

"Forever Wild" and Wild Philosophy: the Adirondacks and Environmental Ethics

BY WAYNE OUDERKIRK

Introduction

In 1858 Ralph Waldo Emerson spent a month in the Adirondacks at Follensby Pond with other intellectuals of the time. Later in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth, the philosophers William James, John Dewey, and other thinkers visited Keene Valley many times, hiking and camping in the area of Mt. Marcy (Schneider, 1997). Although some of these visitors wrote of the beauty of the region, or of the challenges of hiking the High Peaks, none produced works arguing for wilderness preservation or defending the intrinsic value of nature or the rights of animals.

The absence of such philosophical defense of nonhuman nature in the writings of thinkers who obviously loved the Adirondacks partly illustrates the fact that in the past, in their professional works, philosophers mostly either took nature for granted or attempted to show how it is inferior to humans (Des Jardins, 1997). In the last twenty-five years, however, with the increasing awareness of environmental problems, philosophers have turned their attention towards nature in order to help discover solutions to those problems. The result is the growing field of environmental ethics, or environmental philosophy, which began as a branch of ethics, considering how ethics might be applied to environmental problems, and which has emerged as a distinct subdiscipline of philosophy (Ouderkirk, 1998).

Not surprisingly, many of the themes and theories of environmental philosophy are relevant to the Adirondack region and its environmental problems and concerns. I would like to summarize some of those theories, explaining how they relate (or do

not relate) to the Adirondacks. But in the second part of this essay, I will give more concentrated attention to the current philosophical debate about an environmental question that touches the heart of one Adirondack controversy: wilderness.

An Overview of Environmental Philosophy

Three caveats before beginning: I stress that what follows is an abbreviation of much complex philosophical speculation. Such abbreviation sometimes fosters misunderstanding. I hope readers will bear that in mind and will, when they see the need for it, seek additional clarity in the works cited. In addition, the scope of my overview is limited. There are other views, other theorists who provide alternative theories. I only have space to indicate some of the diversity in the field. Finally, no one should expect that the adoption of any particular philosophical theory will solve all our environmental problems, in the Adirondacks or globally. To do so is to misunderstand the nature and role of philosophy, which is to help us clarify our concepts and practices and to develop theories that, functioning as explanatory frameworks, can contribute to solutions.

It is probably too soon to write a history of environmental philosophy, but it is clear that some of the earliest efforts were to secure recognition, in moral theory and thus in moral discussions, for nonhumans (Des Jardins, 1997). Thus, there was a great deal of attention to the question of moral standing, that is, which entities (if any) besides humans we should respect morally. This remains a theme in environmental philosophy, but unfortunately many nonphilosophers identify it with the animal liberation movement, though, as we shall see, the kinds of entities philosophers have proposed for moral standing


have gone well beyond individual animals. Though they are distinct fields with distinct and sometimes conflicting concerns, there is the connection between animal liberation and environmental philosophy that both defend the moral significance of nonhumans.

Animal liberation thought divides into two strands, Peter Singer's Utilitarianism and Tom Regan's Kantian approach. The former says that sentience, the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, is the ultimate criterion for considering a creature in moral deliberation (Singer, 1990). The latter, speaking in the language of rights and duties, claims that any creature that is the "conscious subject of a life" possesses rights and we have a duty to respect those rights as much as we do humans' rights (Regan, 1983). Such theories could influence thinking about the Adirondacks in several ways. The most obvious pertains to hunting, fishing, and trapping, each of which is prominent in Adirondack culture and each of which animal liberation thinkers and activists condemn.

Note that it is not a sufficient response to either Singer or Regan to say, "We have always hunted (or fished or trapped) so your theories must be false." All the thinkers we'll consider are aware that their theories indicate the need to reform our practices. The challenge is not to defend traditions by re-asserting them but to examine the opposing arguments to see if they are cogent and valid.

Environmental philosophers have done just that with animal liberation philosophy and have found what they regard as fatal weaknesses. One central concern is endangered species. That category includes plants, but even for endangered animal species, animal liberation philosophy reserves no special place, focusing exclusively on the welfare of individual animals.

Wayne Ouderkirk is Mentor in Philosophy at Empire State College.



Canoe Stop. Drawing by Barry Hopkins.

To environmental philosophers, that focus is too narrow, especially when species are endangered because of human actions. Animal liberation would oppose destruction of habitat that would harm individual animals; but it would offer little guidance in the hard choice between two construction projects, one of which would harm an endangered animal species, the other of which would harm a non-endangered animal species. It would oppose the reintroduction of regionally extinct species because of the interference with the lives of the individual animals to be released; and it regards plant species as unimportant, so the efforts to protect the endangered alpine plant species on High Peaks summits (Redmond, 1997) are perhaps aesthetically or historically interesting, but they are not in the moral realm.

These differences between animal liberation and environmental philosophy are most vivid in the writings of thinkers who defend the land ethic, originally conceived by Aldo Leopold and elaborated especially by J. Baird Callicott (Leopold, 1966; Callicott 1989, 1999). The land ethic regards endangered species, plants as well as animals, as deserving special moral attention and would usually support the reintroduction of species to their former habitats. Callicott stresses that the land ethic emphasizes our membership in the biotic community, which provides at least some of the standards for our moral decisions. As we have seen, animal liberation thought is resolutely individualistic. Callicott's version of the land ethic allows hunting and fishing, and perhaps also trapping, so long as the good of the biotic community is thereby promoted (or not harmed).

The land ethic is one of several theories labeled "ecocentric," meaning that in environmental matters the ecosystem must be a central consideration. Though they disagree on some important details, Callicott, Holmes Rolston, III (1988), and Eric Katz (1997), all defend ecocentrism on the basis of the intrinsic value of such things as species and ecosystems. Intrinsic value is the value an entity has in and of itself, independent of interests other entities might have in it. Before the advent of environmental philosophy, the main candidates for holders of intrinsic value were God and humans. Ecocentric philosophers expand that list because they see ecosystems as communities, self-organizing systems that also, through biogeochemical interactions, generate other values, such as diverse species of flora and fauna (through evolution), food and habitat for both. A chief

tenet of ecocentrism is that humans are in some way members of those communities, not entirely separate from them.

From this viewpoint, Adirondack ecosystems are intrinsically valuable, not merely economically valuable. Thus, they should be preserved, their value recognized in deliberations about human actions that will influence them. As we saw in the case of hunting, ecocentrism does not prohibit human interference with ecosystems. Thus, it allows for human activities of all sorts, so long as ecosystems are respected.

Ecocentrism also provides an additional moral condemnation of the production of acid rain. Suppose for a moment that the harm caused by acid rain were restricted to high altitude lakes within the Adirondack "forever wild" zone never visited by people. In that case, traditional human-centered ethics would have no moral objections to the damage, since humans would not be harmed, either directly or indirectly, through harm to their property. But many people would think that an exceedingly narrow perspective, believing that there is something wrong with such destruction. Ecocentric theories capture that moral intuition through their recognition of the moral importance of ecosystems.

There are critical questions about ecocentrism, especially about its seeming willingness to sacrifice individuals for the good of the whole (Regan, 1983), and—in the opposite direction—the separateness and independence that intrinsic value seems to demand for beings whose identities are defined by their membership in community (Curtin, 1999).

There is a middle position between the individualism of animal liberation and ecocentrism. Biocentrism holds that all individual living things possess intrinsic value. Though he uses the phrase "inherent worth," Paul Taylor claims that on its basis we have moral obligations to each living entity. Those obligations can vary according to the situation (e.g., we are entitled to self-defense against predators, whether megafauna or microbotic), but they are centered on the individual entities, not on the ecosystems of which they are part (Taylor, 1986). Other thinkers find this view problematic because of the lack of moral consideration for ecosystems and species.

Though biocentrism *per se* has not played a major role in the literature of environmental philosophy, it still has its proponents (Sterba, 1998).

Another form of ecocentrism is deep ecology, which sometimes uses the language of intrinsic value of nature as well as the biocentric-sounding idea of bio-egalitarianism, the equality of all living things. Deep ecology has many variants, most of which claim its founder, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, as their source (Naess, 1989). The ecocentrism of this view comes from its promotion of Self-realization, meaning that one's individual self is actually a part of the larger Self of the world, so the interests of the ecosystem are identified with one's own interests. Deep ecology resonates with many people's admiration for the workings of nature, and that appreciation can easily find its way into debates about Adirondack issues concerning development, acid rain, and wilderness preservation.

Many environmental activists claim to be "deep ecologists," though it is questionable how much actual philosophy some of them have read. Many members of Earth First! identify themselves thus, and some of them were involved in the confrontations over Crane Pond Road in the eastern Adirondacks in 1989-90 (Terrie, 1997); others participated in tree spiking in the Pacific Northwest old growth controversy. Since deep ecology is susceptible of myriad interpretations—indeed, Naess encourages diverse approaches—no one should conclude that all followers of Naess would agree with Earth First!, or that deep ecology promotes violence or ecotage. Certainly Naess himself advocates peaceful activism.

One of the biggest targets of criticism by environmental philosophy is the ideology of anthropocentrism, which, in its extreme form, says that humans ought to promote only their own interests and desires. But there are other, more environmentally friendly forms of anthropocentrism, such as those espoused by Bryan Norton, Andrew Light, and Eugene Hargrove. Norton and Light claim that we need not reconstruct value theory and ethics, as proposed by the views already described. Instead, we can acknowledge that ethics concerns other people but that

there are many values besides crassly utilitarian and economic ones, values that, when recognized, promote the same environmental policies as does ecocentrism (Norton, 1991; Light, 1995; Light and Katz, 1996). Hargrove claims that environmental ethics is actually based in our aesthetic appreciation of nature (Hargrove, 1989).

I suspect that many participants in debates about Adirondack issues unknowingly subscribe to the pragmatism of Norton and Light or to Hargrove's aesthetic argument. I sense that when I read some discussions of Adirondack ecology, or Adirondackers' defenses of their home region, or descriptions of all the region has to offer. The connection between Hargrove's aesthetic argument and Adirondack issues is almost self-evident. One glance at calendars featuring photographs of the region leaves no doubt of the importance of its multiple levels of beauty in deciding about its future. These thinkers would also have a moral objection to acid rain, based on the recognition that we can value things for reasons other than their usefulness. Norton and Light can say that the destruction caused by acid rain compromises an ecosystem, something that ought to be important in a human life informed by ecological knowledge. And Hargrove can say that the conscious destruction of beauty is just wrong.

Some philosophers are questioning the ecocentric/anthropocentric split, seeing it as a distortion and nonproductive. For example, Deane Curtin sees the best path to an American environmental ethic as similar to the path of many third world cultures, namely, basing our ethic in our pre-existing regional community that already includes the nonhuman world (Curtin, 1999). Curtin argues that human identity is constructed out of interaction with our ecommunity, and that idea plays an increasingly important role in Adirondack controversies, where outsiders frequently attempt to define the meaning of the region without acknowledging locally created understandings (Terrie, 1997).

Politics have always been part of the Adirondack debate, and there are schools of thought within environmental philosophy

which emphasize social and political perspectives. Ecofeminism and social ecology are the two chief instances. Both associate environmental destruction with forms of oppressive hierarchy. In the case of ecofeminism, the hierarchy is patriarchal; solutions will only arise through the recognition and elimination of male-centered domination of both women and nature (Plumwood, 1993, Warren, 1990). This ultra-brief summary of ecofeminism may make it seem more abstract and removed from Adirondack issues than it is. However, many ecofeminist theorists advocate strongly the commitment to place that Adirondackers hold dear and rightly include in all issues, problems, and solutions (Handley, 1999). And ecofeminism's advocacy of an ethic of caring will resonate with many.

Social ecology sees human domination of other humans—social and political oppression—as the cause of environmental destruction. The oppression, and the violence necessary for its continuation, extends to nature as well (Bookchin, 1990). Certainly many would agree that, in the Adirondacks, in the past and in some ways today, humans have excessively exploited nature; it seems true as well that the wealthy have exploited those less well off. To that extent, social ecology reflects both realities and beliefs of some participants involved in contemporary controversies. However, it seems doubtful to me that its complete analysis of history, or its proposals for the future, derived as they are from the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, will find many supporters among today's participants.

As I mentioned earlier, my presentation is brief and cursory. I urge readers to delve into the literature of environmental philosophy. They will find a vibrant area of philosophy focused on questions vital to us all and relevant to many of the significant issues concerning the Adirondacks. Now I would like to relate, in a bit more depth, a currently weighty controversy among environmentalists and philosophers, a controversy that has always been part of the many other Adirondack issues.

The Problem of Wilderness

Among the many causes espoused by American environmentalists, wilderness preservation has a special status. The abatement of pollution in its many forms, ozone depletion, global warming, toxic and radioactive waste storage, recycling, and other issues are all important, but they have largely to do with the protection of humans or our living spaces. The preservation of wilderness areas looks like it concerns a logically prior issue because it would prevent natural areas from getting to the point where they would suffer the abuses already existing elsewhere. Equally important is the symbolic aspect of wilderness, which many regard as essential in the formation of our national identity. Certainly the idea of wilderness has played a major part in the history of the Adirondack Park and in the social and political controversies that have shaped that history. Indeed, a recent history of the Adirondacks presents it as a story of developing, competing, and sometimes conflicting ideas of wilderness (Schneider, 1997).

There are many reasons offered for preserving wilderness (Nelson, 1998), but all of them generally reinforce the idea that wilderness deserves special consideration in environmental policy and action. It therefore comes as a surprise to many that some environmental thinkers are questioning wilderness as an ideal. The most prominent among them are Callicott and environmental historian William Cronon (Callicott, 1991; Cronon, 1995). Their telling criticisms represent challenges to our traditional ways of thinking about wilderness. Although some think that such criticisms give extra ammunition to opponents of environmental protection, I think that they are an opportunity to re-evaluate our ideals, to gain additional clarity about what we want to defend and what is indefensible. If it turns out that the concept of wilderness is flawed, knowing what those flaws are will help show what is important and what to jettison.

Throughout their discussions, Callicott and Cronon say that they are not against those areas of land already designated as wilderness. Rather, they see the idea of wilderness as problematic. (Whether they

can maintain that distinction is a question that I cannot answer here.) It is not that wilderness areas should be opened for typical development, but that the ideal that led us to preserve them was flawed and needs replacement. Callicott argues that there are three problems with the wilderness concept: it is ethnocentric, un-ecological, and dualistic. Cronon's list is longer, but the most important of his are that the idea "erases" history and is elitist. The concept of wilderness erases history by, for example, ignoring the fact that most of the land Europeans found in the New World was occupied and used by Native Americans. It was not the "pristine" nature wilderness advocates talk about, but was used, lived in, by indigenous peoples who were then eliminated from it. Calling the land a "pristine" wilderness enables us to forget that history. This is basically the same criticism as Callicott's charge of ethnocentrism: Wilderness is a Euro-American idea, not that of those who lived in it.

It is this concept of wilderness that has led to oppressive measures against indigenous peoples living in areas designated as wildernesses. In several instances, they have been forcibly ejected (Curtin, 1999; Sachs, 1995). No one would call such actions just, and wilderness preservation must not come at the expense of indigenous peoples' cultural connection to their lands. We can find a better way to protect "natural" areas; and there are instances recognizing native peoples' rights to continue their subsistence life styles even while preserving an area from modern development (Kemper, 2000).

In this regard, it was fortunate that the Adirondack Mountains were not home to Native Americans, though they did hunt there (Terrie, 1997); so there was never a question about moving indigenous peoples in order to create the Park. However, there were in 1895, and are now, permanent residents of the Park whose lives are restricted by its regulations. The continuing effort to balance their rights with the forever wild clause of the State Constitution is complex. As a culture, we want to have lands where ecosystemic processes are neither controlled nor compromised by humans, that are not re-made in our image. But if so we also



The Morning After. Drawing by Barry Hopkins.

should recognize the needs of those affected by such preservation. Perhaps the mix of permitted uses we have today points to a solution; but it requires an effort, aided financially and otherwise by those outside the Park, to create new ways, compatible with preservation, for residents to have a viable economy that does not rest exclusively on tourism and recreation. Adirondackers have been calling for something like that for a long time, so thinkers like Callicott and Cronon are stimulating environmentalists to catch up with them.

Cronon's elitism charge also strikes a chord in Adirondack conflicts. Even a brief look at the history of the region shows that many of the most important actions and decisions have been made by the wealthy and powerful, not the working residents. And many see efforts to create more wilderness areas and to restrict uses in other areas as reflecting the preferences of rich outsiders who want places to vacation and recreate and who value "unspoiled" nature (Terrie, 1997). I have already argued that residents' issues must play a major part in our contemporary and future decisions about the Adirondacks, so to that extent I agree with Cronon's criticism. However, although elitism has been part of the history of the Adirondacks and of wilderness preservation generally, I do not agree that elitism is part of the concept of wilderness, or even a necessary result of it. Others besides the rich and powerful value wilderness in the sense of areas not substantially altered or controlled by humans (Foreman, 1994), including many who live within the Adirondack Park (Terrie, 1997).

Callicott's accusation that the wilderness concept is un-ecological derives, I believe, from one meaning of preservation. He thinks preservationists want to keep or return ecosystems to the state that existed before the arrival of humans. But he accurately observes that ecosystems are dynamic, ever-changing areas, not static museum pieces frozen in time. Some attempts to restore ecosystems to their pre-colonial states, like the efforts to re-introduce wolves and lynx to the Adirondacks, can appear to have this un-ecological slant. However, whether one agrees with such re-introductions or not, one consideration

important to supporters is the restoration of the dynamism of the ecosystem, the intention to return it to its own processes by erasing some past human interference and letting it continue on its own (Fascione and Kendrot, 1998). In the Adirondacks, that wilderness preservation means respecting ecosystemic processes is evident; for example, in the opposition to salvage logging after two extensive blowdowns. Preservation means allowing the forest to develop on its own. It may be that some species restoration efforts are impossible, whether for social, economic, or other reasons; but neither the effort, nor the concept of wilderness itself are un-ecological.

For me, Callicott's argument about the alleged dualism of the wilderness concept is the most philosophically interesting. Historically, one common justification for the destruction of nature was through a dualistic metaphysics separating humans from nature, then coupling that separation with arguments that humans are somehow superior to nature. Thus, it is no surprise that anti-dualism is a theme running through much environmental thinking. To Callicott, the usual—what he calls the "received"—concept of wilderness is dualistic in origin, envisioning humans and wild nature as separate. He quotes the U.S. Wilderness Act of 1964: "A wilderness . . . is . . . an area where man himself is a visitor who does not remain." It is easy to see a linkage between this definition and the kinds of abuses already discussed, such as evicting indigenous peoples from designated wildernesses.

To counter this dualism, Callicott argues that humans are natural beings, based on the fact that we, like all other creatures on Earth, evolved. That fact, he alleges, makes us and all our works as natural as beavers and termites and their works (Callicott, 1991). If so, he continues, we are not separate from nature; the dualist wilderness concept, then, is philosophically flawed. In its place, he suggests that we call wilderness areas "biodiversity reserves." Such an approach will emphasize that we are part of nature and need to work with it, not against it, in those areas where we make our livings, but that we also need to provide adequate places for the

rest of nature, especially those parts of it that are less compatible with human settlement and activities. (Callicott, 1998)

Though he does not discuss the Adirondacks, Callicott would see that same dualism at work in the history of the State Forest Preserve, which was originally set aside for watershed protection and future timber resources (Forsyth and Van Valkenburgh, 1996). Such human-centered rationales also see nature and humans as metaphysically separate, with nature existing in service to humans.

But the history of an idea is not its whole meaning, and today, in the Adirondacks and elsewhere, humans are developing ideas about wilderness that are not dualistic. Earlier I mentioned efforts to preserve wild areas that include indigenous peoples living there. Some people think that the value of the Adirondacks lies mostly in its intrinsic value, not in its use-values (Schneider, 1997). Also, it is possible to consider the Adirondacks as a developing effort of humans to live within and care for a natural area, respecting the nonhuman beings and processes that constitute that human home. Not everyone living there thinks that way, of course, but that is basically what is happening. I believe such efforts demonstrate that the concept of wilderness is not essentially dualistic.

Moreover, I do not believe that we have to accept Callicott's ultra-naturalism in order to be non-dualists. He presents us with a choice between just two options, dualism or naturalism. Those options reflect and recapitulate dualism. But there is another possibility. What is actually happening in the Adirondacks and some other wild areas is a recognition that humans and nature are both different and connected. Humans are not "as natural as beavers and termites." To claim that is to obliterate very real differences (art, language, science). But to agree with the dualist is to ignore very real connections (the single genetic code, our utter reliance on nature) (Plumwood, 1993; Curtin, 1999).

There does not seem to be an apt philosophical label for this "differences within continuity" view. It might be called pluralism, which recognizes many kinds of beings, not just humans and nature, but

ecosystems as well. But pluralism also erects barriers between the kinds of beings there are. "Monism" is not right either, since it says that all the different kinds are really just different versions of one kind, again obliterating differences. Whatever we call it, it is a view that seems more compatible with our scientific knowledge, which shows us that we are subject to most of the same forces and processes as other animals, and with our knowledge that we also have different characteristics. Philosophy has tended to emphasize the differences, to the detriment of the environment. Recognizing the connections is important, but we need not go as far as Callicott.

So I think that the criticisms raised by Callicott and Cronon are not cogent enough for us to surrender the idea of wilderness. It does carry with it negative connotations from its origins, and we must remind ourselves of them and work against them. But it is an idea that has evolved and will continue to evolve, an ideal for human action with regard to the nonhuman world. Recognizing our connections with that world, we can also realize that we need not re-make it to reflect only ourselves. We can and should leave some of it alone because nonhuman nature has its own place in the world with us. It is in dynamic interaction with nonhuman nature that we have become who and what we are, and transforming it eliminates part of who we are.

What does this philosophical discussion mean for the Adirondacks? For one thing, it does not legislate precise rules about the meaning of "forever wild." Rather, it says that we all have to work out that meaning based on our connections with and care for the land. It also says that interested outsiders have to understand the knowledge and concerns of those who live in the Adirondack Park. Residents' perspectives must play a major role in any plans and policies. But it also says that wilderness is important, and though "forever wild" and many of the subsequent laws and regulations were born of a flawed concept and imposed by an elite, there remains something of significant value. All those who perceive that value have to work together to maintain it for what it is and for what we are.

Works Cited

- Bookchin, Murray. 1990. *The Philosophy of Social Ecology*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1989. *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1991. "The Wilderness Idea Revisited: The Sustainable Development Alternative." *The Environmental Professional* 13: 235-47.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1998. "Should Wilderness Areas Become Biodiversity Reserves?" In Callicott and Nelson, 1998.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1999. *Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Callicott, J. Baird and Michael P. Nelson. 1998. *The Great New Wilderness Debate*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Cronon, William. 1995. "The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature." In William Cronon, ed. *Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature*. New York: Norton, 1995.
- Curtin, Deane. 1999. *Chinnagounder's Challenge: The Question of Ecological Citizenship*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Des Jardins, Joseph. 1997. *Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy*, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Fascione, Nina and Stephen Kendrot. 1998. "Wolves for the Adirondacks?" *Adirondack Journal of Environmental Studies* 5, 1: 7-10.
- Foreman, Dave. 1994. "Wilderness Areas Are Vital: A Response to Callicott." *Wild Earth* 4 (Winter): 64-68.
- Forsyth, Alfred S. and Norman J. Van Valkenburgh. 1996. *The Forest and the Law II*. Schenectady: Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks.
- Handley, Elaine. 1999. "Where the Human Domain Confronts the Wild." Unpublished. Presented at the Adirondack Research Consortium Conference, May, 1999.
- Hargrove, Eugene. 1989. *Foundations of Environmental Ethics*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Katz, Eric. 1997. *Nature as Subject: Human Obligation and Natural Community*. Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield.
- Kemper, Steve. 2000. "Madidi National Park [Bolivia]." *National Geographic* 197 (March 2000): 2-23.
- Leopold, Aldo. 1966. *A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation from Round River*. New York: Ballentine.
- Light, Andrew. 1995. "Materialists, Ontologists, and Environmental Pragmatists." *Social Theory and Practice* 21: 315-33.
- Light, Andrew and Eric Katz. 1996. *Environmental Pragmatism*. London: Routledge.
- Naess, Arne. 1989. *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*. David Rothenberg, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nelson, Michael P. 1998. "An Amalgamation of Wilderness Preservation Arguments." In Callicott and Nelson, 1998.
- Norton, Bryan. 1991. *Towards Unity Among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ouderkirk, Wayne. 1998. "Mindful of the Earth: A Bibliographical Essay on Environmental Philosophy." *Centennial Review* 47: 353-92.
- Plumwood, Val. 1993. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature*. London: Routledge.
- Redmond, Peter G. 1997. "Protecting the Islands in the Sky: Lessons from Conserving the High Alpine Communities." *Adirondack Journal of Environmental Studies* 4, 1: 19-23.
- Regan, Tom. 1983. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rolston, Holmes, III. 1988. *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Sachs, Aaron. 1995. *Eco-Justice: Linking Human Rights and the Environment*. Worldwatch Paper 127. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute.
- Schneider, Paul. 1997. *The Adirondacks: A History of America's First Wilderness*. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
- Singer, Peter. 1990. *Animal Liberation*. Revised edition. New York: Avon.
- Sterba, James. 1998. "A Biocentrist Strikes Back." *Environmental Ethics* 20: 361-76.
- Taylor, Paul. 1986. *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Terrie, Philip G. 1997. *Contested Terrain: A New History of Nature and People in the Adirondacks*. Syracuse: The Adirondack Museum and Syracuse University Press.
- Warren, Karen. 1990. "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism." *Environmental Ethics* 12: 125-46.



Early Winter. Drawing by Barry Hopkins.