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An Evaluation of the FARC, MLN-T, FMLN :The Impact of Guerrilla Warfare on Democratic Stability in Latin America

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An Evaluation of the FARC, MLN-T, FMLN: The Impact of Guerilla Warfare on Democratic Stability in Latin America



By Anthony Michael Wright

**Senior Thesis Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for Graduation**

**Department of Latin American Caribbean Studies
Union College
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Grandma Ann, I dedicate this work to you and all the love you showed me and through my studies and throughout my life. Your love and support have gotten me through so much, and will never cease to guide me for the rest of my life. I'm saddened to know that you won't be able to read this paper, but I know that you're with me always.

In Loving Memory of my Grandmother, Ann Perik,

November 20th, 1924-November 26, 2016

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Abstract

Wright, Anthony M. The Impact of Guerilla Warfare on Democratic Stability in Latin America

Throughout the history of Latin America there have been many revolutions that have reshaped the political fabric of the entire continent. This thesis will seek to explore the impact that the following three movements have had: The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Las Fuerzas Armadas de la República de Colombia (FARC), and the Tupamaros (MLN-T) in Uruguay. When examining these three movements the research will include histories and discussions of each revolution and text regarding the strength of democracy within the countries. These sections will then be supported with data regarding democracy and the people's perspectives on democracy. The success of these movements will be judged primarily on the strength of the democracy in the country they are based, and additionally by the role that have played in the formation of these democratic principles.

Research into the guerilla groups will discuss their origins, and the primary reasons for their armed resistance to their governments. In addition, these sources will go into detail regarding the individual movement's histories. The data from the censuses from source like LatinoBarómetro, and Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) will help provide constructive polling and data on the strength of democracy in the respective countries.

This paper will seek to examine the guerilla and political movements in a historical and practical perspective. The beginning of the paper will examine the

history of democratic and political revolutions and provide an in depth description of the history of guerilla movements in Latin America. Then the evaluation of the groups will provide practical examples of the impact that guerilla movements have had on democracy within Latin America. Finishing with a discussion of the impacts that the groups have played on democracy within their specific countries.

Table of Contents

Dedication	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Abstract	iv
Table of Contents	vi
Preface	1
Formal and Informal Institutions.....	1
Operational Definition of Democracy.....	4
Terrorism vs. Guerilla Warfare.....	4
1. History of Latin American Guerilla Movements	7
Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican Revolution.....	10
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and the 26 th of July Movement.....	12
The Red Scare and U.S. Intervention.....	16
Conclusion.....	18
2. The Tupamaros and Uruguay.....	20
History of the Tupamaros.....	20
American Intervention in Uruguay.....	23
The Military Dictatorship.....	26
Restored Democracy and Integration of the MLN-T.....	28
LatinoBarómetro data supporting the FA.....	32
Conclusion.....	33
3. The FARC, UP, and Colombia.....	35
History of the FARC.....	35
Development of the FARC.....	37
The UP.....	39
Key LatinoBarómetro Data for Colombian Democracy	41
Colombia’s conflict and Peace Process.....	43
Conclusion.....	45
4. El Salvador’s FMLN.....	48
History of the FMLN.....	48
U.S. Involvement in El Salvador.....	51
The Peace Process and Integration of the FMLN.....	54
The FMLN’s Political Successes and Difficulties.....	56
Data examining the reception of Democracy in El Salvador,.....	60
Conclusion.....	63
Epilogue.....	65
Bibliography.....	69

Preface

Formal and Informal Political Institutions:

Latin America, a region that is unique in its political ideologies, has many different factors that contribute to its political identity. The identity has experienced many changes and has greatly evolved throughout the centuries following Simon Bolivar's campaign for independence.¹ One such tenant of Latin American politics is the idea that individual liberation movements can significantly impact governmental institutions. Within Latin America the idea of popular resistance and the organization of individuals to express political discontent has been commonplace throughout Latin American history. The organizations that consist of civil society are not formal groups and are listed as informal organizations, or popular movements that engage many followers.

Informal organizations, which derive from informal institutions, are different than the recognized formal governmental institutions that they seek to influence through their actions. Informal organizations are bodies that differ from the official government, and work in areas that are outside of official channels. Informal institutions, in the views of Professor Gretchen Helmke, are organized non-governmental groups within countries that have significant impacts within both the political sphere as well as the social culture of a given nation.² Informal organizations however are groups that are separate and different than political

¹ Sherwell, Guillermo Antonio. *Simon Bolivar (the liberator): patriot, warrior, statesman, father of five nations; a sketch of his life and his work*. Bolivarian Society of Venezuela, 1921. 3.

² Helmke, Gretchen. *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2006. Print.

actors that the informal institutions include. As Helmke explores with Steven Levitsky, the difference is that informal organizations, like formal organizations, are separate to informal institutions but each affects the other significantly.³

Informal institutions and organizations are different from recognized institutions in that they strive to enact change through different mediums and act as separate autonomous groups to the national institutions. These formal groups, which include the formal rules of political institutions that run sovereign nations, are affected by the efforts of both informal bodies. Even though they remain as outsiders to the official political realm and the formal institutions like the judiciary, legislative, and executive, they still impact these institutions. The informal organizations, which are similar to the formal organizations, constitute groups of people involved in the political process, include groups like mafias and clans.⁴

When further examining the definition of informal organizations there are several similarities between informal institutions and popular movements. The definition that Helmke and Levitsky provide for informal organizations, as seen above, is similar to what Joe Foweraker and Ann Craig explain in their text *Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico*. In their book, they define popular movements as organizations that have a clear social composition and use their organization as a machine to communicate a political belief.⁵ These political beliefs,

³ Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." *Perspectives on politics* 2, no. 04 (2004): 730.

⁴ Helmke, "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." 732.

⁵ Foweraker, Joe, and Ann L. Craig. *Popular movements and political change in Mexico*. Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990. 13.

as is the case with the informal institutions, are voiced by popular movements directly to the government.

When examining the definitions above for formal and informal institutions, and popular movements, most groups that voice discontent against the government are clearly defined. However, there is another method of expressing political discontent that hasn't received a definition but is still a social movement. The social movement that doesn't have a place in these boundaries are guerilla movements, that have been active in Latin America since the conquest of the continent. The first occurrence of guerilla activity through indigenous populations and the Cacique Enriquillo of the Dominican Republic who rebelled against the Spanish from 1519-1533.⁶ These movements have since proliferated and become a popular method to express political discontent and to seek to enact change on the political institutions throughout the continent.

Guerilla movements, as many theorists, like Helmke and Levitsky note, are very similar and contain many attributes of informal organizations, but aren't categorized along with them due to their politically violent strategies.⁷ While they may not belong in the category of informal organizations, they affect formal government institutions and seek to enact political change through their actions. Guerilla movements, like popular movements, are groups that seek to use their social construction to impart a change on their society. As social movements, and organizations of people who are striving to enact political change, guerilla

⁶ Castro, Daniel. *Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin America*. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. xvi.

⁷ Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. "Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda." 735.

movements are a successful vehicle that people use to give voice to their ideological differences with the government.

Operating Definition for Democracy

As the ideas of setting up the definition of the different forms of institutions is, the creation of a definition for democracy is equally as important for the context of the paper. The definition for democracy, that I will use is the following,

We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.⁸

This definition can be applied to Uruguay, and is in Colombia and El Salvador this definition is in the process of becoming applicable to their democratic system. Through this paper, I will contend that the guerilla groups, have through their efforts, brought their countries if not to this level of democracy, but closer towards the ideals listed above.

Terrorism vs. Guerilla Warfare

When examining guerilla warfare, specifically guerilla groups and their desired transition from armed groups to political actors, it is essential to provide a separate of the definitions for guerillas and terrorists. The two groups appear similar in that they both use violence to obtain their desired goals being political, ideological, or otherwise change. Yet these two groups are different and should not

⁸ Munck, Gerardo L., ed. *Regimes and Democracy in Latin America : Theories and Methods*. Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK, 2007. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 9 June 2015.

be considered in the same categorical definition of one another. Terrorism and guerilla warfare are inherently different and possess ideals separate of one another.

Terrorism, unlike guerilla warfare, prays upon the weakness of non-combatants or civilian targets. This is to say that terrorist groups, like guerilla movements or other protests groups, seek to enact a political change, whether that be political, economic, or social, they seek to use their violent actions for this purpose. These organizations seek to gain media attention that is garnered from attacks on the vulnerable civilians as an aspect of the daily life to create this change. So, an operational definition that Boaz Ganor uses to describe terrorism goes as follows, "Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."⁹ The definition further explains that the collateral damage to citizens from an attack on a military institution cannot be defined as terrorism, but an intentional attack on uninvolved civilians can be considered a terrorist acts.

While this is the definition of terrorist activities, it is important to provide a definition of guerilla warfare and what constitutes a guerilla fighter in comparison to the provided definition for terrorism. Guerilla warfare is described as a military tactic that is adopted by a weaker force, where the weaker force selects the place and time of the conflict against a larger force. In addition to this the guerilla force locates its operations in liberated areas in the countryside where the group can gain members, resources, and create their own separate institutions. Guerilla warfare, as

⁹ Ganor, Boaz. " Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter?" *Media Asia* 29, no. 3 (2002): 126.

Ganor's article continues to explain, takes on the appearance of a formal conflict between two national armies. Meaning that guerilla warfare seeks to wage its conflict with their opposition in accordance to the conventions of standardized warfare.¹⁰

Terrorism and guerilla warfare are two forms of non-conventional conflicts, but besides this classification their definitions are very different from one another. Terrorism is defined as the targeting of civilians and using action that inspire wide ranging fear from non-combatant civilian populations, which terrorists use to enact political change. This definition is significantly different than the military tactics of guerilla warfare, which is an irregular and smaller form of conventional warfare, which seeks to enact a political change on society or government. Ganor however, examines one aspect of terrorism that will be relevant to the contents of the paper. This topic is that of state state-sponsored terrorism, which in Latin America is a very important concept when examining guerilla warfare and will be addressed later in this thesis.

¹⁰ Ganor, 128.

Chapter 1: History of Latin American Guerilla Movements

Guerilla Warfare, or as it is translated into Spanish the “little war”, was coined as a terminology to describe the irregular and untraditional war that the Spanish were waging against the French during their occupation in the 19th century.¹¹ Guerilla movements in Latin America began under a different name, “indigenous uprisings” and the first of these was the aforementioned Enriquillo in the Dominican Republic against the Spanish imperial forces. Enriquillo’s rebellion is referred to as the first armed rebellion of the peoples of Latin America against an oppressive force.¹² He fought for the Taino indigenous people and as Bartolomé de Las Casas described, was a leader of eminent ability, committed to defending the rights of his people.¹³ Although he was unsuccessful in his efforts to rid the island of the Spanish oppressors, his rebellion marked the first resistance in Latin American from an indigenous group against their imperial oppressors.¹⁴

Enriquillo’s success would inspire an uprising two centuries later led by another indigenous man, called Tupac Amaru II in 1780.¹⁵ The rebellion that Tupac began was to reassert the Inca Empire in the Peruvian Andean region. Additionally, based his desires to reassert the dominion of the Incan empire, Tupac sought to

¹¹ Castro, Daniel. *Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin America*. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. xvi.

¹² Altman, Ida. "The Revolt of Enriquillo and the Historiography of Early Spanish America." *The Americas*. 4th ed. Vol. 63. Cambridge University Press. 587.

¹³ Altman, 589.

¹⁴ Altman, 614.

¹⁵ Castro, 1.

rebel against the Bourbon reforms of 1776.¹⁶ These reforms saw the removal of Creoles from governmental positions in favor of European supervisors and the increase of taxes on different goods.¹⁷ Tupac felt that he was fighting to bring back the Incan Empire and described himself as the descendent to the Incan Emperor.¹⁸ This insurrection became a bloody contest between Tupac's indigenous followers and the colonial Spaniards. Tupac's fight would end in 1781 with his capture and execution, which included quartering and then the burning of his remains as an example.¹⁹

Tupac's rebellion was a struggle for the representation of the Indigenous nation and the Indian people of Peru before the colonialization of the Spanish Empire. This movement sought to use war as a way to preserve their society and the survival of their culture. The impact of the rebellion was significant and like other rebellions, by Indian nations against colonialism, bred contempt by both groups. As Daniel Castro notes,

The massacres of Spanish immigrants, especially of those who had lived among the Indians, further widened the gap between the colonizers and the colonized. Old images of imperial authority and king had begun to dissolve.²⁰

The rebellion was an act of protest, and the outcome may have been defeat but Tupac and his followers expressed their discontent with the colonial power. This

¹⁶ Castro, Daniel. *Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin America*. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. 3-4.

¹⁷ Castro, 5.

¹⁸ Castro, 6.

¹⁹ Castro, 7.

²⁰ Castro, 8.

rebellion was the act of a group of marginalized members of society using violence as a manner of political expression.

Some 60 years after the failure of Tupac Amaru II's rebellion in Peru there was a peasant insurgency in the Yucatan province of Mexico near what is now the Belize border. This insurgency, which began in 1847, was referred to as the Caste Wars, a war that was being waged by the Yucatan province for a multitude of reasons. The movement's main leader, Santiago Iman, was a wealthy caudillo, or merchant, and the movement was fighting primarily to resist taxes coming from central Mexico, but also to try and get control over their territories.²¹ This movement gave rise to the first signs of guerilla warfare within Mexico,

Only then did the rebels discover their true calling as guerilla fighters. Retreating with their forces to the eastern rain forests, the leaders of this conflict rallied their soldiers by instituting the religious cult of the Speaking Cross... Supported by the unyielding commands of their oracle, the cruzob (people of the cross) instituted a society of total mobilization: the men divided their time between farming and military service, while the women did household work but also prepared the supplies for campaigns.²²

The people of the Speaking Cross were successful in their uprising and became a separate autonomous region within Mexico. Although this autonomous body would dissolve and splinter after a half-century or so, their victory was a huge milestone. The method through which the Speaking Cross attained their success marked the successful introduction of guerilla warfare and rural insurgency to Central America.

²¹ Castro, 14.

²² Castro, 15.

Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican Revolution:

Emiliano Zapata, a rural leader, who was born into the Mexican state of Morelos, was a revolutionary through and through. In 1909, he was elected by his village to be a President of the defense committee.²³ His requests to the government, as the president of the committee, were not met, and Zapata's response was to peacefully occupy the lands that the government would not relinquish back to the people of the village. In the year 1910, Francisco Madero initiated a revolution against President Porfirio Díaz on the grounds of reflective suffrage and no reelection. Zapata respected this insurrection due to the movements Plan of San Luís.²⁴ The Plan of San Luís was a political manifesto that sought to redistribute land to smaller owners, which had been illegally stolen. With these San Luís goals in mind, Zapata contacted Madero and asked to become part of the movement, and by doing so brought revolution to state of Morelos.²⁵

Following several swift conflicts the revolutionaries succeeded in their uprising against the government in 1911.²⁶ This victory against the Díaz dictatorship was in name only, and the revolutionaries had to deal with the federal combatants remaining active in the countryside. Their differences reached a boiling point due to Madero, who became president elect and rejected all of Zapata's demands for land reform. Following the open rejection of Zapata's demands Madero

²³ Castro, 24.

²⁴ Castro, 25.

²⁵ Knight, Alan. *The Mexican Revolution*. Vol. 1 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 310.

²⁶ Castro, 25.

endorsed a military campaign, led by Victoriano Huerta, against the Zapatistas.²⁷ Zapata and his followers resisted the efforts of the federal forces in the Morelos region. Upon assuming office, Madero moved away from agricultural reform and sought to enact more elite focused political change. Due to his political ineptitude and how he turned on his allies like Zapata upon assuming office, he was easily ousted by a Huerta backed military coup in 1913 and was executed that same year.²⁸

By the year 1914 the Zapatistas and the followers of Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza had successfully defeated the federal forces of the Huerta coup and took control of Mexico once again.²⁹ This control, similarly to the last period of governance, was marred by political strife. This strife was mostly focused on the ideological differences between Carranza and Zapata regarding agrarian reform.³⁰ Carranza believed that the government could not address the issue of agrarian reform and went so far as to say that the re-appropriation of lands was illegal for the government to perform.

For the following four years the Zapatistas waged war against the Carrancistas pushing the government follow through on it's promised land reforms.³¹ The Zapatistas however faced a very difficult struggle in this sense because the Carrancistas were better armed and had better access to supplies. This however did not stop Zapata and his followers, who, through textbook guerilla

²⁷ Castro, 26.

²⁸ Castro, 28

²⁹ Castro, 29

³⁰ Castro, 31-33

³¹ Knight, Alan. *The Mexican Revolution*. Vol.1, 1986. 317.

warfare methods, fought the superior Carrancista forces.³² While the efforts of the Zapatistas were being rewarded with success on April 10, 1919 the movement suffered a crippling loss. While riding to negotiate with an officer of the Carrancistas who was claimed to be defecting, Zapata was shot dead, leaving the movement without its leader and forcing it to the margins of Mexican political scene.³³

In 1920 Carranza met the same fate, as he was killed by Álvaro Obregón's forces, who became president of Mexico until 1924.³⁴ Zapata had been killed, but he remained the embodiment of the Zapatista armed resistance movement in Mexican history seeking to use its influence to enact social change. Zapata's influence as a guerilla fighter and charismatic leader, who represented the desires of the peasants and farmers of Mexico for agrarian reform, became one of the revolution's most defining features. Through his efforts and the efforts of the Mexican Revolution the idea that guerilla movements could experience not only minor success but also overthrow entire governments became real. The Zapatistas left a lasting mark on Mexican social movements, and that mark can still be seen today.

Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán and the 26th of July Movement:

Colonel Árbenz, who led the October Revolution in 1944, which overthrew the military dictator Jorge Ubico, successfully reinstating democratic elections and rule to Guatemala.³⁵ Upon his ascendancy to the presidency he attempted to bring about social reforms that revolved around assisting the impoverished and enacting more land reforms. His efforts, and the efforts of his government however weren't

³² Knight, Alan *The Mexican Revolution*. Vol. 2. 362

³³ Knight, Alan. *The Mexican Revolution*. Vol. 2. 1986. 367.

³⁴Castro, 40

³⁵ Gott, Richard. *Guerrilla movements in Latin America*. London: Nelson, 1970. 5.

enough to aid the poor and were considered too drastic to avoid the attention of the United Fruit Company, who felt their wealth and financial security being endangered by a “socialist”. The attention that the Árbenz government attracted for itself was from the U.S. on behalf of their United States industries heavily involved within Guatemala.

The resulting statement from the U.S. State Department, regarding Guatemala at the time, was that they were disappointed in the country’s voting within the Organization of American States, Rio Defense Pact. Additionally, the U.S. was alarmed that Guatemala was purchasing guns from Eastern European nations, to protect itself from different internal and international threats.³⁶ The reality was much different, according to Richard Gott, author of the *Guerilla Movements in Latin America*. The issue involved the Guatemalan government’s distribution of fallow lands belonging to the United Fruit Company, and Árbenz’s “soft” stance against communism.³⁷ These realities led to the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán by a military coup, led by Carlos Castillo Armas, which was backed by the CIA.³⁸

The importance of this event to future guerilla movements is important as the initial response to this overthrow was that even if guerilla movements and political uprising occur, there is the ever constant threat of the U.S. intervention. The other concern for revolutionaries, as Gott notes is that unless the revolution goes all the way and shuts down the wealthy ruling class and suppress the governmental

³⁶ Gott, 5.

³⁷ Gott, 5-6.

³⁸ Gott, 3.

structure within the nation, there is the threat of U.S. intervention will always be present. At the time of the military coup, President Árbenz had been advised by a future revolutionary, who suggested that he fight against the coup for the rights he desired for the people of Guatemala. This guerilla fighter wanted him to arm the peasants and workers to fight the imperial threat posed by the U.S. backed Guatemalan Carlos Armas, this advice came from none other than Ernesto Che Guevara.³⁹

While a popular rebellion in Guatemala took place later in 1960 and was led by two army officers, Luis Turcios and Marco Yon, its influence on Latin America cannot be understated.⁴⁰ While the overthrow of the Árbenz government took place in 1954 as was previously mentioned, it was an event that inspired Che Guevara, an advisor to President Árbenz, to continue fighting for justice in other countries. Upon the overturn of the Árbenz government Guevara had to flee to Mexico and living off the streets of Mexico City.⁴¹ Che was in luck however, because Mexico City was a refugee for other budding revolutionaries, most specifically Cubans who fled from the Fulgencio Batista regime. It was during this time that Che met with Fidel and Raúl Castro and joined the revolutionary movement that would alter the modern history of Latin American history, the 26th of July movement.⁴²

The 26th of July Movement, began as a small group of freedom fighters who met and trained in Mexico, seeking to end the Fulgencio Batista dictatorship in Cuba.

³⁹ Gott, 6

⁴⁰ Gott, 20

⁴¹ Ross, John. "Che's Mexican Legacy." [Www.counterpunch.org](http://www.counterpunch.org). February 26, 2016. Accessed January 20, 2017. <http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/10/19/che-s-mexican-legacy/>.

⁴² Ross, 2

The movement acquired its name from the unsuccessful assault on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba, led by the Castro's on the 26th of July 1953.⁴³ The survivors of the Moncada attack and others travelled in the *Granma*, a leaky and unstable yacht that Fidel Castro, the leader of the movement, had acquired their return to Cuba. On December 2nd of 1956 the small detachment landed in Cuba and were immediately ambushed.⁴⁴ Following this crushing blow the surviving members of the group fled to the Sierra Maestra, a heavily wooded mountain area to recover and plan their next course of action. From their mountainous position, they coordinated with their clandestine urban cohort in Santiago de Cuba to plan minor battles to raise the confidence and support for the movement in the Sierra Maestra.⁴⁵

Following series of minor victories, they took full advantage of media coverage from the *New York Times*⁴⁶ to grow in size as their skirmishes grew as well. These small victories solidified the movement and their purpose to eliminate the Batista regime from power. In the spring of 1958, following many victories from the small band of guerillas, the Cuban people began supporting the movement.⁴⁷ Following the development of a unified front, which included the Auténticos, Ortodoxo party, the Directorio Revolucionario, and the Montecristi movement the revolution pressed on to remove the Batista regime.⁴⁸ This final press became the

⁴³ Goldenberg, Boris. *The Cuban revolution and Latin America*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 153-154

⁴⁴ Goldenberg, 155

⁴⁵ Goldenberg, 155

⁴⁶ Goldenberg, 156

⁴⁷ Goldenberg, 159

⁴⁸ Goldenberg, 161

final offensive in December of 1958 and with it the Batista fled the country and the infrastructure collapsed. In January of 1959 Fidel Castro and the 26th of July movement toppled the Batista regime and took control of Cuba.⁴⁹

Upon seizing power in Cuba, the movement immediately enacted changes to the policies that had suppressed the country under Batista's regime. The revolutionary government sought to champion social revolution, which would include agrarian reformations, literacy reforms, the nationalization of important Cuban industries, and the desire to promote an industrial Cuban economy.⁵⁰ The influence of the Soviet Union on these policies, and their Marxist ideologies is a point of great importance to the origin of guerilla movements, especially during the Cold War.

The Red Scare and U.S. Intervention:

The U.S. policy towards Latin America, in context of the feared spread of Marxist and leftist beliefs, is another component that is crucial to understanding guerilla warfare in Latin America, and the purpose of their struggles. The development of these policies began following World War II and the development of the Soviet Union as a political rival to the U.S. following the collapse of the Axis Alliance. The predominant theory that would initiate this interaction would be the development theory, which sought to increase the interaction and financial aid that the U.S. provided Latin American. Development theory operated on the pretext of supporting the economic growth of "third" world countries, but this idealism was

⁴⁹ Goldenberg, 163

⁵⁰ Wright, Thomas C. *Latin America in the era of the Cuban Revolution*. New York: Praeger, 1991.

merely a cover for full blown U.S. intervention throughout the entire region against Latin American governments⁵¹.

The intervention of the U.S. in Latin America throughout the 20th century should not however be viewed as an operation to assist local governments develop more complete economies, but rather as a political action reacting to the perceived communist threat. The most notable of these interactions were the removal of Salvador Allende in Chile and the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba, but the U.S. involvement went deeper than these two incidents.⁵² The actions of the U.S. government were not in response to any direct threat from the countries in question or even from Russia using the countries as a base of operations. The U.S. was acting in defense of a national image of strengthen against the perceived threat of the spread of Communism throughout the world.

Their actions in Latin America, as Grow's text explains, were a show of international strength to deter the soviets,

... U.S. leaders worried that failure on their part to maintain firm hegemonic control over the United States' traditional sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere...would be interpreted by other governments as an indication of U.S. weakness, a sign perhaps that the United States no longer had the capability, or the will, to project its power in defense of interests.⁵³

The U.S. therefore had to pursue these hardline policies, due in large part to the advice from Henry Kissinger, who served as Secretary of State and National Security

⁵¹ Hunt, Michael H. *Ideology and U.S. foreign policy*. New Haven: Yale University press, 1987. 159-160

⁵² Grow, Michael. *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: pursuing regime change in the cold war*. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2012. 186-187.

⁵³ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 187.

advisor for Presidents Nixon and Ford, as well as unofficial advisor to many leaders.⁵⁴ Kissinger would continue on to clarify this idea even further with his own doctrine, the Kissinger Commission of 1984, where he stated that “the triumph of hostile forces in what the Soviets call the ‘strategic rear’ of the United States would read as a sign of U.S. impotence”.⁵⁵ With all of this taken into account the U.S. foreign policy into the Latin American region reflected a very militant, and non-supportive stance towards leftist, democratic governments that were perceived as communist friendly governments.

Conclusion:

The importance of the Cuban Revolution was that the imperial efforts of the United States within Latin America had been successfully challenged. Cuba was a nation that had thrown off the shackles of imperialism and had done so through an armed conflict led by the 26th of July movement and its leaders Che Guevara and Fidel Castro. In the following decades, the Cuban nation would face great difficulties and punishment from the United States for the success of the revolution. Yet, no matter how severe U.S. policy in Cuba was, the revolutionary government would not cave in, and constantly strove to live up to the ideals that they waged the revolution to institute.

Latin American countries would view the Cuban Revolution with a sense of pride and unity. Throughout Latin America, the U.S. backed dictatorships and false democracies had reigned uncontested. Cuba, and its revolution would inspire not only leftist movements throughout Latin America but would serve as an inspiration for

⁵⁴ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 98.

⁵⁵ Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions*, 187.

social movements globally. The revolution was unique because it was a guerilla movement that achieved its goal and became a sovereign nation, free of dictatorship. Through their success, they inspired many other guerilla movements throughout Latin America to form and resist their oppressive governments.

Chapter Two: The Tupamaros and Uruguay

History of the Tupamaros:

In 1971, a group known as the Frente Amplio (FA), or the Broad Front in Uruguay came into existence. The Frente Amplio represented a democratic coalition of around 12 fractured leftist political parties. The movement really began to gain traction in the early 1970's but swiftly lost a lot of popular support because of the terrorist tactics that they were employing. The Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros) were not like other guerilla movements; they were more of a political movement that decided to take up arms as their method of protest. They wanted to move the country away from an authoritarian dictatorship and help save the workers from market capitalism. However, with the 1973 military coup d'état, most democratic rights guaranteed in the 1967 Uruguayan constitution were not respected, leading effectively to the death of the FA after little over a decade in existence.⁵⁶

The Tupamaros officially began organizing in late 1962 into early 1963, and were led during their initial formation by Raúl Sendric and other disgruntled members of the Socialist party.⁵⁷ The name for the movement is widely believed to have been taken from the revolution of Tupac Amaru against the Spanish Empire in 1572.⁵⁸ In Martin Weinstein's book he addresses the overall structure of Uruguayan

⁵⁶ Garcé Adolfo "De guerrilleros a gobernantes: El proceso de adaptación del MLN-Tupamaros a la legalidad y a la competencia electoral en Uruguay (1985-2009)" *Hal*: 1-24.

⁵⁷ Weinstein, Martin. *Uruguay: the politics of failure*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975. 120.

⁵⁸ Weinstein, 121.

democracy, specifically drawing attention to the lack of representation that the Tupamaros had in government. Weinstein quotes the MLN-T's first public statement to the nation in 1967,

For these reasons, we have placed ourselves outside the law. This the only honest action when the law is not equal for all; when the law exists to defend the spurious interests of a minority in detriment to the majority; when the law works against the country's progress; when even those who have created it place themselves outside of it, with impunity, whenever it is convenient for them.⁵⁹

The quote continues to introduce the movement and announce the beginning of the Tupamaros guerrilla warfare to fighting the dictatorship. The movement came out with this charged statement to show that they felt it necessary to create an armed rebellion to fight for their rights. The desire of the movement to promote the economic well-being and political stability of the country would motivate the group to wage an armed guerilla war against the Uruguayan government for many years.

The Tupamaros, unlike other guerilla movements in the past decade, such as the Cuban Revolution, sought to become an urban guerilla fighting group. This idea of urban resistance went completely against the mold of guerilla fighting at the time, as created by Che Guevara through his own book, *Che Guevara Guerrilla Warfare*, which he wrote following the Cuban revolution. In his Guevara's book on Guerilla Warfare, he discusses three major components to irregular warfare, the third of which was the necessity to have a countryside base of operations to concentrate the development of your forces.⁶⁰ The Tupamaros however did not feel that Uruguay was the environment for a rural-based revolution, as was the case in the Cuban

⁵⁹ Weinstein, 121.

⁶⁰ Guevara, Che. *Che Guevara guerrilla warfare*. New York: Vintage Books, 1969. 14.

Revolution, which relied on mountains, trees, and rallying the peasants, and rural citizens. The Tupamaros saw an opportunity in Uruguay to develop an urban resistance in Montevideo and began an urban guerilla war against the dictatorship.

They felt that this method would be very successful due to the design of Montevideo, and the greater metropolitan area of the city. In Daniel Castro's book, he cites an anonymous interview with a Tupamaro fighter, where the fighter addressed questions regarding the strategies, policies and beliefs of the group. One such question addressed the idea of the urban revolution in Uruguay,

Q: *And for the urban struggle, do the conditions exist?*

A: Montevideo is a city sufficiently large and polarized by social struggles to give cover to the vast active commando contingent. It constitutes a far better framework than that which other revolutionary movements have had for the urban struggle.⁶¹

The Tupamaros underwent a military campaign that sought to unite other social movements, labor unions, and the impoverished Uruguayans who the desperate economic situation most significantly affected.⁶² The urban guerillas, however, did not achieve their goal of bringing down the government, and following the capture of several important leaders in 1972, the movement collapsed entirely.⁶³ Following the defeat of the Tupamaros the government of Uruguay took an even more oppressive which led to the prolonged imprisonment and torture of captured Tupamaros.

⁶¹ Castro, Daniel. *Revolution and revolutionaries guerrilla movements in Latin America*. Wilmington (Del.): SR Books, 1999. 112.

⁶² Brum, Pablo. *The Robin Hood guerrillas: the epic journey of Uruguay's Tupamaros*. Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2014. 24.

⁶³ Brum, 282.

American Intervention in Uruguay

U.S intervention throughout Latin America has been a prolific and dramatic occurrence and Uruguay was no exception during the 1960's and 1970's. Uruguay, widely referred to as the Switzerland of the South American nations due to its history of social democracy and peaceful society had been violence free since 1848. This period of peace was destined to fall however because of U.S. interests in hemispheric hegemony and their intervention policies that supports this dictatorship.⁶⁴

The initial intervention from the U.S. in Uruguay took place in the Uruguayan police force throughout the nation. The U.S. Office of Public Safety (OPS) began training police officers in Uruguay and additionally hundreds of officers were encouraged by the OPS to travel to the International Police Academy and the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama to gain further U.S. training. The OPS, which had functioned in other "struggling" democracies like Vietnam, had gained a negative reputation for its aggressive torture techniques. While the OPS were supposed to maintain an advisory role to the Uruguayan police force, in 1966 under the leadership of William Cantrell, the head of the program at the time and a covert CIA officer, moved to marginalize the police forces.

This marginalization took the form of the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence (DNII), which was Cantrell's organization that replaced the

⁶⁴ McSherry, Patrice J. "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor, and the United States." *Journal of Third World Studies*, 2007. Association of Global South Studies. 4.

Uruguayan led department of Alejandro Otero.⁶⁵ Otero was the head of the Uruguayan police force and in 1966, with the successful marginalization of Otero and the anti-torture Uruguayan police force, Cantrell began torturing political prisoners. With the flood gates of torture opened in Uruguay the OPS brought in Dan Mitrione, who was an advisor on Latin America to the CIA, to lead the Public safety office in Montevideo and train the officers. Mitrione had been heavily active in the South American police forces, and previously had trained the Brazilian police forces in interrogation and torture methods before arriving in Uruguay.

Under Mitrione the cases of torture increased and in an interview in 1970 Ortero publicly denounced Mitrione's methods and noted his scientific and psychological torture methods. One Cuban operative within the CIA, Manuel Hevia Concelluela, describe one of Mitrione's methods in his book *Pasaporte 11333, Eight Years With the C.I.A.*⁶⁶ In it Concelluela described a sound proofed room, where Mitrione and his men performed different demonstrations of torture methods, using electric currents and chemical substances on four homeless beggars.⁶⁷ In addition to the U.S. sponsored police brutality and torture methods, U.S. intervention took on another form, which was the development and support of death squadrons.

In a declassified telegram from 1971, the U.S. ambassador to Uruguay, Charles Adair, discussed the existence of death squads with important Uruguayan Ministers of the Interior. The following quote acknowledges that not only did the Uruguayan government know these squads existed, but that both governments

⁶⁵ McSherry, 5-6.

⁶⁶ Langguth, A.J. "Torture's Teachers." *New York Times* (New York), June 11, 1979.

⁶⁷ McSherry, "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor, and the United States." 6.

endorsed their existence, "Re counterterrorism, particularly formation of 'death squads' as tactic, I said I would not presume to pass judgment on developments in Uruguay ..." ⁶⁸ The ambassador would later add that he told the officials that such tactics weren't effective, but did not recant the statement he had made regarding death squads. Both the U.S. and Uruguay have admitted that the death squads existed and that they were an active component of counterinsurgency efforts in Uruguay. ⁶⁹

The existence of death squads became even more apparent when, in 1972, the Tupamaros kidnapped and questioned Nelson Bardesio, who had been OPS director Cantrell's driver. In their line of questioning, which Bardesio acknowledged was without violence, he revealed that the death squads were prevalent throughout the Uruguayan police force and the DNII. He gave the Tupamaros the names of officers Hugo Campos Hermida, Victor Castiglioni, and admitted to his own involvement in the squads. The other two officers he indicated were important members of the DNII. Castiglioni was the director of intelligence for the DNII and Hermida was in charge of investigations for the DNII. Bardesio also revealed that these death squads were responsible for assassinations and bomb attacks against socialist and communist leaders. ⁷⁰

These two examples of U.S. intervention, coupled with the idea of the U.S.'s desire for hemispheric control, led to the manipulation of the Uruguayan elections. This interference, which was spearheaded by President Richard Nixon and his

⁶⁸ McSherry, 7.

⁶⁹ McSherry, 9.

⁷⁰ McSherry, "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor, and the United States." 7

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, encouraged the Brazilian and Argentine militaries to take an active role in sabotaging the Frente Amplio political coalition. In a meeting between Kissinger and Brazilian dictator Emílio Médici, Kissinger commented on the status of the left in Uruguay and Bolivia, "in areas of mutual concern such as the situations in Uruguay and Bolivia, close cooperation and parallel approaches can be very helpful for our common objectives."⁷¹ This support, and the effective destruction of the left by the army and police forces in Uruguay, led the country to take a dramatic turn, which was led by the military seizing power in 1973.

Military Dictatorship:

In 1973 a group of Uruguayan generals and president Juan María Bordaberry, a civilian who assisted the military junta against the government, established his own dictatorship in Uruguay. Once the dictatorship was in place the government began a hardline approach against the rising left and Tupamaros. This military regime brutally suppressed the left and kidnapped, tortured, and killed many of the leaders of the left and the Tupamaros. After capturing Tupamaros leaders during the rebellion, they imprisoned them and began torturing them and exacting their revenge. One of these leaders was José Mujica, who was considered a high value prisoner and was never kept in one prison for longer than six months because of his ability to rally the prisoners and the importance he held for the Tupamaros.

José Mujica, one of the leaders of the MLN-T, was abducted by military forces while roaming the Uruguayan countryside and was brought into the military's

⁷¹ McSherry, 8

interrogation facilities. During his initial capture in 1972 he was tortured in captivity for information regarding the Tupamaros and their leadership structure. This torture included a particularly awful method of using an electric prod on his naked body, which led to a permanent change in Mujica's incontinence and severe mental trauma. Upon receiving what information they desired from Mujica, he was released to partake in the negotiations with the government and the remaining MLN-T fighters. These negotiations, which were held in undisclosed locations involving the surrender of the Tupamaros fighters, and the government used former members, like Mujica, to negotiate with the fighters.⁷²

With the collapse of the civilian government in 1973 Mujica's life as a political prisoner changed. For the following twelve years, he and several other leaders of the MLN-T would be transferred around to different military facilities.⁷³ This was necessary because the dictatorship chose different military facilities so that they could keep all the Tupamaros separate. In these separate and isolated locations, they would commit egregious human rights violations to them during their captivity. These violations, which Mujica lists thoroughly, fundamentally broke him down mentally and would stay with Mujica long after his captivity.

Mujica was held with a certain group of Tupamaros, the others being Eleuterio Fernández, and Mauricio Rosencof. The three each experienced similar conditions during they're captivity. Mujica's conditions included not being allowed to bath for two years, water boarding, physical abuse, hallucinations due to guards

⁷² Brum, Pablo. *The Robin Hood guerrillas: the epic journey of Uruguay's Tupamaros*. Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2014. 298.

⁷³ "The Robin Hood Guerillas", 335.

watching him, and solitary confinement.⁷⁴ During his time as a prisoner Mujica spent over 4,000 days in these kinds of living conditions with no hope of release and no news from the outside world.⁷⁵

At the same time the dictatorship was facing a struggle to maintain its repressive techniques and control over the Uruguayan populace. During the 1980's there was a resurgence in politicians from the formerly banned leftist groups who desired to bring about a change in Uruguay. In response to the rise of these new politicians in 1980, the military regime under Aparicio Méndez sought to entrench themselves, and their authoritarian regime, with a new constitution. This tactic failed and encouraged the exiled and repressed political leaders to seek to the end the regime. This change came about in 1984 through the Naval Club Pact, which established the conditions for the transition back to civilian rule and the end of 12 years of dictatorship.⁷⁶

Restored Democracy and the integration of the MLN-T

Once democracy was restored in 1985 under President Julio Sanguinetti, the FA came back as a strong coalition and served as a sign for the future of democracy in Uruguay.⁷⁷ This included the reintegration of the MLN-T into political society. The MLN-T has seen many of its leaders in political office, but none more prevalent than José Mujica. Mujica was elected president in 2009, and was one of the most active Tupamaros kidnapped during the military coup, released in 1985. Upon his release,

⁷⁴ "The Robin Hood Guerillas", 334.

⁷⁵ "The Robin Hood Guerillas", 1.

⁷⁶ Garcé, Adolfo "De guerrilleros a gobernantes: El proceso de adaptación del MLN-Tupamaros a la legalidad y a la competencia electoral en Uruguay (1985-2009)" 10.

⁷⁷ Luna, Juan Pablo. "Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay." *Latin American Politics and Society* (2008): 15.

he and the leaders of the Tupamaros decided to forgo guerilla warfare and enter politics. Shirley Christian, of the New York Times, below illustrates former president Mujica's description of the internal review that the MLN-T underwent before joining the FA.⁷⁸

Mr. Mujica also acknowledged that the Tupamaros are going through an "internal reorganization" that reflects the varied experiences of the members during the past dozen years as well as what he termed "the crisis all over the world in the traditional thinking of the left".⁷⁹

This moment in the formation of the FA is impressive due to his incredible patience to suspend their push for the immediate creation of an active party in the political structure. This patience allowed the Tupamaros to achieve a better understanding of themselves and the world. The leaders of the movement knew that they had to first understand themselves before they could try and change Uruguay.

In Christian's 1986 New York Times article she describes the influence of other worldly movements and how the leaders of the MLN-T sought to use these events to help their cause and solidify their political party,

Some Tupamaros, he said, have returned from exile in Western Europe, where they were influenced by social democratic thinking. Others are marked by the long years of prison isolation. Still others, he said, are returning to Uruguay from Central America, where they were influenced by the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrillas, both of whom believe in leadership by an all-powerful revolutionary vanguard.⁸⁰

With different perspectives in mind the MLN-T formed their own political party called the called the Movement of Popular Participation (MPP), which joined the FA

⁷⁸ Garcé, 12.

⁷⁹ Christian, Shirley "Tupamaros of Uruguay: The Mystique Survives" *The New York Times* November 3, 1986. 1.

⁸⁰ Christian, 3.

in 1988 and is currently the largest single faction within the FA.⁸¹ The MPP and the MLN-T wanted to fully endorse the socialist movement and create a party that would embody what the Cuban Revolution and other revolutionary movements in Central America had fought to achieve. They didn't want to continue the violence of the past, but instead to have their goals represented through an open and democratic political process.

The MPP political party took in several different aspects not only regarding themselves, but also of the world around them. In 1995, the Progressive Encounter and the Nuevo Espacio coalitions joined the FA and they began to compete on the national stage as a serious political movement. In the 2004, national elections the party pulled off a major upset against the traditional parties like the dominant Colorado party (PC) and the Blanco parties (PB).⁸² They were able to come away with 17 out of the 31 senate seats, 52 out of the 99 in the chamber of deputies and won the presidency behind Tabaré Vázquez.⁸³

The results of this election helped cement the FA as a major political group. The FA was able to represent the far left, and it encompassed both the poor and the conservative populations that sought to bring back import industrial substitution (ISI) which endorsed the usage of foreign made goods to substitute national industry.⁸⁴ It was a broad movement that helped people feel that they were truly

⁸¹ Garcé Adolfo "De guerrilleros a gobernantes: El proceso de adaptación del MLN-Tupamaros a la legalidad y a la competencia electoral en Uruguay (1985-2009)" *Hal*: 1-24.

⁸² Luna, Juan Pablo. "Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in Uruguay." *Latin American Politics and Society* (2008): 18.

⁸³ Luna, 21.

⁸⁴ Luna, 23.

being represented. With the successful presidential election of Tabaré Vázquez and the FA congressional majority in 2006, the coalition solidified its presence on the national stage and showed the huge progress that it had made since its formation. The FA's success represented the national acceptance of a solidified left. This success would lead to the election of José Mujica to the presidency.⁸⁵

The largest issue that the MPP and the FA currently face is that the majority of their political leaders are advancing in age and there appears to be no younger generation of leaders to fill the void. Christian's New York Times article accurately shows however that this is not the first time that these issues have been encountered,

... Despite the graying image of the leadership, more than half of the current Tupamaros militants are less than 25 years old. An open convention called by the Tupamaros last December attracted about 1,000 people, thought to constitute the total number of members and serious sympathizers.⁸⁶

The party has had problems gaining younger leaders and the older leaders like LatinoBarómetro, which is a poll that gathers the opinion of citizens throughout Latin America on issues regarding social norms, economic issues, and politics. LatinoBarómetro provides data illustrating the success of the party over the recent years and has shown that there has been a serious spike in the popularity of the party since its formation.

⁸⁵ Lanzaro, Jorge. "Uruguay's Social Democratic Experiment." *Current History* (2014): 77.

⁸⁶ Ibid

LatinoBarómetro data supporting the FA:

In 2004 LatinoBarómetro survey posed the question to a sample of Uruguayans what party they would vote for if the election were this Sunday. The data that came back didn't favor the political system, 64.6% of the population felt that they wouldn't vote while another 20.1% of the population felt that they didn't even know whom they would vote for. These numbers are staggering because they represent a population that had lost faith in the democratic process. The numbers however changed drastically and in the most recent 2013 opinion polls 41.8% said that they would vote for the FA candidate. This number has gone up since 2001 when the FA and the Encuentro Progresista (EP) claimed 34.6% of the entire population's vote.

LatinoBarómetro data tables regarding Uruguay's democratic transformation from 1995 to 2013 are interesting. The data shows an impressive national swing towards the left. In 1995, the total percentage of the Uruguayan population who claimed to be leftist was around .2% of the total populace with around 11.7% of the country claiming to be right wing. So the data is showing a country that was typical for its time and a political system that favored right wing and conservative policies. However in 2013 the most recent LatinoBarómetro surveys have shown a huge swing to the left. In 2013 about 11.3% of the Uruguayan population oriented themselves with the left wing. This is a huge change in the national percentage that considers themselves to be leftist. This national switch in many ways is a result of the Frente Amplio and the influence of their political coalition.

In 1995 the LatinoBarómetro polled how satisfied people were with democracy in Uruguay and only .5% of the population claimed that they were very satisfied with democracy in Uruguay. This poll was taken again in 2013 regarding satisfaction with democracy and 70.9% of the population now claim to be very satisfied with democracy. This poll is reveals of the significance of the FA because as the total amount of people who support the FA has increased so has the increased satisfaction with democracy. The MPP and the FA have been influential in Uruguay allowing the country to feel that democracy is being valued and that it is something important to their country. The FA has helped increase the strength of democracy in Uruguay and through these different statistics the correlation between the FA and overall trend of democratic stability in Uruguay is clear. The FA and the MPP have helped democracy solidify and they have helped people feel that democracy is possible.

Conclusion:

In the most recent publication of Latinobarometro's data in 2015 the idea of Uruguay maintaining a strong democracy was supported. In the 2015 data tables 75.8% of all of those polled responded that democracy was the best governing option, with 11.1% claiming that the manner of governing didn't concern them. This data confirms that democracy is still an active part of Uruguayan culture and the efforts of the FA have been paying off. In addition to these data points reflecting the national support for democracy is overall happiness regarding the actions of the parliament and national congress. The data that came back from Uruguay regarding

this satisfaction reflects very well on the institutions, with 5.6% of those polled saying that they are doing very well and 57% saying they have done a good job.

In addition to these data points Latinobarometro includes the survey regarding the particular party that voters would back if they had to vote this Sunday. In these polls 49.8% of those polled felt that they would vote for the FA, the closest group to the FA was the PN (Partido Nacional) with 7.8%. In additional polling Latinobarometro asked voters how strongly they support this party and 35% answered strongly while 50.5% answered quite strongly. The Uruguayan political landscape has changed dramatically since the 1970's dictatorship and, based on the efforts of the FA and the Tupamaros, the revolutionary ideals that the movement cherished have flourished and developed into a strong democracy.

Uruguay is currently one of the most stable democracies in all of Latin America. This is in large part because of the contributions and hard work of the Tupamaros for democracy. The Tupamaros began as a movement that tried to fill the holes that democracy was unable to fill. They then became part of the government as a formal political party and ceased their guerilla activities. For these reasons, I think it is fair to say that they were an informal organization, that became an informal party and finally became an official movement. This transition from informal to a formal movement through the formation of the MPP and the FA is a testament to the desire of the Tupamaros to strengthen democracy in Uruguay.

Chapter Three: The FARC, UP, and Colombia

History of the FARC:

In order to understand the formation of the FARC, or Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia it is necessary to explain the impact of an event called *la violencia*. *La violencia* was a nine year period, between 1948-1957, where state violence was waged between the liberal and conservative parties within Colombia, which resulted in a high amount of civilian deaths. *La violencia* began with the assassination of the liberal political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948, which many liberal leaders credited to the conservative party. Gaitán, who was meant to be the liberal's presidential candidate, led the way for the conservative, Laureano Gómez to win the next presidential race in the 1950.⁸⁷

Gómez's victory, and the continued control of the conservative party in the countryside, greatly contributed to the formation of liberal guerilla squads, which were organized to combat conservative party's control in rural villages and farms. Gómez would lose the faith of both the conservative party and the military, and was deposed by a military coup d'état, which led General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to presidency in 1953. During Pinilla's presidency, he sought to end the political insurgency throughout the countryside by adopting a hardline approach using violent suppression methods. Pinilla remained in power until 1957, at which time the liberal and conservative parties united to form the National Front. The National Front reached an agreement that they would alternate who would win the

⁸⁷ Offstein, Norman. "An Historical Review and Analysis of Colombian Guerrilla Movements: FARC, ELN and EPL ." *Desarrollo y Sociedad*, September 2003, 101.

presidency lasting until 1974. This agreement began with the election of the liberal Alberto Camargo to the presidency in 1958.⁸⁸

Under the leadership of Camargo, the Colombian government sought to combat the damage that *la violencia* had brought to the Colombian people. By the time that Camargo had come to power approximately 200,000 people had died during the nine year period of the violence. Carmargo sought to end *la violencia* by putting different policies into place that would lift the rural communities out of poverty. These policies, included plans to redistribute lands to small planters, construct schools, health clinics, water and sewage systems, roads, and community centers. The program faced many problems, which included a lack of funds and a slow pace of land redistribution, that greatly affected their effectiveness in the countryside. The reforms also couldn't address the high rates of urban unemployment and the lack of low income housing in urban areas, which created tension throughout the country.⁸⁹

This tension unified the dissenting liberal guerilla groups, that had previously remained in isolated and separate jungle pockets during the 1950's. These guerilla groups, which would eventually form the FARC movement, began as the Southern Guerilla Bloc. The Southern Guerilla Bloc, which developed throughout southern federal administrative sections, developed a strong relationship with the Colombian Communist Party (CCP). This relationship was extremely beneficial for the Southern Guerilla Bloc, who received financial support from the party as well as

⁸⁸ Offstein, 101-102.

⁸⁹ Offstein, 103.

political direction for the movement. The connection the CCP and the support the party had from Russia, gave the Southern Guerilla Bloc much needed resources and confidence to emerge as a national guerilla movement. With the formation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) in 1964, Moscow released a statement regarding U.S. imperialism and how the U.S. had military bases in Colombia calling for workers and peasants to support the guerillas.⁹⁰

Development of the FARC:

The U.S. and Colombia, during the rise of the FARC, had good inter-governmental relations, and Colombia was one of the U.S.'s strongest allies in the region. During the Cold War Colombia had openly supported U.S. anticommunism, and President George W. Bush stated that Colombia was the U.S.'s strongest ally in Latin America. Colombia had sent soldiers to Korea during the Korean war in the 1950's and motioned to expel Cuba from the OAS at the 1961 conference following the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Additionally, and most relevant to combating the FARC and other insurgency groups within the country, during the 1960's Colombia adopted the national security doctrine promoted by the United States. The Colombian government had agreed upon an intelligence sharing plan, which allowed the U.S. to place military officials in the Bogota embassy as advisors to the government.⁹¹ With Colombia's close, and supportive relations to the U.S. in mind, the formation of the FARC, a communist group that had the support of the CCP with

⁹⁰ Offstein, 103.

⁹¹ Nieto, Jaime Zuluaga. "U.S. Security Policies and United States-Colombia Relations." *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 1 (2007): 116.

support from the Soviet Union, represented a grave threat to the U.S. and the Colombia government.

The FARC formally created their name in 1966, declaring their status as a communist armed guerilla movement within Colombia, which triggered the U.S. fears of the spread of communism within Latin America. The beginning of the U.S. intervention against the FARC was through Plan Laso, which was a U.S. led counterinsurgency effort that overlapped with Colombian efforts to combat guerillas. The implementation of these policies were quite severe on the FARC, with the movement seeing a loss of 70 percent of its armaments and a significant amount of their soldiers between 1966 and 1968. Even with these efforts however the FARC would survive and grow to 1,000 soldiers by 1978.⁹² Although the FARC's forces grew during this period, they had been pushed deep into the jungle regions of Guaviara, Caquetá, and Putumayo. These regions would eventually serve as the basis for the development of their economic role in narcotrafficking.⁹³

The 1980's represented a bright future for the FARC and for their development. With the success of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, the FARC, as well as other guerilla movements throughout Latin America, felt empowered. This empowerment for the FARC represented the development of a different approach, that would venture away from the Cuban hit and run style, into a more direct and frontal assault style. This represented the development of 48 different

⁹² Rochlin, Jim. "Plan Colombia and the revolution in military affairs: the demise of the FARC." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 02 (2010): 720.

⁹³ Rochlin, 720.

military fronts, with an increased presence in urban areas, and improved communication amongst the guerillas. These developments would greatly assist the FARC in opening negotiations with the Colombian government to further advance their cause, not as guerillas but as a political movement.⁹⁴

The UP:

In 1985, the Colombian government signed an agreement to “ensure political security and equality for the UP (Union Patriotica)”⁹⁵ This was an empty promise, however, as the government eventually did not honor this agreement. Several different non-governmental organizations, with encouragement from the government, were the major perpetrators responsible for subsequent deaths of members of the UP. The paramilitaries, drug lords, and the Colombian army all lined up against the UP and their officials for different reasons. The issue came to a head when in 1987 a young fourteen year old boy, who was directly related to a Medellin drug cartel, assassinated Jaime Pardo, the 1986 UP presidential candidate and party figure head, leading to the FARC abandoning the UP and returning to Guerilla warfare.⁹⁶

The official death count of members of the UP is around 3,000 but many believe that number to be closer to 5,000. The UP represented an opportunity for the federal government to put aside their grievances with the guerillas and allow them to reintegrate into normal life. The government however didn't want to

⁹⁴ Rochlin, 720-721.

⁹⁵ Gomez-Suarez, Andrei. "Perpetrator Blocs, Genocidal Mentalities and Geographies: The Destruction of the Union Patriotica in Colombia and Its Lessons for Genocide Studies." *Journal of Genocide Research*: 639. Print.

⁹⁶ Gomez, 640.

provide the FARC or other guerilla movements the opportunity to seek political representation for fear of losing control over political landscape. The Álvaro Uribe administration then deemed it necessary to exterminate the UP because they were acting as a cover for the FARC to solidify their position in Colombia. The violence levied against the UP and their supporters was so drastic that in 1987 the FARC saw themselves forced to renounce the UP party returning to armed struggle against the Colombian government.⁹⁷

The UP was going to represent the left in the country during the late 1980's election cycles. In 1986, they won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in different assemblies, 9 congressional seats, 6 senators seats, and 4.6% of the presidential vote.⁹⁸ These results were greater than any other leftist party in Colombia, and more than any other third party in its history. The UP wanted to represent the hopes of the people and the needs of the poor. These desires were also synonymous with those of the FARC, which was why it was so fitting that the FARC co-founded the organization. The UP's goals were to fight for land redistribution, better health care, educational improvements for the poor, and the nationalization of businesses, banks and transportation⁹⁹. These desires to represent the people however were never offered to the UP as the Uribe administration never followed through on its promises to help protect the party's leaders from governmental sponsored paramilitary groups.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Gomez, 643.

⁹⁸ Freeman, E., Daniel, "Patriotic Union" *Colombian Reports*, January 13, 2014

⁹⁹ Ibid

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

Key LatinoBarómetro Data for Colombian Democracy:

Democracy in Colombia has been severely affected by the actions of the federal government against the FARC and the UP. The lack of democratic legitimacy within the Colombian government as well as the lack of variety in political parties is due in most part to state sponsored violence committed against the UP. The current state of democracy in Colombia is in shambles. The Colombian general populace has generally lost faith in the system, and the following LatinoBarómetro data helps prove this claim.

In a 2013 poll 34.5% of the populace surveyed said that they wouldn't vote while another 6.4% said that they would submit blank ballots. In addition to this data the overall satisfaction with democracy in 2013 was staggeringly low. In the LatinoBarómetro poll of satisfaction only 4.1% of those polled responded as saying that they are happy with the state of democracy. Currently some 49.35% of those polled they are not very satisfied with the democratic institution in place. Additionally, only around some 1.5% of the population believe that there is a democratic process in place with some 48.6% saying that the government is currently a democracy but that it has major problems. Another interesting piece of data that LatinoBarómetro provides regarding current beliefs about democracy in Colombia are the polls endorsing a one party system. In the 2013 polls for Colombia of those interviewed who don't feel that the one party system is the most effective approach to governance. Only 25.1% agree or strongly agree with the idea of a one party system while the other 74.9% of those polled believe that there should be a multiple party system in place.

These two data sets support the case for the inclusion of the FARC in the political structure go back to 1985. The people of Colombia clearly feel that the democratic system is not working and that the parties that are in place aren't representing their needs as a society. The FARC, in their recent round of negotiations with the Colombian state have asked for something similar to Uruguay, when the Tupamaros became a political party. In their negotiations with the Colombian government they sought to bring about a self-critique to try and reform the state model. In 2013, *Colombia Reports* published a piece in 2013 regarding the response of one of the leaders of the FARC to a political controversy regarding corruption in the armed forces. The current leader, Timoleon Jiménez, directly addressed the letter to the current Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos saying the following,

Se puede leer en las noticias. El modelo de imposiciones e intolerancias se ha agotado. La democracia colombiana, por encima de los discursos, es una vergüenza, Santos. Vamos a cambiarla.¹⁰¹

Roughly translated Jiménez is saying that one can see in the news that the government is exhausted and that it is shame. I think that the idea of a complete reform of the government is a valid one. When examining the effect of the organizational review that the Tupamaros underwent, and their subsequent success, this review could be of use for Colombia. The commitment to an internal review would lead to very positive democratic results in Colombia and possibly resolve the issues currently facing democracy within the country.

¹⁰¹ "Timochenko le envió carta al presidente Santos rechazando la democracia colombiana" *Colombiano* July 9th, 2013

Colombia's Conflict and Peace Process:

The war between the FARC and the government has claimed around 220,000 lives and 6.7 million people have been labeled as victims of the war between the government, paramilitaries, and the guerillas.¹⁰² The reform of the UP and the ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC are reassuring for the future. The negotiations began in 2013 and a the LatinoBarómetro survey regarding people's beliefs for democracy in ten years showed a remarkable increase as previously described.

The general sense of all those in Colombia is that the future for the country still lies with democratization. This claim is supported by a LatinoBarómetro survey where 52.3% of Colombian's believe that democracy is the preferable system of governance. In this poll, only 12.7% said that they would prefer an authoritative form of governance to democracy. LatinoBarómetro also has surveys that show that the people believe that the future for democracy is bright. The current polls reflecting the scale of democratization of Colombia show that only 10.1% of Colombians feel that the government is completely democratic. LatinoBarómetro also takes polls for where the people think that democracy is going to be in ten years from now and the results from the 2013 survey were interesting. Some 63.4% of those polled believe that in 10 years the state will be completely democratic with only 1.4% believing that the state will be undemocratic. This data is encouraging as recent news described the UP party as attempting to return to the political arena in Colombia. They also refuse to call

¹⁰² Aldwinckle, Jack, "How Colombia plans to turn 32,000 ex-jungle-dwelling guerrillas into useful members of society" *Quartz*, May 31, 2015

themselves communists or Marxists but seek to gain the trust of millions of impoverished people on the fringes of the country.¹⁰³

The relationship that has developed between the FARC and the political institutions of the Colombia government is extensive historically speaking. With these negotiations underway, the process trying to stabilize Colombia can begin. As such it is important to note that the FARC, through the UP, began as an organization that sought political change through peaceful means. The government used this to its advantage and invited them into the political process, just to slaughter their candidates. This politicide was a negative turning point that led to genocide. Colombia is now ready to move on past this period of violence to reform their political process. The current negotiations between the FARC and the Santos government are healthy and should lead to a positive change in the overall democratic transition of Colombian politics.

The current negotiations currently with the FARC are still progressing and are promising. They have reached several stalling points but they are seeking to try and reach a point where the two can agree on issues as wide and varying as land reform, governmental reform, drug trafficking, etc.¹⁰⁴ The war that has been waged between the government and the FARC is one that needs to end in order for democracy to flourish in Colombia. If the two sides can reach an agreement like that of the MLN-T and the Uruguayan government then the outcome would be very productive for both sides.

¹⁰³ Freeman, E., Daniel, "Patriotic Union" *Colombian Reports*, January 13, 2014

¹⁰⁴ Neuman, William "Killing of 10 soldiers deals a setback to the Colombian peace talks with the FARC rebels" *The New York Times*, April 15, 2015

Conclusion:

The UP party that the FARC co-sponsored is now fighting for its very survival. How can we justify or explain this outcome for each guerilla movement?

In Racheal Rudolph's *From Terrorism to Politics*, she says

These murders radicalized FARC, which felt legitimized in its actions: FARC officially interpreted the UP's extermination as a sign of the government's intolerance and of the impossibility of legal political action in Colombia. A serious chance, such as that witnessed in Lebanon and Northern Ireland, was therefore lost.¹⁰⁵

The FARC began, as an organization that sought democratic reconciliation through a political participation in Colombia but the Uribe organization didn't accept that they were an honest player. The previous quote is particularly interesting because it reveals the frustration of not being able to reach a peaceful agreement as what occurred in Ireland with the IRA and in Lebanon with Hezbollah.¹⁰⁶ While the other examples here, in both Lebanon and Ireland had didn't partake in the narco-trafficking, the political frustrations regarding representation are similar.

The resulting ceasefire merely forced the FARC to prolong its battle against the government and becoming even more violent. In the LatinoBarómetro surveys the percentage of people who say that guerilla movements are a crucial issue, these polls are very high but they have gone down significantly over the last decade. From 2001-2003 for example the number of

¹⁰⁵ Engeland, Anisseh Van, and Rachael M. Rudolph. "Failed Attempts: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (FARC) and the Union Patriótica (UP)." In *From Terrorism to Politics*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

people that said the guerillas and their armed insurrection were the major issues facing the country was high 40.5%. Whereas in 2008 that number dropped significantly to 16.6% and in 2013 it was down to 12.4%.

The violence experienced in the aftermath of the failed integration of the FARC-UP coalition was extensive and devastating. As was previously mentioned Colombia is a country where political development is in a state of disarray and one of the major issues that they are contending with is guerilla and paramilitary violence. If one relies on the surveys taken by third parties, like LatinoBarómetro, using methods described by Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbel Pérez Liñán then several key aspects are going to be missing. In their own words they define democracy as,

We define a democracy as a regime (a) that sponsors free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive; (b) that allows for inclusive adult citizenship; (c) that protects civil liberties and political rights; and (d) in which the elected governments really govern and the military is under civilian control.¹⁰⁷

These categories are useful when examining countries with established and secure democracies, but when evaluating a situation like Colombia they are not adequate. This is not to say that democracy is non-existent in Colombia, but rather that there are discrepancies within the strength of democracy being high. The system is in disarray because democratic values do not extend past the major cities where the federal government can oversee the democratic process. The government of Colombia must seek to extend the parameters of democracy past

¹⁰⁷ Munck, Gerardo L., ed. *Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods*. Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK, 2007. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 9 June 2015.

the major metropolises and into the countryside. The issue that has violently erupted looks to develop democracy, involves the war that the government and the FARC are waging that puts all citizens in serious danger.

The issue of controlling the FARC, Colombian government, and paramilitary violence through the ongoing war that the government is waging is of the utmost importance to spread democratization across Colombia. In order to try and negotiate with the FARC, the Santos administration is having to deal with the outcome of forcing more guerilla warfare. They are effectively demobilizing an army, and trying to reintegrate them back into society. The current negotiations are hitting several reported “road-blocks” including narcotrafficking, land-redistribution, and political representation or a political change of some kind. These negotiations are crucial for the advancement of democracy in Colombia and will allow for the country to constructively on raising the quality of institutions while maximizing the effectiveness of the participatory process.

If Colombia had allowed the FARC to take an active role in the democratic structure of the country, then the shape of democracy today might be completely different. The exclusiveness of the Colombian political system is one of the major reasons for the continued violence within the nation. If the political system was allowed to be open, like that of Uruguay, then the FARC would not need to continue guerilla warfare. The most significant aspect related to this is that the negotiations between the government and the FARC haven't broken down yet and the peace progress is continuing. The inclusion of the FARC and other movements is crucial to developing a healthy democracy.

Chapter Four: El Salvador's FMLN

History of the FMLN:

The formation of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), which was formally announced on October 10th, 1980, was the result of a long process of negotiations that were held in Cuba between different leftist groups from El Salvador. The five groups, which included the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (FPL), The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), The Resistencia Nacional (RN), The Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (PCS), and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).¹⁰⁸ The negotiations held in Cuba tried to sort out the political differences these groups attempted to iron throughout the 1970's during their development. The political differences, which included conflicts over guerilla strategies as well as competing political interests, the most important involving peasant support in El Salvador, had to be resolved before the FMLN could be formed into a viable political party.¹⁰⁹

The guerilla movement in El Salvador began in the 1970's as an offshoot of the Communist part. During this it was divided over the issue of what approach would reap the most success; 1) armed insurgency or 2) engage El Salvador's political system. The dissenting voices within the movement however sought to enter negotiations following the Sandinistas defeat of the Anastacio Somoza

¹⁰⁸ MacClintock, Cynthia. *Revolutionary movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN Peru's Shining Path*. Washington (D.C.): United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 68.

¹⁰⁹ Oñate, Andrea. " The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981 - 92." *Cold War History* 11, no. 2 (April 15, 2011): 137.

dictatorship in Nicaragua. The strength of the Sandinistas came through the unification of various dissenting guerilla movements into one organized front against the Somoza dictatorship.¹¹⁰ The triumph of Sandinistas in Nicaragua inspired a great deal of fear within the government of El Salvador, and encouraged them to fully endorse a violent policy to destroy political resistance.¹¹¹

The violence that the guerilla groups endured led to the FMLN conference held in Havana, Cuba, for an accord amongst the larger guerilla groups fighting in El Salvador. The accomplishment of these negotiations allowed the FMLN to release a statement regarding the objectives of the movement and what they were fighting for. The FMLN and their leaders were fighting against the government to create a social democracy in El Salvador and to contest the authoritarian regime.¹¹² Joaquín Villalobos, one of the main leaders of the FMLN, explains their position,

The FMLN is struggling for a government of full participation, with representation from all the democratic political forces, including of course the FMLN-FDR.... The FMLN maintains that a government of full participation should guarantee freedom of expression and organization, respect for Human Rights, and truly free elections with participation by all parties and forces¹¹³.

The FMLN merely sought democratic stability and a government that reflected the demands of the people. The government however felt that the group was seeking to enforce a Marxist-Leninist ideology for the nation.

With this in mind, the FMLN leadership sought to persuade the El Salvadoran

¹¹⁰ Oñate, "The Red Affair" 138.

¹¹¹ Oñate, 138.

¹¹² MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 56.

¹¹³ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 58.

middle class that the group was not seeking to create a socialist state in El Salvador, but only sought to change the political reality of the country. Another leader of the FMLN, Cayetano Carpio, who was leader of the FPL until 1983, was perceived to be one of the movements most profound Marxists-Leninists, who described the group's efforts,

The revolutionary government... will not be socialist.... The revolutionary democratic government will support all private businessmen, the small industrialists and merchants, and all of those who promote the development of the country and the application of a revolutionary democratic program.¹¹⁴

The FMLN wanted to overhaul the government and follow in the footsteps of the Cuban Revolution. This effort, which had the prime opportunity to realize the ambitions of leading the country from a revolutionary platform failed to capitalize on the moment due to the continuation of infighting within the FMLN after the negotiations ended.

This failure to grasp the opportunity of a weakened government materialized through the poorly organized "Final Offensive" in 1981, which was meant to be a broad sweeping movement against the national military. The FMLN proposed plan was a multi-faceted assault on two-thirds of El Salvador's military garrisons. The timing was ideal for the group because General Carlos Romero was in a very unstable political position and lacked the support of wealthy local elites and the U.S. The eventual failure of the "Final Offensive" was due to dissent amongst the five groups that made up the FMLN coalition, specifically the RN and ERP, who refused

¹¹⁴ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 57.

to commit to the action.¹¹⁵ The failure of the “Final Offensive” would setback the FMLN a decade before they saw their efforts materialize into political representation. Efforts to end authoritarianism became much more complicated following the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the renewed commitment to anti-communist intervention as a policy in Central America.

U.S. Involvement in El Salvador:

Throughout Latin America, especially during the 20th century, the influence of the U.S. government can unmistakably be seen. El Salvador was no exception as increased support to the military regime was synonymous with the rise of the FMLN in El Salvador. These interactions were most noticeable in the realm of financial and military assistance by the U.S. government. In 1979, the U.S. gave El Salvador 11 million dollars of financial support, by 1980 this jumped to 64 million dollars. From 1980 onwards the amount of financial support that the U.S. provided to El Salvador continued to rise, and in 1987 the total rose to 574 millions dollars worth of support. The increased assistance can be placed in perspective by examining the percentage of support El Salvador received, in comparison with other Latin American nations. As was previously noted the U.S. hit its aid peak in 1987, at 574 million dollars, this level of support represented 30% of the total U.S. aid to Latin America, which is impressive seeing as El Salvador only has 5 million citizens.¹¹⁶

The type of aid that the U.S. provided is important to understand when

¹¹⁵ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 57.

¹¹⁶ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 221-222.

examining the FMLN as the majority of the aid was used to develop the El Salvadoran military. From 1980 to 1989 the U.S. provided El Salvador around \$1 billion in financial support for their military. Specifically, in 1984, the highest year of aid during this period, the U.S. provided 194 million dollars for military support, representing more than half of the U.S. total military aid in Latin America. This information is relevant because, when examining the size of the armed forces in comparison to the FMLN, in 1979 the ratio was 1.5 military officials to every guerilla fighter. This ratio would rise by the end of the 1980's to a ratio of 8 soldiers to 1 guerilla.¹¹⁷

This military aid was designed to help the regime in its efforts to end the FMLN and their terrorist activities throughout El Salvador. The aid provided the U.S. an opportunity to apply pressure to the El Salvadoran government regarding their elections system and human rights violations. The U.S., while being afraid of the rise of the communism throughout Latin America, were also concerned about the use of their aid for the support of death squads. The U.S. became heavily involved in El Salvadoran politics, making it very clear to government officials that should human rights violations continue to occur U.S. aid would dramatically decline. This realization motivated the government to support candidates that the U.S. backed as a positive example of U.S. aid to El Salvador.¹¹⁸

The U.S. believed the success of the elections in El Salvador, in 1982, was a positive sign that the country was moving towards a superficial democratic process

¹¹⁷ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 228-229.

¹¹⁸ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 225.

and that the FMLN lacked popular support against the government. Even with this attempted transition to the Presidency of Álvaro Magaña, human rights violations persisted and the FMLN continued to grow in strength. As continuing political strife led to the U.S. Congress to severally curtail the military aid that President Reagan provided to El Salvador. In the election of 1984, President Reagan and Vice President George H.W. Bush made it apparent to El Salvadoran politicians that human rights and democratization had to improve for the U.S. to continue to provide resources to combat the FMLN. The 1984 election marked a great success as the election was perceived as successful and clean, and José Duarte, who was the U.S.'s favorite candidate, won the election.¹¹⁹

Duarte's administration however faced great difficulties in combating the FMLN, while attempting to spread democratic ideals to the El Salvadoran people. Moreover, people desired social reforms, but Duarte's U.S. backed free market policies made the development of effective social reforms extremely difficult. Duarte, who won as a candidate for the Christian Democratic Party, received 1-3 million dollars in covert funds from the CIA in 1984.¹²⁰ The equivalent per capita to 50-100 million for a U.S. election and lost the respect from the El Salvadoran people. In the elections of 1989, Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party lost the presidency to ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista). With the victory of ARENA's Alfredo Cristiani, and of George H.W. Bush in 1989, policy regarding the FMLN dramatically changed as political violence increased. Throughout El Salvador

¹¹⁹ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 225-227.

¹²⁰ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 226.

changes in this strategy reflected a desire by both the U.S. and El Salvador to seek a negotiated settlement with the FMLN rather than use military force to defeat the guerillas.¹²¹

The Peace Process and Integration of the FMLN:

The war between the FMLN and the government came to a head in 1989 when the guerillas launched a final offensive against the U.S. backed military regime. After a failed series of negotiations with the recently President-elect Alfredo Cristiani following a death squad attack on the Federación Nacional Sindical de Trabajadores, the largest labor trade federation in El Salvador, the FMLN reverted to a full on assault. This approach, was swift with a series of conflicts between the guerillas and government's forces, which only served to show that the government wasn't capable of defeating the guerillas in combat. This level of political violence, which the conflict had generated, led to an international intervention, where the U.N. Security Council and President George H.W. Bush's administration called for peace between the guerillas and the government.¹²²

The FMLN offensive launched during that year would effectively halt the counterterrorism efforts of the government. With the support of the international community and the impressive manner with which the FMLN had combatted the government gave them a serious advantage during peace negotiations in 1990. The conditions for peace the FMLN presented to the government involved reforming the security sector, ending impunity, and major political reforms. While the negotiations

¹²¹ MacClintock, *Revolutionary movements in Latin America*, 226-227.

¹²² Chávez, Joaquín M. "How Did the Civil War in El Salvador End?" *American Historical Review*, December 2015, 1790-91.

failed to provide extensive military reforms, the amnesty reforms they won were later overturned by ARENA in 1993. The FMLN however did get many of the political reforms they had sought. On January 16th 1992 the FMLN and President Cristiani signed a peace accord at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City.¹²³

The outcome of these negotiations was that the FMLN went from being a potent armed political movement to a major political actor in the new El Salvadoran neoliberal democracy. This peace process was made difficult as both the FMLN and the government violated the agreed upon peace accords. The FMLN, which agreed to hand in all their weapons, remained armed by storing caches of weapons in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras. Most notably, in Nicaragua one exploded prompting the surrendering of several caches in different countries. Like the FMLN, the Cristiani government also struggled to comply with the agreements of the peace accords. The failure of the peace process took the form of state agents and right wing extremists engaging in the assassinations of FMLN leaders and social activists at the same time maintaining paramilitary death squads by merely changing their names.¹²⁴

After settling the peace accord violations, the FMLN finally demobilized its guerilla force and formally entered into El Salvador's political process. With this in mind the, FMLN sought to have a political apparatus in place to support the party's participation in the presidential, municipal, and parliamentary elections of 1994. In order for the movement to be able to achieve this level of political sophistication they trained their members in activities related to political activism and electoral

¹²³ Chávez, 1792-93.

¹²⁴ Chávez, 1794.

politics. With this transition came new difficulties, in 1994 when the FMLN formally dissolved the five different parties making up the guerilla coalition all differed in the political direction with the FMLN movement. These differences initially took the form of the PD, which was made up of the RN and the ERP, which would eventually develop into an internal political conflict for the left of El Salvador.¹²⁵

FMLN's Political Successes and Difficulties:

The dissention of the movement and departure of the ERP and RN from the FMLN in 1994 was the result of decision to change to a 9 out of 15 majority for the party's decision-making process. The development of a 60 percent threshold led to the ERP and RN being effectively phased out by the FPL, FAL, and PRTC during the presidential primary for the 1994 election. During these elections, the FMLN candidate, Rubén Zamora, would lose to ARENA's Armando Calderón Sol in a close runoff. In addition to this loss at the presidential level, the FMLN accrued 21 of the available 84 seats in the National assembly, making it the second largest party to ARENA, but not affirming their strength as a political movement.¹²⁶

Following a restructuring of the movement, by making it easier for the political party to allow people to join the FMLN and not have to seek individual groups to try and seek entry into the party. This reconstruction helped solidify the FMLN as one heterogeneous political party and allowed them to experience more success during the following election cycle in 1997. This election cycle, which was

¹²⁵ Chávez, Joaquín M. "How Did the Civil War in El Salvador End?" 1795.

¹²⁶ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. "Unity and Disunity in the FMLN." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54, no. 4 (2012): 99-100.

the first one where the PD was an active competitor to the FMLN, marked an increase in political representation for the FMLN. Who saw an increased in number of National Assembly seats from 21 to 27, and a 15-35 increase in mayors, gaining political control of capital of San Salvador.¹²⁷

These advances marked the FMLN successfully surviving the defection of the ERP and the RN from their party, as the PD only managed to attain 1 percent of the popular vote for their candidates in 1997. Differences within the party continued with the presidential election of 1999, where the FMLN struggled to select a presidential candidate. After much internal debate, they decided on Facundo Guardado and Nidia Díaz as the vice president for their presidential ticket. This led to an unsuccessful FMLN primary, as they only captured 30 percent of the popular vote and lost once again to the ARENA candidate Francisco Flores.¹²⁸

Following this defeat the party, it was still able to increase its presence in the legislative and municipal elections of 2000, overcoming ARENA in the National assembly for a total of 31 to 29 seats in the national assembly. This victory marked the first time since 1989 that ARENA had not held the majority of seats in the national assembly. The following elections of 2002-2003 the FMLN also achieved great success maintaining their lead against ARENA in the legislative bloc by significantly overtaking them in opinion polls for the presidential election in 2004. However, following the legislative election cycle the FMLN once again faced great internal strife and the selection of a presidential candidate divided the entire

¹²⁷ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 104.

¹²⁸ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 106.

movement. The candidate that the FMLN put forward for the 2004 presidential election was Schafik Handal, who was well received by the majority of FMLN members, but faced stiff disapproval from the general public. Handal was perceived as a member of the old generation of the FMLN. As the ARENA candidate, Elías Antonio Saca, represented a new and more modern approach to leadership with a more constructive image. Saca's desires to improve their relations and outreach to the population won ARENA the election, with Handal only receiving 36 percent of the vote.¹²⁹

This defeat forced the FMLN to create a unified vision for their political party. This agreed upon position, from which they would seek to communicate their desires for the country, was a Marxist-Leninist platform. This cohesion did not reflect well in the 2006 election period, where they did not make much political head way, but the united vision of the party would assist them in future. The most important of which would become the Presidential election of 2009.¹³⁰

On September 11, 2007, the FMLN announced that their presidential ticket would include Mauricio Funes running for president and Sánchez Cerén as his vice president candidate. The selection of Funes was important to success of the 2009 campaign, due to his ability to gain more centrist votes for the FMLN. Funes was a journalist and not a member of the FMLN, but had expressed great interest in running with the FMLN party since 2004. With the death of Handal in 2006 while returning from Evo Morales's inauguration, and the political unification of the

¹²⁹ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 107-108.

¹³⁰ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 109.

socialist left of the FMLN Funes was the ideal candidate for the party. In the 2009 election Funes, with the FMLN support and centrist voters, won the presidential election against ARENA's Rodrigo Avila by a few points, 51.3 to 48.7.¹³¹

This election marked the first time that a candidate from the FMLN had been elected to the presidency, but with it came a difficult period for the direction of the party. During the presidency of Funes there was a disagreement between the FMLN and Funes over their respective domestic policies and Funes's efforts to build his own image as a leader. Funes operated in an independent nature because in El Salvador there is a constitutional law in place that doesn't allow candidates to run twice in a row for presidency through the same group.¹³² This law led the FMLN to select a different candidate for the 2014 presidential election, the former Vice President, Sánchez Cerén.

Cerén's candidacy for the FMLN signaled a return of the guerilla presence because of his status as a commander in the FMLN's guerilla movement during the revolution. Cerén however sought to appease concerns that he would seek to replicate Hugo Chávez populist policies, by affirming that he wanted to position himself more to the center and to replicate José Mujica of Uruguay. The 2014 presidential election between Cerén and the conservative Norman Quijano was a tightly contested race with Cerén narrowly winning. He won with a little over 6,000 votes and his election led to many accusations of political corruption, which led ARENA to initiate several legal cases to contest his election. The result was that

¹³¹ Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 110-111.

¹³² Allison, Michael E., and Alberto Martín Alvarez. 112.

Cerén won the election, but the aftermath of the close race caused the public to doubt the legitimacy of democracy, leaving a scar on the electoral process in El Salvador.¹³³

Data examining the reception of Democracy in El Salvador:

When examining data for El Salvador, recorded by LatinoBarómetro, there are several different points that stand out as interesting regarding the FMLN, and democracy in El Salvador. The first is the data surrounding citizen's political allegiances to different individual parties. The poll asked if you had to vote this Sunday for a political party, who would you support. In 1996, which was when the FMLN was allowed to form as a political party, only 7.4% of those polled said the FMLN would have their support, while 19.9% said ARENA. This data was to be expected, but the highest group, 28.9%, were those who said that they would not vote at all, which is interesting when viewing the growth of the FMLN.

In addition to this voter information, LatinoBarómetro also polled citizens regarding their perception of politics in the country during 1996. The top three beliefs, which cumulatively equaled 61.8% of the total population sample, were indifference, distrust and boredom, in that order. The data would continue to reflect this belief in the 2002-2003 elections with the combined total of the FMLN and

¹³³ Partlow, Joshua. "Former guerrilla wins presidential vote in El Salvador." The Washington Post. March 14, 2014. Accessed March 08, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/former-guerrilla-commander-wins-el-salvador-presidential-election/2014/03/14/ddaa0dda-b77c-4f33-bb2d-225330c3745a_story.html?utm_term=.e6ddc349877d.

ARENA equating to 36.6% and those not voting equaling 34.9%. These data points are particularly interesting because they indicate that the voter population still didn't feel represented by either political party. These trends however would take on a different form in the presidential elections of 2009. This cycle, as was noted previously, was the first time a FMLN candidate was elected to become the president of the country.

The data trends from polls done by LatinoBarómetro in 2009 represented a positive transition for democracy within El Salvador. One such poll, in response to a question regarding the power of the individual's vote, and the change it can cause, showed that 76.4% felt their vote mattered, while 19.6% felt that their vote didn't. This poll marked a dramatic improvement to the same poll taken in 1996, at the beginning of the FMLN participating in El Salvador's political system, where 45.6% of the sample felt that their vote held no significance for the future. Additionally, the overall satisfaction with democracy increased from 1996 to 2009. In 1996 40.6% felt unsatisfied with democracy, and 26.8% were not satisfied at all. These numbers were greatly reduced in the 2009 poll, with 42.3% claiming to be satisfied and 17.8% being very satisfied, and only 26% felt unsatisfied and 10.1% felt very unsatisfied.

In addition to these political improvements in the perception of El Salvador becoming a democracy during the rise of the FMLN, was the changing perception regarding the rigging of elections. When LatinoBarómetro polled El Salvador in 1997 a resounding 54.2% of those polled felt that the elections at the time were

rigged, while only 36.9% felt they were clean. These data points would look vastly different when the same poll was asked in 2009. The result of that poll was how 62.3% of voters felt that the elections were clean and only 25.4% of those asked in the poll felt that the elections system was rigged. These polls show that democratization in El Salvador, which included the FMLN, was moving in a positive direction. A positive direction that would face a serious challenge in the most recent 2015 polls regarding the development of democratic institutions.

While the data from 1996-2009 showed an upward trajectory for democracy, the data following the election of 2014, and the controversy that surrounded the results, reversed the progress that had been made with the Salvadoran voters. The data regarding the most recent presidential race show that 39.6% of the sample felt it was fraudulent and 10.9% thought it was very fraudulent. This data can be used to understand other polls regarding democracy, and how support and satisfaction for democracy were recorded at their lowest points since 2007. With these points being acknowledged not all the data for democratic trends in El Salvador are negative.

The polls regarding support for a democratic system of government were still positive, with 48.8% believing that it was the best and 11.5% inclining strongly that it is the best system for governance. In addition, when polled about the impact that they felt their vote could provide the feedback was positive. The result was that 54.1% of those polled felt that their vote would influence the future, and the structure of the government, with 37.9% saying that they didn't feel their vote would secure any change in government. These two trends represent positive

perspectives on democracy in El Salvador today, and for the democratic structure moving forward.

Conclusion:

The overall efforts of FMLN, like those of the MLN-T in Uruguay, have created a positive environment for democracy in El Salvador, and improving political participation in the democratic process has been crucial to this development. The FMLN's efforts since they initially broke from the communist party in the 1970's to take up arms against the failing El Salvadoran government have been crucial to the evolution of democracy. The FMLN resisted not only the military regime, but also against the financial aid and support provided by the U.S. throughout the conflict. The FMLN fought against these forces to secure a position in the government that meant something and could provide meaningful change.

Upon securing a peace agreement in 1992, which saw their vision realized, they began the process of integrating themselves into the democratic structure of El Salvador. In 1994, the FMLN would put together its first candidates in the elections for local seats throughout the country. The FMLN then began experiencing success during these and subsequent elections throughout the following ten years. Building off these electoral successes the FMLN launched a successful presidential campaign in 2009 with Mauricio Funes. The FMLN would follow this success with the election of Sánchez Cerén, in the 2014 presidential election, who holds office currently .

When examining the political environment of El Salvador it is impossible to

ignore the impact of the FMLN. It was a guerilla movement that went from being an anti-systemic movement by taking up arms against political corruption, to becoming an active party within democracy seeking to alter the government. Through their efforts, they saw their political ambitions realized and changed the system to allow their beliefs to be represented in El Salvador. The FMLN provided legitimacy to democratization in El Salvador and signaled the transition from authoritarian politics to multi-party democracy. The future of El Salvador, and the soundness of the government's institutions, is now being guided not only by ARENA and El Salvadorian politician's but also by the FMLN guerillas who once fought for this form or representative democracy.

Epilogue

Guerilla movements throughout Latin America have waged war for different reasons and in widely varying situations. In this paper I have evaluated three different guerilla movements the FARC, MLN-T, and the FMLN. These three groups were selected because, unlike other groups throughout Latin American history, they sought to transition into politics, rather than transform them entirely. Unlike the successful revolutionary movements of Cuba and Nicaragua, and the unsuccessful efforts of other groups, they didn't seek to take over the governmental systems they were opposing. These guerillas rather sought to become members of the political institutions and, through their armed resistance, to gain entry to the political institutions of their respective countries.

When examining these groups, it is helpful to gain some understanding of guerilla warfare in a global sense, and how other movements have been international viewed. To compare with the groups examined in this paper, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (RK), which was the militant branch of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa was an international movement that resorted to violence to attain their goals. Like the movements that have been described in the paper, the ANC, a political organization, sought to be a part of the government that had no desire to include them in the system. In the 1960's the ANC created the RK branch of their movement, which would assume the military operations. Through the efforts of the ANC, the RK, and international support, the ANC was able to

participate in the South African political system.¹³⁴ The ANC and the RK are an example of movements that used the violence that has become associated with guerilla movements of Latin America to attain political representation. Like the RK the three movements described in this paper were movements that used armed insurgency as a way of attaining political representation within their own countries.

The Tupamaros, an urban guerilla movement that sought to oppose an undemocratic and brutal dictatorship in Uruguay, were unable to achieve military success or an immediate negotiated participation. The Tupamaros, and those who sought democratization in Uruguay, eventually defeated the dictatorship, and achieved their goal of joining the political system. The guerilla's participation would have to wait until democracy was restored in Uruguay, but the MLN-T party would eventually attain political support and would formally enter as the FA coalition. Their participation would see José Mujica, a former MLN-T guerilla leader who was tortured by the dictatorship surviving to become the president of the country. The guerillas efforts would lead a political coalition of parties through which they were able to exert direct influence over the government, and extend access to all the politically marginalized in Uruguay. The success of the movement, and the development of guerilla leaders shows the ability of non-state actors to transition and become formal actors within the government.

As was the case with Uruguay, El Salvador was a country that was rife with political malpractice, and the FMLN moved to armed resistance to attain a

¹³⁴ Lissoni, Arianna . "Transformations in the ANC External Mission and Umkhonto We Sizwe, C. 1960-1969." *Journal of Southern African Studies*

resolution to address the military regime. This rebellion, which resembled the movement in South Africa in that the FMLN had a political and militant branch, quickly decided to follow armed insurrection to achieve their political goals. After a long and bloody civil war, the FMLN and the El Salvadoran government reached an agreement that saw the FMLN gain political representation. The success of the movement, and their ability to transition from a violent actor to a political actor, shows the ability of the Tupamaros to become formal political actors.

This idea of political involvement of non-state armed actors has not been the case with the FARC and Colombia. The ideals that the FARC began with, to combat a corrupt governmental structure and to seek to enact change did not last for the duration of the movement. When the group was allowed to form the UP political party, their involvement in the government was a complete failure. This resulted in a return to armed resistance to combat the corruption that had barred them from political participation. Following this break down in direct political involvement the group diverged from their initial beliefs and have only recently begun renegotiating with the government to seek peaceful reentry into society. Part of their negotiations, includes, in a similar pattern to the other two groups discussed, political representation within the government and the ability to form a political party.

Guerilla groups, like the three that this paper has discussed, are militant groups that are fighting for a political objective. Whether these objectives are ideological or if the groups are fighting to attain political rights, they nonetheless use violent resistance as a way of attaining their goals. In my paper, I have shown that guerilla movements, while they began as informal and militant movements, can

integrate and become positive formal parties within democratic structures. The FMLN, MLN-T, and the FARC's UP are all examples describing the extent to which guerillas can integrate and become members of formal, stable, and representative democracies.

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