers and Celtic rivalry, one of the most shocking instances of violence between the two clubs’ fans can be traced to the

Scottish Cup final in 1980. Unlike the previous incident, this violent episode occurred on the field of play following the match. This thrilling final was played at Hampden Park, a neutral stadium because it is an away match for both sides, resulted in a 1-0 victory for Celtic in overtime. During the trophy ceremony, the Celtic fans scaled the fence on the East side to join in celebration with their team (Galbraith, 1993). Likewise, disgruntled Rangers fans descended from the West side of the fence to meet their rival fans on the pitch, and fittingly, a fight ensued between fans from each club. Galbraith quotes one eye-witness describing the mayhem that the police faced, "The thin blue line of police found themselves overwhelmed as fans descended upon them from the terracing, scaling the much-vaunted safety fences with ease." It is necessary to mention that not only did the Scottish ground have a fence similar to those featured on Latin American grounds, but also that the Celtic and Rangers fans were able to scale this celebrated fence without difficulty. After an initial shortage of police, 500 officers were called to make over 160 arrests within the stadium, as well as 50 additional arrests made outside of it. One account of the scene stated, "For a time it was mob rule, with hordes of fans, most of whom were drunken teenagers, jostling, swaggering, jeering, swearing, and singing along the main routes into the city." The report later issued by the Scottish Football Association recognized the animosity between the clubs, due to the religious differences, as having a role in the violence that followed the match's conclusion. Needless to say, this incident is one of the more infamous incidents in the Celtic-Rangers rivalry's history. In part, this is because live television cameras captured the entirety of the riot on the pitch.

In the entire discussion on hooliganism, it is worth noting two main points. First, in spite of the strong association with violence surrounding fans from Latin America, the

violence associated with soccer hooliganism occurs worldwide. As Lever previously suggested, the fences surrounding the soccer fields has become the enduring image and reasoning behind the consensus that Latin American fans are inherently more violent, when in fact violence by hooliganism and fans occurs everywhere (p. 30). Secondly, often times the violence that accompanies these hooligan activities is influenced by factors seemingly unrelated to soccer. Whether it be a rivalry divided on such polarizing factors as religion or social class, or whether it is an international contest intertwined with political subtexts, the violence in soccer is strongly influenced by factors outside the realm of the game. While the game has been viewed as the cause of the violence, it is important to remember that typically the game is merely the source that receives the blame for a much greater, underlying cause.

Referees: Violence, Outrage & Doubt

Before examining how referees in soccer have been subjected to violence, it is essential to observe how referees and officials of all sports have been victims of verbal and physical abuse. Historically speaking, players, coaches, and fans have been apt to scrutinize or harass referees. Despite having won seven Grand Slam singles titles in his past, the most common image associated with the career of tennis great John McEnroe is of him cursing and yelling at an official for making a call that he did believe was correct (Posnanski, 2009). Yet, the issue at hand today is not so much that the dissent that occurs between referees and players, coaches, and spectators, as this has been occurring for many years. Rather, it is that the confrontations are happening at an increasing frequency, and the nature of the incidents has changed from to include both verbal and physical abuse (Springer, 2013).

Within the United States alone, there exists the National Organization of Sporting Officials (NASO) in order to handle the physical and verbal abuse targeted towards these referees and officials in all sports. Barry Mano, the founder and president of NASO, has stated that his group hears news of an official being attacked at least once a week (Springer, 2013). Although these incidents only document the cases affecting the 20,000 members that constitute the NASO, as he postulates that many other cases go undocumented. One documented case would be a Little League coach from Newark who recently plead guilty to assaulting an umpire, cracking his skull and causing him to partially lose hearing in his ear. Two years prior, a football referee in Sarasota was attacked by both football players and coaches, which resulted in a broken shoulder, in addition to back and neck injuries. Three adults and one minor were subsequently charged with battery for their actions in the incident. Perhaps the most recent and startling case occurred in a suburb of Salt Lake City, in which a 17 year-old recreational league soccer player, after being issued a yellow card, punched the referee in the head. Ultimately, he would go into a coma and died as a result of the injury sustained. In the court hearing, the teenager pleaded guilty to homicide by assault, and said of his actions, "I was frustrated at the ref and caused his death." (Springer, 2013). This particular causality will be further examined later on in greater detail, but the fact remains that referees and officials in all sports are subjected to similar verbal, and unfortunately physical in some cases, harassment.

While Mano is correct in his assertion that "Sports is simply life with the volume turned up," making a reference to the role of adrenaline and competitiveness in sports, violent actions towards referees should not be such a commonplace in youth and amateur sports. It is unacceptable to hear of incidents such as a referee in Lynn, Massachusetts

being attacked by a player after receiving a red card, which landed him in the hospital for two days with a broken facial bone and a deep laceration on his forehead (Springer 2013). The referee of this United States Latin Soccer League contest should not fear performing his job, particularly given this amateur game's lack of importance. Given the high frequency of these instances of violence against referees and officials, it is quite possible that Springer is correct in her conclusion that these instances suggest that the United States has a more aggressive and less civil society.

Ever since soccer's inception, referees have received the ire of coaches, fans, and players alike, often being subjected to acts of physical abuse. Two incidents from Argentina worth examining on the topic of referee violence date back to 1912. The first incident occurred in match between Estudiantes de la Plata and Estudiantes of Buenos Aires. Due to an assault on a referee following the match, the stadium for Estudiantes de la Plata was closed for the remainder of the season (Mason, 1995). In addition to the closing of the stadium for the remainder of the season, two players were issued a similar suspension for their role in persuading the spectators to attack the referee, in which one of the players himself had assaulted the referee. It is important to note in this instance that not only was a player guilty of assaulting a referee, but also that the player had helped to incite the crowd to join in on this attack. Similar to the incident in Brazil examined in the introduction, in this assault the players as well as the spectators engaged in the attack launched at the referee. However, in this particular instance, the assault did not occur following the issuance of a card. In the second instance of violence in Argentina, the violence occurred following the issuance of three red cards. In a match between Independiente and Porteño to decide the 1912 title, three players were sent off for dissent

after arguing with the referee about a call disallowing a goal in favor of a corner (Mason 7). Following the cards, the referee was assaulted and the crowd had stormed onto the pitch, resulting in the match being abandoned. A disciplinary hearing suspended two Independiente players and had awarded the championship to Porteño as well. In this instance, the decision to eject three players from the match provoked the assault, and led to the crowd infiltrating the pitch. Although it should be noted that the importance of the game, to decide the Argentine League title, might have played a role in the violence by the players, as well as the crowd participation that occurred.

On occasion, games of a heightened magnitude can lead to violence against referees that actually result in the referee's death. To examine this issue, it is necessary to look at the incident surrounding the 1989 Colombian National Tournament final between Atletico Nacional and America de Cali. To provide a brief context for Colombian soccer, this incident occurred during a time period for Colombian soccer referred to as "Narco-futbol" (or Narcotics Soccer). This term was coined because at that time in Colombia, when Pablo Escobar and others had exported an excess of \$3 billion worth of cocaine to the United States and Europe, soccer was the vehicle through which money could be laundered (Zimbalist & Zimbalist, 2010). According to one of Escobar's henchmen, a man who is known by the alias "Popeye", soccer in Colombia "became a tug-of-war amongst the druglords." These drug lords owned the teams in the Colombian league, and through their finances, had been able to build soccer fields throughout the country, ultimately cultivating a level of soccer in Colombia that was unprecedented at the time. Pablo Escobar, the notorious drug lord, was the president of Atletico Nacional. As Fernando Rodriguez, the son of the president of the America de Cali club, quite appropriately notes, Escobar "would

kill anyone to win a soccer game.” In this particular game, to decide the national title, Escobar was certain to make sure the referee Alvaro Ortega did nothing to prevent his side from securing the championship. However, as his associate Popeye confesses, “The referee had blatantly robbed us of the game. Pablo told us to find the referee and kill him.” (Zimbalist & Zimbalist, 2010). As a result of Escobar’s belief that the referee had stolen the game from him, he had instructed someone to kill the referee, and it was carried out accordingly. Despite the referee simply performing his job, he was killed because his impartiality had clashed with Escobar’s ego. While it is quite possible that Escobar could have killed a referee in a game of less importance, it is hard to not view the magnitude of the game as having an influence on Escobar’s decision to have the referee executed. Famous Liverpool manager Bill Shankly once said, “Some people believe football is a matter of life and death, I am very disappointed with that attitude. I can assure you it is much, much more important than that.” (Hassall, 2010). In this case, Shankly is correct because soccer to Escobar was of the utmost importance to him. Rather than to accept that his team could have been defeated, his ego could not accept this fact and he assumed that a mediocre official had cheated his team out of a trophy. Thus, he had the referee killed.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the violence towards referees, including its recent increase, is the fact that violence is actually more prevalent when the stakes are not quite as high. Of course, this fact goes against the common sense belief that the violence towards a referee occurs because of the magnitude of the match. Yet, most incidents involving violence against officials occurs in amateur or youth games worldwide, where it is quite certain the stakes or implications of the game are not nearly as high as professional or international ones. One previously examined incident that fits this category was the case

in Utah, where a 17 year-old player had punched the referee following a yellow card, resulting in him slipping into a coma and later dying (Springer, 2013). Another incident like this occurred in Spain in February 2013, except on this occasion the referee was 17 years old, and was attacked by the player following the issuance of a yellow card. This man, a policeman in the real world, punched the teenage referee and kicked him twice while he was on the ground. The young referee lost three ounces of blood, in addition to his spleen, as a result of the attack, which got the policeman suspended from his job while he awaits trial (Krug, 2013).

With regard to this Spanish incident, it is important to understand the specific culture of their soccer, and their hatred of officials, to comprehend how this event transpired. As a player from the game, Alejandro Urego, quite appropriately noted "Referees are scared to show red cards to those insulting them for possible violent consequences." (Krug, 2013). Krug further examined this notion of the Spanish referees being the subject of abuse by fans, although noting that it is usually verbal and not physical abuse. According to a Madrid taxi driver interviewed by Krug, the Spanish fans have a tendency to blame everything on the referee, as he concludes that, "The stadium is the place for Spaniards to vent their frustration." Phil Ball, a Spanish soccer writer, concisely describes the Spanish soccer culture, when he states, "If you don't pressure the ref here then you are seen as stupid." Chastising a referee is seen as commonplace in Spain. Within their culture, referees are vilified and believed to be of lower status, in spite of the heightened status they naturally attain as part of their job. Within this culture of animosity towards the referee, it is not quite as shocking that the referee can become the target of physical and verbal abuse.

While Spain has been the previous topic of focus, it is essential to recognize that instances of referee violence have occurred throughout Europe, ranging in youth levels all the way up to those in the semi-professional ranks. One example, occurring in September 2011 in Berlin, involved a referee being assaulted after the issuance of a second yellow card, which resulted in the player's removal from the match. The referee, Gerald Bothe, was left unconscious for an entire 10 minutes, swallowed his tongue, and required hospitalization for many days as a result of the incident. An assault of this magnitude, which occurred following the issuance of a second yellow card and the dismissal of the player, validates Urego's claim that referees are intimidated to show red cards for fear of a violent response by the player (Krug, 2013). Fortunately, this incident did not result in death. However, the same cannot be said of a December 2012 incident in Holland. Following a youth league game, during the customary handshakes between the players and officials, a crew of teenagers began assaulting and kicking Richard Nieuwenhuizen while he lay on the ground (James, 2012). Although parents were able to intervene, and Nieuwenhuizen was able to reach his feet, he refused to involve police and went about his day as he normally would by watching an under-17 youth match nearby. At this match, Nieuwenhuizen collapsed and later died. Nieuwenhuizen, not even the center referee, was presumably killed on the assumption that he was impartial in his role as linesman given his son's involvement. Regardless of the motive and intent, a man is now dead as a result of the attack. Accordingly, five of the teenage attackers were sentenced to two years in youth detention for manslaughter, in addition to one of the player's fathers receiving a prison sentence of six years (Mohamed, 2013).

To understand adequately the plight of the referee, it is important to analyze further the physical and mental pressures imposed on these individuals. From a physical standpoint, as was previously mentioned, referees run between 9 to 13 kilometers over the course of a match (Gabrilo et al., 2013). In terms of energy, referees typically expend 734 kcal per game, requiring a diet ranging in 3500-4000 kcal per day, only a mere 500 kcal less than their soccer player counterparts (da Silva, Fernandes, & Fernandez, 2008). In addition to the physical labor, the game is mentally taxing because, as Groot (2005) suggests, the majority of these decisions are made split-second. For that reason, referees occasionally find themselves making the incorrect decision through no deliberate fault of their own (Groot, 2005).

Along with the mental and physical pressures, there are certain psychological stress factors imposed on the referees, in addition to the occasional instances of physical confrontation. Previous research has shown an alarming percentage of referees who have been the victim of aggression. In a study of Swedish referees by Folkesson, Nyberg, Archer & Norlander (2002), 35.1% had reported experiencing at least one threat, with 24.3% of the threats coming from players. While the number that reported being assaulted was much lower at 15%, a significant 63.6% reported receiving verbal aggression on at least one occasion. Overall, 72.9% of the Swedish referees had been subject to at least one instance of physical aggression, verbal aggression, or a threat. In addition, the study found that older referees were typically the targets of fewer threats and less aggression, verbal and physical, than their younger peers, even in cases where their younger peers had more refereeing experience. Though they did not test a hypothesis for this discrepancy, they believed that the difference might be explained in one, perhaps two ways. First, based on

the difference in “greater life experience,” they believed that perhaps the older referees’ experiences outside of soccer would allow them to mitigate or prevent a potential threat or aggressive act. Secondly, they believed that perhaps an older referee would align more closely with the archetype of the patriarch, in essence worthy of more respect by players, coaches, and fans alike. Regardless of the specific reasoning, this may help to explain why in more cases a younger referee is the victim of an assault, as opposed to his senior peer. A similar, more recent study, conducted by the University of Tübingen, found that of the 2,600 regional referees interviewed, over 40% reported instances of being threatened on the job, as well as 17% who stated that had been physically attacked while officiating (Krug, 2013). Given the similar percentages amongst the two studies, it is quite apparent that there is a degree of scrutiny and potential physical harm to which referees are placed in while officiating.

In contrast to these previous reports, however, empirical evidence in at least one case has shown that the exact psychological stress that referees experience over the course of a game is not quite as excessive. This study was conducted on 156 assistant referees and referees from the Turkish league, to examine the magnitude of stress experienced by the referees. In the study, three questions were asked to quantify and qualify the stress, tension, and pressure the referees felt on a 5-point scale (1=none, 2=very little, 3=moderate, 4=quite a bit, 5= a great deal). The study found that the average score for a referee was 2.45, indicating a very little to moderate experience of stress for referees (Gencay, 2009). In addition, there was no significant difference between the average stress score experienced by referees and assistant referees. One possible explanation could be that perhaps Turkish soccer in itself is less contentious and referees. Regardless, the fact

remains that this study directly opposes the previous accounts, portraying the extensive psychological stresses experienced by referees during matches.

While this study is important in the sense that it contradicts the previous cases, which stated that referees were subjected to strenuous psychological pressures, it is worth noting that there are inherent limitations in this study, which the authors acknowledge to a certain extent. To begin with, the study was only conducted in one country. Although the Turkish league in its own right may place pressure on its officials, it would not necessarily be appropriate to generalize these findings for all leagues or competitions worldwide in which referees participate. Secondly, it is worth challenging the way that the stress levels were measured, a three-question interview conducted following the season by the referees themselves. This is problematic not only because it is a brief questionnaire, in which the participants may not be entirely candid, but also because it is itself merely self-reported by the referees. In the event that physiological measures of stress, such as heart rate during the match, were incorporated to report the degree of stress experienced by the officials, it could be more perceivable that the stress for soccer referees is nothing more than moderate. Nevertheless, the study presents a statistically significant case in which the psychological stress level was not substantial.

While it is now possible to comprehend the general animosity launched towards referees throughout the world, it is worth examining the history referee abuse and ire in Argentina. Argentina, historically speaking, has had trouble policing its game and maintaining order, as an alarming 82 players were red carded in the year 1964, later eclipsed by 186 red cards in 1977 (Mason, 1995). Although Mason (1995) does note that in general the title of being a referee in South America has not historically been viewed

favorably, the disdain for officials has been even more profound in Argentina. Especially in the late 1920s and early 1930s, referees in Argentina were subjected to treatment equivalent to criminals, as they were deemed to be incompetent and too intimidated by home crowds. Within this anxious and hatred filled environment, one commentator once said that being a referee in Argentina “was taking your life in your own hands.” (p. 107). Given the high occurrence of assaults in the Argentine league, Argentina sought to reform their officiating by outsourcing these positions to British referees. This was done in part because public trust amongst referees was low, but also because British referees were more likely unbiased in their officiating, removing the previously held notion that referees were “bought by the big clubs” (p. 110). Beginning in 1948, Argentina began incorporating the use of British referees in order to combat this issue in neutrality and policing of the game.

During the introductory period of British referees in Argentina, British referees, much like their Argentine and Uruguayan counterparts, were subjected to abuse from players and fans alike. At the conclusion of a 1958 international match between Uruguay and Argentina, in which the British referee had to issue five cards amongst the two sides, he claimed that the match was “the hardest game he had ever tried to control” (p. 111). While this match also provides an international sporting context, it speaks volumes to the difference in referee discretion and how the game might have been policed differently between the two countries. However, not all games for British referees were free of violence. In 1950, one British referee called a seemingly harmless foul five minutes before the conclusion of the match; however, it broke out into a 22-man brawl in which police intervention had to be used to arrest and detain players from both sides (Mason, 1995).

Even in the case of the 1967 World Club Championships, between Celtic of Scotland and Racing of Argentina, an international referee in Argentina would not necessarily be spared from the influence of the crowd. In an extremely hostile environment, the rambunctious crowd was able to sway the Uruguayan referee to overlook the blatant attempts by Argentines “who systematically kicked, hit and insulted them when the ball was far away or spat in their faces.” (p. 114). Of course this ties into Mason’s assertion that the Argentine crowd has often been classified as the “12th player,” but it further demonstrates the hostility aimed towards referees by Argentine crowds, whether the referee was foreign or native.

In spite of the fact that these referees are typically unjustly harassed, there have been instances in which referees have been guilty of deliberately fixing matches by way of controversial calls and suspensions. One particular region that has suffered significantly from referee match fixing scandals would be in Italy, and no two teams have been more culpable of bribing referees than the clubs Juventus and AC Milan. Foer (2005) explains this culpability, as he writes, “[Juventus] and [AC] Milan often can rig the system to assign themselves the most mediocre, provincially minded referees, who are (subconsciously) more deferential toward their prestige clubs.” (p. 170). Given the clubs storied history, and the fact that each owner has such immense wealth, they are able to purchase the decision making of the officials (Foer, 2005). Although they both have been accused and found guilty of match fixing in the past, they have achieved this nepotism from different angles. Juventus, despite being the most storied club in Italian, soccer has often been the recipient of puzzling late season calls in their favor. Perhaps the most poignant example of this late season nepotism would be the conclusion of the 1998 season, deemed by some as the

“season of poison.” (Foer, 2005). Instead of pointing out blatant, specific instances in which Juventus received favorable calls, it more essential to note that despite having been the club that committed the most fouls in the league, they received the fewest red cards, which Foer asserts as “a statistical inconsistency that defies logical reasoning.” (p. 175). In contrast to the direct bribing of officials by Juventus, AC Milan have attempted to fix calls in their favor by manipulating the media. The media’s position allows them to either highlight or overlook the favoritism that the two clubs receive. Foer describes this manipulation, writing, “If the press launches a crusade against a referee, it makes the referee extremely self-conscious. He will bend over backwards to avoid appearing biased, and may unconsciously bend even further than that.” (p. 183). In essence, instead of directly paying off referees, by providing the press with specialty treatments and offerings, such as exceptional seating at home matches with top-of-the-line service, Foer argues that the press will write articles that will influence referees to make decisions in Milan’s favor. While the purpose of these examinations is not to argue that all referees are subject to bribes, or that bribery would justify assaults and verbal abuse; rather, it is important to note that there is reason for people to be skeptical of officiating at times. However, it should be observed that, to a certain extent, these influences occur outside of their locus of control (Foer, 2005).

Along with Italy, there have also been Latin American countries that have been the subject of criticism for match fixing. While the match fixing cases in Latin American countries have not been as commonly connected to one or two clubs like in Italy, there have been controversial games decided by questionable officiating. For instance, the Mexican soccer league has been riddled with referee match fixing. To provide context for

the match fixing history of Mexico, Taylor (1998) quotes journalist Héctor Huerta, who asserts, "Mexicans want to believe that football is clean. That is one of the few spaces in national life that is clean. They are reluctant to believe that they are being tricked, knowing that they're being tricked." (p. 238). One famous example that demonstrates the blatant nature of the match fixing and bribery would be the 1984-1985 playoff for the league title between Club América and Pumas. Played on a neutral ground, Club América was gifted a penalty by the referee, in addition to having been let off for having committed three fouls worthy of a penalty call. Taylor again quotes journalist Héctor Huerta, and he said regarding the match, "It was never proved that he was bought off. But it's a fact that he never refereed again." (p. 237).

Another Latin American country with a history of match fixing, or referee bribery allegations, would be Colombia. Previously, during the period of Narco-futbol in Colombia, there was much speculation to the integrity of officiating, and in that period's aftermath, Taylor (1998) argues that there remains an enduring doubt that matches are fairly officiated. One such game that portrays this lingering doubt would be a match between Millonarios and Tolima in 1996. While the game had been progressing and appeared to be fairly officiated, a questionable second yellow card was given to the visiting goalkeeper for time wasting (Taylor, 1998). Two primary concerns arise with this type of call. To begin with, the visiting goalkeeper received a yellow card previously for the same offense, which is extremely uncommon, especially considering that the goalkeeper had not wasted more than the average time taking the kick. Secondly, it is highly unlikely that the goalkeeper of a 0-0 match would choose to waste time, as it is typically a tactic employed by the team that

is ahead. Due in large part to the instances of match fixing in Colombia's recent past, it is challenging to ignore the possibility of bribery when observing such a dubious call.

In spite of the cloud of doubt that may linger over the results of matches within specific leagues, referees should not be the victims of such violent and verbal outbursts. With this view in mind, certain measures have been implemented in an effort to mitigate the amount of verbal abuse that occurs. One measure incorporated in Holland, the same country where a volunteer linesman was killed following the conclusion of a youth league game, is to incorporate a stringent policy in which any player who approaches a referee or official to argue a foul will be issued a yellow card (Krug, 2013). Although this has not led to a significant increase in bookings since its implementation, it would appear to be a logical step to decrease on the field verbal confrontations between players and referees. To provide a context for those unfamiliar with the game, soccer teams typically only have one captain who is considered the representative for his team in communication between his team's players and the referees. While this has not typically been enforced, this step could possibly reduce the ridicule launched towards referees, which in turn may decrease the instances of violence that could occur. In addition to this league-wide mandate, in specific instances a severe suspension could arise to address the severity of a violent act. One such instance occurred in Indonesia, in which Pieter Rumaropen punched a referee after he had called a penalty against one of his teammates, stopping game play for 10 minutes while the referee was receiving medical attention (Bailey, 2013). This unexpected punch, which for lack of a more appropriate term could be labeled a "sucker punch," landed Rumaropen a lifetime ban by the Indonesian Soccer Association. Pope (2013) spoke to the appropriateness of this punishment, as he writes, "Striking a referee is an assault. But it's

much too little and far too late. Players and coaches have no respect for referees and it's an epidemic of sports culture." While it is not hard to argue against Pope's assertion that violence and outlash towards referees has become almost accepted by the sporting and soccer culture, it could be worth a trial run to see if these lengthy suspensions could dissuade players and coaches from assaulting referees. However, the efficacy of a zero tolerance policy, such as this case in Indonesia, remains to be seen.

In addition to these measures, referees themselves have hypothesized various recommendations for how to combat the violence and verbal attacks launched their way. One method proposed by Krug (2013), provided by 18 year-old German referee Max Klein, would be to institute a financial penalty for instances of referee assaults. Klein, a Cologne native, states his rationale, "the best way forward is to introduce monetary fines for teams. That would hit the aggressors hard where it hurts most—their pockets." (Krug, 2013). While this could possibly be a deterrent for potential aggressors, it appears unlikely to have the same value throughout all levels of the game. For instance, while fining a youth league player or amateur a certain amount may burden their financial standing, fining a professional athlete may not have the same impact given the amount of money he/she receives as a salary. Perhaps, instead of merely imposing a fine for said actions, incorporating an additional suspension could be used in concert to affect not only the player's wallet, but also the team's fortune. Another referee proposal examined by Krug (2013), offered by 21 year-old Emilio Jose Ayuso of a small town near Madrid, would be to incorporate the use of psychological classes for teams. As previously mentioned, the Referee Association of Madrid requires its referees to take two classes in order to prepare for the verbal abuse that accompanies the occupation, and Ayuso reasons, "That way they

see that we too can make mistakes” (Krug, 2013). While it is a well-intentioned idea, it is important to recognize that the psychological classes themselves would not be sufficient enough to resolve this referee violence. The violence itself is not caused merely by a lack of empathy or understanding, and although this paper does not address the role of masculinity and adrenaline, it cannot be overlooked that these factors in their own right might have a strong influence on the potential for a confrontation towards a referee to turn violent (Springer, 2013). In spite of their shortcomings, it is important that these and other measures are examined to evaluate which are most appropriate to combat this increased violence towards officials.

A more troubling truth regarding the instances of referee violence in Europe relates the notion that the violence is almost accepted as ordinary. At least within Europe, for the time being, it appears that referees and fans alike are accepting the nature of referee violence in soccer’s culture. In part, this had led to a decline in the number of referees in areas such as Cologne. According to Herbert Fandel, the head of the German Football Association’s referee commission, there were 1,000 referees in 2003, whereas there are only 600 in 2013 (Krug, 2013). Although it cannot be strictly tied to violence, it is worth noting that the number of referees is in decline. Perhaps, this decline could be due to the acceptance that a certain degree of violence or threats are to be expected within the society. Fandel commented on this aspect of the referee violence predicament, saying, “The verbal and physical violence against referees is also a sign of our times, a mirror of our society.” (Krug, 2013). Even those in the professional ranks hold similar views, as former international referee Tom Henning Ovrebo says, “All over Europe you can find a culture of harassment against referees.” Ovrebo, who has since retired from professional refereeing

and plies his trade as a psychologist, has his own personal experience with this harassment, as he was sent numerous death threats following his officiating in the 2009 Champions League Semifinal (Krug, 2013). While it may not be the most appropriate course of action, it appears that many referees attempt to espouse an apathetic, and accepting view of the referee violence within soccer.

Through this examination of physical and verbal abuse aimed towards referees, it is worth noting that there are two important aspects. First, as has been showcased by these instances, most referee attacks occur as a result of the issuance of a card, whether it is red or even merely a yellow. This can be seen in the case back in Utah, with a juvenile punching a middle-aged referee after receiving a yellow card, as well as in the original case in Brazil, in which the player's decision to push the referee to the ground was prompted by the issuance of a red card. Although not every instance in which a referee is assaulted occurs after the issuance of a card, it would be difficult to classify the quantity of assaults stemming from the card as being merely coincidental. As will be examined in the following section on social psychological and sociological factors, this may relate to the overall views that these players hold toward authority figures, or the referee in this case. Second, much like hooliganism, violence towards officials occurs globally. Verbal attacks, assaults, and even lethal attacks launched towards referees are not limited to simply Latin America. Referees are subjected to scrutiny and violence throughout the world in soccer, and similar to hooliganism, it is naïve and incorrect to label Latin America as the region where this violence is most prominent or profound. In reality, soccer violence is universal (Foer, 2005).

Social Psychological and Cultural Factors

“One thing we know from research on hooliganism is that people tend to ‘de-individualize’ themselves and become more a group member who follows the group norms instead of their own norms.”

Tom Henning Ovrebo (Krug, 2013)

There are two primary purposes for a section examining social psychological and cultural factors. First, an understanding on social psychological principles can allow for a greater understanding of crowd behaviors and group dynamics, which is very closely tied to the issue of hooliganism (Foer, 2005). By understanding the nature of people in crowds and groups, it is possible to comprehend in part why the hooliganism violence occurs, as well as why it occurs worldwide, since social psychology is based on how people behave similarly in social interactions (Lilienfeld, Lynn, Namy, & Woolf 2009). Secondly, by attaining knowledge of cultural factors, it allows for greater understanding of the societal dynamics at play in different cultures. In this paper, the region of emphasis is Latin America, in part to understand why it has been widely believed to be the region with the most violent culture surrounding soccer (Mason, 1995). By achieving an understanding of the specific forces at play in Latin America, it allows for the most successful tactics to be implemented to mitigate the specific forces that govern Latin America’s soccer violence (Spaaij, 2008).

As former referee Ovrebo’s quote suggests, a key social psychology concept to examine regarding hooliganism is de-individuation. This concept has been applied more specifically towards the behavior of crowds, but some have offered it as a possible explanation for the violent behavior of hooligan groups (Spaaij, 2008). The term originated in a study by Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1951), in which they aimed to examine under what conditions would a person lower his or her inner restraints in the presence of a

group. They defined this concept as de-individuation, which they defined as “A state of affairs in a group where members do not pay attention to other individuals *qua* individuals, and, correspondingly, the members do not feel they are being singled out by others.” (p. 389). In their study, college student subjects were told to read a fictitious study, which they believed true, detailing that 87% of college students had “a strong, deep-seated hatred for one or both parents.” (p. 384). After reading the survey, the students were instructed to have a 40-minute discussion assessing each group member’s positive or negative attitudes regarding their parents. In this phase, positive and negative statements were measured and recorded in some cases, along with pauses, by the experimenter. Following the discussion, the experimenter read aloud various statements and the subjects were asked to identify whether the given statement was in the discussion, and if so, who was the person that said the statement. In conclusion, the subjects was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 pertaining to not at all, 5 pertaining to definitely) their desire to return for more discussions of these topics with the same group, assuming their schedule would allow it.

Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1951) were primarily interested in measuring the frequency of negative statements made regarding one’s parents, and whether these revealed an increase in memory. They found that the group members were often unable to recall who said a particular statement in the discussion, which they attest is influenced in part by de-individuation. Likewise, as they had hypothesized, the members in groups with a higher number of negative statements were better at recalling what was said. They believed that the more the statement aligned with those in the discussion, the more attentive the members were to their words, and thus had greater memory of the statements. The other area they were interested in examining was the relation between

the frequency of negative attitudes and the attractiveness of the group to its members. In this case, they found that a higher incidence in negative attitudes significantly correlated with the attractiveness of the group to its members. They reasoned that the reduction of inner restraints made it possible for the group members to each behave more openly than they would normally, and that this reduction led them to find the group more attractive. This study's significance that the members felt freer to engage in less restrained behavior, and consequently found the group more attractive, which they attributed in large part to de-individuation.

In addition to the previous study, Zimbardo (1969) provided keen insight on the topic of de-individuation during the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. To begin with, Zimbardo added to the definition of de-individuation by stipulating that "under appropriate conditions what results is the "release" of behavior in violation of established norms of appropriateness." (p. 251). He attested that this phenomenon resulted in more antisocial negative behaviors, such as increased hostility and aggression, as well as more positive behaviors, such as an increased love or happiness by the group, than the members would normally exhibit. This inhibition in large part arises from a feeling of anonymity, which Zimbardo reasons allows the individual to not be concerned with social evaluation, as well as being simply considered part of the crowd as opposed to a specific person. With this anonymity also comes the idea of a reduction in responsibility, as he attests that groups tend to ignore or trivialize the consequences of their behavior. In addition, Zimbardo discusses the concept of sensory stimulation in de-individuation, as a person may become absorbed in the action such that "the only meaning of the act is inherent in its performance and lacks further implications or goals." (p. 258). Similarly, a noncognitive

feedback system is used in situations according to Zimbardo, which he writes is “influenced directly by proprioceptive feedback from one’s own action as well as the activity of co acting others” (p. 258). Another interesting finding by Zimbardo was that when in a novel situation behavior is less inhibited by learned situational-bound clues. A final conclusion worth noting is the how cognitive controls can be diminished within altered states of consciousness, such that someone under the influence of drugs or alcohol in a situation of de-individuation would act perhaps more aggressively or impulsively due to the drug.

With the knowledge on the concept of de-individuation from the works of Festinger, Pepitone and Newcomb (1951) and Zimbardo (1969), it is important to understand how this knowledge can be applied to hooliganism specifically. In reference to the first study, the notion that fans could feel freer to engage in less restrained behavior is interesting within the realm of hooliganism. As Foer (2005) noted previously, many of these hooligans can have families, hold down real jobs, as well as being perceived as nonviolent outside of the soccer context. Given the presence of the crowd, these family men may lose their sense of self and become more prone to engage in aggressive behavior. Similarly, the family man’s interest in the group can be increased due to the fact that he feels less constrained and free within this social environment.

One study that more closely examines how anonymity within a group can lead to more aggressive acts by a person undergoing de-individuation can be observed in an experiment by Rehm, Steinleitner and Lilli (1987). In their experiment, they randomly assigned 5th graders one of two teams of five for a 10-minute game of handball. One team was wearing a uniform orange shirt, while the other team wore their own shirts that varied in size, color, and shape. During the game, two observers, who were blind to the

hypothesis, recorded the number of violent acts committed by each team. As the results showed, uniformed teams committed significantly more acts of aggression than did the teams wearing personal shirts. In their interpretation of these results, they reasoned that their hypothesis was correct, as “less personally identifiable groups in fact committed more aggressive acts.” (p. 358). In conclusion, they believed that these results supported Zimbardo’s (1968) findings on de-individuation, as they stated, “higher degrees of anonymity did lead to more aggressive acts.” (p. 359, 1987)

When applied specifically to hooliganism, it is easy to interpret how the aggressive acts committed by hooligans can be supported by their increased anonymity. Despite the fact that these hooligans can be non-violent outside of the hooligan activities, sometimes even having families and steady jobs, they adorn the same jerseys and colors at the matches they attend, often singing the same anthems in support of their team (Foer, 2005). However, the findings by Rehm, Steinleitner and Lilli (1987) would suggest that this attire and these songs could provide the degrees of anonymity that allow for these hooligans to not only become de-individuated by being a member of this group, but also how this can lead to an increase in the aggressive acts committed by those members in their state of de-individuation.

Another study on de-individuation that supports its affect on aggression would be an experiment by Mann, Newton, and Innes (1982). In their study, they had groups of six to eight subjects watch two discussants on what they believed to be closed circuit television, although it was merely a pre-recorded videotape, and they were told to share their reactions by pressing a button that would play a crowd noise in the discussants’ headphones. The crowd noise to which they had access to allowed them to either play

applause or booing, and they were given free will to press the buttons as often they as they chose. The levels of the noise ranged from soft to painfully loud and the averages were to be reflected in a response light visible to all participants that demonstrated the average of the subjects', although this was pre-programmed to be either lenient or aggressive by the experimenters. Within each norm, half of the subjects were identifiable and the other half was anonymous. They found that those in the anonymous-aggressive and anonymous-lenient were the most aggressive groups, and they concluded that the findings supported Zimbardo's theory, asserting that, "anonymity is of prime importance in accounting for crowd aggression, with the nature of the group norm of secondary or incidental importance." (p. 270). However, it should be reiterated that they surmised, from self-reports in the study, that this aggression arose from the state of de-individuation, as they wrote, "aggression was not merely due to the structural aspects...but was also mediated by a state of psychological de-individuation characterized by a sense of being unselfconscious and uninhibited." (p. 272).

In the application of Zimbardo's (1969) findings to hooliganism, it is possible to understand not only the behavior of the prototypical hooligan, but also how a fan that might not normally identify with being a hooligan can engage in the violent behavior under certain circumstances. In examining how de-individuation can result in more antisocial behavior, such as hostility and aggression, or positive emotions, such as love and happiness, it is possible understand the dynamics of a hooligan fan. When there is a moment to celebrate, for instance a win, the ebullience felt by a hooligan fan in the stadium amongst the group would exceed the joy he would normally experience in the same circumstance alone. Conversely, in the event of a confrontation with another hooligan

group, the hooligan fan alongside his group of hooligans will be more likely to engage in the violent and hostile acts towards the opposing group. In addition to the anonymity, or the sense that the hooligan can act without the judgment of others, the reduction in responsibility amongst in de-individuation could be utilized to explain their propensity to fighting, along with the hooligan's occasional desire to destroy public property (Foer, 2005). With regard to Zimbardo's notion of sensory stimulation and noncognitive feedback system, it is possible to understand how the hooligans in the midst of their antisocial may not be aware of the consequences and legal ramifications of their actions, instead placing attention on their own actions, as well as those of their fellow members. The final two concepts of how de-individuation occurs in novel situations, as well as in the case in when alcohol is consumed can be observed in the 1980 Scottish Cup final between Rangers and Celtic (Galbraith, 1993). In the violence that occurred when the fans scaled the wall, it is possible that ordinary fans when confronted with this novel situation, they were less apt to follow the normal guidelines prohibiting them from infiltrating the field. While it can be understood that hooligans would be responsible for the majority of the damage, a regular fan may be at a cross when confronted with an ambiguous situation such as the scene at Hampden Park. Within the chaos that day, perhaps alcohol, in large part to blame for what transpired according to the police report, could have been a strong influence because of how it can diminish cognitive controls, and potentially spur these fans and hooligans to engage in the violent and hostile behavior that occurred.

Another essential social psychology concept that is important to the understanding of the violent behavior of hooligan groups and fans is the concept of risky shift. This term arose from Stoner's (1961) master's thesis and entails that, with regards to groups as a

whole, groups made significantly more risky decisions than the average group member would make individually. A few years later, Stoner (1968) conducted another experiment examining this concept, in which subjects were given 12 hypothetical life scenarios each containing one risky and one cautious alternative. Subjects were told to select one alternative for each life scenario, which Stoner had set up to have six risk-oriented scenarios and six cautious-oriented scenarios. Subjects were later told to evaluate the same questions, except this time selecting their choices according to what they perceived 200 similar people would select. Afterwards, subjects were required to rank 18 phrases in the order to which they found them important, which intentionally represented values that corresponded with the 12 life scenarios. The final segment of the experiment involved the subjects assembling in small groups of three or four participants to evaluate the same 12 life scenarios, this time having to reach a group consensus for each item.

Stoner's experiment produced quite interesting findings, in large part consistent with his previous findings. Stoner (1968) found that when the subjects were asked to evaluate how they perceived 200 similar people would respond to the 12 life scenarios, the subjects typically considered themselves more risky on risk-oriented items than their peers, while likewise considering themselves more cautious on the cautious-oriented items than their peers. With regard to the 18 phrases, the most desired values of the subjects significantly related to the orientation of the question, such that the value connected to the risk-oriented item would be preferred to its cautious, and vice versa with the cautious-oriented items. In relation to the risk-oriented items, the group made significantly more risky decisions than the average of the individual group members' decisions. In his conclusion, Stoner (1968) confirmed the idea of a value hypothesis to explain a shift, such

that if the item's value is more widely associated with either the risky or the cautious alternative, the group will favor the consistent alternative. He summarizes his hypothesis, as he writes, "risky shifts arise because of the dominance of values favoring the risky alternative; cautious shifts come from the dominance of values favoring the cautious alternative." (p. 455). Using value hypothesis, it is possible to comprehend how groups tend to gravitate towards the alternative that aligns with their common value.

In contrast to Stoner's conclusion of a value hypothesis, a study by Yinon, Jaffe, and Feshbach (1975) can provide a different theory behind risky shift, and can be applied more specifically towards a condition in which the risky shift will result in more aggressive behavior. In their study they recruited groups of four, made up of three subjects and one confederate, to participate in an experiment that they were told dealt with teacher-learner effects. The learner was chosen by lottery, although it was always fixed so that the confederate was in the learner position and the three subjects constituted the teacher group. The learner's task was to respond to a pattern of light bulbs, numbered one through four, that would correspond with a light switch A or B, depending on the selected pattern. The task was to be considered easy, and thus the confederate was told to make mistakes on 8 of the 20 trials in a non-specific order. The teachers were given the option of either a safe teaching method, in which a light would illuminate demonstrating to the learner that he had made a mistake, or they could employ a risky method in which an electric shock would be administered to the learner. Although the learner never actually felt the shock, the participants were given the chance to apply a shock on a scale of 1, seemingly harmless, to 10, a painful shock. The teachers could decide between the two methods, although they had been instructed that the use of shocks would promote faster learning than the safe,

light illuminating alternative. Given that the experimenters were promised a very small reward if the learning was up to a certain degree, the experimenters designed the study so that the risk alternative was more salient. The group was instructed to make a unanimous decision to either use one form of punishment or the other throughout the trials, such that only one method could be used for each mistake.

In their research, Yinon, Jaffe, and Feshbach (1975) found that subjects in groups would take higher risks than the individual teacher trials. In the case of group decision making, in 35% of the decisions the members had agreed prior to discussion, while in 39% of cases the group had employed majority rule. In 11% of the group decisions, the group used the average of the individual opinions to determine their ruling, while in the remaining 15%, the groups made decisions based on a single participant's belief (in 9% it was the safe alternative, in 6% it was the risky alternative). Although they did not conclude that the value hypothesis would be correct in the explanation of the results, as aggression is not a culturally held value by women traditionally, they believed that the results aligned with the belief in diffusion of responsibility as the reasoning behind the shift towards the risky, aggressive alternative. Ultimately they argued for more research into the causality, but they concluded that the results did demonstrate that groups would favor the risky, aggressive alternative to the safer one.

The research on risky shift, as well as that on risky shift applied to aggression, is important in order to comprehend the violent behavior of hooliganism groups, as it provides insight as to why the groups may engage and provoke fighting amongst other groups. Stoner's (1968) risky shift theory would assert that the group would act more violently, the risky alternative, if the group's members hold values similar values in that

direction. Given the hooligan group's propensity to fight, it would seem logical that the group would act more violently than its members would by themselves (Foer, 2005). Regardless of the country, as long as the salient value within the hooligan group is risk-oriented, as opposed to cautious-oriented, Stoner's theory suggests that the group will act in a more risky manner, which typically means that the group will engage in a more violent manner.

In an attempt to understand the recent increase in violence directed at referees, it is necessary to examine how this behavior could in part be learned and imitated by children and players alike. The social psychological theory that examines how the behavior could be reenacted as a result of observation is Albert Bandura's social learning theory of aggression. Bandura's theory is the concept that "we learn aggression not only by experiencing its payoffs but also by observing others" (p. 290, Myers, 2005). Bandura (1962) conducted an experiment on nursery school children to determine whether aggressive behaviors by adults could be learned through observation, and subsequently imitated by the children. According to Bandura (1962) imitation is "the tendency for a person to match the behavior or attitudes as exhibited by actual or symbolized models" (p. 592). To examine this, the children were placed into the aggressive model, the nonaggressive model, or a control group not exposed to any behavior. Children in the aggressive model watched, on film, the adult model perform various specific acts of aggression towards a large inflatable plastic doll. In the nonaggressive model, children simply watched the adult model assemble tinker toys in a reserved fashion, ignoring the inflatable doll entirely. The children were subsequently put in a mildly frustrating

condition, prior to being placed in an experimental room, which contained the same toys and doll as in the video, for 20 minutes.

Bandura (1962) found that children who had observed the aggressive model performed about twice as many aggressive acts as the children who had either observed the nonaggressive model or were placed in the control group. One of the more intriguing aspects to this study was that the children who watched the aggressive model were not only more aggressive, but the nature of their aggressive behavior was practically “carbon copies of their models.” (p. 596). Bandura reasoned that the behavior exhibited by the adult models might be very influential in the construction of the child’s frustration reactions. Similarly, he offered the notion that the child might identify with the aggressor, in the sense that “a person presumably transforms himself from an object to an agent of aggression by adopting the attributes of an aggressive, threatening model in order to allay anxiety, is widely accepted as an explanation of the imitative learning of aggression.” (p. 597). Bandura ultimately concluded that, “much of a child’s behavior repertoire is acquired through imitation by the child of attitudes and patterns of behavior exhibited by adult models.” (600).

Given Bandura’s finding that aggressive behavior by models can be imitated, a compelling case can be made regarding how the aggressive behavior towards referees is learned, as well as possibly explaining its recent increase throughout the world. Children and others may observe this behavior by athletes on their favorite teams, and may without thinking, mimic this behavior (Springer, 2013). In this sense, the child will imitate the aggressive modeled behavior of their favorite athletes in similar situations while playing the game. For instance, observing a player punching a referee following the issuance of a

red card could lead a child to perform the same aggressive behavior when confronted with the same situation. Given the increased availability and exposure of soccer games, with more games being broadcast on television and the ability to watch soccer online, it is even more possible for children and players alike to observe athletes and their criticisms, and potential violence, towards referees (Davis, 2012). Due to this exposure, Springer (2013) suggests that a way to reduce the incidence of the violence towards officials would be for professional athletes, parents, and coaches to provide a better example of behavior for the generations to follow. While Springer offers a logical resolution, and it is possible that it could help reduce the instances of violence towards referees, in her resolution she overlooks the potential influence of testosterone and a person's competitive nature, both of which she briefly stated might have a possible influence on the player's violent behavior towards officials. In order to secure this change in behavior, it might be necessary to implement more severe monetary fines in conjunction with stringent suspensions to dissuade such aggressive acts by players.

In order to understand why various cultures would respond in varying degrees of aggression towards referees, the authority figures in soccer, it is important to recognize each culture's perception of authority. To evaluate and compare views towards authority, it is essential to examine the cultural dimensions of different cultures, and this paper will utilize Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory. Hofstede developed this theory while he was working for IBM in order to compare working environments for IBM around the world (Gladwell, 2008). Utilizing statistical analyses on surveys to generate scores for different values amongst cultures, Hofstede developed a measure in the 1960s and 1970s to evaluate where cultures stood on certain dimensions. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) have defined

culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others” (p. 4). Additionally, they contest that culture is not innate, but rather learned from one’s surrounding environment. The two define dimension as “an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures” (p. 23). With this scale, is important to remember how the relationship between one’s personality and culture in behavior. Although there is no clear determinant, Gladwell (2008) offers a relationship, as he writes, “Each of us has his or her own distinct personality. But overlaid on top of that are tendencies and assumptions and reflexes handed down to us by the history of the community we grew up in.” (p. 204). While it is not the sole determinant of behavior, cultural values, according to the theory, do in fact influence the behavior. The cultural dimensions are calculated in relation to nations as opposed to society, because, as Hofstede and Hofstede write, “Many nations do form historically developed wholes even if they consist of clearly different groups and even if they contain less integrated minorities.” (p. 18). They later expand upon this notion by adding that shared aspects of a nation often include one common national language, a national education structure, as well as specific products that are exported. Due to this unification, Hofstede and Hofstede reason that a nation can be considered a culture. On a final note, it should be recognized that in Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory, there is no right or wrong place to be on the scale of any value (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).

Since the theory’s inception, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) have restructured the original cultural dimensions theory in an effort to evaluate how cultures differ on the aspects of power distance index, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance index. To examine the violence towards referees, both power

distance index and uncertainty avoidance index will be examined. This will help evaluate how the Western cultures examined, as opposed to the Western nations comprised in Latin American cultures, may differ on these aspects. The Latin American cultures will be evaluated in relation to the ratings for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. Likewise, Western cultures will be evaluated in relation to the ratings for the United States, Great Britain, and Spain, the main cases examined of violence outside of Latin America. Ultimately, these ratings may aid in the interpretation of each culture's issue of violence towards referees.

To begin with, it is logical to evaluate various Western and Latin American cultures on Hofstede's power distance index dimension. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) define power distance index as "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally." (p. 46). Institutions in their mind reflect schools and communities for example, whereas organizations reflect where people work. In low power distance index countries, there is not a strong dependence by the subordinates towards their superiors, as the superiors are quite easily approachable and reflect a consultative relationship between the two. High power distance index countries usually have subordinates who are very dependent on their superiors, in a paternalistic or autocratic manner, and are unlikely to seek them out to express any disagreement. With these nations however exists the possibility of counterdependence, the idea that the subordinates reject their superiors entirely. In terms of rankings for Latin American countries, Argentina ranked 49th, Brazil ranked 26th, Colombia ranked 30th, and Mexico ranked 10th out of the 74 countries surveyed. For

Western countries, United States ranked 40th, Spain ranked 45th, and Great Britain ranked 63rd.

In spite of the power distance index being related to the instances of referee violence, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between scores and instances of referee violence. The rankings do not seem to indicate any relationship between how the cultures opinions of authority relate to their instances of violence towards referees. Most notably Argentina, with such a storied history of referee violence and scrutiny, is the lowest ranked Latin American country examined, even lower than the United States and Spain. Thus, the culture's views towards authority cannot really offer any insight into the violence towards referees' dilemma. All that it might suggest is that there are not glaring differences amongst the cultures, and perhaps that is why the incidence of violence towards referees is relatively similar across the cultures. However, that explanation is speculative at best.

Similar to power distance index, the uncertainty avoidance index may provide additional insight into each culture's referee violence dilemma, and possibly some explanations regarding hooliganism amongst them. Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) define the uncertainty avoidance index as "the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations." (p. 167). In short, the theory aims to evaluate anxiety levels experienced by people of a certain culture in an unknown circumstance. They add that those who rate the highest are the most anxious, writing of their people that, "they are places where people talk with their hands, where it is socially acceptable to raise one's voice, to show one's emotions, to pound the table." (p. 171). On the other hand, in cultures on the lower end of the scale, it is deemed unacceptable to show such emotions. For Latin American countries, Argentina ranked 17th, Brazil ranked 31st,

Colombia ranked 29th, and Mexico ranked 26th out of the 74 nations surveyed. For Western countries, United States ranked 62nd, Great Britain ranked 66th, and Spain ranked 17th. Much like the power distance index, these ratings reflect the notion that Latin American cultures are more emotional and expressive than their other Western culture counterparts. However, it is worth noting that Spain, placed under the category with the other Western cultures outside of Latin America, had the same ranking as Argentina.

Despite the high ratings by Latin American countries, in comparison to their other Western countries counterparts, it is important to remember to interpret the uncertainty avoidance index within the correct context in relation to violence towards referees. As Gladwell (2008) writes, “Hofstede wasn’t suggesting that there was a right place or a wrong place to be on any one of these scales. Nor was he saying that a culture’s position on one of his dimensions was an ironclad predictor of how someone from that country behaves.” (p. 203-204). It should be reiterated that the scales are neutral, in the sense that being on either end of the spectrum does not imply that the culture embodies a good or bad trait, as well as the notion that the culture’s position does not necessarily reflect the attitude or behavior of the individual.

In addition, it is hard to determine if the uncertainty avoidance index has a direct relation to how each culture would act within the context of a game. Many other conditions in a game, such as testosterone and the magnitude of the game, cannot be overlooked or trivialized in comparison to the cultural dimensions rankings when examining the violence towards referees. Plus, the survey evaluated these values in questions related to workplace conditions, in that questions on the uncertainty avoidance index addressed workplace stress and anxiety, as opposed to the specific stress and anxiety that might arise in a soccer

game (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). In this sense, it would be inappropriate and incorrect to use these rankings in any effort to suggest that Latin American cultures are more prone to violence towards referees since the surveys did not address athletic events.

Perhaps the most startling revelation in the uncertainty avoidance index rankings lies in the fact that they are not an effective indicator of whether a country will engage in violence towards referees. Countries from both Western cultures and Latin America have been shown to engage in violence towards referees. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), for countries on the lower end of the uncertainty avoidance index “Aggression and emotions are not supposed to be shown: people who behave emotionally or noisily are socially disapproved of.” (p. 171). However in the case of the United States, in contrast to its 62nd rating, it is still prone to violence towards officials in various sports (Springer 2013). What these rankings might more appropriately suggest is the dichotomy regarding hooliganism by Western cultures, in comparison to the Western nations in Latin America. This applies directly to the case mentioned previously of the fences surrounding Latin American stadiums symbolizing the notion that their soccer fans were more violent than their Western culture counterparts (Mason, 1995). When coupled with Margaret Thatcher’s quote labeling hooliganism as “A disgrace to civilized society,” it is simple to ascertain the notion that hooliganism violence is not to be expected of the other Western cultures like Great Britain (p. 13, Foer, 2005). In spite of the fact that Latin American nations have generally higher rankings than their other Western culture counterparts, both countries are susceptible to the same hooliganism issues. Yet, the association between violence amongst fans is more commonly associated with Latin America. This can be understood partially due to the fact that, as Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) state, “alien

cultures are often pictured in moral terms, as better or worse.” (p. 5). Thus, in light of the notion that the rankings should not be construed as positive or negative, because Latin American countries and the other Western countries examined represent opposite values, maybe that is why Latin American soccer culture is widely viewed as the more violent one. Based on their assertion, it is conceivable that the Western culture would identify their placement along this dimension as better, and likewise Latin American cultures are pertaining to worse. While Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) suggest that it would be vacuous to imply a value as anything other neutral, in this instance they are correct that it may be possible for a culture to assign a negative connotation to a culture representing the opposite value. With this in mind, it is possible that these rankings can explain why much of Western culture links hooliganism violence by fans with their Latin American nations.

In conclusion for this section, it is worth expanding upon how the association with Latin American soccer as being the violent soccer culture has been maintained. To examine this, it is important to acknowledge how the psychological concepts confirmation bias and belief perseverance affect this association. Confirmation bias is simply put “the tendency to seek out evidence that supports our hypotheses and neglect or distort evidence that contradicts them” (p. 29, Lilienfeld et al., 2009). Similarly, belief perseverance can be defined as “the tendency to stick to our initial beliefs even when evidence contradicts them.” (p. 30). In the case of confirmation bias, people of the other Western cultures could be neglecting the 1980 Scottish Cup Final, and hypothetically distorting or minimizing the Nottingham Forest-Liverpool tragedy (Galbraith, 1993; Foer, 2005). Instead, people of these Western cultures examined may have a tendency to only think of the 1924 Olympic game between Argentina and Uruguay, or perhaps the more recent case of in the beheading

of Silva in Brazil (Mason, 1995; Collman, 2013). Also, perhaps the perseverance in the belief that Latin American cultures have violent fans and more instances of violence towards referees is based on the strong association of soccer violence in Latin American cultures, as well as how the cultural dimensions theory could supplement their view of Latin American cultures as being more aggressive. Regardless, it is apparent that these violent episodes are not limited to Latin America, despite the outstanding belief that it is the region with the more violent soccer culture.

Conclusion

Throughout the paper, attention was primarily focused on the examination of the instances of hooliganism, while not as much has addressed efforts to mitigate hooliganism. Given that, it is important to discuss and analyze the efforts made around the world to eradicate the violence that occurs within hooliganism. In review of successful efforts to extinguish hooliganism, it is best to examine the country where it began: Great Britain.

According to Spaaij (2005) British authorities have revamped security efforts since the late 1980's in an effort capture more evidence of hooliganism. This need for increased security was caused by lawsuits in the mid 1980's in which hooligan leaders were often acquitted due to a lack of evidence. In response, through closed circuit television monitoring, as well as an increase in law enforcement officers at the ground and in the stands, the violence within the stadium walls has decreased significantly. Spectator movement as well as street level hooliganism is now monitored, with undercover law enforcement observing hooligan groups and their activities in an effort to gather

information regarding membership, location, and motives. These increased measures have led hooligan groups to plan ahead with rival hooligan groups at a meet place in order to engage in the violence. Despite their forward thinking, British authorities have since implemented cameras in public spheres to capture attempts at fights between hooligans. Their measures have moved the fighting out of the stadiums, but they have not been without their faults. Spaaij acknowledges that the increased surveillance centers on known hooligans and organized groups, whereas a substantial degree of spectator violence is unorganized and not a product of hooligan efforts. In addition, while national intelligence efforts are quite advanced, the amount invested and technology available across regions is varied. Despite these shortcomings, the implementation of video surveillance and undercover police work has been able to curtail much of the hooliganism violence in Britain.

Based on the success of the video monitoring in Great Britain, it would be interesting to see if this tactic could mitigate the hooliganism violence in Latin American countries. As Spaaij (2005) notes, the most common tactic employed in Latin America has traditionally been the use of police and/or military force in great capacity. While it is a well-intentioned approach, perhaps an increase in authority figures would not be the appropriate response to mitigate the violence. According to MacLin and Herrera (2006) the common stereotyped criminal is perceived to be either of African American or Hispanic/Latino descent in countries like the United States. Given this stereotyped view of Hispanics by the United States, a fellow Western nation, along with their results on the Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) uncertainty avoidance index, perhaps there is a perceived view by some Western nations of Hispanics or Latinos as more emotional and aggressive.

This perception, coupled with the increased presence of police officers and/or military, as well as the implementation of fences surrounding soccer stadiums, may enhance this “criminal” stereotype in the minds of other Western cultures. Regardless of whether this has led to the creation of this stereotype of criminals or instability, it should be emphatically stated that these stereotypes are both incorrect and unsupported. Many of the hooliganism incidents and violence examined in this paper have been just as common in countries outside of the Latin American region, which have been perceived as being more democratic and controlled by their cultural values (Foer, 2005; Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). In addition, as Wilson and Breuer (1993) note, the greater the number of police officers present can lead to an increase in the officers’ aggression in conflict resolution. However, despite all the instances of hooliganism violence and violence towards referees in other Western nations, the false perception of Latin American soccer being home to violent and unruly fans still persists (Mason, 1995).

Of course, the implementation of a video surveillance system at Latin American stadiums would be expensive. Even in Great Britain, there have been stadiums that have not been able to afford the costs associated with implementing this new technology (Spaaij, 2005). However, in implementing this technology, it could allow for a decrease in police presence. In addition, the video surveillance and undercover police work may help to mitigate the hooliganism violence much like in Great Britain. In spite of this possible intervention, it is important to recognize that the implementation of any successful tactic to combat hooliganism must take into account cultural concerns and the local environment (Spaaij 2005). Therefore, it should be carefully employed, perhaps in a trial run in certain stadiums, to see if the video surveillance and undercover police work would truly mitigate

the hooliganism violence, and validate the financial investment, in Latin American stadiums.

With regard to referee violence and abuse, one possible solution could be the addition of a second referee within the field of play. An additional referee could decrease the amount of pressure on the referee, as well as to aid in officiating because there would only be more than one perspective when making a call (Foer, 2005). In addition, it would keep the referee from being the sole target of ire for players, coaches, and fans alike (Lever, 1995; Krug, 2013). Given that in the NFL, there are multiple referees on the field at once, and there have been no reported cases of players assaulting refs to date. Granted it is a different sport, however, there have been no assaults by players on fans within these games. Nonetheless, the main concern for this strategy would be that there might not always be funding available for the two referees, particularly in youth and amateur matches where most instances of violence have recently occurred (Krug, 2013). Also, from the game's perspective, it would be challenging to have two referees call the game at the same time since it can sometimes be played at a frantic pace (Foer, 2005). Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see an experiment such as this to decrease the physical and verbal attacks launched at referees.

Another method proposed by Springer (2013) was to have increased security and police on staff at amateur and youth games. Although it would certainly be costly to implement such a strategy, it would definitely be a tactic worth examining. Much of the violence that occurs at youth and amateur games happens without the presence of a genuine authority figure (Springer, 2013). Springer asserts that this would provide the youth and recreation league referees a degree of security, as well as eliminating their role

to police the atmosphere surrounding the game, which is not in the typical job description. Provided that there would be funds to secure the presence of police or security guards for the referees, it would certainly dissuade the notion of violence by players and parents alike. At the same time, much of this violence cannot exactly be predicted and could also occur during the field of play. Therefore, while it may dissuade aggressive acts after the game, it most likely would be unable to eradicate the in-game violence towards referees.

Within a paper addressing an issue of such magnitude, there are inherently various limitations. One of the more pressing problems in the issue of violence and aggression, in both hooliganism and referee violence, is that the violence cannot be manipulated in a lab setting. Of course, there are clear ethical concerns with any study attempting to measure violent activity, as it would be in violation of the code that participants should not be physically or mentally harmed. In addition, it would be near impossible to mimic the atmosphere between referees and players, as well as that between two hooligan groups from rival fan bases in a laboratory setting. While aggression and violence can be examined in laboratory settings unrelated to soccer, the challenge lies in creating an environment that most nearly resembles that of the hooliganism realm, and the context of a soccer game, between players and referees. For that reason, it is challenging to accurately apply studies of aggression and violence to the instances of hooliganism and referee violence.

Another area that was not examined, but would be important for comparison purposes, is how violence between fans and towards officials occurs within other sports. While issues of assaults against officials were addressed in part, there should be research dedicated towards examining how other sports have limited the violence and verbal abuse

towards officials (Springer, 2013). In addition, by communicating with other sports, there could be collaboration to address the overall issue of violence within our society, which is often on display in sports. It would be beneficial for international sports agencies, such as FIFA and the NFL for example, to get together and discuss ways in which each could eradicate the unnecessary violence that occurs surrounding their respective sports, to determine if successful strategies within one sport could be implemented universally in sports domains. In addition, it would decrease the instances of violence that could be observed by the upcoming generations, which might in turn decrease the incidence of violence and verbal assaults launched towards officials (Bandura, 1962).

In addition, another limitation of this study was the role of masculinity as well as testosterone and other physiological levels in sports. Although there was no attention directed towards the notion of masculinity in soccer, and how this gender construct might impact aggression, it would be intriguing to examine how this concept could be applied to hooliganism and referee violence. With regard to testosterone and physiological levels, as Gladwell (2005) examined in high-speed car chases, the increased heart rate, adrenaline, and testosterone that occurs during these chases has resulted in more aggressive actions being taken by police officers upon the conclusion of the chase. While it should be acknowledged that the tensions and physiological levels in a soccer match may not rival those involved in a car chase, it is important to recognize that these measures may be important in evaluating and comprehending the violent attacks launched by players towards referees. Perhaps with a greater knowledge of the physiological dynamics, it might be easier to understand when a confrontation between players and referees will

become violent. Despite the possibility, this paper did not examine whether or not physiological factors have a great effect on violence towards referees.

With regard to future research, it would be worth examining more specifically the cultures within Latin American countries and clubs to address their issues with hooliganism. Although the paper did examine the hooliganism violence and violence towards referees within countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, the paper did not focus specifically on one country or one particular region. Given Spaaij's (2005) assertion that any tactic to mitigate hooliganism should be culturally specific, it would be worthwhile for further research to focus specifically on one region to identify specific strategies that could be successful within the hooliganism of one region, as they could perhaps offer strategies that might be applicable in other regions. Once again, it is worth reiterating that the decision to focus on a more wide-ranging review of hooliganism and referee violence within Latin America, and worldwide, was done in order to dispel the commonly held, false perception that Latin American soccer is home to a more violent culture than its European counterpart (Mason, 1995).

Another area for future research that merits examination would be the biological factors influencing the violence towards officials. This was a clear limitation in the study, and it would be worth examining average testosterone and adrenaline levels within the context of the game, as well as heart rate, to determine what effect, if any, that this would have on the violence that is aimed at referees. It is hard to determine how these levels could be examined outside of a laboratory, but in the event that a study could put soccer players through similar physical tasks as they experience within the course of a game, such

as the distance run, it could provide some insight on how the physiological factors might influence the aggression that occurs.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that hooliganism happens everywhere (Foer, 2005). Hooliganism has not been confined to solely Latin America, despite the prevailing perception that it is home to the more violent fans (Mason, 1995). It is important to acknowledge that hooliganism is in need of worldwide examination in an attempt to eradicate the game of this unnecessary violence (Spaaij, 2005). While it may not be completely solved in Great Britain, the tactics and their success at reducing instances of violence between hooligans offers hope that potentially the problem could also be reduced in other regions of the world.

Furthermore, it is important to realize that in many respects, soccer is a mirror to society (Foer, 2005). As has been documented in the case of the world's most bitter rivalries, fights and deaths can arise over battles between fans representing divergent social classes, in Boca Juniors and River Plate, and religions, in Celtic and Rangers (Mason, 1995; Taylor, 1998; Foer, 2005). Similarly, just like in other areas of society, such as politicians, referees are on occasion guilty of letting bribery influence the execution of their jobs (Taylor, 1998; Foer, 2005). In reference to the referee violence, these assaults, aimed at authority figures, could mirror other attacks at authority figures, such as those aimed at police officers (Krug, 2013). Although it may not be true in every capacity, there are certainly areas within the realm of soccer that can provide a glimpse of societal dilemmas.

References

- Baer, P. E., & Bandura, A. (1963). 1. Behavior Theory and Identificatory Learning. *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 33(4), 591-601.
- Bailey, R. (2013, April 23). Indonesian referee punched in the face after awarding penalty. *Yahoo Sports*. Retrieved February 25, 2014, from <http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/soccer-dirty-tackle/dtodd-indonesian-referee-punched-face-awarding-penalty-143251403--sow.html>
- Collman, A. (2013, July 8). Brazilian soccer referee beheaded by angry fans who put his head on a stake after he stabbed player. *Mail Online*. Retrieved September 17, 2013, from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2357453/Brazilian-referee-beheaded-Angry-fans-head-stake-stabbing-player.html>
- Davis, S. (2012, October 28). NBC Universal acquires exclusive English Premier League rights in United States. *NBC Sports*. Retrieved February 19, 2014, from <http://prosoccertalk.nbcsports.com/2012/10/28/nbc-universal-acquires-exclusive-english-premier-league-rights-in-united-states/>
- Festinger, L., Pepitone, A., & Newcomb, T. (1952). Some Consequences Of De-individuation In A Group.. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 47(2), 382-389.
- Foer, F. (2005). *How soccer explains the world: an unlikely theory of globalization*. London: Harper Perennial.
- Folkesson, P., Nyberg, C., Archer, T., & Norlander, T. (2002). Soccer Referees' Experience of Threat and Aggression: Effects of Age, Experience, and Life Orientation on Outcome of Coping Strategy. *Aggressive behavior*, 28, 317-327.
- Gabrilo, G., Ostojic, M., Idrizovic, K., Novosel, B., & Sekulic, D. (2013). A retrospective survey on injuries in Croatian football/soccer referees. *BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders*, 14(1), 1-12.
- Galbraith, R. (1993, October 16). When Two Tribes Go To War. *Herald Scotland*. Retrieved February 11, 2014, from <http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/when-two-tribes-go-to-war-1.737582>
- Gencay, S. (2009). Magnitude of Psychological Stress Reported by Soccer Referees. *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal*, 37(7), 865-868.
- Gladwell, M. (2005). *Blink: the power of thinking without thinking*. New York: Little, Brown and Co..
- Gladwell, M. (2008). *Outliers: the story of success*. New York: Little, Brown and Co..

- Groot, L. (2005). Referees among Most Important Players in Soccer Tournaments. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 29(4), 437-442.
- Hassall, P. (2010, February 12). Bill Shankly in quotes. *Liverpool FC*. Retrieved February 27, 2014, from <http://www.liverpoolfc.com/news/latest-news/bill-shankly-in-quotes>
- Hofstede, G. H. & Hofstede G. J. (2005). *Cultures and organizations: software of the mind* (Rev. and expanded 2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- James, S. (2012, December 22). Richard Nieuwenhuizen: Dutch football and the death of a linesman. *The Guardian*. Retrieved February 5, 2014, from <http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/dec/21/richard-nieuwenhuizen-dutch-death-linesman>
- Krug, M. (2013, May 6). Soccer violence: Referees under siege. *CNN*. Retrieved February 4, 2014, from <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/14/sport/football/referee-violence-spain-football/index.html>
- Lever, J. (1995). *Soccer madness: Brazil's passion for the world's most popular sport*. Long Grove, Ill: Waveland Press. (Original work published 1983)
- Lilienfeld, S., Lynn, S., Namy, L., & Woolf, N. (2009). *Psychology: from inquiry to understanding*. (International ed.). S.l.: Pearson Education.
- MacLin, M. K., & Herrera, V. (2006). The Criminal Stereotype. *North American journal of psychology*, 8(2), 197-207.
- Mann, L., Newton, J. W., & Innes, J. M. (1982). A test between deindividuation and emergent norm theories of crowd aggression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 42(2), 260-272.
- Maradona, D., Arcucci, D., Bialo, E., & Araujo, M. (2007). *Maradona: the autobiography of soccer's greatest and most controversial star*. New York: Skyhorse Publishing.
- Mason, T. (1995). *Passion of the people?: football in South America*. London: Verso.
- Mohamed, M. (2013, June 17). Richard Nieuwenhuizen death: Six teenagers and 50-year-old father convicted of manslaughter in shocking case of referee killed over a game of football. *The Independent*. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/richard-nieuwenhuizen-death-six-teenagers-and-50yearold-father-convicted-of-manslaughter-in-shocking-case-of-referee-killed-over-a-game-of-football-8662177.html>
- Myers, D. G. (2005) *Exploring psychology* (6th ed.). New York, NY: Worth Publishers.

- Pope, D. (2013, April 25). Worldwide violence against referees reaching all-time highs. *Examiner.com*. Retrieved January 21, 2014, from <http://www.examiner.com/article/worldwide-violence-against-referees-reaching-all-time-highs>
- Posnanski, J. (2009, November 2). Harassment In The Workplace. *NBA refs are going back on the job. What are they thinking?*. Retrieved February 11, 2014, from <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1161831/2/index.htm>
- Rehm, J., Steinleitner, M., & Lilli, W. (1987). Wearing uniforms and aggression—A field experiment. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 17(3), 357-360.
- da Silva, A. I., Fernandes, L. C., & Fernandez, R. (2008). Energy expenditure and intensity of physical activity in soccer referees during match-play. *Journal of Sports Science and Medicine*, 7, 327-334
- Spaaij, R. (2005). The Prevention of Football Hooliganism : A Transnational Perspective. *Actas del X Congreso Internacional de Historica del Deporte* (pp. 1-10). Seville: CESH.
- Springer, S. (2013, August 24). Magazine. *BostonGlobe.com*. Retrieved January 24, 2014, from <http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2013/08/24/violence-against-referees-what/ig85FIHm2vAGqQYy1oMo40/story.html>
- Stoner, J. A. (1961) A comparison of individual and group decisions involving risk. Unpublished Master's thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Industrial Management.
- Stoner, J. A. (1968). Risky And Cautious Shifts In Group Decisions: The Influence Of Widely Held Values. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 4(4), 442-459.
- Taylor, C. (1998). *The beautiful game: a journey through Latin American football*. London: Gollancz.
- Wilson, C., & Brewer, N. (1993). Individuals and Groups Dealing With Conflict: Findings From Police on Patrol. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 14(1), 55-67.
- Yinon, Y., Jaffe, Y., & Feshbach, S. (1975). Risky Aggression in Individuals and Groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 31(5), 808-815.
- Zimbalist, J. & Zimbalist, M. (Directors). (2010). *The Two Escobars* [Documentary]. USA: ESPN, Inc..
- Zimbardo, P. G. (1969). The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order versus Deindividuation, Impulse and Chaos. *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, 17, 237-307.