

6-2016

New Refugees - Old Rules: An Analysis of Jordanian Refugee Policies and their Effects on Humanitarian Relief

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New Refugees – Old Rules:
An Analysis of Jordanian Refugee Policies and their Effects on Humanitarian Relief

By

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
Honors in the Department of Political Science

UNION COLLEGE
March, 2016

ABSTRACT

KADER, SARAH New Refugees – Old Rules: An Analysis of Jordanian Refugee Policies. Department of Political Science, March 2016

ADVISOR: Thomas Lobe

Over 1.4 million Syrians have fled to Jordan since 2011 as a result of the brutal, ongoing conflict in Syria. Just as the Palestinians fled Israel these last 67 years, the newly arrived Syrian refugees are an ignored actor in a cruel game between the Jordanian state, the United Nations Agencies, the United States and interested non-state actors. The resulting human rights violations, including denial of rights to work, healthcare, education, and movement, are not accidental but are sanctioned by the Jordanian state.

This thesis analyzes Jordan's history with the Palestinian refugees; the motivations and implementation of policies excluding Palestinians from integrating into Jordanian society, and compares these policies Jordan's current decisions regarding the treatment of Syrian refugees. Through research of Jordanian ministries such as the Ministries of Interior, Education, and Health, and data provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) we find that the exclusive policies which affected the Palestinians are the template which the Kingdom of Jordan will use to deny Syrians the services and care they desperately need.

For my parents:

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Introduction

It is impossible to understand the intricacies of the Syrian Refugee crisis: the decisions countries make in how to care for refugees, and the international institutions that come to their aid, without first understanding the events behind the creations of these institutions. Taking into consideration the environment surrounding the creation of accords, statutes and institutions, we can further understand the few “options” afforded to refugees as they attempt to navigate their new, insecure worlds post displacement.

A refugee is defined as a person fleeing armed conflict or persecution¹. Refugee crises and the attempted management of them have been studied since the beginning of World War II. Since the flight of any group en masse is typically precipitated by conflict, the political turmoil – war, revolution, genocide, or endemic gang violence – that caused a group to abandon their homes and livelihoods is an important topic of scholarly and public policy based scrutiny. Not only are the causes of a refugee exodus analyzed, but the corresponding effects of refugee migration on neighboring countries, the international community and the subsequent decisions that are made regarding those refugee groups is deeply studied. Crisis after crisis, the aftermath of flight is studied in order to determine how to better care for refugees who remain stateless, and how to better respond when the next event occurs.

¹ Barnett, M. (2001). Humanitarianism with a Sovereign Face: UNHCR in the Global Undertow. *International Migration Review*, 35(1), 244–277. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676060>

Each group of refugees provides a different lesson; Vietnamese refugees were resettled and repatriated. Most Rwandan refugees returned home. Though the endings are different, the ultimate trend determining how refugees will live the course of their lives is influenced by two general actors: the bordering nations to a country in conflict, and the international community, which together scrounges resources to bring some modicum of support to the refugee community.

Refugees are in the unique position of statelessness, and are dependent on neighboring nations to provide shelter and other basic necessities crucial to survival. Neighboring countries usually lack the resources or infrastructural capacity to accommodate a large number of refugees, or are preoccupied with caring for their own, often poor populations. As a result, the host nations and refugees have to rely on the good-will of the international community for financial support. The fate of these large groups of people largely depends on the decisions made by these two sets of actors. Volleying between these two actors are the various organizations and do-gooders, both international governmental organizations such as UNICEF and the World Health Organization and non-governmental organizations like the International Red Cross Association.

However, a refugee, the stateless human, is still human, and as such their rights are recognized, at least theoretically, within the international community. One important document which details these rights is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of the Refugee, which was first approved by the United Nations in 1951. Though initially prepared to defend the rights of the European refugees displaced by WWII, it branched out to cover all refugees, no matter their origin, with one important exception. The

Convention places a specific amount of duties on its signees, which, alongside the 1951 Conventions definition of a refugee, has produced some reluctance on behalf of numerous nations, some of which, like Jordan, have never signed it outright. The signatories of the 1951 convention agree to cooperate with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) which coordinates and provides humanitarian assistance to almost every single group of refugees that has existed since 1951, as well as the implementation of national legislation to insure applications of the convention². The 1951 Refugee Convention denotes important rights that refugees have, such as the right to seek asylum, or the right against refoulment, which makes it illegal for a country to send an asylum seeker back to the dangerous place they have left. By refusing to sign it, many countries refuse to hold themselves accountable to the international community for treating refugees inhumanely.

The 1951 Refugee convention also highlights the responsibility of the UNHCR, the satellite organization of the U.N. responsible for the funding, provision, and coordination of refugee relief services, and the international community to realize “durable solutions” on behalf of a group of refugees. The UNHCR notes three “permanent solutions” for a refugees’ insecure position. The first, repatriation, is defined as the voluntary return to the “home country” or the “country of origin”³. In this case, the status of refugee is temporary and the refugee regains citizenship (and ideally) rights within their nation of origin. Voluntary repatriation, when a refugee returns to their home nation when it is safe to do so , and of their own free will, is considered the “ideal”

² [UNHCR: *States Parties to the Convention and Protocol*](#), retrieved 1 29 2016

³ Voluntary Repatriation. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2015.

solution by the UNHCR⁴. The UNHCR assists with negotiation between host nations and the nation of origin to determine whether or not repatriation is possible.

Repatriation is further classified within the context of the conflict from which a refugee has fled and under which they have returned. These circumstances should be viewed on a spectrum which can classify types of repatriation with great variability. Examples of these factors include: whether the repatriation is unassisted or organized, and by which actors; the degree to which it is purely voluntary, encouraged, induced, or forced; whether it is a return by an individual, a small group, or a more sizeable collective; whether, and to what extent, there has been a significant change in the original cause of flight.⁵

A common thread amongst all groups of displaced peoples, from Eastern Europe, to Sudan to Vietnam, is the desire to return home, and this is why repatriation is considered the ideal solution. Though repatriation is considered the most desirable in abstract, “it is the most difficult to achieve in the concrete”⁶. Refugee literature cites many failed attempts by the UNHCR to organize voluntary repatriation, from repatriation attempts in former Yugoslavia, Eastern Africa, and other parts of the world⁷. Issues surrounding repatriation include constructs of nationalism, the economic realities of returning to a war torn state, which can be just as difficult as living as a refugee. Silent

⁴ UNHCR Global Report 2013 - Finding durable solutions. (n.d.). Retrieved November 10, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/539809d8e.html>

⁵ Stein, B., & Cuny, F. (n.d.). Refugee repatriation during conflict: Protection and post-return assistance. *Development in Practice*, 173-187.

⁶ Zeager, L., & Bascom, J. (1996). Strategic Behavior in Refugee Repatriation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 460-485.

⁷ Waters, T. (2001) Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of Humanitarian Relief Operations.

deterrents to repatriation can come within the refugee, the inability to return to towns where loved ones were lost, with traumatic memories

Analysts cite the economic inability of the nation of origin, insufficient donor activity and long term instability as core deterrents to successful organized voluntary repatriation⁸. Successful, organized repatriation requires the cooperation of both the host nation and nation of origin, as well as sufficient funding, without which keeping each party accountable for the welfare of the population becomes much more difficult⁹. Furthermore, reintegration into the nation of origin and regaining financial stability make repatriation a long and difficult process.

The repatriation of refugees from Sierra Leone following the civil war which ranged from 1991 to 2002 is a prime example of many difficulties associated with repatriation, even when voluntary. An estimated 400,000 Sierra Leonean refugees fled into the neighboring nations of Guinea and Liberia during more than ten years of violence, with an estimated two million internally displaced. After the conclusion of the civil war, the UNHCR began an assisted repatriation program. This program, which conveyed almost 200,000 refugees by the end of 2004, provided them for transportation, four months of rations and a few essential items such as a tent, was successful in returning refugees to Sierra Leone but widely unsuccessful in reintegrating refugees back into the country, for reasons including widespread poverty, as well sociopsychological

⁸Stein, B. (n.d.). Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees. *International Migration Review*, 264-264.

⁹ Long, K. (2013). The Ethics of Voluntary Repatriation. *Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation The Point of No Return*, 157-177.

reasons¹⁰ such as lack of attachment to Sierra Leone after living so long in another country.

Though refugees always keep home in mind, home may not be a safe place to return to. Forced repatriation can occur due to systematic oppression by the host nation, including violence against the refugees from host citizens. Host countries ultimately have an interest in the repatriation of refugees, voluntary or not, and some host nations will expel refugees from camps and local communities and return them to their country of origin. This process was noticed in its largest scale in Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where troops militantly forced 1.4 million refugees back to Rwanda. This process of “forced repatriation”, or refoulment, is considered an international crime underneath the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.

The second “durable” solution is the transfer and resettlement of countries from the developing host nation to a third country, perhaps a country with more financial resources to accommodate them. Resettlement as a viable option requires the other nations to allow for a large influx of refugees into their nation. The UNHCR and, by extension, the United Nations, has named resettlement “the costliest and least desirable solution” to any refugee crisis, despite the fact that it is a more permanent solution than repatriation, especially in countries with recurring conflict. While repatriation is ideal because refugees can return to their homes, and that the violence is over; resettlement programs are the international communities acknowledgement that for some refugees, returning home can never happen.

¹⁰ BRADLEY, M. (2014). Rethinking refugeehood: Statelessness, repatriation, and refugee agency. *Review of International Studies*, 40(1), 101-123.
doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000514>

Though resettlement may be the costliest durable solution, it is the most economically sound solution especially in places of long-standing, recurrent conflict. Due to the participation of wealthier nations, resettlement also serves as a form of reparation for those who have suffered so much. The massive resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in the United States and France following the Vietnam War is an example of this kind of success. Following the Vietnam war, the hundreds of South Vietnamese attempting to flee with evacuating US military personnel gave many Americans a better idea of what the massive losses the Vietnamese had experienced in the war. The former President Gerald Ford pushed The Indochina Migration and Refugee Act through Congress against popular opinion, appealing to the American public's sense of responsibility. The Indochina Migration and Refugee Act allotted a budget for resettlement services, including healthcare and education, even in the face of recurring arguments against refugee settlement, including domestic poverty and questions regarding a group's ability to integrate into the host society.

Typical nativist arguments were often exacerbated by scale, over 130,000 refugees were successfully resettled in the United States and caused concerns with resettlement, such as the the worsening of existing poverty in the United States at the time, or the difficulties refugees will face assimilating into their new culture. Despite these misgivings, the resettlement of about Vietnamese refugees and the resulting remittances those families sent to Vietnam is historically considered a success ¹¹.

So when neither of these two durable solutions, resettlement or repatriation, are possibilities, the last durable solution is known as local integration. Local integration,

¹¹ Tempo, Carl (2008). *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War*.

when done properly is the integration of the refugees into political, economic, and social fabric of their host nation, typically a neighboring country. The host nation is typically bears the load of the refugee population. However, the local “integration” of refugees implies that these people may regain some aspects of normalcy in a new place, employment, the right to property, and services such as education and healthcare.

Local integration, true integration where a refugee can begin a new life as a productive citizen, rarely happens in the poor, developing nations where local integration is most likely to take place. More likely, the host nation will allow for other international agencies to manage or contain the refugees, to keep them alive but far, far away from the possibility of becoming a permanent member of a society. It is in these countless refugee crises, Afghani, Sudanese, Guatemalan, and countless others, that one can recall the sea of UNHCR stamped tents, surrounded by barbed wire fences. Containment is the most temporary, cruelest, and most common way the world responds to a refugee crisis. Without the freedom to move or work, refugee camps are simply glorified internment camps.

To predict the possibility of a bordering host nation’s decision to integrate versus contain a refugee population, one must take into account the “political will, diplomacy, and statesmanship of [host] governments”, and the extent to which a country provides education, healthcare and the opportunity to work to refugees; services important to the concept of integration. This case study refers to two specific refugee populations, Palestinian and Syrian, within the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country burdened with a continuous influx of refugees since 1948.

In order to highlight the inconsistency with which the international community responds to a group's collective displacement, for example, why Palestinians were never given the right to repatriate, a massive resettlement campaign, or successful integration into a host nation like Jordan, we must make a historical comparison to a refugee group fleeing conflict at the same time. Following World War II, 60 million,¹² displaced laborers, survivors from conflict zones, and political refugees fled from the Soviet zone to Western Europe. Almost concurrently, across the Mediterranean, Palestinians were fleeing their ancestral homes towards the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Despite the large volume and need of both groups, the way the international community regarded these two refugee groups in terms of providing security and assistance provides a lesson for the lack of assistance afforded many groups of refugees today.

The sense of responsibility attached to the victims of WWII and the early stages of the Cold War, the majority of whom were European was much greater than the responsibility the Western world felt for the Palestinian Arabs displaced after the creation of the state of Israel. As a result, the institutions and rights afforded to these groups reflected this varying sense of responsibility. For example, The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), founded in 1943, then the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which took over the duties of the UNRRA in 1946¹³, were both temporary and Eurocentric in nature. Their mandates were temporary, their focus solely on the repatriation and resettlement of European refugees. The limited time-span of these institutional mandates is even reflected in the UNHCR, which is a permanent

¹² Harris, C., & Wulker, G. (1953). The Refugee Problem of Germany. *Economic Geography*, 10-10.

¹³ AGREEMENT FOR UNRRA. (n.d.). Retrieved January 9, 2016, from <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431109a.html>

body of the United Nations but still treats each refugee crisis as temporary, leading to inconsistencies in humanitarian aid which have important consequences, like disruptions in a refugee's access to food, water, and healthcare.

The United Nations High Commission on Refugees mandate is to “provide, on a non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek permanent solutions for them”¹⁴. The culmination in United Nations actions regarding the European refugee crisis came in 1951, as six million refugees remained unsettled. Despite a common agreement to protect the status of refugees, each refugee crisis is a complex arrangement of international agencies, and the political agendas of powerful nations. The “permanent solution” a refugee needs may provide refugees with safety, but above all must suit the political interests of the world's powerful nations at the time. that may help the refugees but above all suits. The refugees who should be given the agency to decide how they rebuild their lives, are an ignored pawn in a global game.

Though post World War II, Europeans fleeing to Western Europe had the assistance of donors and the goodwill of western governments when fleeing to safety. This was evident in the legitimization of their “refugee passports” as forms of identification, and entrance (though limited) into the Western European economies. This rarely occurred within other developing host nations, which are much more economically burdened by the refugee's presence and do not have the infrastructure to support them. In these cases, “local integration” at best means unofficial employment and some access to services that international actors, such as UN organizations or NGOs, provides. The 1951

¹⁴ UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Self-Study Module 1: An Introduction to International Protection. Protecting Persons of Concern to UNHCR*, 1 August 2005, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4214cb4f2.html> [accessed 10 January 2016]

Geneva Convention on the Status of the Refugee also guaranteed refugees political rights, particularly, against refoulment – a state sanctioned deportation of a refugee to their unsafe nation of origin.

Following 1950, refugee populations have had the support of the UNHCR, who would negotiate with host nations, origin nations, service providing NGOs and possible resettlement countries on its behalf. The singular exception to the UNHCR's mandate is the majority population of Palestinian refugees. The 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee specifically excludes any group of displaced peoples receiving assistance from any agency apart from the UNHCR¹⁵. The Palestinians in the host nations of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a UN body commissioned to provide direct relief to Palestinians within these host nations.

As I will show in the upcoming chapters of this thesis, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) allowed the international community to disengage from protecting the Palestinians' political rights. Since UNRWA already provided services (food and shelter) for Palestinians, Palestinians were excluded from benefiting from any other U.N. refugee agency. The 750,000 Palestinian refugees that fled into Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in 1948 received no political protection, and while a small minority were able to find resettlement in a western country, the majority Palestinian refugee never found a "permanent solution" to their plight. The exclusion of Palestinians from the Convention on the Status of Refugees places millions of Palestinians in the position of

¹⁵ Palestinians Who Fall Under the 1951 Convention. (n.d.). Retrieved November 11, 2015, from <http://www.refugeelaidinformation.org/palestinians-who-fall-under-1951-convention>

“permanent temporariness”¹⁶. Repatriation was ruled out almost automatically during any discussion of peace between Israel and Palestine. The “right to return” was solely for Jews migrating into Israel, not Palestinians wanting to return to their farmland. While resettlement and integrations were viable, if not the most desirable options, even those were denied to Palestinians within their Arab host nations. The result of this is a paradoxical “permanent temporary status” spanning generations, where both refugees and their descendants are disenfranchised, dependent on IGOs and NGOs for their survival, and in constant insecurity.

In this state of “permanent temporary status”, the host nation plays a much larger role in the security and well – being of the refugee population. The way each nation addresses a large influx of refugees can be determined by a combination of internal political motivators and external pressures. The combination of these two variables can lead to wildly shifting policies regarding the integration or exclusion of refugees within the host nation, and contributes to the refugee population’s sense of insecurity.

This variability in policies also affects their access to services such as education, healthcare and safe living conditions. Without consistent living space and protection, many children in refugee camps must rely on informal educational services provided by a third actor (an NGO, or IGO), and depending on the inconsistency of funding and length of their refugee status, may go without education for years¹⁷. This is especially true in emergency camp settings, where education is deprioritized in favor of funding basic forms of aid (food and shelter). Access to quality healthcare within refugee camps is

¹⁶ Menachem Klein, 'The Palestinian refugees of 1948: models of allowed and denied return,' in Dumper, 2006 pp. 87–106, p. 93.

¹⁷ Refugees in Camps. (2014). *Refugee Politics in the Middle East and North Africa*.

precarious at best, and absent at worst. Health outcomes are consistently poor due to the lack of management of chronic conditions, but access to healthcare is incredibly dependent on the refugee's integration into the host society.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, was the first Arab country to host and partially resettle Palestinian refugees. In the past four years Jordan has been overwhelmed with several hundred thousand Syrian refugees seeking refuge. In order for third party actors, such as small relief non-governmental organizations (NGOS) to provide help to people who desperately need it, it is crucial to understand the various actors, their interests and roles within Jordan's political landscape. It is just as important to understand the geopolitical landscape at the time of migration, and how actors such as the United States and United Nations, play a role in Jordanian policymaking.

The plight of the Palestinian refugees, now more than seventy years in the making, then offers a base with which to analyze how Syrians, a relatively new refugee population, have been treated thus far, especially in regards to healthcare services. By understanding the policy shifts over the initial twenty-year period in terms of actors, not only is it possible to understand how the policies have shifted in a more exclusive direction, but more pointedly, why so many gaps in care exist., and why it is difficult for so many innocent people have difficulties finding the services they to which they have an undeniable right.

History of the Palestinian Refugee Crisis: 1948-1950

As stated in the introduction, the treatment of Palestinian refugees remains different than the treatment of any other refugee group to this day. The responsibility for the Palestinian exodus; a pouring of more than 750,000 Palestinians from coast cities such as Haifa and Jaffa into neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, was unwanted by Syria, Lebanon and the rest of the international community¹⁸. The exodus caused by the 1948 Arab Israeli War was violent; the displacement accompanied by the forceful eviction of Palestinians from their homes, miles – long marches, and massacres. It was also an expulsion that seemed a long-time coming, with members of the international community, the United Kingdom in particular, complicit in denying Palestinians their right to self-determination, and following the crisis, in denying their political rights as refugees.

However, the aftermath of the refugee crisis and the singular lack of protection afforded to Palestinian refugee crisis is more unique than the circumstances of their exodus. This is largely due to intense Israeli protection over their new territory and complacency on behalf of the International Community. The refugees, which had fled for their own safety under violence or the threat of it, were eager to return to their homes. The majority of the refugees that attempted to wanted to search for their loved ones, or to

¹⁸ Palestine refugees | UNRWA. (n.d.). Retrieved March 06, 2016, from <http://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>

reclaim their homes or harvest their fields¹⁹. Normally, the “right to return” to a refugees place of origin is a political right granted to every refugee group. The 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of the Refugee, states that “Each refugee is authorized to return to their home state from the contracting [host] state”²⁰.

There was never any execution of this convention after the Palestinian refugee crisis, because two parties made the repatriation of Palestinians actively impossible, the Israelis, and the International community. Though Palestinians had a right to return to their homes after the 1948 Arab Israeli War ended according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, Palestinians were either deported back over the Israeli border, or shot at by Israeli military forces²¹. In 1954, the Israeli Knesset would pass a “Prevention of Infiltration Law” which would give Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) license to forcibly deport any Palestinian attempting to return to their homes. The language of this law also defined “infiltrators” as any internally displaced Palestinian in Israel as well, and because of this several thousand more Palestinians who still remained in Israel were deported to camps within the West Bank²². The infiltration law, passed in 1954, was simply a legalization of existing practices; the Israeli army had been systematically removing

¹⁹ Jiryis, Sabri (1981): *Domination by the Law*. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 10th Anniversary Issue: Palestinians under Occupation. (Autumn, 1981), pp. 67-92.

²⁰ Morris, B. (2004). *The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²¹ Kirshbaum, David A. *Israeli Emergency Regulations and The Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945*. Israel Law Resource Center, February 2007.

²² "Prevention of Infiltration Law (1954)". Israel Law Resource Center. passed by the Knesset August 16, 1954. Retrieved 4 June 2012. SOURCE: 'Laws of the State of Israel: Authorized Translation from the Hebrew, Volume 8'. Government Printer, Jerusalem, Israel (1948-1987), p. 133-7

Palestinians who had reentered after the war since 1950 as a way to “control the entry of Arabs into the new Jewish state”²³.

This disregard for Palestinian rights was practically ignored by the International community, particularly the United States and the United Nations. While both actors affirmed the Palestinian right of return, both the U.S. and the U.N. did little to enforce or protect their rights. The closest the U.N. came to establishing a Palestinian right of return was a key component of the resolution admitting Israel as a member of the General Assembly, which stipulated that Israel “unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations”²⁴. One of the obligations of the United Nations includes the support of the Palestinians’ right to return to their homes. Though Israel accepted the UN Charter, they refused Palestinians repatriation as national policy, and the UN did nothing more than affirm that Palestinians had the right to do it.

The international community U.N. partition plan, the admission of the State of Israel, and subsequent complacency regarding the infiltration law can be attributed the political agenda of the western world and the emotional climate following WWII. If Jewish refugees had their own state, they would not have to be resettled in European countries, and so the creation of the state of Israel was one way for western countries, particularly the U.K. and the United States, to disengage from Jewish refugees²⁵. At the

²³ Korn, A.. (2000). CRIME AND LEGAL CONTROL: The Israeli Arab Population during the Military Government Period (1948—66). *The British Journal of Criminology*, 40(4), 574–593. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638486>

²⁵ THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND BINATIONALISM. (2010). THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND BINATIONALISM. In *The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation: Repression Beyond Exploitation* (pp. 188–201). Pluto Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183gzjm.15>

same time, the massive tragedy of the Holocaust meant that some form of reparation was in order: if not resettlement, in the form of a Jewish state²⁶

Another sign of complacency regarding the repatriation of the Palestinians was their outright disqualification under the 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee. This document, which the world still uses to define the the rights afforded to refugees and the agencies responsible for their protection, was also used to disengage the United Nations from actually having to push for Palestinian repatriation.

Article 1. of the 1951 convention defines a refugee as a person who, “owing to well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”²⁷. Palestinians, who fled the violence of the 1948 Arab – Israeli War, undeniably fall under the category of “refugee” .

The 1951 Convention, though euro-centric in its creation of UNRWA and focus on immediate repatriation to their European country of origin, specifically excludes the Palestinians. By stating that the “Convention also does not apply to those refugees who benefit from the protection or assistance of a United Nations agency other than UNHCR,

²⁶ From the Holocaust to the State of Israel. (2001). From the Holocaust to the State of Israel. In *Rethinking the Holocaust* (pp. 242–260). Yale University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt32bpxv.15>

²⁷ UN General Assembly, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html> [accessed 7 March 2016]

such as refugees from Palestine who fall under the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)²⁸, the U.N. is actively denying Palestinians the benefits of the only charter, treaty, or document that specifically lays out the political rights of the refugee. While notes from the General Assembly state that this separation was to maintain the Palestinian refugees as an exclusive group who can continue to get relief from UNRWA, the result was the effective barring of Palestinians from ever returning home.

As mentioned in the introduction, the UNHCR states three durable solutions for refugees are repatriation, resettlement, and local integration. Since Israel's "prevention of infiltration" law ruled out repatriation immediately, the only "durable solutions" left, solutions that allow refugees to live their lives with peace and security, are resettlement and integration into host nations. For Palestinians, especially the poor neither of these were viable options. To resettle, or gain asylum into a wealthier nation, such as the United States, a refugee requires significant financial capital in order to make the journey. Furthermore, prove a need for political asylum in a way that normal refugees cannot. For this reason, many Palestinians who made it to the United States or Europe were wealthier Christians, who were able to both pay for the journey and state that they had faced religious persecution²⁹.

There is political integration, which means that a refugee has been given citizenship to another country, but there is also actual integration, when the refugee is allowed to actually participate in the political and economic spheres of a new nation.

²⁸ UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

²⁹ John Tofik Karam, "On the Trail and Trial of a Palestinian Diaspora..." <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9070730>

With true integration, refugees are actually allowed to partake in the rights and public services that a normal citizen would have access to. True integration also requires similar financial capital, and education are in order to truly integrate into the Arab host nations, but even that is not a guarantee.

While immediately following the refugee crisis, some highly educated Palestinians were able to move to Jordan's capital and participate in the government, the vast majority of Palestinian refugees were *fellahin*, farmers who could neither read nor write³⁰. Furthermore, the integration of Palestinians was heavily dependent on Jordanian political interests, so much so that even Palestinians who were educated had difficulty integrating into Jordan's economy and political systems.

If none of the three temporary solutions are viable for the Palestinians, then what is left? Without being able to repatriate, resettle, or integrate, The Palestinian refugees were left in a state of “permanent temporariness”³¹, where they lack both the autonomy and self determination any of the three solutions would provide for them. To be in a situation of “permanent temporariness” is to be in a state of abject poverty, without the ability to move, work, or live freely in any matter. A refugee in this situation is unable to support his or herself, instead utterly dependent on the good – will of international actors and the host nations.

The Palestinians in Jordan, the focus of this case study, fall firmly into the “permanently temporary” category despite outward political motions towards integration by the Jordanian state. Unlike the UNHCR, or even UNRWA, whose goals and mandates

³⁰ Young, E. G. (2012). *Gender and nation building in the Middle East: The political economy of health from Mandate Palestine to refugee camps in Jordan*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

³¹ *Ibid.* Young, E. (2012)

are to provide services for refugees, Jordan was under no such obligation; they did not sign the 1951 Convention, nor did the Jordanian State feel morally responsible. Instead Palestinian lives became a cog in a wheel of political motives and aspirations, used only to suit the Jordanian state's purposes. It is a situation that began bleakly, and would only become worse with each year, with each exacerbation of the Palestinian conflict, and with each political machination of the Jordanian state.

Economics of Annexation and Inclusion:

Of the 750,000 Palestinian refugees expelled from their land, the majority found themselves completely barred from returning to their homes, and unwanted in the places they've fled to. Places like Lebanon and Syria prevented Palestinians from entering the workforce, accessing health or education resources, or utilizing the political rights that citizenship or legal residency would provide. From the very start, Jordan was notably different in its treatment of the Palestinians, even lauded in the international community as a "safe haven" where Palestinian refugees would be treated relatively well.

To this day, Jordan is the only Arab country to naturalize the refugees of the 1948 exodus, giving Palestinians from the migration the opportunity to apply for citizenship. With citizenship, the Palestinians who took the offer became "Jordanians of Palestinian Origin" and gained access to Jordan's public workforce, educational services, and healthcare. However, the reasons for this inclusion were far from humanitarian, instead calculated based on the Jordanian state's economic and political interests. Rather offer protection out of kindness, Jordan became a place of refuge simply because it was convenient to do so at the time.

Since Transjordan's (the British Mandate) creation in 1921, the country has been ruled by the Hashemite Royal Family. The Hashemite Royal Family is actually an extension of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia, implanted there by the British prior to the disbandment of the mandate. Following the role of Jordan's first king, Abdullah I, in inciting the Arab revolt that ousted the Ottoman Empire, the Hashemites have been the steadiest, most powerful actor in Jordanian politics. The interests of the Hashemite royal

family have been the strongest motivator of the Jordanian state's domestic and regional policies.

Though the Hashemites' established a two house parliament following Jordanian independence in 1946, the two – house Parliament did not (and does not) have nearly the political clout as the King and his family. The prime minister is not voted in by the people, but rather appointed by the King. In 1948, there was no illusion that the true levels of power lay with King Abdullah I³². The will of the king is seen everywhere, from the core focuses of Jordanians refugee policies to the official name of the country itself: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The Hashemite's interests within the Kingdom of Jordan are paramount; especially in their reaction to the influx of refugees. 750,000 refugees were pouring into the West Bank and across the Jordan River, and in immediate need of assistance, but this didn't stop Lebanon & Syria from barring them from everything except the gate. Why would Jordan, with very few natural resources of its own, with a miniscule amount of political capital in the international community agree to not only take on this humanitarian burden, but actually begin to integrate the Palestinians by offering them Jordanian citizenship?

The answer lies more in Abdullah I's vision for Jordan's future and his concern with his political legacy, rather than the well-being of the fleeing Palestinians. Following the dissolution of the mandate, the King was acutely aware of the barriers preventing Jordan from enjoying economic prosperity³³. Jordan did not have oil or access to sea

³² Plascov, A. (1981). *The Palestinian refugees in Jordan 1948-1957*. London: F. Cass

³³ ibn Hussain, Abd' Allah (1951). [*Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan*]. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 275, 226–227. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1028281ddd>

trade, like the gulf nations. The majority of the land in Transjordan was rough, sandy, and completely unsuitable for agriculture. Transjordan, dependent on dry farming, sheep and camel raising, was impoverished. Unequal distribution of the already low national income favored extended members of the Hashemite family, but made the average Jordanians, including the Bedouins and merchants, who were non-Hashemites, poor and desperate. Raids between the Bedouins and merchants occurred consistently and contributed to a rising crime rate³⁴.

The tense relations between Hashemite, the non-Hashemite Bedouins other non-Hashemite Jordanians were reflected in Jordan's parliament, whose members were evenly divided amongst Hashemites and non-Hashemites³⁵. The Hashemites represented their own interests (and by extension, the interests of the King) in Parliament, but the non-Hashemites represented the interests of their own groups, nomadic or not³⁶. The clashes of these groups, within Parliament and on the streets, presented a security threat to the Hashemite regime. The political representation of the non-Hashemites began to shake the classist foundations of Jordanian society: many richer merchants were overtaking Hashemites as members of the upper class, a Jordanian *nouveau riche* that infuriated the poor Hashemite Jordanians³⁷.

During the Arab Israeli War of 1948, Jordanian forces had swept across the river into West Bank. Following the invasion of Jordan into the West Bank, Abdullah quickly

³⁴ Baster, James (1955). The Economic Problems of Jordan. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol 31, No. 1 Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 26-35 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2604575>

³⁵ *Ibid*, ibn – Hussein (1951)

³⁶ *Ibid*, Baster (1955).

³⁷ Satloff, R. B. (1994). From Abdullah to Hussein : Jordan in Transition. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, USA. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

decided to annex the West Bank, keeping his armed forces in several key cities such as Bethlehem and East Jerusalem. With the annexation of the West Bank came 900,000 Palestinians who were not refugees, but conquered along with the West Bank, as well as the 750,000 refugees that had fled in 1948.

The annexation of the West Bank was a calculated move on behalf of King Abdullah I based on short lived economic advantages and the King's hopeful political legacy. The annexation of the West Bank brought it refugees, yes, but it also brought the fertile land on the other side of the Jordan river. Though the West Bank is a significantly smaller area compared to the rest of Jordan, following annexation, the West Bank was home to more than 50% of Jordan's viable agricultural land³⁸. Initially, Jordan greatly benefited from the the West Bank's stronger economy, and this includes Palestinians who contributed to the Jordanian economy. The Palestinians became a source of labor, and brought the the tools of trades that gave comfortable livelihoods in Palestine. Many of these Palestinians, educated in their own right, were responsible for the urbanization that developed Jordan's infrastructure following 1948³⁹. Many Palestinian refugees also transferred their bank accounts to Jordanian banks, bringing further capital into Jordan's economy.

The annexation of Palestine was also Abdullah's first, tentative step towards his expansionist goals. Abdullah, formerly stifled by the priorities of the British mandate, saw his annexation of the West Bank as the first step to his ruling "Greater Syria", his

³⁸ *Ibid*, Baster (1955)

³⁹ Mishal, S., Baer, G., Divine, D. R., Heller, M., Miller, Y. N., Mishal, S., ... Taqqu, R.. (1980). Conflictual Pressures and Cooperative Interests: Observations on West Bank-Amman Political Relations, 1949-1967. In *Palestinian Society and Politics* (pp. 169–184). Princeton University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zts44.18>

imagined kingdom comprised of Transjordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, with his capital in Damascus. This expansionist interest was illustrated with Abdullah's takeover of East Jerusalem, which he labeled "an integral part of the Jordanian state"⁴⁰. In conquering Jerusalem, King Abdullah I declared the Hashemites "stewards of the Dome of the Rock"⁴¹. The Dome of the Rock is the third holiest site in the Islamic world, and the mantle of the mosque's "protector" added a symbolic legitimacy to King Abdullah I's expansionist ideals. This conquest also furthered King Abdullah's religious and cultural significance in the Arab World, even rivaling that of Saudi's ruling family, the protectors of the Kaabah (Islam's holiest site)⁴². Abdullah had hoped that with this new found religious significance, he would be able to expand further, even claiming Damascus as the "true capital of his Kingdom" in March of 1949⁴³.

Despite King Abdullah I's numerous reasons for annexing the West Bank, reactions within the Middle East and rest of the international community were mixed. The Palestinians themselves regarded the annexation of the West Bank between a range of ambivalence and hopeless acceptance. At the time, Palestinians were religiously disorganized, the average Palestinian unaware of the decisions of the *muftis*, the religious leaders that hailed from Jerusalem. The *muftis* trusted King Abdullah to protect the holy land, and save them, the people within it, from their wretched state, whilst a larger section of the ordinary Palestinian population were uninterested in the machinations of the ruling class, provided it did not effect their livelihoods⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, Satloff (1994)

⁴¹ *Ibid*, Satloff (1994)

⁴² Budeiri, M.. (1996). Poor Kid on the Bloc: The Importance of Being Jordan. *Die Welt Des Islams*, 36(2), 242–257. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693464>

⁴³ Aruri, N. H. (1972). *Jordan: A study in political development (1921-1965)*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, Plascov (1981).

Thrown about amongst various other interests, the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, just like the Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon viewed their situation as temporary even as the deaths of their neighbors due to Israelis “infiltration laws” proved they may never return⁴⁵. Even when Palestinians were offered citizenship by the Jordanian government, it is estimated that only 25% of Palestinian refugees took the offer⁴⁶. Most Palestinians feared that taking Jordanian citizenship would impede their right to return to their own land⁴⁷. Overall, the Palestinian’s lack of political organization left them powerless: Gaza was quickly annexed by Egypt in 1948, and around the same time in Jericho, King Abdullah’s representatives were meeting with the *mufitis* to declare King Abdullah I of Jordan the King of Palestine.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, reactions to King Abdullah’s were incredibly negative. One cause of the negative reaction was on behalf of the Arab constituents in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, who believed that the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was fought to give Palestinians their homeland, and believed that the annexation (and Jordanian citizenship offered to Palestinians) directly contradicted this goal.

The annexation also sharply divided the Arab League, the regional organization formed in 1945 to “to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries”⁴⁸. Whilst Jordan’s actions were supported by Abdullah I’s fellow Hashemites, the ruler of Iraq, Abdullah of Hejaz, who also supported the Hashemite rule of “Greater Syria”, they were sharply criticized by

⁴⁵ Ibid, Aruri (1972)

⁴⁶ Ibid, Aruri (1972)

⁴⁷ Ibid, Aruri (1972)

⁴⁸ Pact of the League of Arab States, 22 March 1945". The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. 1998. Archived from the original on 25 July 2008. Retrieved 15 July 2012.

many other leaders of the Arab League, particularly the Kingdom of Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria, who criticized its “lack of legal justification”⁴⁹. These leaders were highly concerned with the annexation, Abdullah’s expansionist vision, and his separate dealings with Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom. These countries almost immediately voted in an attempt to remove Jordan from the Arab League, though this was prevented by the dissenting votes of Iraq and Yemen, which were also ruled by the Hashemite family. Though largely ignored by the international community Israel, also voiced its opposition to Jordan’s annexation of Jordan stating that it was a violation of the UN Partition Plan of 1947. The annexation was one of the beginning causes of tensions between Jordan and Israel, which only became worse throughout Jordan’s period of control over the West Bank.

Though the rest of the Middle East hardly approved of Abdullah’s expansionist vision, the United States and the United Kingdom allowed it with little argument. King Abdullah I had garnered the approval of both countries by appearing as a “moderate” Arab Leader, especially when Abdullah I put forward his willingness to enter a separate peace with Israel (unlike the rest of the Arab League)⁵⁰. Prior to World War II, the United States was primarily interested in maintaining connections to oil supplies in the Middle East, particularly in the new Saudi Arabia and Iraq⁵¹. Following World War II and the United Kingdom’s disengagement from the Middle East, the United States stepped in as a reluctant broker in Israeli – Palestinian affairs. And while the United States approved of a partition plan in 1947, it had no vested interest in the Palestinian people or a Palestinian

⁴⁹ Ibid, Aruri (1972)

⁵⁰ Ibid, Aruri (1972)

state. Palestinian or Jordanian, the nationality of the state didn't particularly matter as long as United States' own interests were secure. So while the United States did not recognize Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, the United State's refusal to disapprove outright was all the permission Abdullah needed to move forward.

However, the outrage expressed by various Arab Leaders placed King Abdullah and his in considerable danger. Without the support of leadership in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, his legitimacy was threatened on a regional scale⁵². The small sums the Arab League supplied for the procurement of supplies for Palestinians dried up before 1948 ended. Though the United States and United Kingdom quickly came to the aid of the Hashemite monarchy, the mumblings heightened insecurities led King Abdullah I's implantation of contradictory integration policy, which would mollify Jordanians as well as solidify his own rule as sovereign amongst other Arab nations.

The centralized Civil Law that was ratified at the first Parliament meeting in April of 1950, did nothing more than solidify the monarch's power to govern, leaving him completely unaccountable to any other governing body and leave little scope for any opposition. Any parliamentary amendment which proposed to reduce his absolute power became instantly doomed to fail. The King reserved the power to call upon or dissolve Parliament at will, and authorize new elections at any time.

The ideals King Abdullah's Western protectors, the United Kingdom and United States, claimed to champion, "civil rights" or "freedom of assembly" were considered a threat to the burgeoning Hashemite regime. Censorship of the press was a given, and

⁵² Ibid, Ibid, Aruri (1978) United State' integrationordanianstional monarchyt did not effect their livelihoods he led in 1948. tates, toBudeiri (1996)

serious opposition was subject to punishment from strict laws arbitrarily executed at the King's will.

King Abdullah I was able to enforce his autocracy through his control of the *Mukhabarat*, the Jordanian general intelligence directory, as well as Jordan's armed forces and Public police services, which could silence cries for a more constitutional monarchy both underground and in the open. But more importantly to Abdullah's regime than brute force, was the support of the non-Hashemite local leaders, who he enticed by promising highly respected positions within his government⁵³. By winning the support of village leaders, both religious and secular, he could appear as a popular leader in front of the international community as well as amongst the poor Jordanian villagers. These village leaders and tribal elders could give King Abdullah's expansionist vision and the annexation of Palestine a paternalist spin, retaining the support of the villagers and discouraging further political opposition.

The tradition King Abdullah created would install itself throughout the history of Jordan. The approval of Jordan's local leaders, and its resulting influence on the King's popularity amongst the poor masses, will remain a high security concern for every Hashemite King to follow in Abdullah's footsteps. Though the King's influence on Jordan's politics prevent the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from ever becoming a true democracy, or even constitutional monarchy, it gives the opinions of the average Jordanian population, and any inkling of discontent significant bearing on future kings' political decision. As a Hashemite King, it is not enough to be feared or respected. A Hashemite King must also be liked.

⁵³ Plascov, A. (1981)

One year after Jordan annexed the West Bank, it became obvious King Abdullah I took on more than he bargained for. Though initially the West Bank seemed like a fantastic economic prospect, it very quickly became a heavy burden. When the refugees first arrived in Jordan, their pressure on housing, particularly in the towns, created an unprecedented urban building boom in which refugee money and refugee skilled workers played a large part. But the relative addition to the labor supply from the refugee immigration far outweighed the relative addition to capital. Prices and rents rose encouragingly, but wages dropped.

Palestinians, on average both more literate and more skilled than the Jordanians now faced extreme impoverishment coupled with the animosity of their poor Jordanian neighbors. Palestinians were better qualified for the high paying jobs in the government sector, where few stable careers remained. Though Palestinians could initially gain the positions they were qualified for, it was only a short while before King Abdullah's contradictory policies took shape, and Palestinians began to view the Jordanian government's motives for annexation with suspicion. The *de facto* denial of Palestinians from important positions began the tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians which would concern the Hashemites to this day.

When it became clear by 1949 that offering Palestinians the political rights of citizenship could not solve the strain that several hundred thousand refugees were causing, Jordan began to pursue a two – sided policy with regards to the refugees' political status: inclusionary and exclusionary⁵⁴. It wanted to effect the political integration of the refugees, doing away with Palestinian separatism to maintain the

⁵⁴ Plascov, A.

ownership Jordan had over the West Bank. At the same time, Jordan needed to ensure the permanent economic and general responsibility of the international community, so that Jordan does not get crushed under the economic burden.

The Additional Nationality Law No. 56, passed by Jordanian parliament in December of 1949 is the first example of one of these numerous practical measures intended to maintain this “dual status” of the Palestinians⁵⁵. The new law provided for the refugees’ participation in Parliament, the right to employment, the right to own property and other political rights, further promoting the inclusion of Palestinians into Jordanian society. This law abolished the short lived “Ministry of Refugee Affairs”, instead forming the “Ministry of Development & Reconstruction”. The wording of Law No. 56 carefully outlines the Jordanian state’s commitment to resettlement while contradictingly emphasizing the Palestinians right of return. The policy was designed by the Jordanians to appease the Palestinians, who, feeling antagonized in Jordan, were beginning to express nationalist sentiments. The seeming “temporariness” of the law also mollified poor, suspicious Jordanians who did not want the Palestinians there. While this important law guaranteed the rights of the Palestinians on paper, it will be shown that that equal access to important services such as work, education, and healthcare were hardly guaranteed. Various Jordanian bureaucracies, such as the ministries of health, education, and planning, would impose various regulations barring Palestinians from the equal access to the services Law No. 56 entitles them to.

Formally, the West Bank was not annexed until April of 1950, and until then Palestinians only had the option of being granted Jordanian citizenship. The Palestinians

⁵⁵ University of Jordan School of Law, Accessed December 2015.

that did take up Jordanian citizenship moved across the Jordan river to the East Bank in search of better economic opportunities, and whilst these Palestinians were initially embraced by their fellow Arabs, the generous sentiment decreased rapidly as more than 50,000 young, single men flooded the market and created formidable competition in an already over-saturated unemployed labor pool⁵⁶. Following official annexation, Palestinian citizens were offered citizenship automatically, in order to solidify Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, even though Jordanians resisted integration and the decreased wages the influx of new, cheap labor caused⁵⁷.

With the new economic realities bearing down on the Jordanian state, it is a wonder how Jordan continued to offer citizenship, and the right it entails to refugees at all. Yet again, this was hardly a humanitarian act but the result of powerful international pressure from the United States and the United Nations. Three political actors supported integration: the States of United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations.

The war of 1948 led United States officials to conclude that American interests would be served best by minimum involvement in Palestinian politics. The United States policies following 1948 became vacillative, moving from involvement to prevent a Soviet foothold in the Middle East, and disengagement⁵⁸. The support of Jordan's integration of Palestinian citizens came from a desire from United States officials to remain as far away from the refugee problem as possible. While President Truman used the Lausanne conference of 1949 to attempt to persuade Israel to make concessions regarding the

⁵⁸ Kadosh, S. (1984). United States Policy toward the West Bank in 1948. *Jewish Social Studies*, 46(3/4), 231–252. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4467261>

Palestinians right of return or otherwise lose the United State's economic support, it proved wildly unsuccessful, and this would be the first and last time the United States would criticize Israel's refusal of a Palestinian's right to return. With that possibility out of reach, United States officials, including the State department, focused on the next best thing, which was promoting the Arabs to come to a solution as quickly as possible. The United States' support for Jordan's integration of the Palestinians was a political move supporting what seemed to be the quickest way to decrease the number of refugees in the West Bank, rather than support of King Abdullah's expansionism.

Jordan appealed to the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom for assistance, and both footed the bill. An important subsidy from the United Kingdom to maintain the Arab League gave Jordan more than \$7.9 million in 1949. These subsidies, as well as further loans from the United Kingdom, helped the U.K. further disengage themselves from the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Meanwhile, grants from the United States, which in 1949 began with value of more than \$8 million, formed the beginning of United State's true involvement with the Palestinian refugees as well as lay the foundation for the financial ties between the two countries which defines their relationship to this day⁵⁹.

The most important supporter of integration, and the backbone of services provided to the Palestinian refugees, was the United Nations. Since repatriation wasn't an option for the Palestinians, the United Nation looked upon the example of the European refugees which were resettling and integrating into host nations with relative success. The U.N. General Assembly, recalling the agencies used to address the European refugee

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Plascov (1981)

process, supported the integration of Palestinians into other Arab states. As millions of refugees of numerous nationalities were able to find host communities or resettle with relative success, the United Nations supported integrations in hopes that the Palestinians could resettle permanently in an Arab country where both refugees and host citizens could share a language, religion and culture.

Once it was clear to the United Nations that the Palestinians could not transition as smoothly as hoped, and the state Jordan continued to express the struggles struggling under the burden, in December of 1949 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 302, which created the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA). UNRWA much like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency or International Refugee Organization, for European Refugees, was designed to be a humanitarian service for any refugee displaced in the Arab Israeli War of 1948.

Like any non-governmental or international organization, UNRWA had to gain explicit permission from the Jordanian State to operate within its borders. The first agreement, signed by the Director of UNRWA and Jordan's first Minister for Development and Reconstruction in 1951, vaguely lays out the terms of UNRWA's tenancy within the West and East Banks. In exchange for UNRWA's relative freedom in Jordan, the ability to move freely within the state, to travel between Jordan and other Arab countries, and to operate relief efforts with relative freedom, UNRWA assured the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that UNRWA will give the Jordanian government access to any of the services it imports into the state, important resources like petroleum, goods,

and finances that UNRWA can provide to the Palestinians⁶⁰. UNRWA also agreed to pay the Jordanian government rent for any land occupied by refugee camps or UNRWA facilities, as well as pay for the rights to water. With this agreement, UNRWA, much like the United States, would quickly become the most important investors in Jordan, easily overpassing the United States in mere dollars donated, let alone the services UNRWA provided.

Despite the similarities between the formative refugee organizations of the United Nations, UNRWA stands out simply because of its financial weight. While the United States involved itself in the reconstruction of Western Europe's infrastructure and the United Nations refugee organizations were clearly temporary emergency services, designed just to get Europe back on its feet, UNRWA was immediately set up as a long – term development organization, taking over many of the social responsibilities the state is responsible for: education, vocational training, healthcare. The economic weight of UNRWA in Jordan cannot be understated; It not only supported the Jordan balance of payments but, in the first year of its mandate, was the largest local employer and the largest supplier and distributor in the country. Its food distributions, its housing programs, and its housing development schemes relieved the intense pressure on the labor market.

Though it appears by the majority of the UNRWA/ Jordan agreement that UNRWA has essentially free reign in running its relief services, one lynch pin which would ensure the Jordanian government's control over UNRWA's services is Article IX

⁶⁰ Agreement Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees – United Nations Relief and Work Agency Documental Archives, Amman Jordan, Accessed December 15 2015.

of the agreement. This section ensures that “the conditions under which works and reintegration projects are to be carried out shall be laid out in special agreements between the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Agency [UNRWA]”. This statement reaffirms the Jordanian state’s sovereignty over UNRWA in a purposely vague way so that any and all projects UNRWA may carry out must first be approved by the Jordanian government.

The interplay between Jordan’s affirmation of its own sovereignty and its economic dependence on international actors is crucial, since it directly affects the implantation of policies regarding refugees, Additional Nationality Law No. 56 and the UNRWA/Jordan agreement. The push and pull between various ministries, who must support the interests of the “original Jordanians”⁶¹, UNRWA, providing relief to the new “Jordanians of Palestinian Origins”: the 1948 refugees, and donors such as the United States, who above all protects its own interests in the middle east, leaves refugees and their day-to-day struggles in the midst. The dynamics will of various ministries with UNRWA and other actors will be broken down into the vectors of work, education, and healthcare in order to determine where the difficulties in inclusionary policies lies, and the lessons the Jordanian state learned as it reluctantly welcomes the Palestinians into the fold.

⁶¹ Ibid, Aruri (1978)

Implementation of Inclusionary Policies

As stated in the previous chapter, Additional Nationality Law No. 56 gave every Palestinian refugee from the 1948 Palestinian exodus the opportunity to gain Jordanian citizenship automatically. But though this law promised the Palestinians of 1948 political rights, including the right to participate in government, the right to work, and the right to own property, the vast majority of the Palestinians had fled the Arab – Israeli war of 1948 with little more than the clothes on their back. The economic boom King Abdullah and his advisors predicted never happened. Instead, the cash influx from a few wealthy Palestinians was overshadowed by the several hundred thousand poor farmers and Bedouins that had fled from the historic Palestine with the little they could carry. For the fleeing *fellahin*: peasants that manned olive groves and orangeries, the land was their wealth, and that land was gone. In the West Bank, they were now desperately in need of shelter, food, and work.

For all of the 1950s, over 60% of UNRWA's funding came from the United States⁶². This both reflects the United States emergence as a great power, as well as the United States' interest in integration of the Palestinians into other Arab populations. Of the total funds, 61% was used for "relief", which UNRWA defined as ration vouchers that Palestinians can use to purchase food, as well as supplies such as tarpaulin for the

⁶² UNRWA Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, 1951. Sixth Season Supplement No. 16 A/1905. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman.

sturdy tents for makeshift shelters, and sanitation supplies such as soap and oil with which to boil water and cook with⁶³. While 3% was used for administrative costs (which included giving Palestinians their salaries), about 36% of the remaining funding provided was used to implement work programs, build schools and clinics, pay for health services, and donate construction supplies to local communities.

From 1950-1967, UNRWA provided resources to Palestinian refugees as well as Palestinians who accepted Jordanian citizenship (the Jordanians of Palestinian origin). Despite their new Jordanian nationality, refugees who became Jordanians of Palestinian origin struggled to access basic services just as much as the refugees who chose to keep their defunct Palestinian passports. Until noted otherwise, when UNRWA refers to “Palestinian” in any of their statistical data, they are referring to both refugees and Jordanians of Palestinian origin alike.

A total of sixty UNRWA camps were raised in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (which refers to both the East and West Banks until 1967). Of these sixty, a total of twenty - three were in Jordan. It was important for the refugee housing to be of “comparable standard of living” to the local population, meaning that the quality of housing could not be better than that of the local Jordanians. Though UNRWA scouts had hoped to place the majority of the camps in the Jordan valley (about 100 km south of Jordan’s capital, Amman) large portions of the Jordan valley are inhabitable due to a lack of a water source. These resultant camps were then placed on the outskirts of major cities, and mostly comprised of tents, but as years went on, became replaced with concrete barracks

⁶³ UNRWA Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, 1951. Sixth Season Supplement No. 16 A/1905. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman.

and metal shanty houses, often comprised of zinc alloys)⁶⁴. By June of 1951, eighteen camps were raised in the West Bank, and five were established in the East Bank. Of the 750,000 Palestinian refugees in both the West and East Banks, approximately 20% lived in barracks, 7% lived in zinc shanties, and 73% lived in tarpaulin tents⁶⁵.

Interestingly, about 2% (approximately \$700,000) of UNRWA's annual budget from 1951 – 1959 was given to the Jordanian state as “rent” for the ground the refugees camps were built upon, and another 1.25% was given to the Jordanian state to build roads and other infrastructure to and from the camps. The payment for land relates back to the agreement agreed upon between UNRWA and the state of Jordan prior to UNRWA's implementation, but the donation UNRWA paid to Jordan for infrastructure was in hopes that a richer, more prosperous Jordan would integrate the Palestinians more readily⁶⁶. The initial donations to Jordan, which accounted for 7% of Jordan's GDP, gives the first indicator of how important UNRWA will become to Jordan's economic viability over the next several decades⁶⁷.

In the twenty-three camps, donations of items such as food and clothing supplied by more than 26 Christian missionary groups⁶⁸. The donations of these missionary groups totaled almost \$500,000 USD, an astounding amount for a series of churches. Missionary hospitals, such as the Red Crescent in Amman as well as the Jihad Hospital in the West

⁶⁴ UNRWA Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, 1951. Sixth Season Supplement No. 16 A/1905. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman.

⁶⁵ UNRWA Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, 1951. Sixth Season Supplement No. 16 A/1905. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman.

⁶⁶ Plascov A (1981).

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Aruri (1972)

⁶⁸ Where We Work UNRWA. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2016, from <http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan/camp-profiles?field=13>

Bank city of Tulkaram donated their medical resources, tending to ill and injured Palestinians while UNRWA began to build clinics, schools, and infrastructure⁶⁹.

The second director of UNRWA, John Blandford Jr, implemented most of the relief and works plans following the ground research conducted in 1949. Blandford was a consultant to President Harry Truman on the Marshall Plan for Europe⁷⁰. UNRWA's mission emphasized integration into the "Works", rather than temporary relief.

Blandford was a strong believer that the 'works' projects with UNRWA's help would form 'the antithesis of camp life and idleness', so numerous works projects were intended to give the Palestinians a sense of economic autonomy.

UNRWA's mechanism for relief featured several key areas: economic development, education, and health. The tent cities that rose within the West Bank and East Jordan were completely insufficient on their own, and it was the hope perpetuated by the integration that with enough initial development through the resources of the United Nations, as well as the assistance of more affluent Arab nations the Palestinian refugees would become self-sufficient, and UNRWA's temporary mandate could remain just that.

UNRWA's economic development strategies were two –fold, focused on the work projects within the camp and the encouragement of migrant travel; to bring economic development to the Middle East as a whole. A United Nations Economic Survey mission stated that at the time, the Middle East "suffers from poverty in the extreme" it also is "undoubtedly one of the potentially richest areas of the world" because of the large oil

⁶⁹ UNRWA Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Work Agency, 1951.

⁷⁰ Farrah, R. Keeping an Eye on UNRWA. Al-Shabaka, January 2012.

reserves and access to sea trade⁷¹. Realizing that the main barrier to economic prosperity in the Middle East, UNRWA along with the rest of the General Assembly, reiterated the importance of continued investment to continue the economic development in the area.

Work

In order to provide employment for Palestinian refugees without home or income, UNRWA used its funding to create several infrastructural projects that used refugee labor. These projects were small in scale, only employing 12,000 Palestinians across the East and West Banks, a sparse number compared to the number of refugees living in Jordan, which was more than 750,000. Of these 12,000 almost 40% were involved in agricultural projects funded by UNRWA, while another 20% worked in “unskilled labor” who worked in ports or construction⁷². These UNRWA employees refugees caring for refugees themselves, and higher level positions were reserved for international workers coming from the United States, Canada, and other parts of Western Europe.

UNRWA compelled other Arab countries, especially gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia to accept Palestinian refugees as economic migrants. Once Palestinian refugees were given Jordanian passports and became Jordanians of Palestinian origin, it was UNRWA’s hope that Palestinians, Jordan, and gulf nations would benefit. Palestinians would easily benefit from employment, the oil nations would benefit from the cheap labor Palestinians could provide, the Jordanian state would benefit from the influx of capital Palestinian brought back with them. The agency referred to the pursuit of

⁷¹ Note to the General Assembly, Economics Survey Nov. 15 1949, Accessed December 12, 2015.

⁷² UNRWA Special Report to General Assembly No. 16 A/2304. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman 1951.

this method of economic development as “economic intelligence” that they felt would benefit the Arab world as a whole.

UNRWA calculated that approximately 150,000 Palestinians were employed through the private sector, such as the oil fields of Saudi Arabia or Kuwait⁷³. This created various problems for the local Jordanians, who found the job market incredibly competitive. It was clear that the mostly nomadic Jordanians would be unable to compete with the Palestinians from the West Bank, which was more urbanized and had better education. Though cheap employment in the gulf countries was a quick, temporary solution, it often proved incredibly difficult for Palestinians to emigrate to gulf countries with the little economic resources they had. Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait granted work visas to the more qualified Palestinian refugees over the average Jordanian, it only further added to simmering economic tensions despite formative integration policies. To many poor, native Jordanians Palestinians were beginning to overstay their welcome.

Once poorer Hashemites began voicing their discontent because of their lack of economic progress, King Abdullah I began to take it as a political threat. In another political move designed to solidify his own security, he began approving fewer projects in the West Bank and shifting UNRWA funds towards the East Bank, which though vastly underdeveloped compared to the West, had fewer refugee camps. This redirectioning of funds was intended to further develop the infrastructure of the East Bank, benefiting both Hashemite and non – Hashemite Jordanians by developing roads and further urbanizing East Bank cities with factories and new residencies . The

⁷³ UNRWA Special Report to General Assembly No. 16 A/2304. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman 1951.

urbanization of the East Bank encouraged greater Palestinian migration to the parts of Jordan with the most resources, and by 1952 more than 100,000 Palestinians refugees had migrated from the West Bank to the East in search of work, an unintended consequence of King Abdullah's siphoning of funds⁷⁴.

Education:

The main UNRWA services that were developed in the years 1950 – 1956 were schools and clinics. In 1949, these services were not proposed offerings since the United Nations hoped the Palestinian refugees' situation post – expulsion would be temporary. As two years passed without any progress towards repatriation, the United Nations believed that any agency for the Palestinians was to provide relief in the form of social services (again, avoiding the repatriation question entirely). It is important to note that at the time, UNRWA's mandate was intended to last only three years; in these formative years, UNRWA established numerous temporary schools which would only become more permanent with each year Palestinians could not return home. In order to maintain some sense of control over UNRWA's activities, in 1950, Jordan began to organize its rudimentary bureaucracies, the Ministries of Health (MoH), Education (MoE), Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (MoDR). These bureaucracies were in existence since the 1920s, remnants of the bureaucracies formed by the British mandate, but only became fully utilized in the 1950s, once King Abdullah I realized the need for refugee management⁷⁵.

⁷⁴ Mishal, S. (1978). *West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, Aruri, (1972).

For such a centralized government, prior to 1950 there was hardly any regulation or management of public services: schools, hospitals, and infrastructure were left to the devices of local village leaders. The creation and strengthening of these bureaucracies is critical for three main reasons. Centralized bureaucracies for services such as health and education formed the proverbial muscle through which King Abdulla can flex his interests when regulating the Parliaments very vague refugee policies. Furthermore, the nationalization of these services, and the seeming attention he seemed to give towards public services, increased his popularity amongst Jordanians, who were increasingly antsy in sight of the “benefits” the Palestinians seemed to be receiving in their new nation⁷⁶.

Overall, these ministries, particularly the MoI, which handles residency and employment regulations take advantage of purposeful ambiguity to create implementation protocols based on the political landscape and international pressures of the time. During the 1950s, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) worked closely with the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (MoDR) to promote the inclusive / exclusive agenda of King Abdullah I, which ultimately was to improve the economic and social situation of Jordanians to improve his own political security⁷⁷.

The centralization of public services is most notably seen in access to work, education, and health services. This centralization, while strengthening the reach of the Jordanian government into the average citizen’s life, quite effectively segregated both Palestinians and Jordanians of Palestinian Origin, preventing them from integrating into Jordanian society . The MoI as well as the MoDR particularly limit the Palestinians

⁷⁶Mishal, S. (1978)

⁷⁷ Mishal, S. (1978)

entrance into the Jordanian work force, by a stipulation in an article of the “Jordan Nationality Law”, which was ratified by Parliament in 1954, gives the Ministry of Interior the responsibility to determine that “non-Jordanians not compete with Jordanians for occupations in which a number of them were available”⁷⁸. Though the law clearly states that Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 qualify as citizens, members of the Ministry of Interior used this law to effectively bar further educated Palestinian refugees from reaching high levels in the ministries or in the private sector, since many positions require work permits from the Ministry of Interior prior to hiring⁷⁹.

This de facto segregation was primarily due to Jordanian discontent at their poor situations compared to the Palestinians, who had the economic support of UNRWA while simultaneously receiving the benefits of King Abdullah’s inclusionary “Additional Law No. 56” which gave the Palestinian refugees Jordanian citizenship. Therefore, an inclusive law with contradicting implementation can satisfy Jordanian’s relationship with both the Palestinians and the Jordanians.

UNRWA’s reactions to the silent barring of Palestinians from the private sector was regarded differently at various institutional levels. The upper level management, who was not Palestinian but rather international employees from Western Europe and North America, noted that “50% of Palestinians had difficulties gaining and retaining employment in the agricultural and labor sectors” in 1955, but did not note in their missives to the General Assembly the effects this had on the Palestinian populations, including

⁷⁸ الاردنية الجنسية قانون (6) رقم قانون 1954 Accessed December 24, 2015. Translated by Dr. Yousef Rababa

⁷⁹ United Nations Note to the General Assembly (Nov 24 1956).

UNRWA's lower level staff⁸⁰. The Palestinian members of the lower staff, including teachers, nurses and laborers, saw their qualified friends and students denied from positions for which they were qualified – for seemingly no reason. These burgeoning barriers to integration, particularly the inability to Palestinians to truly participate in Jordan's economy, would lead to later tensions between Jordanians and Palestinians in the next decade and for decades after.

The dichotomy between the “Jordanian system” and the “Refugee system” is at its clearest when observed in educational and healthcare services. Jordan's educational system became centralized in a direct response to the attention and success UNRWA saw amongst its students. UNRWA's schools were completely free to Palestinians, and offered primary education, secondary education and vocational training to both girls and boys⁸¹. The education was better than both private and public Jordanian schools; while the public schools only taught Arabic, arithmetic and history at the time, the UNRWA schools taught those as well as English and French⁸². The children at these schools, who took the same exams as Jordanian children in public and private schools, scored significantly better marks from 1953 – 1965⁸³. In addition to UNRWA's standardized education, which exceeded the Ministry of Education's own curricula, young boys were trained in vocations such as carpentry, shoemaking, weaving, tin-smithing, and agriculture. Palestinian students also had a chance to pursue higher education in the

⁸⁰ UNRWA Special Report to the General Assembly, July 1955 No. 20 A/2213. Accessed December 22 2015.

⁸¹ Anderson, B. S. (2005). *Nationalist Voices in Jordan : The Street and the State*. Austin, TX, USA: University of Texas Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

⁸² UNRWA Special Report to the General Assembly No. 16 A/1705. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman 1951.

⁸³ Talhami, G. H. (2003). *Palestinian refugees: Pawns to political actors*. New York: Nova Science.

universities of the West Bank, Damascus, Lebanon, and East Bank, thanks to their high test marks, education grants from UNRWA, and their new Jordanian passports⁸⁴.

While in the first year UNRWA's schools only taught 32% of all Palestinian children in in comparison, in 1949, only 22% of Jordanian children were enrolled in public school⁸⁵. While the British Mandate had installed an educational system in Jordan consisting of public, private and religious schools, public schools were difficult for Jordanians to attend, since there was a fee associated with entering primary school that many children could not afford⁸⁶, and private schools were even more expensive. The free education offered to Palestinians incensed poor Jordanians, and with this in mind the new King Hussein, the third King of Jordan, quickly began his educational reform in 1953.

The first series of Jordanian education reform was ratified in response to the success of UNRWA's schools. The Education Reform Law's most important clause was to affirm education as a right for every citizen of Jordan without discrimination, as far as the government could provide it, and that primary education (which in Jordan lasts seven years) is compulsory for all Jordanian children⁸⁷.

Health

Both Palestinians and Jordanians exhibited similar disease incidences prior to 1948. In 1951, UNRWA and the World Health Organization (WHO) surveyed both

⁸⁴ UNRWA Special Report to the General Assembly No. 17 A/1001. Accessed December 7, 2015, Amman 1951.

⁸⁵ Al-Bataineh, A. T., & Nur-Awaleh, M. A. (2005). *International education systems and contemporary education reforms*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, Al-Bataineh, A., et al. . (2005).

⁸⁷ Alayan, S., Rohde, A., & Dhouib, S. (2012). *The politics of education reform in the Middle East: Self and other in textbooks and curricula*. New York: Berghahn Books.

native Jordanians and Palestinians to determine any significant differences in infectious disease health markers or quality life indicators. This research was then used by UNRWA and WHO to determine which health care services refugees needed most.

WHO and UNRWA found significant differences in incidence for cases of venereal diseases, tuberculosis, typhoid, and measles, the most threatening infections of that time⁸⁸. WHO found significant disparities in infant mortality, an epidemiological factor indicating overall quality of life⁸⁹. WHO predicted this was caused by crowding and poor living conditions within the camps. Palestinian Infant mortality rates were 220 per 1000 live births, was worse than Jordan's: 160 per 1000 live births. There were little organized maternal health services, and the medicalization of pregnancy and childbirth that had occurred by the 1940s in the United States had not yet reached the Middle East. Instead, care in childbirth was supplied by a local midwife, the *Daya*, a woman who traveled from village to village delivering other women's children.

Both Palestinians and Jordanians exhibited comparable incidence rates of heart disease, diabetes, and tobacco use, though these illnesses weren't concerns to WHO at this time. Infectious diseases such as malaria, typhus, dysentery, and venereal diseases were endemic across the Arab world, but exacerbated amongst Palestinians, creating a public health hazard, especially since these illnesses could spread to the native Jordanian population and cause an epidemic in the Middle East . UNRWA would use these indicators to determine what health services they provide to the Palestinians.

⁸⁸ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

⁸⁹ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

Prior to the implementation of UNRWA's health services (1948-1950), sick and wounded Palestinians were treated by missionary hospitals, and relief NGOs such as the International Red Cross. The International Red Cross provided the most emergency relief from 1948-1950, treating wounded Palestinians for injuries such as compression fractures, leg injuries, and traumatic wounds which occurred as a result of the 1948 exodus⁹⁰. Other Muslim and Christian missionary groups in Jordan and the West Bank provided medical services for Palestinians living in camps, infectious diseases ran rampant due to exposure to the elements, poor living conditions, and overcrowding⁹¹.

In 1951, UNRWA took over the allocation of healthcare services to the Palestinians alongside the World Health Organization (WHO). The epidemiological research conducted by (WHO) showed that Palestinians exhibited rates of infectious diseases; typhoid malaria, measles, acute conjunctivitis and dysentery at rates significantly higher than the Jordanian host population⁹². Poliomyelitis, a crippling neurological infection was also a very large concern to UNRWA and WHO, as several thousand children were exhibiting symptoms of the disease⁹³. These trends, along with the preexisting rates of infant mortality and life threatening chronic conditions, made healthcare an important priority for UNRWA.

UNRWA and the WHO focused on implementing two modes of healthcare services, general clinics, which provided overall health services, various "projects" -

⁹⁰ The ICRC and assistance to Palestinian refugees (1948-1950). (n.d.). Retrieved February 06, 2016, from <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jref.htm>

⁹¹ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1951).

⁹² Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1951).

⁹³ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1951).

specific plans targeting malaria, venereal diseases, maternal–fetal health⁹⁴ and other sources of poor health within refugee communities. Both the clinics and projects were run out of tents and zinc shanties; intended to last only for only three years under UNRWA’s temporary mandate. However, UNRWA’s Director of Health’s at the time predicted that the mandate would be extended, and then created “long term public health initiatives designed to better lifelong health”⁹⁵. The intended longevity of these projects is yet another sign that UNRWA was not a temporary relief agent, but here to stay.

Numerous clinic / small hospitals were established with each UNRWA center, equipped with physicians, nurses and other hospital staff. In 1952, before westernized medical education reached the Middle East, the employees of these healthcare workers were primarily international aid workers, either with the Red Cross, or nurses and medics from the militaries of the U.S. and U.K.⁹⁶ The clinics were also outfitted with hospital beds for more severe illnesses requiring inpatient services. The average UNRWA clinic in Jordan had about 150 inpatient beds. As a point of comparison, the average number of beds per hospital in the United States in 1950 was 190 beds, making the UNRWA clinics in the 1950s relatively well staffed⁹⁷. UNRWA also engaged with other local hospitals within Jordan, subsidizing beds to be used by the Palestinian refugees. The healthcare services UNRWA provided had widespread use, and utilized by 349,000 refugees in

⁹⁴ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

⁹⁵ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

⁹⁶ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

⁹⁷ Hospitals, beds, and occupancy rates, by type of ownership and size of hospital: United States, selected years. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2011/116.pdf>

Jordan within their first year alone⁹⁸. The need for healthcare services was so great that in 1952, UNRWA added more than 300 additional clinics and hospital contracts.

UNRWA pursued two different public sanitation projects to reduce the rate of infectious diseases. The first sanitation project installed sewage systems and water filtration, to provide refugees with safe water, a tactic used to address the endemic cholera in the Middle East. The second project, pest control, was designed to address the transmittance of vector diseases like malaria and typhus, both of which are spread by insects. Insect control included sprayings of repellants across camps as well as vaccination programs against typhus and paratyphus⁹⁹.

UNRWA's special maternal health programs were more difficult for UNRWA to implement than the vaccination or sanitation programs, but were just as important to the health and well being of the Palestinian refugees. Because of long standing cultural positions on pregnancy and delivery, prior to UNRWA's presence, women's health was still completely unmedicalized.

Childbirth was a family event, and welcoming a child into the world was ritual, with strong ties to Arab and Islamic tradition. Though Arab culture was, and remains, strongly patriarchal, in the instance of childbirth, tribal matriarchs had full domain.

Grandmothers, mothers and aunts would assist in the delivery, guiding the mother from within her home. Following the childbirth, the mother that would feed the infant sugar from a date and whisper verses of the Qur'an to welcome her child into the world.

Childbirth, like the rest of motherhood, was the woman's sphere, the husband and other

⁹⁸ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

⁹⁹ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near (1951)

men of the family were allowed to enter only after these rituals were completed . Even within difficult deliveries, the *Daya*, midwife, was always a woman much like the mother's own grandmother. The *Daya*, the most trusted figure in pre-westernized healthcare, was a wealth of knowledge and comfort that would travel from village to village assisting and placating mothers during woman difficult or even deadly deliveries¹⁰⁰.

The arrival of western gynecology, women's health care administered by men, was often both inappropriate and an intrusion into the *Daya*'s and the mother's territory. Pelvic examinations, which medical research has proven is essential to maintaining a woman's gynecological health, were considered an assault on a woman's privacy and many women chose not to use the maternal health services which were available at first. It was only after UNRWA physicians began educating the *Dayateen* ; teaching them the ways of Western medicine, that maternal health programs were more positively received. Despite the initial backlash against maternal services, by 1953 maternal health services were more accepted due to the participation of the *Dayas*, and routine examinations of pregnant women, distributions of milk, and hospitalized deliveries were used more frequently.

In the first year of implementation (1950-1951) the UNRWA programs significantly improved the quality of life within the refugee camps. The vaccination program led by the WHO almost eradicated poliomyelitis, measles, and whooping cough, with the number of cases dropping from several thousands to simply hundreds. The

¹⁰⁰ Young, E. G. (2012). *Gender and nation building in the Middle East: The political economy of health from Mandate Palestine to refugee camps in Jordan*. New York: I.B. Tauris.

public sanitation program completely eliminated typhoid and cholera by July of 1952¹⁰¹. The maternal health program also succeeded, despite the initial hesitancy, in encouraging mothers to engage in more pre-natal programs such as pre-natal vitamins and examinations. UNRWA's healthcare education program was credited, alongside UNRWA's sanitation programs, in decreasing the incidence of infectious disease as well as improving the diets of the malnourished Palestinians.

UNRWA's efforts were appreciated both by the local Palestinians who utilized their services, and the international community. General Assembly notes routinely recognized the efforts of UNRWA in the region and routinely called for increases in UNRWA's funding, so that it could provide services at a greater volume. In one year, UNRWA created a name as an efficient U.N. body which could move quickly to provide services. The United States in particular raised its donations to UNRWA in 1952, a note from the United States' ambassador Warren Austin to the General Assembly cited UNRWA's organizational structure as a main reason for increasing UNRWA's funding from 1951 to 1952¹⁰².

But despite the great bounds of UNRWA's health sector within its first two years, there was still so much more that needed to be done. While able to provide primary care and diagnose illnesses, neither UNRWA nor WHO had the supplies, healthcare infrastructure, or funds to treat the endemic chronic illnesses which plagued Palestinian refugee populations. UNRWA and WHO could only tell the Palestinians which diseases

¹⁰¹ Annual report of the Director of Health / United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (1952)

¹⁰²

they had, without any chance of making them better. Funding, or the lack of it, would only become more important to UNRWA with each passing year.

However well received UNRWA was by the international community, Jordanian citizens were less than pleased by the special treatment the refugees appeared to be getting. Comparatively, Jordan's healthcare infrastructure was much weaker, even though UNRWA and who had only been active one year. In fact, the care Jordanians received from their own health services seemed dismal when compared to UNRWA's more organized, higher quality system. UNRWA gave more than \$500,000 to the Jordanian government each year to implement healthcare reforms, but Jordanian there were no signs of its implementation in terms of health outcomes (such as decreased mortalities) . To many poor Jordanians, the Palestinians, despite their displacement, were inherently better off than their Jordanian counterparts.

It is important to note that in UNRWA's early years, the Jordanian healthcare system did benefit from UNRWA's presence. The medical advancements, such as public sanitation, insect eradication and maternal fetal health, also benefited Jordanians. Jordanian physicians and *Dayas*, benefited from Western medical education.

King Abdullah I, quickly began implementing a series of healthcare reforms as soon as UNRWA's high performance was noticed by the general Jordanian population. However, unlike education reform, which was ratified through different legislative laws, the implementation of health reform was left almost entirely to the Ministry of Health (MoH), established in 1951 by the General Health Law, which was ratified in Parliament a year earlier.

Even as early as 1950, the Ministry of Health had large administrative leeway and several different duties. The MoH was distributed funds to each hospital, clinic, in Jordan, and determined resource allocation to higher medical education. In only the first year as an active Ministry of Health, the MoH created a nursing school and began the process of creating a medical university, which would open with the University of Jordan in 1962.

The MoH used the majority of the funding they received from UNRWA to expand the Medical Services in the East Bank, mainly in the capital, Amman. By advancing services in the East Bank, no Palestinian, refugee or Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the West Bank could not access the Jordanian health system. The MoH also used the funding it received from UNRWA to increase existing capacities in hospitals that were already running¹⁰³. But while hospitals in the East Bank were benefiting from UNRWA funds, hospitals within the West Bank were flailing, running out of supplies and increasingly relying on UNRWA for support.

Healthcare, in many ways, was already showing signs of discrimination, by the very nature of which hospitals got funding, and new medical where medical centers were being opened. While not discriminatory outright, the allocation of funding from the MoH was already starting to exclude Palestinian refugees, many of which had no access to Jordanian services, which as citizens, they had a right to.

The Push and Pull: Jordanian Policies and Access to Services

The relationships between UNRWA and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Hashemite ruler's relationships with Jordanians and Palestinians, and Jordanian

¹⁰³ Ministry of Health (1951) Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa.

relationships with Palestinians, are fraught with complexity. The aftermath the violence in 1948 as well as a hasty reconstruction left each group dissatisfied with their political position as well as their quality of life. The Palestinians were still waiting for an actualized right of return. The Jordanians, after a few years, felt that the Palestinians had overstayed their welcome. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the new King Hussein were primarily concerned with the security of the royal fan, which was continually threatened by Jordanian poverty.

UNRWA, given the responsibility of keeping Palestinians alive, encountered the difficulties that came with attempting to care for an unwanted population in a state reluctant to truly care for them. Despite this, UNRWA became the second most important political actor in Jordan, second only to the King himself in influencing political decisions. Without UNRWA, Jordan would have had no way to care for the hundreds of thousands of refugees King Abdullah I hastily adopted in his quest for Hashemite expansion. UNRWA, even when not dealing with the Jordanian state directly; through agreements and funding deals, influenced the Jordanian state merely by providing for the Palestinians and inciting the discontent of the Jordanian population. By 1953, UNRWA had become a formidable force within Jordan, and their actions within the country instigated the creation of ministries, the very same ones that would begin to deny Palestinians rights and services only fifteen years later.

UNRWA and Jordan, at best, had an uneasy, tense alliance, held together only by tiny threads of mutual need. UNRWA needed Jordan to uphold its agreements, so that UNRWA could act in Jordan with relative autonomy. Jordan not only needed UNRWA to provide services for the Palestinians, but the funds that UNRWA brought for Jordan's

own development. Without UNRWA, and other donations from places such as the U.S., Jordan would simply be unable to exist as a state. However, even with UNRWA's help, it was incredibly important for the Jordanian state to maintain the refugee identity of the Palestinians so that the Jordanian state could continue to garner funding from wealthier nations in the name of refugee protection.

In a sense, by providing so many services to the Palestinians, and not encouraging full integration with Jordanian ministries, UNRWA was actually assisting the Jordanian state in maintaining refugee exclusivity. Within the next fifteen years, the tensions within Jordan between Palestinians and Jordanians, UNRWA and the Hashemites would reach a tipping point which would forever change Jordan's stance on integration. This change in position would drastically change the state of the refugee in Jordan, whether they be Palestinian in 1967 or Syrian today.

An Uneasy Calm before the Storm 1950- 1967

The creation of the state of Israel, the Arab Israeli War, and the resulting displacement of 750,000 Palestinians irreparably altered the political framework of the Middle East. Jordan, like the other post-colonial nations in the Middle East, was attempting to define itself as a state both internally and regionally from within a sea of upheaval. The heavy involvement of the international community only added to the complex political dynamics of the Jordanian state from an internal, regional, as well as international perspective.

Despite UNRWA's presence in Jordan to help bear the burden of the Palestinian refugees and Jordan's own political reforms from 1949-1950, Jordanians felt the state's precarious economy in their access to work, education, and their healthcare services. These worries reflected from the bottom up: the voices of the poor Jordanians, Hashemite and non-Hashemite alike were heard by the tribal leaders that held great sway in Jordan's parliament, bureaucracies and militaries. In the face of pervasive anxiety, non-Hashemite political actors saw their chance to usurp the Hashemites of their political influence. The period between the 1948 Arab Israeli Conflict and the Six-Day-War of 1967 is defined by this political instability, as each Jordanian political actor, Hashemite or not, nebulously tried to maintain their influence and power in the small arena of Jordanian politics.

King Abdullah I was assassinated in 1951, in the immediate aftermath of his assassination, two separate spheres of political activity began to evolve. The first was within the framework of Jordan's parliamentary structure, as Hashemites and non-Hashemites parried for political favor amongst the Jordanian people, and within Jordan's

parliament and bureaucracies, while educated Jordanians of Palestinian origin attempted to break in. With only a few notable exceptions, Jordanians of Palestinian origin were largely barred from the political arena.

King Abdullah I ruled Jordan with a firm hand, obsessed with his vision of “Greater Syria” and a unified Arab nation ruled by the Hashemites. Kingdom of Jordan’s expansionist goals were lost without King Abdullah I’s strong leadership. His successor King Talal, weak in health and political might, King Talal’s short reign threw the upper echelons of Jordan’s political structure were tossed into turmoil, allowing the seeds of non-Hashemite political discourse to take root.

The relationship between the late King Abdullah I and his eldest son, Talal , was known as tense at its very best, physically and emotionally abusive at its worst. It was known throughout Jordan that King Abdullah I had little faith in his son, calling him a “simpleton”, “drunkard” and “*kafir*” (infidel) on numerous occasions within Hashemite court¹⁰⁴. As the young Talal grew, traveling to European schools to be free of his domineering father, he swore that as a ruler, he would be everything his father was not. And while King Abdullah I was a strong, ambitious, capable statesman, his son was aloof and withdrawn from political affairs, preferring to let others rule for him, creating a small power vacuum in his absence.

Though King Talal’s abusive (albeit royal) childhood had a profound effect on his leadership capabilities and his skills of governance, his mental illness could have had just as much effect on his short lived reign. King Talal was posthumously diagnosed with residual / catatonic schizophrenia, most often described as “a disinterest in life”. He was

¹⁰⁴ Satloff, R. B. (1994). *From Abdullah to Hussein : Jordan in Transition*. Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, USA. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

often described by his companions as “preferring more to rest and lounge than to rule”¹⁰⁵ King Talal spent the last year of his reign in a Switzerland sanatorium, leaving Jordan to be run by the Parliament which quickly tried to limit the monarchy’s power .

Whatever the reason for King Talal’s disinterest in politics, his political weakness created an opening for the Parliament to begin to limit the power of the monarchy. The most notable champion of this stance was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin named Tawfiq Abu l-Huda, the prime minister during King Talal’s two years of rule.

Tawfiq Abu l-Huda, Jordan’s prime minister from 1951 – 1954, was the severest threat to the Hashemite regime¹⁰⁶. A lawyer trained in Istanbul, and who worked under King Faisal of Syria, Abu l-Huda quickly rose through the ranks of Jordanian bureaucracy, becoming a member of King Abdullah I’s cabinet in 1929. Though originally from historic Palestine, Abu l-Huda quickly claimed Jordanian nationality when it became available in 1950¹⁰⁷.

Abu l-Huda, ambitious, intelligent, was more similar in personality to the King Abdullah than Talal. However, without the presence of King Abdullah I to keep him in his place, Abu l-Huda spent his time in Parliament undermining King Talal, and quickly claimed the King’s ability to make executive decisions for himself, including jailing several of his political opposition in 1951¹⁰⁸.

Abu l-Huda focused on solidifying the power of the upper levels of Parliament as quickly as possible. Throughout the short reign of King Talal, Abu l – Huda used King

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

Talal's more liberal leanings, his need to be exactly like his own father, and most important, his absence due to his mental illness, to pursue his own agenda.

Like King Abdullah, Abu'l – Huda's goal was to “project a liberal image with the assurance of a predetermined outcome”, to maintain the image of a democracy while ruling with an iron fist. Abu'l-Huda's political reforms to the Jordanian constitution showcase his focus on his own security as the prime minister, not the political rights of his constituents¹⁰⁹. The new Jordanian constitution, ratified by an ill King Talal in 1952, promised work, education, freedom of speech and the press to Jordanians. Conveniently for Abu'l-Huda, the constitution also granted the prime minister the power to order arrests without probable cause, give executive orders to the ministries, and realign Jordan's cabinet. The new constitution attempted to limit the power of the monarchy, stating in the constitution that the “the nation”, not the monarchy, was the “source of all power”¹¹⁰. In exchange for this litany of liberal commitments (such as free speech), each of these rights were contingent on the “limits of the law”, giving Abu'l – Huda and subsequent authorities considerable latitude in determining what these “limits” actually were through his control of Jordan's bureaucracies¹¹¹.

Much like Abdullah I, the tension between Palestinians and Jordanians was becoming a concern for Abu'l-Huda, and was only exacerbated by worsening economic circumstances¹¹². 1953 was a particularly brutal year; a drought exacerbating the tensions caused by economic security. The loss of wealthy Palestinian capital via resettlement, high customs tariffs, exhaustion of resources by the Palestinian refugees, and the burden

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

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¹¹² *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

of a largely unemployed population were making Abu'l – Huda's fears of Jordan's economic unviability a reality.

In an attempt to resuscitate Jordan's economy, Abu'l – Huda implemented austerity measures reflected in cuts in funding to Jordanian education and healthcare. Abu'l – Huda's extreme cuts on government spending, a fiscally safe move which gained approval by UNRWA and the United States, enraged the rest of Parliament and the Jordanian community. His austerity measures, which halted government expenses by 11%, increased the Jordanian State's dependency on UNRWA and aid from the international community¹¹³. The result was a halt in the numerous health and education reform King Abdullah promised prior to his death. These austerity measures disproportionately affected the Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees, people who needed these services just as much as native Jordanians. Without *wastah*, connections to the bureaucracies, the average Jordanian of Palestinian origin was unable to get the services they needed. Conversely, Jordanians, particularly those who could claim a connection with the important tribes, had little trouble accessing healthcare or education.

The royal political tactic of assuaging the poor Jordanians is a common theme throughout the history of the Hashemite's political policy, in King Abdullah's, Abu'l-Huda's and King Hussein's rule. At the same time in Jordan's history, Palestinian nationalism was beginning to take root in both the West and East Bank, spurred by the lack of political representation, and right to services their Jordanian citizenship promised. Unable to overcome the "laws" that ministries deployed at will to deny access to

¹¹³ Hinnebusch, R. (2003). *International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester, GBR: Manchester University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

secondary education or secondary health services, it became clearer to Palestinians that the only place they would be treated fairly was in a nation of their own making.

The second sphere of political activity, forming outside of the halls of parliament, were the stirrings of Palestinian nationalism. While many Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees hoped that Abu l-Huda's rise to power would enfranchise them, the political advancement of Palestinians stagnated in favor of Abu l-Huda's political security in Parliament. In 1952, parliament had been evenly split between Jordanians of Palestinian origin and native Jordanians, a move championed by Abu l-Huda to instill a sense of loyalty and belonging amongst Jordanians of Palestinian origins. By 1954, this ratio shifted, with a far greater number of native Jordanian seats in order to mollify the native Jordanians Abu l-Huda needed to keep his power. Furthermore, Abu l-Huda's active denial of his Palestinian heritage, incensed Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees, particularly the well-educated who were unable to enter Jordan's political forums.

The whispers of Palestinian nationalism were strongest amongst the elite, the educated, economically secure Palestinians who were only welcome in Amman as long as it was convenient for the crown. These Palestinians, some of whom had been high ranking officers or government ministers during the reign of King Abdullah I, were quickly disillusioned with King Hussein, who manipulated local, municipal, and Parliamentary elections in order to quash any Palestinian political opposition. These fledgling opposition parties were unable to gain a foothold in Parliament, nor gain standing with the poorer Palestinian population. Amongst the poor, political groupings

were based more on collective economic and social interest, rather than higher-level interests such as national identity or “political belonging”¹¹⁴.

While the Palestinian national movement was largely unorganized in the 1950s, this would soon change with the pan-Arab awakening and renewed devotion to the Palestinian cause created by students in Egypt, Lebanon and Kuwait. The *Fatah* movement, the word *Fatah* meaning “to open” as well as a reverse acronym of *Harakat Al – Tahrir al-watani Al- Falastini*, the “Palestinian National Liberation Movement” were the first real beginning of the sort of nationalism which would seriously threaten the security of King Hussein’s regime. *Fatah*, founded in 1955 in Kuwait by several Palestinian activists, notably Yasser Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalef, Farouk Kadoumi, and others, presented itself first as a “national movement” rather than a political body. *Fatah*, and other spin off groups such as the “General Union of Palestinian Students” sparked interest in Palestinian nationalism within Jordan that the Hashemite Kingdom, distant, unhelpful, and unjust blatantly lacked¹¹⁵.

Palestinian nationalism also blossomed within UNRWA schools, where Palestinian teachers began introducing discussions of civil discourse into their classrooms¹¹⁶. UNRWA’s employees, all Palestinian refugees, openly emphasized the rights of the refugee, particularly the right of return passed in the General Assembly

¹¹⁴Mishal, S., Baer, G., Divine, D. R., Heller, M., Miller, Y. N., Mishal, S., ... Taqqu, R.. (1980). Conflictual Pressures and Cooperative Interests: Observations on West Bank-Amman Political Relations, 1949-1967. In *Palestinian Society and Politics* (pp. 169–184). Princeton University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7zts44.18>

¹¹⁵ Jung, D. (Ed.). (2004). *Middle East and Palestine : Global Politics and Regional Conflict*. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

¹¹⁶ al-Husseini, J.. (2000). UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 29(2), 51–64. <http://doi.org/10.2307/2676536>

Resolution 194¹¹⁷. These teachers were politically literate, recognizing that UNRWA's assistance program was "regarded not just as a temporary international charity venture, but above all as recognition of the refugees' status as refugees endowed with political right"¹¹⁸.

It was during those same pre-PLO years that the Palestinians began to see the agency as an informal institutional framework within which the rehabilitation of Palestinian society could take place. The political literacy of UNRWA's teachers was passed down to UNRWA students, who would then join the student groups created by *Fatah*, and others. Palestinian nationalism flourished under the UNRWA agreement signed with Jordan in 1950, wherein the Jordanian state promised non-interference in UNRWA schools so long as the education was comparable to that of Jordanian public schools. This remained a cause of unease throughout Abu'l – Huda's tenure, and would follow King Hussein until the mid-1970s.

King Hussein was crowned in 1952, but was controlled by a regency council, headed by Abu'l – Huda and other cabinet members. By the time of his enthronement, King Hussein clung to the little power the crown possessed, and he needed to reclaim his position in the eyes of Jordanians as well as in the eyes of the Middle East's regional powers. The subsequent years following King Hussein's ascension to the throne would be filled with Hussein's scrambling to maintain political majority within parliament, appease the Jordanians, quash Palestinian nationalism, and establish as much control over UNRWA as possible. Regaining his control of Jordan was Hussein's ultimate goal, a control bought with the rights of the several hundred thousand Palestinians who still have

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, al-Husseini, J. (2000)

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, al – Hussein, J. (2000)

not achieved a durable solution they were owed. In his own quest for control of his kingdom, King Hussein's decisions played an important role in the tensions that would continue to undermine it.

Despite all that King Abdullah I and Abu'l-Huda had in common, Abu'l-Huda's regional policy directly undermined that of King Abdullah I's expansionist vision. Abu'l-Huda actually spent 1950-1954 appeasing the Syrian and Egyptian heads of state, Jordan's commitment to the Arab League and restating Jordan's support for a Palestinian state.

King Hussein started this transformation by removing all British military forces from Jordan, as well as remove any non-Jordanians (British and Palestinian) from positions of power within the Jordanian army. He replaced all British and Palestinian officers with tribesmen of the East Bank, from the disadvantaged, poorer cities of Al-Karak and Al-Salt. The realignment of the military served the purpose of securing the loyalties of the southern tribes, enticing them away from Abu'l-Huda with high ranking military positions, a tactic that both King Abdullah I and Abu'l-Huda have used to garner loyalty. These tribal families have remained fiercely loyal to the crown, and cherish the late King Hussein's memory today..

King Hussein cleaned out parliament similarly, dissolving the government and supporting the campaigns of loyal politicians. During the late King Talal's rule, political representation was split equally amongst West Bank and East Bank, Palestinian and Jordanian alike. . King Hussein's realigning of the Parliament essentially destroyed any of the Palestinian / West Bankers political representation, instead concentrating on the poor Jordanians of the East Bank. Interestingly, Abu'l – Huda, died in a suicide that was

never confirmed in 1955. Several Jordanian historians have viewed the released cause of death with skepticism, going as far as to claim that King Hussein may have ordered his death¹¹⁹.

To King Hussein, squashing Palestinian nationalism was almost as important as appeasing the poor Jordanians, since this nationalism was a threat to Hashemite regime for several reasons. It was important for King Hussein to dispel any notions regarding a Palestinian state in order to maintain political and economic control of the West Bank. Secondly, even as King Hussein attempted to remove Palestinians from participating in politics, they were still the largest internal contributor to the Jordanian economy. But most importantly, if Palestinians were given a state, or if Palestinian refugees were no longer present, Jordan would lose the presence of UNRWA and all the financing and infrastructural support UNRWA provided. Therefore, it was crucial to both the political and economic security of King Hussein's regime for Palestinians to remain on the fringes of society, both politically and economically.

At first *Fatah* encouraged economic support for the Palestinian cause; investments to liberate the occupied land provide financial and military assistance to the Palestinian people overcome its problems. In this way, *Fatah* was an unapologetic champion of the Palestinian cause in a way that Jordan, an active opponent of Palestinian nationalism, would never be. While at first the movement was largely disorganized, and the political rhetoric limited to students within UNRWA, by the end of the 1950s, different groups of *Fedayeen*, freedom fighter groups (which included not only the PLO but the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)) began to organize and

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

move back and forth from Israel to Jordan with the support of *Fatah* who viewed the use of violence as “necessary” in order to win back their state¹²⁰.

While the *Fedayeen* were largely inefficient in terms of military prowess, it caused multiple problems for the regional Arab community, worsening the already existing tensions between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. In response to the *Fedayeen* attacks, Israeli Defense Forces indiscriminately attacked villages within the West Bank, despite the 1949 Armistice Agreement and the censure of the United Nations and United States. One notable attack was the Qibya Massacre (1953), in which sixty-nine Palestinian civilians unrelated to the *Fedayeen* were killed, forty-five houses a school, and a mosque were destroyed¹²¹. Israeli Defense Forces believed that the *Fedayeen* were using these schools as a base camp, and attacked them indiscriminately¹²².

The censure Israel received from the international community did not stop the Israeli attacks on Palestinian villages inside the Green Line, but these attacks did succeed in forcing Jordan to better control the *Fedayeen*, patrolling the borders more carefully and arresting *Fedayeen* members. By 1958, about half of the Palestinians in Jordanian prisons had been arrested for “infiltrative crimes”¹²³. For many Palestinians, this was seen as a complete betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Egypt in particular echoed this belief, and the Egyptian state openly supported *Fedayeen* raids in the Gaza Strip¹²⁴.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, Satloff, R. (2004)

¹²¹ Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War*, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 258–9.

¹²² Ryan, C. R. (2009). *Inter-Arab alliances: Regime security and Jordanian foreign policy*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

¹²³ *Ibid*, Ryan, C (2009)

¹²⁴ *Ibid*, Ryan, C (2009)

Jordan's censure of Palestinian discourse and attempts in destroying Palestinian nationalism succeeded in further alienating other Arab states, particularly Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's president, openly called upon King Hussein to support a Palestinian state. Nasser would utilize public radio to both encourage the *Fedayeen* as well espouse his vision of a pan- Arab state. A *coup d'etat* in Syria had overthrown the royal family, allowing the Baa'th party to gain power. The resultant closeness between Nasser and the Syrian Baa'thists were a threat to Hashemite stability.

The regional pressures on Jordan furthered King Hussein's reliance on the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States, the United Kingdom, and United Nations, their perception of the climate in the Middle East, and efforts to thwart the Soviet Union began to heavily play into King Hussein's decision-making. This created a difficult juggling act, balancing King Hussein's need to please Jordanians, and please the international community, whose funding Jordan relied on.

For the most part, Jordan navigated these waters by assuaging both the U.K. and the U.S. via secret meetings while openly supporting Egypt in its antagonism of the U.K., particularly during the creation of the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Crisis. While the United Kingdom was disengaging politically from Jordan, removing all of its military personnel and limiting its financial support to construction and other infrastructural subsidies, the U.K. renewed its interest in the Suez Canal. The U.K. needed the Suez Canal to fulfill its numerous obligations of pacts made following WWII to maintain Western influence. The Canal also held the economic interest of the U.K., and was still used for commerce and trade.

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal put King Hussein in a tight spot. In private, King Hussein assured diplomats of the United Kingdom that the Hashemite / British alliance was strong. Through 1958, riots supporting Arab unity and anti-British sentiment gave Hussein even more threats to his regime. In response to these changing sentiments, Hussein crushed an attempted military coup, banned all political parties and Egyptian radio stations, placed Jordan under martial law, and began tamping down on any protests¹²⁵. Despite that, numerous events, from the *coup d'état* which overthrew the Iraqi Hashemites or the bombings of the British Council or Ministry of Development in Amman by Arab nationalists, made Hussein realize the precariousness of his position.

In a political move that would begin to establish the U.S. as leading power in the Middle East, Jordan asked to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, due to the heavy anti-British sentiment in both Parliament and the public, Jordan declined membership to Baghdad Pact, an intergovernmental military alliance with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. While Jordan was not allowed entry into NATO, it cleanly broke any outward political ties Jordan had with the U.K. and paved the way to becoming a client state of the United States¹²⁶.

When it became clear that not even martial law could completely stop sympathies with Egypt, King Hussein conducted yet another purge of Parliament in 1960. King Hussein also swept the military for "communists", sacking at least fifty officers for suspected "party ties" and several thousand activists with "leftist ties"¹²⁷. This

¹²⁵ Joyce, M. (2008). *Anglo-American support for Jordan: The career of King Hussein*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

¹²⁶ Tal, L.. (1995). Britain and the Jordan Crisis of 1958. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31(1), 39–57. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283698>

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, Halliday, F. (2002).

clampdown and the resulting autocracy, ceased the illusion of civil discourse or liberties. No one would be able to threaten King Hussein's regime so openly again. Washington D.C. understood King Hussein as a ruler not easily overthrown, and the Eisenhower administration gave unconditional backing for the Hashemite regime to continue to restore order via force. The White House released a public statement declaring Jordan's "independence and integrity" as central to U.S. interests, and the relationship was solidified.

In fiscal terms, the United States resolved the crisis. Days after Hussein declared martial law, the Eisenhower administration authorized a \$10 million emergency grant to address the near bankruptcy of the Jordanian government. Later that year, the United States cleared another \$10 million grant for the Jordanian spending budget. In a year, when the Jordanian state collected only \$27.6 million in domestic revenues but spent nearly \$37 million on internal policing and the military, this aid kept the regime afloat. These supplements allowed for the payment of salaries to most civil and military employees, who were subject to pay cuts from Abu'l-Huda's austerity measures in 1953¹²⁸.

The regime also began receiving American weaponry in order to boost capacity to police society. During that same summer of 1957, the Eisenhower administration announced an initial \$10 million arms grant consisting of firearms, spares, and light equipment so that the Jordanian army could plug any immediate material shortages and maintain readiness for deployment given the state of emergency¹²⁹.

¹²⁸ YOM, S. L., & LYNCH, M. (2016). *From Resilience to Revolution: How Foreign Interventions Destabilize the Middle East*. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/yom-17564>

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, Joyce, M. (2008)

Each year leading up to the Six-Day War grew more tense, and the resulting actions taken by King Hussein grew more extreme. But even with the fear both inside Jordan and out, King Hussein took no legal measures to refoul Palestinian refugees, or remove their citizenship. King Hussein needed the Palestinians, an uneasy alliance necessary for economic survival. Palestinians were constantly the victims of systematic discrimination at the hands of Jordan's bureaucracies, but these injustices slid underneath law as the effect of an autocratic ruler focused on maintaining the security of the regime.

This would all change with the Six – Day – War of 1967. The tensions that had been simmering in the Middle East since 1948, stoked from within Jordan as well as the regional and international involvement of Jordan's neighbors, the United Kingdom, and United States, would send the Middle East to a boiling point. Jordan's losses, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and its gains, 250,000 more Palestinian refugees, would cause the shift in policies from inclusionary to exclusionary. The denial of their rights the new wave of Palestinian refugees would endure will no longer exist as an effect of discrimination but as implemented, state sanctioned human rights abuse.

The Six – Day War: Beginning of Jordan’s Political Exclusion

The Six-Day-War, fought between Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan from June 5th to June 10th, 1967, drastically changed how Palestinian refugees are treated in Jordan. The Six-Day-War was the culmination of all the regional tensions that have been worsening between Israel and its Arab neighbors since the Arab-Israeli War in 1948¹³⁰. As discussed in the previous chapter, relations between Jordan and Israel never normalized after 1948, instead deteriorating with every guerilla attack by the Palestinian *Fedayeen*, and every disproportionately violent Israeli retaliation.

On a regional scale, Israel was also responding to Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iraqi military preparations, the closing of the Strait of Tiran by Egypt, and several other instigators. The Israeli military launched a series of preemptive strikes against its neighbors, almost destroying each country’s military capabilities and conquering all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights¹³¹.

The Six-Day-War resulted in the displacement of more than 300,000 refugees, approximately half of which fled from UNRWA camps from within the West Bank. These twice displaced refugees were joined by more than 125,000 Palestinians that fled from destroyed villages and homes. Lebanon and Syria closed their borders as soon as Palestinians started to flee, forcing the Palestinians, leaving Jordan as the nation of refuge.

¹³⁰Dowty, A. (2012). *Israel/Palestine*. Cambridge, UK: Polity

¹³¹ *Ibid*, Dowty, A. (2012)

Jordan's annexation of the West Bank complicated the categorizations of the new 1967 refugees. Amongst them, only 10% were Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and were primarily migrant workers in the gulf who traveled in between the West Bank and gulf states for work¹³². Over half were Palestinian refugees of 1948 who had been living in UNRWA camps in cities like Nablus and Hebron¹³³. These refugees had not accepted the offer of Jordanian citizenship and now were twice- displaced. Set apart from these two groups were the new refugees of 1967, who comprised of approximately 35% of the 1967 exodus. The majority of these refugees were *fellahin*, farmers who saw no need to travel to Amman and claim Jordanian citizenship. Even though these refugees migrated internally from the East Bank to the West (as Jordan did relinquished its political claim on the West Bank until the 1970s), these Palestinians did not have citizenship. There were also approximately 50,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin still living in the West Bank, who chose not to flee in the 1967 war, yet another complicating category as Jordan attempts to recover in the face of yet another influx of refugees.

With a precedent set in place from Jordan in 1948, the refugees fleeing to the East Bank now needed assistance, Jordan was now left to define and provide for not only an old refugee population 750,000 Palestinians in 1948, but 300,000 more. The Jordanian state also needed to decide how to respond to the Jordanians of Palestinian origin left behind in what was now "occupied Palestine". Now that the West Bank was occupied, did these Jordanians of Palestinian origin technically have a "right to return" to Jordan?

¹³² Special Report of the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency For Palestine Refugees in the Near East Twenty Fourth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/7614), Accessed December 16 2015, Amman, Jo.

¹³³ UNRWA No. 14 (A/7614), Accessed December 16 2015, Amman, Jo.

Like the refugees of 1948 that fled to Jordan only to find they could not return to their homes, the Palestinian refugees of 1967 experienced a similar predicament, prevented from returning to the West Bank by the Israeli Defense Forces with the same “Prevention of Infiltration Law”¹³⁴. The Israeli settlements (which were mostly military outposts) began to grow in number following the occupation of the West Bank to solidify Israel’s control over the area. Just as in 1948, the political rights of the Palestinians to return their homes following the end of the conflict was ignored by the international community. Even the 1967 protocol relating to the status of the refugee, which was signed by countries such as the United States and the U.K in October of 1967, after the conflict, excluded Palestinians. The 1967 protocol widened the 1951 definition of a refugee, now longer limited to European refugees after WWII. However, this protocol made no move to allow Palestinians to fall under the UNHCR mandate. There were no edits to UNRWA’s mandate between 1948 – 1967 that included the political rights of the Palestinians. Without the protection of the UNHCR or changes made to UNRWA’s mandate, the Palestinians of 1967 were left homeless, and stateless, much like their 1948 counterparts.

Unsurprisingly, the international community sympathized with the displacement of 300,000, and disapproved of the sharp increase in number of Israeli settlements, but didn’t protect the political rights of the Palestinians with anything more than political posturing. The Security Council’s adopted a resolution (resolution 242) following the six-day-war which called on the government of Israel to “to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to

¹³⁴ ‘Adwān, S. ‘, Bar-On, D., & Naveh, E. J. (2012). *Side by side: Parallel histories of Israel/Palestine*. New York: The New Press.

facilitate the return of those that had fled” without ever enforcing the actual return of any refugees¹³⁵. It also called on Israel to make reparations to UNRWA for “damage, death and injury caused to Agency property and personnel as a result of the hostilities”¹³⁶. The total cost of damage to UNRWA’s workers equaled more than \$2.4 million in today’s dollar. These reparations were also never enforced.

The United States’ reaction to the Six-Day-War was largely reflective of the Cold War Politics at the time. The United States had spent the last ten years financially supporting countries like Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in order to maintain their positions as loyal client states, but when Egypt began entertaining a relationship with the Soviets, the United States turned towards Israel to maintain a “balance of power”, gifting Israel with a series of fighter planes that would be used in Israel’s preemptive strike on Egypt¹³⁷. During the six days of actual fighting, Israeli forces attacked the *USS Liberty* a United States intelligence ship in the region, killing more than 30 Americans¹³⁸. The Israeli explanation for the attack was that the ship was mistakenly identified as *Al-Kasir*, one of Egypt’s ships¹³⁹. With this explanation in mind, the literature surrounding this event explores the possibility that the attack on the *USS Liberty* was an intentional act to prevent U.S. monitoring of Israeli military actions¹⁴⁰. Whatever the motive, the Israeli

¹³⁵ Security Council Resolution 2252. Document A/6797 15 June 1967. Accessed December 17 2015.

¹³⁶ UNRWA Special Report of the Commissioner – General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency For Palestine Refugees in the Near East. General Assembly Official Records: Twenty Second Session Supplement NO. 13 (A / 6713) 30 June 1967. Accessed December 17 2015.

¹³⁷ Kanovsky, E.. (1968). The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War: Uar, Jordan and Syria, Part II. *Middle East Journal*, 22(3), 278–296. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324297>

¹³⁸ Gerhard, William D.; Millington, Henry W. (1981). "[Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the USS Liberty](#)" (PDF). NSA History Report, U.S. Cryptologic History series. National Security Agency. partially declassified 1999, 2003.

¹³⁹ Bamford, J. (2002). *Body of secrets: Anatomy of the ultra-secret National Security Agency*. New York: Anchor Books.

¹⁴⁰ Some of the Israel’s military actions in dispute include: the ships identification prior to the attack given Israel’s military capabilities at the time, and the motive for the attack: which may have been to prevent the

government apologized and charged several naval officers, including the Acting Chief of Naval Operations for three counts of negligence, and the United States took no further action¹⁴¹.

During the aftermath of the Six-Day-War, it was important for the Johnson administration to maintain the strongest allies possible. Since Jordan and Syria, two of the United States' allies were crippled by the six day war, the Johnson administration decided to proceed with its support and strengthening of the Israeli state, while also financially supporting Jordan and Syria¹⁴². Johnson ordered his Joint Chiefs of Staff to do a study on the six-day-war to determine what territory was needed to survive as a nation. Following this study, the Israeli government was advised to hold on to whatever territories they had gained: the Gaza Strip, mountains and plateaus of the West Bank, the tip of the Sinai, Sharm El-Sheikh, the Golan Heights east of Quneitra and all of Jerusalem¹⁴³.

The security of America's allies was the primary concern of the United States, the rights of the Palestinians were ultimately ignored in these decision-making processes . Even though the United States, like the rest of the international community, disapproved of settlements and the occupation of the West Bank, these fell to the wayside to make room for the security of U.S. interests in the Middle East.

ship's crew from monitoring radio traffic that might reveal Israel being the aggressor in its impending invasion of Syria

¹⁴¹ Scott, James (2009). *The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship*. Simon & Schuster

¹⁴² *Ibid.* Kanovsky (1968)

¹⁴³ America and the Six Day War. (n.d.). Retrieved February 17, 2016, from <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/7123#.VsUs9JMrIXo>

The Six-Day-War severely set – back Jordan’s fluctuating economy. The Six-Day-War destroyed much of Jordan’s military capabilities, which they had been building with help from the U.S. and U.K. since 1948¹⁴⁴. They also lost the West Bank, which meant they lost any agricultural profit from the area. While much of Jordan industrial development and urbanization occurred in the East Bank, the 1/3 of the development budget allocated to the West Bank, was spent on agriculture¹⁴⁵. The development in the East Bank lacked this agricultural leaning, focusing instead on phosphate mining, factories, and urbanization. Prior to the war, the West Bank produced a surplus of fruits and vegetables which accounted for more than 30% of Jordan’s GDP.

The loss of the West Bank was a huge blow to the tourism sector. 55% of tourists traveling to Jordan went to the West Bank to see Jerusalem as well and other religiously significant cities such as Nazareth and Bethlehem¹⁴⁶. In 1968, this amounted to a loss of \$24 million in revenue at the time, which amounts to almost \$163 million in 2015¹⁴⁷. The Six-Day-War and the resulting losses now meant Jordan had to rebuild its military, find ways to import food as well as support the needs of the 300,000 refugees in the West Bank alongside any Palestinian migrants now in Jordan.

Considering how the Palestinians brought instability to the Jordanian economy in 1948, the Jordanian population was cautious of yet another wave of Palestinian refugees, and resentful that they had to shoulder the responsibility yet again¹⁴⁸. Spurred on by

¹⁴⁴ Document 69 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian. (n.d.). Retrieved February 17, 2016, from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d69>

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Kanovsky (1968)

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.* Kanovsky (1968)

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Kanovsky (1968)

¹⁴⁸ Abu-Odeh (1984), *Jordanians, Palestinians & The Hashemite Kingdom*

Abdel Nasser's angry defeatism, the Jordanians also blamed the United States and Europe for supporting Israel and therefore crushing an Arab victory. King Hussein, who had actually previously advised Egypt and Syria against underestimating Israel's military might, actually rose in popularity as Jordanians blamed the United States, Israel, and Egypt for the worsening economic tides.

King Hussein assured the Jordanians that the newly arriving Palestinians would be able to return home soon. He validated his claims by keeping the two bridges open and advocating for the "unity of the two banks"¹⁴⁹. Predicting the economic losses that were sure to come if he lost the West Bank, King Hussein pressed the Arab League, the United States, and delegates from the United Nations to return the West Bank to Jordan. It made sense, he argued, because almost all of the Palestinians in the West Bank had Jordanian citizenship anyway¹⁵⁰. King Hussein even visited the United States in late June after addressing the U.N., offering peace with Israel if the West Bank was returned. President Johnson was largely uninterested in who possessed the left bank, and left the situation open for direct negotiation with Israel, an option that left King Hussein unsatisfied¹⁵¹.

The Palestinians, particularly the more organized members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), were advocating for a separate Palestinian state. The fact that King Hussein's goals directly opposed the Palestinians desire for self-determination was only another reason King Hussein lost so much support amongst Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Palestinian refugees. The PLO-Jordanian conflict over Palestinian representation first reached the political sphere during the Al-Khartoum Arab Summit in

¹⁴⁹ Al-wathaiq al-Urduniya (The laws of Jordan Documents), p. 58. University of Jordan School of Law, accessed December 24, 2015. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, Abu-Odeh, (1984)

¹⁵¹ Document 69 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968

August, 1967. Al-Shuqairi, the PLO leader at the time, also thinking that the Israeli occupation would not last long, requested that Palestine be given the right of self-determination, and not to return to Jordanian rule. He continued to claim that the PLO was the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Unlike Nasser, who incited public outcry over the results of the six-day-war, King Hussein took a moderate approach toward the Jordan-Israeli conflict, realizing (through his state visits to Western countries) that Israel's existence was a reality that had to be accepted. He was rational in his approach, trying to convince the Arab leaders during the Al-Khartoum summit to exert all efforts, including diplomatic ones, in an endeavor to secure the restoration of the West Bank Arab lands to Jordan. The Arab League decided at the Al-Khartoum conference to support King Hussein's endeavors to reclaim the West Bank. The United Nations Resolution 242 was received with varying reactions within the Arab World. While accepted by both Jordan and Egypt, it was rejected by Syria and the PLO, because it did not make any mention of a Palestinian state.

For the Palestinians, the situation following 1967 would only be an exacerbated replay of 1948. Palestinians relied on UNRWA for services, and UNRWA was struggling now more than ever. UNRWA dealt with not only the 750,000 refugees which fled in 1948, but now was responsible for the children of those 750,000 and for the lives of 300,000 more. In 1967, ten more camps were in Jordan to shelter the 300,000 refugees¹⁵². Each year, UNRWA would ask for more funding to fulfill the needs of the quickly growing Palestinian population. There was an immediate need, but a dearth of resources.

¹⁵² Suleiman Musa, (1996) *Tarikh al-Urdunfi al-Qarn al-Ishrin, 1958-95 (Jordan History in the Twentieth Century)*, vol.2. Amman: Maktabat al-Muhtaseb. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

Both King Hussein and UNRWA needed a solution, because the number of refugees had simply become too large for the Jordanian infrastructure. King Hussein's solution was a redefining of a "Palestinian refugee"¹⁵³. An amendment to Additional Law No. 56, which granted Palestinians citizenship, limited the citizenship to refugees of the 1948 exodus only. Furthermore, it defined a Palestinian refugee as a "Palestinian fleeing from their home as a result of the June War". This definition makes all refugees which fled in 1948 full-fledged Jordanians.

UNRWA underwent a similar redefining process in 1968, changing the mandate to include refugees from 1967. However, because of the finalization of the Jordanian nationalization process, the Palestinians who had fled in 1948 were technically no longer refugees. This only left UNRWA to care for the refugees who had fled because of the Six-Day-War, but left many "Jordanians of Palestinian Origin" impoverished and without services.

By annexing the West Bank in 1948 and offering citizenship to Palestinian refugees, Jordan had set a precedent that no native Jordanian was willing to follow. The international community expected that the refugees of 1967 would be offered the same citizenship that the refugees of 1948 were offered; this never occurred. The growth in tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians, as well as near economic collapse, caused King Hussein to worry about the security of his regime once again. In the face of these threats, the integration experiment would not be repeated. The Six-Day-War marked the beginning of King Hussein's shift towards exclusionary policies, and decades of suffering

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, Suleiman (1996)

that the Palestinians would endure as a result due to discrimination, lack of services, and abuse.

The Politics of Exclusion

Since its independence in 1946, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has lasted numerous wars, has absorbed more than three million refugees, had fought in two wars, had absorbed more than one million Palestinian refugees, and has survived despite having almost no arable, livable land, and no economic viability. The resiliency of Jordan's Hashemite monarchy, disliked and threatened by every bordering nation, should be acknowledged. In the face of both internal and regional tensions, King Hussein's political instincts talent at assuaging the Jordanian population and engaging the United State's support should be acknowledged.

Following the 1967 war, Hussein and Parliament were faced with a series of questions that needed to be answered quickly: with Palestine under occupation, did Palestinian refugees in the West Bank keep their Jordanian citizenship, and were the refugees of 1967 given citizenship?

Policies were not changed right after the six – day- war, partly because King Hussein was still hedging for the reunification of the West Bank. Following 1948, there was continuous economic migration of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank to the East Bank in search of employment. Furthermore, the 800,000¹⁵⁴ Palestinians who lived in the West Bank prior to 1948, and who did not flee during the 1948 war, offered Jordanian citizenship. These Palestinian / Jordanian citizens who weren't refugees also had the opportunity to migrate to the more industrialized cities of the East Bank.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.* Plascov, A. (1981)

Through the unification of the West Bank and East Bank, a possibility still existed that the 300,000 Palestinian refugees of 1967 could return to their homes. When it became clear that the refugees of 1967 would be unable to return home, much like the refugees of 1948, native Jordanians, rich and poor alike, considered the Palestinian refugees an infrastructural burden¹⁵⁵. By 1967, the tensions between Jordanians of Palestinian origin and Jordanians regarding access to work and services was of large concern to King Hussein. Poor Jordanians were an important constituency because of the sway they held over the tribal leaders who Hussein needed to maintain control over his Kingdom¹⁵⁶.

Almost all of the refugees that fled to the West Bank in 1948 were automatically offered citizenship in 1948. However, unless a Palestinian traveled to the Ministry of Interior in Amman, they were unable to claim their Jordanian citizenship¹⁵⁷. Nearly one million Palestinians in West Bank did not take Jordanian citizenship when offered¹⁵⁸. The average Palestinian refugee in 1948 believed that accepting the Jordanian citizenship would prevent their right to return to their ancestral homes, and held that belief into the 1960s¹⁵⁹. Approximately 400,000 refugees in the East Bank did not take Jordanian citizenship for similar reasons¹⁶⁰. National Palestinians - who were not refugees - either migrated to the East Bank and became “Jordanians of Palestinian origins” or chose to stay with their homes in the West Bank. The Palestinian *fellahin* who chose saw no economic benefit in migrating to the East Bank. The Palestinians that did migrate,

¹⁵⁵ Ryan, C. R. (2002). Jordan in transition: From Hussein to Abdullah. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Ryan, C.R. (2002)

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* Ministry of Interior, translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Plascov, A. (1981)

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.* Mishaul, S. (1978)

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Mishaul, S. (1978)

refugees or not, could still migrate in between the East and West Banks with relative ease (compared to today). Post 1967, the citizenship status of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, whether they were originally refugees or not, remained the same.

UNRWA remained an important source of aid and relief to the Palestinian refugees in 1967, but UNRWA in the East Bank was under the financial pressure to support more than 300,000 more refugees¹⁶¹. Despite numerous funding appeals to the United Nation, and claiming that their financial situation in 1968 was “more alarming than ever before”. In 1968, four new “emergency camps” had to be created to sustain the 300,000 new Palestinian refugees, creating a new set of expenses amongst continuing budget restraints. From the years 1963-1967, annual spending by UNRWA increased by \$2.5 each year. Furthermore, numerous donors fail to commit to their donor pledges, leaving UNRWA shortchanged by an average of 8 million each year from 1960-1967. UNRWA lost 9.6 million dollars in donor pledges in 1967-1968 alone¹⁶².

UNRWA’s financial stress worked well for King Hussein, who made one important change to citizen policy. The amendment to Additional Law No. 56, made in November of 1967, limited the offer of Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinians that accepted it from 1948-1966. This automatically excluded any of the 300,000+ refugees fleeing from the East Bank from applying for the citizenship they were entitled to under Law No. 56. This change also meant that any Palestinian who did not have a citizenship number was unable to get one after 1967, refugee or not. Ultimately, it is one’s citizenship status which affected what Jordanian services a person had access to, as well

¹⁶¹ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁶² Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

as how UNRWA serviced both refugees from 1948 and 1967, with an adverse effect on Palestinian employment, literacy, and healthcare outcomes.

Though the change in citizenship policy from inclusionary to exclusionary would benefit UNRWA, King Hussein advocated this change in policy for his own reasons. The Jordanian private sector had already been saturated for years, and the unemployment rate fluctuated between 7-12% between 1950-1967. The 1967 war led to a rise in unemployment from 7% to 15% in 1968¹⁶³. Jordan's only saving grace was its donors: the United States, UNRWA and the Arab League. The U.S., Jordan's largest donor gave 58.9 million in the form of aid, and over 20 million in "technical assistance" which included infrastructural improvements to Jordan's intelligence agencies and military¹⁶⁴. In total, U.S. donations and assistance amounted for 52.9% of Jordan's entire GDP¹⁶⁵. Arab donations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE totaled approximately 7% of Jordan's GDP¹⁶⁶. The United States' foreign policy is a major influence in King Hussein's regional political decisions, and it is crucial for the economic viability of Jordan that King Hussein falls in line. The Hashemites have angered poor Jordanians many times by following United States' foreign policy motives, such when Jordan and Israel signed peace accords in the 1970s. Without the United States' support, the Hashemites and the Jordanian state would not have survived.

The aid given to King Hussein was used to maintain and gain loyalty any way he could. Very little of the aid Jordan received went into the private sector, where the

¹⁶³ Mutawi, S. A. (2002). *Jordan in the 1967 war*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶⁴ Kanovsky, E.. (1968). The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War: Uar, Jordan and Syria, Part II. *Middle East Journal*, 22(3), 278–296. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4324297>

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Mutawi, S. (2002)

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.* Mutawi, S. (2002)

majority of Jordan's industrialization had occurred in the 1950s. Instead, the majority of financial aid went to strengthening the public sector, from rebuilding Jordan's military to improving the infrastructure of Jordanian ministries¹⁶⁷. The average Jordanian could not work in the public sector, as positions within the ministries were awarded to other Hashemites and Bedouin tribesleaders in exchange for loyalty. The Bedouins leaders of the South were King Hussein's most important constituents, since they were the best fighters and formed a large part of Jordan's military leadership¹⁶⁸.

After an attempted *coup d'etat* in 1958, the loyalty of the Jordanian military was more important to King Hussein than ever. The investment in the public sector, which also included the creation of Jordan's first public university (the University of Jordan) and several hospitals, also benefited the Hashemites and those loyal to the regime. Anyone who worked for the state of Jordan in the public sector was able to utilize these services at a subsidized cost¹⁶⁹.

The tightening of the definition of citizenship is important because it redefines who UNRWA serves. In June of 1967 Resolution 2252 was passed by the General Assembly to "continue to provide humanitarian assistance... on an emergency basis, and as a temporary measure, to persons in the area who are currently displaced and in serious need of continued assistance"¹⁷⁰. It was clear UNRWA workers that though UNRWA was renewed as a temporary mandate yet again, UNRWA's advisory committee understood that this mandate UNRWA's presence in Jordan could continue for several

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* Mutawi, S. (2002)

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* Plascov, A. (1981)

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* Ryan, C. (1993)

¹⁷⁰ United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2252 A/8812. Accessed January 4 2016

more years¹⁷¹. This lack of funding was the reason for the shift in UNRWA's specificity: which refugees they helped and to what capacity.

Until 1968, UNRWA serviced a large population of "Jordanians of Palestinian origin", refugees of 1948 who had taken Jordanian citizenship but still utilized UNRWA schools, clinics and work programs due to difficulties gaining employment the Jordanian private sector¹⁷². The Jordanians of Palestinian origin had access to Jordanian services by law, though they had trouble paying for educational entry fees or healthcare services¹⁷³. Dr. Subhi Amr, leader of the UNRWA's advisory committee wrote in a letter to the commissioner –general in 1968, that "strict adherence to UNRWA's mandate should compel Jordan to improve its services for the benefit of all citizens"¹⁷⁴.

By strictly following the mandate, the UNRWA advisory committee hoped that Jordan could use its own funds to provide for the Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and UNRWA could focus on the refugees without Jordanian documentation, both from 1948 and 1967. UNRWA's changes to its mandate only helped so much, as the number of refugees living in the East Bank ballooned after the Six-Day-War. In fact, in 1968 the number of registered refugees UNRWA served in the East Bank (taking into account these new restrictions) increased by 125,000¹⁷⁵.

While the change to the law itself was not protested in Jordan, its ramifications across Jordan caused discontent amongst the Jordanians of Palestinian origin and served and caused even greater tension between the Jordanians of Palestinian origins and native

¹⁷¹ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁷² Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁷³ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁷⁴ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁷⁵ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

Jordanians. The full ramifications of this one simple change in policy were huge when applied to the the operations of the Ministries of Interior, Labor, Education, and Health. In essence, the amendments to Law No. 56 accomplished the political barring of both refugees from 1948 and 1967 from ever integrating into Jordan. This law, and its subsequent implementation paved a path of systemic discrimination of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who, no longer served by UNRWA, fell through the cracks.

Regulations of Citizenship

It is crucial to understand that the true determinants of access are within Jordan's bureaucracies. In order to participate in Jordanian life at all, one has to be a citizen. Citizenship is proved under No. 56 by a person's "citizenship number" and their passport. These two forms of documentation are required in order to go to a Jordanian school and university, to visit a Jordanian hospital or even to work. These identifiers are distributed by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Residency (MoR). Without them, a refugee cannot own property or work legally without paying exorbitant "guest" fees. Both the MoI and MoR created a specific set of taxes and stipulations that are required of "foreigners" living in Jordan. These stipulations apply to each "foreign" non-governmental organization and inter-governmental organization as well as any refugee living in the urban environment (such as the city of Amman) without a citizenship number or passport.

Other regulations make it nearly impossible for refugees to live and work in Jordan legally. For example, Jordan's document renewal process, managed by the MoR automatically puts Jordanians of Palestinian Origin at a disadvantage. Jordanians of Palestinian origins are not immediately given Jordanian passports, instead, they are given two-year travel documents. Two-year travel documents require the recipient to leave the

country and return in order to renew a visa. Since Palestinians were not allowed to enter Lebanon, Syria or Saudi Arabia without great difficulty, many were forced to travel to and from the West Bank. With the West Bank now under occupation, many Jordanians of Palestinian origin were unable to re-enter the West Bank due to Israel's infiltration laws, which had been in effect since 1954.

Jordanians of Palestinian origin unable to renew their two-year travel documents could get their citizenship revoked, even if they already had a citizenship number¹⁷⁶. Even though a Jordanians of Palestinian origin can become a citizen once they have lived in Jordan for five years, but if they cannot show proof of residency (through a travel document) they can be subject to a fine for each day they lived in Jordan "illegally". This fine, administered by the MoI, is another barrier to many Palestinians' integration into Jordan. It is estimated by UNRWA field-workers that at least 40,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin who had been "granted" citizenship in 1948 were actually denied their citizenship based on these regulations¹⁷⁷.

The implementation of the amendments passed in 1967 was tasked to the ministries without any oversight. Positions of authority within the ministries were given to loyal Hashemites and tribal leaders, who then used these positions to institute a bureaucratic culture of corruption. Whether Palestinian or Jordanian, it is impossible to navigate these bureaucracies without *wastah*, important connections that bear political significance¹⁷⁸. The nepotism prevalent throughout these ministries, allowed by a lack of

¹⁷⁶ Akram, S. M.. (2002). Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics, and Implications for a Just Solution. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 31(3), 36–51.
<http://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2002.31.3.36>

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Akram, S. (2002)

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* El – Abed (2012)

checks and balances and King Hussein's willingness to look the other way to maintain loyalty, makes these bureaucracies a nightmare to Palestinians to this day. Submitting information, requests, and payments through proper channels in no way guarantees a result; instead, friendships and family connections are the only way to achieve a desired outcome, whether that be the renewal of a passport or a certification of a citizenship number. Palestinians, who often lacked connections amongst the upper class Hashemites, were unable to penetrate this system.

The regulations implemented by the MoI and MoR succeeded in segmenting the refugee population which had existed from 1948 to 1967, into several categories, each with differing rights to services. There were refugees of 1948 who had become full-fledged Jordanians of Palestinian origin: these former refugees no longer had access to services from UNRWA. Then, following these new Jordanians, there were refugees from 1948 who had never claimed their Jordanian citizenship, as well as the refugees of 1967. Due to the amendments to Additional Law No. 56, these Palestinians and their descendants will never become citizens of Jordan.

Lastly, the Jordanians of Palestinian origin who had somehow had their citizenship revoked were now stateless, and could not legally work because they had lost citizenship. They still had the opportunity to regain citizenship by navigating their way through Jordan's tangled bureaucracies, though this was rarely successful¹⁷⁹. Ultimately, the latter two groups would become the most vulnerable population of Palestinians in Jordan, denied both their political and social economic rights by the Jordanian

¹⁷⁹ Awwad, Mohammad (2005). Jordanian – Palestinian Relations.

government, instead forced to the outskirts to be either abused, or ignored as much as possible by the Hashemites as well as native Jordanians.

Work

This application of Law No. 56 limits the mobility of any refugee, either from 1948 or 1967 and makes them easy to exploit. Neither Palestinians of 1948 or 1967 were able to work legally under these purposefully difficult regulations. This creates an estimated 1,000,000 refugees that are unable to enter the Jordanian private job market because they cannot pay the “guest fees” and it is illegal to work otherwise¹⁸⁰. A culture of abuse quickly took shape, with Palestinians paid unfair wages and forced to live in subpar living conditions. This was particularly true in the phosphate mining industry, where the majority of the workers were Palestinian and suffered the health consequences of working in unsafe conditions¹⁸¹. The parts of cities most heavily populated by Palestinians were shanty towns on the edges of Amman and Al-Zarqa, often made out of zinc, which UNRWA and the World Health Organization would later uncover as a public health concern as well an abuse of human rights¹⁸².

Jordan’s unemployment rate in 1968 (15%) affected all Jordanians, but disproportionately affected the Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Of Jordan’s unemployed population in 1968, more than 80% were Jordanians of Palestinian origin¹⁸³. The unemployment of professional youth was growing into a considerable problem. Many

¹⁸⁰ Brynen, R., & El-Rifai, R. (Eds.). (2007). *Palestinian Refugees : Challenges of Repatriation and Development*. London, GBR: I.B. Tauris. Retrieved from <http://www.ebrary.com>

¹⁸¹ Ababsa, M., Ababsa, M., Dupret, B., & Denis, E. (Eds.). (2012). Public Policies Toward Informal Settlements in Jordan (1965–2010). In M. Ababsa, M. Ababsa, B. Dupret, & E. Denis (Eds.), *Popular Housing and Urban Land Tenure in the Middle East: Case Studies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey* (pp. 259–282). American University in Cairo Press. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15m7mk7.16>

¹⁸² *Ibid.* Ababsa, M. (2012).

¹⁸³ Wilson, R. (1991). *Politics and the economy in Jordan*. London: Routledge.

Jordanians of Palestinian origin graduating from universities were unable to find suitable positions of management or leadership in private sector, with the public sector nearly impenetrable to the low and middle class Palestinians completely, regardless of one's academic status¹⁸⁴. The unemployment of educated Jordanians of Palestinian origins would become a significant instigator of tensions between native Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians and contributed to the rapid growth of the Palestinian national movement following the Six-Day-War¹⁸⁵.

Though UNRWA employed approximately 12,000 Palestinian refugees as teachers, healthcare providers, and other local-field staff, there weren't nearly enough employment opportunities to provide for more than 800,000 refugees living in Jordan in 1968¹⁸⁶. UNRWA created several infrastructural projects, including home-building, sewage installation, and life-training to employ the refugees living in the 10 camps scattered throughout Jordan. Concrete housing replacing tarp tents, and new schools were built to accommodate new students¹⁸⁷. Together, these projects temporarily employed about 8,000 more Palestinians in 1968¹⁸⁸. However, these projects could only provide employment for so long, especially as UNRWA's funds continued to decrease. As UNRWA projects ended, since it was impossible for any Palestinian refugees to gain citizenship after 1967, they were unable to find legal work even when qualified to do so.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Wilson, R (1991).

¹⁸⁵ Tal, L.. (1993). Is Jordan Doomed?. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 45–58.
<http://doi.org/10.2307/20045813>

¹⁸⁶ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁸⁷ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

¹⁸⁸ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

Education

1950-1967 were years of significant educational growth for Jordan. The Education reform law, passed in 1952 and pushed forward by King Abdullah I, declared education as a human right for all Jordanian citizens. A subsequent law passed in 1955, the Education Law No. 20, stipulates granting the opportunity for all Jordan's people through subsidies and free primary education (the first six years of schooling). Education Law No. 20 also states an emphasis on "value oriented" education and health education¹⁸⁹. King Hussein intended "Value oriented" education to form a younger generation that is aware of its duties towards God, the Nation, and at the same time open towards the Arab world and global thought¹⁹⁰.

Up until the Six-Day-War, educational reform had been focused on the centralization of Jordanian education. Additional educational reform, such as Education Law No. 13 and 16 both passed in 1964. Education Law No. 13 made primary education compulsory for all Jordanians citizens. Law No. 16's goal was to eradicate illiteracy. It made nine years of education mandatory, and aimed to link long term secondary education reform to the needs of Jordanian society. Law No. 16 also mandated the Ministry of Education to establish reforms address quality issues amongst headmasters, students, teachers and curricula.

Like the majority of Jordanian policies, the actual implementation of these projects was borne out through its ministries. The Ministry of Culture and Youth (MoCY), a new ministry created by Law No. 16, and the Ministry of Education (MoE)

¹⁸⁹ Alayan, S., Rohde, A., & Dhouib, S. (2012). *The politics of education reform in the Middle East: Self and other in textbooks and curricula*. New York: Berghahn Books.

¹⁹⁰ Al – Tal, Ahmad. (1978) *The Political, Economic and Social Conditions that Influence Educational Development in Jordan*. Amman: Ministry of Culture and Youth. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015.

worked together to attempt to engage the young Jordanian population as well as well as expand Jordan's centralized educational system¹⁹¹. Following the ratification of these laws, the need for schools and teachers skyrocketed. Law No. 13, which made primary education compulsory is credited for adding approximately 600,000 students (both native Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin) to the educational system.

Laws No. 13 and 16, placed Ministry of Education in charge of building primary and secondary schools and appointing new teachers. Since Law No. 16 aimed to make nine years of education compulsory and free for Jordanian citizens, there was a quick decrease in illiteracy rates to King Hussein¹⁹². Educational reform was also impeded by decentralized administration in education and lack of structure regarding curriculums¹⁹³. In attempts to establish educational infrastructure in the form of schools, a uniform curriculum was not fully established.

While Jordan's focus on education improvements continued following the disruption of the Six – Day – War, the percentage of Jordan's budget allotted to education were insufficient in meeting the needs educational reform created. In 1968, Jordan's budget for education, healthcare and other public works projects decreased by 6.2% in order to fund King Hussein's army, despite his promises for more service reform¹⁹⁴.

In the face of these budget cuts, the MoE and MoCY made changes to the curriculum in order to benefit from the breakdown in primary vs. secondary education. While primary education is free for Jordanian citizens, public secondary education is available for an annual school fee. In 1968, the MoE implemented a regulation which

¹⁹¹ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

¹⁹² Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

¹⁹³ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

¹⁹⁴ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

shortened the years of primary education from six years to five¹⁹⁵. This increases the number of years a student spends, and therefore must pay for, in secondary school.

This regulation discriminately affected Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Compared to native Jordanians, Jordanians of Palestinian origin were more likely unable to afford secondary education fees¹⁹⁶. Even though the Ministry of Education provided subsidies for poorer Jordanians, they were only distributed to families who “have lived in Jordan for more than twenty years”¹⁹⁷. This automatically rules out many Jordanians of Palestinian origin, from receiving any education subsidies at all. While some of this decrease in students could be attributed to the opening of several private schools serving upper-class Jordanians, it is clear that the majority of students were unable to complete their secondary education due to the cost.

UNRWA’s educational infrastructure grew following the six-day-war despite a continual need for funds. The six-day-war and the resulting 1967 created a need for further educational services: In 1968 UNRWA schools had 64,300 students enrolled, as opposed to 54,700 students that were enrolled in 1967¹⁹⁸. Because of the sudden increase in number of students, 12,000 of these students were taught in tents and other temporary structures. Starting in 1968, UNRWA expanded multiple vocational and training programs particularly for teaching, so that refugees in 1967 could work and contribute to

¹⁹⁵ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

¹⁹⁶ Ali S. Zaghal. (1984). Social Change in Jordan. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 20(4), 53–75. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283030>

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid*, Zaghal (1984)

¹⁹⁸ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

the camp's environment.¹⁹⁹ These training programs also provided vocational programs for women, and UNRWA hired an additional 250 female teachers in 1968 alone²⁰⁰.

In order for refugees to integrate into higher education systems in their host nations, UNRWA's curriculum in Jordan was matched with that of the Jordanian public schools. However, comparative analytics compiled by United Nations and the Jordanian government have shown that UNRWA students consistently performed better than their Jordanian counterparts. Though the curriculums are the same, in terms of both attendance and testing, UNRWA students, Palestinian refugees, appeared to be receiving the better education and became a source of contention between Jordanians and Palestinians²⁰¹.

One quality indicator which showed this variation in quality were the *tawjeehin*²⁰². The *tawjeehin* is cumulative examination which ultimately determines which course of study a student can apply for in the universities. As early as 1970, UNRWA students scored about 100 points higher on their *tawjeehin* than Jordanian (both Jordanian of Palestinian origin and native Jordanian) students²⁰³. A study conducted by the MoE in 1972 showed that UNRWA students' scores were one fifth of a standard deviation higher than the scores of Jordanian students²⁰⁴. Because *tawjeehin* scores determine which careers students can enter, higher *tawjeehin* scores imply that UNRWA students were more eligible for "higher level" careers, particularly in the sciences and

¹⁹⁹ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

²⁰⁰ Special Report to the General Assembly 1968. A/7614. Accessed January 4 2016

²⁰¹ *Learning in the Face of Adversity The Unrwa Education Program for Palestine Refugees*. (2015). World Bank.

²⁰² *Ibid*, Al-Tal (1978)

²⁰³ *Learning in the Face of Adversity The Unrwa Education Program for Palestine Refugees*. (2015). World Bank.

²⁰⁴⁻⁵⁵ *Learning in the Face of Adversity The Unrwa Education Program for Palestine Refugees*. (2015). World Bank.

public service²⁰⁵. UNRWA students showed a significant performance advantage, despite a resource-constrained education administration and the various sources of adversity affecting both students and teachers – who as refugees, often suffered disproportionate physical, emotional and psychological disadvantages²⁰⁶.

Many studies have attempted to understand the success of UNRWA schools compared to public schools, the majority of the analysis contributes UNRWA's success to teacher satisfaction, greater administrative support for teachers and management, better recruitment strategies, mandated focus on professional development, and a greater sense of responsibility regarding student outcomes²⁰⁷.

The Ministry of Education struggled to make Jordan's public schools as competitive as UNRWA, creating an intense focus on examination preparations. However UNRWA continued to best the Ministry of Education in *tawjeehin* scores and public university admittances. The continuing variance could be attributed to hiring bias. UNRWA has a more formal hiring process; preference is given to skilled or trained refugees who are hired by UNRWA's supervisors, the majority of which were European or American. Because of this, UNRWA is supposedly less susceptible to the *wastah*, nepotism, or bribery that is prevalent in the MoE's hiring practices.

Since UNRWA's students were more qualified than Jordanian public school students for the top university spots, the MoE needed to create further opportunities for Jordanian public students. While private preparatory high schools were ratified by the MoE to create more competitive students, these schools were too expensive for the

²⁰⁷ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

average Jordanian²⁰⁸. The MoE ultimately created more spots for Jordanian students by implementing barriers which prevented many UNRWA students from attending Jordan's universities. Under an amendment to Education Law No. 18, a student must show "proof of residency" meaning, to pay the large fine to live outside of the refugee camps²⁰⁹. A student must also have a current passport, which rules out the stateless Palestinian refugees. These stipulations also affected Jordanians of Palestinian origin without the proper documentation, such as a passport.

The MoE also instituted financial restraints to limit the participation of UNRWA students, and by extension, many Jordanians of Palestinian origin lacking documentation. An Amendment to Education Law No. 20 allows for the MoE to determine how international students should be accepted into Jordanian universities. The MoE decided that all "guest students", meaning students without a citizenship number and Jordanian passport, may attend Jordanian universities if a "guest student tuition" is paid. This "guest student tuition" in 1970, was four times more expensive than the "Jordanian student tuition"²¹⁰. The "guest student tuition" barred the majority of Palestinian refugees from entering Jordan's higher education system. UNRWA could only provide scholarships for a few hundred Palestinian students, due to funding constraints²¹¹. After 1967 and the resulting changes in citizenship policy, UNRWA subsidies were not enough to pay the high price of "guest tuition". The refugees, who were not allowed to work legally, were unable to cover even a fraction of the cost.

²⁰⁸ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

²⁰⁹ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

²¹⁰ Ministry of Education, Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa December 2015, Amman.

²¹¹ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1951 A / 2670

Healthcare

Much like education, access to healthcare was limited primarily through regulations by the Ministry of Health (MoH), and these regulations were contingent on a person's citizenship. Without citizenship, though a person isn't automatically impeded for healthcare services, the high cost of care is enough to impede both Palestinian Refugees and Jordanians of Palestinian origin from getting the healthcare they need.

Prior to 1967, UNRWA's healthcare system and the Jordanian hospital systems were linked. UNRWA clinics would provide primary services and healthcare education to Palestinian refugees as well as Jordanians of Palestinian origin. If needed, UNRWA would send Palestinian patients to both public and private Jordanian hospitals, where they would be treated for their more advanced illnesses. Each year, UNRWA would give each Jordanian hospital a lump sum that hospital could use to cover the cost of those patients' cases²¹².

Jordan's healthcare capacity increased rapidly from the years 1950 to 1967, in order to address greater needs in capacity. The Jordanian government built public hospitals and funded private hospitals. The Jordanian military funded the expansion of its Royal Medical Service, (RMS) an operated branch of public health services. The Ministry of Health funded the implementation of public health law No. 43, to provide preventative health education services.

Unlike Jordan's educational system, which began centralized, Jordan's healthcare resources were divided amongst the private system, the hospital system and the RMS. The private hospitals were primarily operated by missionary groups, both Muslim and

²¹² Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1951 A / 2670

Christian. They charge a fee per service, but provide services if a patient cannot pay. Since the first Palestinian refugee crisis, many of these hospitals partnered with UNRWA to provide services to Palestinian refugees. Public hospitals, operated by the Jordanian government, also contracted with UNRWA, but could not provide free services. The six-day-war resulted in a shift away from health services, despite an increase in the increase in need caused by the arrival of the Palestinian refugees in 1967. The need to contain costs created a need for change in payment processes that the hospitals underwent in the 1970s.

The Ministry of Health's restrictive regulations were based on citizenship, much like the restrictions in education. The amendment to Health Law No 1. In 1969 allows for the Ministry of Health to place a higher price on services for "guests" of the country²¹³. This means that refugees, without Jordanian citizenship, who need inpatient services have to pay a much higher price than Jordanians, who can receive subsidies from the MoH.

Because of this new implementation, UNRWA needs to pay four times as much for a refugee's secondary healthcare services: services such as surgery, recovery and medications. Like its other services, following the six-day-war UNRWA limited its services to Palestinian refugees with documentation, excluding Jordanians of Palestinian origin from their clinics. If Jordanians of Palestinian origin could not prove their citizenship to the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Labor, they are just as easily barred from healthcare services as a Palestinian refugee would be²¹⁴.

By 1972, UNRWA would no longer have the capacity to send refugees to public hospitals at all. Instead, UNRWA switched to a "health care voucher" system. In this new

²¹³ Ministry of Health Amendment 55 Health law No. 1 1969. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

²¹⁴ Ministry of Health Amendment 55 Health law No. 1 1969. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

system, UNRWA gives an annual voucher to each family for the use of healthcare services. While these funds are meant to supply a whole family with medications or treatments for a year, more often than not these funds were not enough to cover necessary services, causing refugees to choose to deny themselves needed care²¹⁵.

Policies Effect on Health Outcomes:

Morbidity measures like disease prevalence and mortality can provide a reference for which to determine these policies affects on a refugee's health. Disease incidence is defined as the portion of a population newly diagnosed with a condition²¹⁶, such as heart disease or diabetes. While the disease incidence portrays the penetration of a disease in a population, the mortality rate indicates the likelihood a patient will die from that illness²¹⁷.

Fleeing refugees are likely to face disruptions in healthcare services. However, when provided access to services, these morbidity rates should improve: which is to say, any care is better than no care at all²¹⁸. However, an increase in mortality rates would indicate that the health of the refugees was deteriorating in regards to certain conditions.

Some of the difficulties that arise from comparing health statuses of the refugees of 1948 and the refugees of 1967 is the difference in focus for UNRWA and WHO at the beginnings of the refugee's exodus. During 1950-1953, UNRWA and WHO were mostly concerned with eradicating instances of infectious diseases like typhoid and malaria. By 1967, infectious diseases were largely under control, and focus shifted to the control and treatment of chronic conditions. Even then, it's still possible to compare changes in

²¹⁵ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1970 A / 2870

²¹⁶ World Health Organization. Epidemiology Handbook 2015.

²¹⁷ World Health Organization. Epidemiology Handbook 2015.

²¹⁸ World Health Organization. Epidemiology Handbook 2015.

healthcare utilization and morbidity for the treatment of the most common communicable disease in both 1948 and 1967, tuberculosis²¹⁹. Another indicator of healthcare capacity is the resources provided to expecting mothers, child mortality rates and access to gynecological services.

To show that the changes in healthcare access following 1967 created adverse health outcomes, incidence rates, morbidity rates, and infant mortality rates were used. Healthcare capacity was defined as a number of beds reserved by UNRWA for use by Palestinian refugees in Jordanian public hospitals²²⁰. This is a useful indicator of healthcare capacity since UNRWA has to pay for the services of each patient. The years compared were 1951 (UNRWA's first active year) through 1954 and 1967-1970.

Table 1. Tuberculosis Incidence, Mortality, and Dedicated Beds²²¹

Year	Incidence (Jordan)	Mortality (per 1000 people)	Dedicated Beds
1951-1952	4,529	23	25
1952-1953	1,159*	16*	27
1953-1954	956*	17	26
1967-1968	360	17	35*
1968-1969	300	20*	21*
1969-1970	273	24*	15*

*marks significance, $\alpha = 0.05$

The significances marked by the WHO show a significant decrease in incidence and mortality rate. This is a sign that the healthcare services provided to refugees are efficient enough to notably reduce the burden of disease. The WHO noted that the short rise in tuberculosis incidence noted in 1967 was due to the influx of 300,000 refugees and

²¹⁹ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1969 A / 2670

²²⁰ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1951 A / 2670

²²¹ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1951 A / 2670

the subsequent cramped living quarters. But even after the exodus occurred, there were no significant decreases in incidence from 1969-1970²²².

A simple regression analysis shows that there is a significant correlation between the number of dedicated hospital beds to UNRWA patients and the mortality rate of tuberculosis ($p=0.044$; $r^2=0.924$). A dedicated bed is signatory of all the inpatient services a refugee might have gained in the hospital, including physician monitoring and access to medications. A decrease in a bed is a loss of acute healthcare services for hundreds of refugees per lost bed.

Interestingly, there were significant decreases in the number of dedicated beds within hospitals for the treatment of tuberculosis, due to higher cost of care implemented by the Ministry of Health in 1968²²³. The mortality rate increased, a sign that more Palestinian refugees were dying from tuberculosis as a result of this shortage²²⁴.

Table 2. Infant Mortality, Dedicated Gynecological Beds²²⁵

Year	Mortality (per 1000 people)	Dedicated Beds
1951-1952	97	100
1952-1953	82*	125*
1953-1954	82	125
1967-1968	74	202
1968-1969	85*	172*
1969-1970	80*	160*
<i>*marks significance alpha = 0.05</i>		

Infant mortality rate, defined as the number of deaths occurring in the first year of

life per 1000 births, was analyzed by WHO in a similar fashion. As noted in Table 2

²²² Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

²²³ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

²²⁴ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

²²⁵ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

above, the years 1952 – 1953 showed a significant drop in infant mortality rate, caused by the implementation of UNRWA’s health programs. The infant mortality rate in 1968-1969 rose again in comparison to 1967-1968, alongside a significant decrease in the number of beds dedicated to maternity services in those same years²²⁶.

The linear regression analysis performed on infant mortality rate and dedicated beds also showed a significant correlation between dedicated beds and infant mortality ($p=0.048$, $r^2=.896$). The infant mortality rate is an indication for maternal health since the health of a mother and child are so highly inter-correlated.

Though UNRWA’s health services consist of a multi-faceted approach involving health education and nutrition, hospital beds and mortality are a useful indicators of the health of a population. These metrics can help understand healthcare access (dedicated beds) and its relationship to health outcomes (prevalence and mortality).

The distribution of beds is directly determined by the policies put in place by the Ministry of Health to limit healthcare services to refugees. By restricting access to inpatient hospital services through policy and economic limitations, these Jordanian bureaucracies are immediately affect the health and well-being of Palestinian refugees. The worsening of metrics such as mortality are a somber example of the effects of the denial of care.

Black September and a Precedent for Exclusion:

The exclusive policies implemented following the six-day-war barred Palestinian refugees from 1967 (and many from 1958) from integrating into Jordanian society. Unable to work or live outside the camps, and lacking services such as secondary

²²⁶ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. November 1951 A / 2670

education and important healthcare resources, leaves Palestinian refugees in Jordan vulnerable to this day.

The use of citizenship as a grounds for human rights abuses sets a dangerous precedent for how refugees are treated in Jordan. Furthermore, by the implementation of purposely vague laws to Jordan's bureaucracies, both the King and ministry possess an inordinate amount of power to continually restrict these policies based on the political climate at the time.

Black September was the culmination of two decades' worth of tension between the native Jordanians and Palestinians. The civil war between a Palestinian resistance organized by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian government solidified King Hussein's fear that Palestinian nationalism was a true political threat²²⁷.

Prior to the war, the Jordanian police had completely lost control in areas with high populations of Jordanians of Palestinian origin²²⁸. Negotiations between King Hussein and leaders of the PLO failed to solidify King Hussein's authority, and the Jordanian army conducted attacks on PLO military bases, and the armed clashes erupted into a civil war that lasted between September of 1970 to July of 1971²²⁹. At this time, King Hussein gained more military support from the United States in the form of radar detection and military training – he had successfully proven to the United States that the PLO was a threat to his regime. The complacency the United States possessed regarding

²²⁷ Bailey, C. *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948–1983: A Political History* (2006)

²²⁸ *Ibid.* Bailey, C. (2006)

²²⁹ *Ibid.* Bailey, C. (2006)

Palestinian self-determination had morphed into a concern that Palestinian self-determination would threaten the stability of the entire Middle East.

A perfect example of the political climate's affect on refugee services is the complete restriction of healthcare services to Palestinian refugees following Black September. Riding the wave of anti-Palestinian sentiment in Jordan, the ministry of interior began revoking Jordanians of Palestinian origin of their citizenship, seemingly at random²³⁰. No longer refugees or Jordanians, these Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost any semblance of support from either Jordan or UNRWA. The Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 40,000 Jordanians of Palestinian origin lost their citizenship in this process from 1971 to this day²³¹. Similarly, the Ministry of Health barred Palestinian refugees from utilizing beds in Jordanian public hospitals, severely limiting UNRWA's healthcare utilization²³². UNRWA lost approximately 200 of its dedicated beds. The loss of beds contributed to a spike of more than 700 cases of untreated tuberculosis that could not be treated.

UNRWA's resources could not handle the cut, and in 1972 the Commissioner – General urged the international community to incentivize Jordan to reopen its infrastructure to UNRWA through donations. However, the disengagement of the international community from responsibility regarding Palestinian refugees is much more indicative of how refugee groups will continue to be treated in Jordan. Since 1967, the international community has consistently valued regional security over the safety and

²³⁰ Stateless again: Palestinian Jordanians denied of their nationality. Human Rights Watch (2010)

²³¹ Stateless again: Palestinian Jordanians denied of their nationality. Human Rights Watch (2010)

²³² Ministry of Health Annual Report 1972. Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

health of the Palestinians²³³. What this means is that while Jordan is increasingly susceptible to the whims and interests of actors like the United States, the lack of international support limits the bargaining power of UNRWA.

²³³ Annual Report of the Department of Health by the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 1972-1973.

Exclusion and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

The Syrian Refugee Crisis began with the Arab Spring in 2011. Inspired by the political revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, thousands of Syrians took to the streets to protest the Assad regime's restrictions on political freedom. The Syrian government reacted quickly and brutally, killing protesters *en masse*. The result was an escalation into a multi-faceted civil war that tore Syria apart, and that rages on to this day. So far, more than 4.5 million refugees have fled to neighboring countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 13.5 million remain internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance²³⁴.

As of December 2015, the UNHCR estimates that there are more than 1.4 million refugees throughout Jordan. Of these, approximately 700,000 refugees are registered with the UNHCR²³⁵. Much like the Palestinians, Jordanian policies regarding the Syrian refugee crisis are responses to a combination of Jordan's internal political environment and international pressure. But even pressure from the United States is not enough to compel the Jordanian state to risk its own security as the Middle East grows more unstable with each passing month. Continuing from 2011 to 2016, we see Jordanian policies transform from inclusive to exclusive, mirroring the same restrictions the Palestinian refugees have suffered from in the shift to exclusivity following 1967.

However, there are several differences between the resources and organizations available to the Syrian population and those afforded to Palestinians. The Syrian refugees

²³⁴ UNHCR Regional Refugee Response Portal; December 2015

²³⁵ UNHCR Regional Refugee Response Portal; December 2015

fall under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of the Refugee, unlike the Palestinians, who were purposefully excluded. Syrian refugee's inclusion in the mandate changes both the number and type of organizations that aid Syrian refugees, numerous United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations. Unlike the Palestinian refugees, whose only source of aid and relief is UNRWA, the Syrian refugees has led to an influx of numerous non-governmental organizations as well as international – governmental organizations that have come to their aid. Notable NGOs include Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Save the Children, and the International Rescue Committee. United Nations Agencies actively serving Syrians in Jordan include UNICEF, the United Nations Children Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, and most importantly, the UNHCR.

In 2011, there was a sense of emergency surrounding the Syrian refugees due to the escalation in violence following the Arab spring, but it was always thought of as temporary. Following the success of Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab Spring, a statement by Barak Obama showed that the United States expected the Assad regime to fall “within weeks”²³⁶. The few thousand refugees that fled in 2011 were the upper-class, Syrians that had gained from Assad's regime and now sought political protection in Jordan²³⁷.

Under the 1951 Geneva Convention, the Syrian's right to return to their land is protected, and even as the refugee crisis continues Syrian refugees hold out hope that they will one day return home²³⁸. Once the violence ends, there will be no infiltration law to keep Syrians from returning to what's left of their homeland. But compared to the aid

²³⁶ Barak: Assad will fall within weeks. (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2016, from <http://jerusalemworldnews.com/2011/12/12/barak-assad-will-fall-within-weeks/>

²³⁷ Jordan Needs Assessment. UNHCR Regional Refugee Response Portal; November 2011.

²³⁸ Kader, S. Interviews with Syrian Refugees, conducted November 2014-April 2015

given to the Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, the relief services conducted by UNHCR seems disorganized and short-sighted. This refugee crisis was *supposed* to be temporary, and the infrastructure of camps, aid, and services was designed as such. No one could have predicted the escalation in the Syrian refugee crisis, which has now surpassed World War II as the “worst humanitarian crisis of our time”²³⁹.

While the transition from inclusive policies to exclusive policies exists for both Syrians and Palestinian refugees, the baselines for these shifts occurred on different levels of exclusivity. By the time the Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011, Jordan’s strict citizenship policies had been in place for forty-two years. Integration and Jordanian citizenship were never an option for Syrian refugees the way they were for Palestinians in 1948. Those same citizenship laws have barred Syrians from working legally, and attending Jordanian schools²⁴⁰. While a few of the refugees that fled with monetary means could afford the high residency fees the Jordanian Ministry of Interior charges could live as “guests”, and not refugees, the majority of Syrian refugees are reliant on the numerous agencies for access to food, water, and shelter.

The Syrians who began to flood into the camps of 2012 entered a chaotic system where numerous actors were at play. At the forefront, the UNHCR is responsible for providing shelter and coordinating the services offered from both IGOs, NGOs, and the Jordanian government to refugees. A new Jordanian agency, Ministry of Planning and

²³⁹The worst humanitarian crisis since World War II. (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2016, from <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/worst-humanitarian-crisis-since-world-war-ii/>

²⁴⁰ Akram, S. M., Nouredine, E., Kuzmova, Y., Lang, A., Bidinger, S., & Hites, D. (2015). Protecting Syrian Refugees: Laws, Policies, and Global Responsibility Sharing. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 7(3), 287-318.

International Cooperation (MoPIC) which was founded in 2011, is the liaison between the Ministries of Interior, Health, and the IGOS and NGOS active in Jordan²⁴¹.

A large part of the disorganization can easily be attributed to the misalignment of goals between the UNHCR and the Jordanian state. The various bureaucracies of the Jordanian State are agents of King Abdullah II's will, and like his predecessors, is ultimately concerned with the security of his rule, especially watching Arab leaders fall one by one in the Arab Spring²⁴². Another attributing factor to the chaotic assistance offered to refugees is the exponential influx of refugees in the period 2012 – 2015. In 2012 alone, more than 3,000 refugees would arrive at ten official crossing points per day, and countless more snuck in through the 25 unofficial crossing points²⁴³. This was a far greater influx than the UNHCR expected, and time was spent scrambling to provide resources to a population growing at a rate far exceeding Jordan's capacity.

The refugees were arriving at a rate exceeding the infrastructure of the existing refugee camps. Because of this, the UNHCR obtained special permission from the Ministry of Interior for refugees to live outside of refugee camps²⁴⁴. Immediately, a dichotomy was created between the services allowed refugees in the urban environment and refugees within the camps. Refugees within the camps had access to food, water, and shelter that was provided by the UNHCR and the World Food Program. Refugees within in the urban environment, when registered, could access resources of NGOS within cities

²⁴¹ Kader, S. (2015) Interview with Andrew Harper; United Nations High Commission on Refugees Country Commissioner-General, Jordan. March 1 2015.

²⁴² Interview with Muhammad Al-Awael. Department of Residency; Ministry of Interior. January 12, 2015.

²⁴³ Interview with Davide Terzi, International Office of Migration. November 29 2015

²⁴⁴ Jordan Needs Assessment. UNHCR Regional Refugee Response Portal; January 2013.

like Amman and Mafraq, but could not access food within the camps without registering to live there.

Movement was not yet restricted, so camp refugees could register and receive food and water while moving in and outside of the camp. Urban refugees lived in apartments for however long they can afford them, but within a short period of time homeless Syrians began occupying tents and zinc oxide shanties on the outskirts of major cities, without the benefits that were offered within the UNHCR's centralized distribution system²⁴⁵.

When Palestinians arrived in the first months of 1948, they were initially met with native Jordanians who sympathized with their plight. The incoming Syrians experienced a similar initial experience. Faced with both internal pressure to provide for their Arab "brothers and sisters" as well as a push from the international community to keep its borders open, the Jordanian government pursued a relatively "inclusive" policy in 2011-2012²⁴⁶. Though refugees could not work, or gain an education at Jordanian schools, the UNHCR contracted with the MoH and the MoPIC to allow Syrians to use Jordan's public hospitals for "free" - given sufficient donations from the UNHCR²⁴⁷.

However, as history has proven with the Palestinian refugees, the native Jordanian's sense of good-will only lasted so long. By the beginning of 2013, Jordan's public opinion had shifted in the opposite direction; the "refugees are a burden", "they are increasing our wait times at hospitals" and they are "making it more difficult for me to find work". Protests erupted in the streets throughout 2013 and 2014 against King

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Akram, S. (2015)

²⁴⁶ Interview with Andrew Harper; United Nations High Commission on Refugees Country Representative, Jordan. March 1 2015.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Akram, S. (2015)

Abdullah's inability to provide for his citizens, or control rising prices of food and gas. Each economic blow to the average Jordanian was another protester in a rally expressing anger and discontent²⁴⁸. "The potential seeds of conflict are really there," says Musa Shteivi, who heads the University of Jordan's Centre for Strategic Studies. A poll he ran in 2015 found that 73% of respondents were against hosting more refugees—up from 64% in 2012²⁴⁹.

The United States had a vested interest in the security of Jordan's borders. In 2012, Al-Nusra, an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, began gaining power along the Syrian – Jordanian border, and both King Abdullah II and the United States faced concerns due to the large amount of Syrian refugees that traveled between Jordan and Syria to fight²⁵⁰. The United States gave \$1,135,289,839 in aid to Jordan, of which \$303,650,000 was specifically for strengthening the Jordanian military, and \$18,354,815 for "Anti-Terrorism". It is unclear from the literature or expenditures what the aid for "Anti-Terrorism" is being used for²⁵¹. The United States also contributed \$131 million to the UNHCR, requiring it be used to create tighter security measures. These new security measures included retina scans that are used to register refugees and track their locations using bio-metric identifiers²⁵². The United States push for greater security did not stop refugees from entering Jordan, but it did increase monitoring of the movements of Syrian

²⁴⁸ Interview with Saleh Abu-Saleh; United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Peacekeeping Operations Jordan. December 18 2015.

²⁴⁹ Interview with Musa Shteivi, University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, December 7, 2015.

²⁵⁰ Interview with Saleh Abu-Saleh; United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Peacekeeping Operations Jordan. December 18 2015.

²⁵¹ USAID Annual Report of Loans and Grants, June 2013.

²⁵² Eye-Imaging ID Unlocks Aid Dollars for Syrian Civil War Refugees. (n.d.). Retrieved February 28, 2016, from <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/eye-imaging-id-unlocks-aid/>

refugees. By January 2014, Iris Scanners were implemented in the use of refugee registration.

The United State's vested security interests in Jordan have only increased since 2014, due to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq & the Levant (ISIL). became a powerful, terrifying force, and quickly usurped the role as the predominant security concern. ISIL, or "Daesh" as they are known throughout the Arab world, have caused mass and indiscriminate suffering throughout Syria and Iraq.

Until February of 2015, the Jordanian state attempted as much disengagement from Syria's war as possible. At the United States' behest, Jordan joined a military coalition which began air-strikes on Syria to combat ISIL. This political move was strongly opposed by the Jordanian populace, who considered the war on ISIL "Syrias War- not Jordan's"²⁵³. The kidnapping and execution of Moath Al-Kasbeh, a Jordanian pilot from a prominent Southern family incited Jordanian anger and fear, proving to many Jordanians that Jordan should have never gotten involved with the conflict in Syria. ISIL was outside Jordanian responsibility²⁵⁴. Fear of conflict spillover as well as the economic pressures the average Jordanian now faced inspired a wave of anti-refugee sentiment in early 2015 that would push many of these exclusive policies into action.

Ultimately, the increasing anger of the native Jordanians caused the MoPIC, MoI, and MoH to begin barring Syrians from both the urban environment and Jordanian services in rapid succession. Like the Palestinian refugee crises preceding it, these

²⁵³ Interview with Musa Shteivi, University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, December 7, 2015.

²⁵⁴ Interview with Musa Shteivi, University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies, December 7, 2015.

exclusive regulations appear most sharply in their affect on the Syrian refugees' access to work and movement, education, and healthcare services.

Work and Movement

Um Fadi, a mother of seven children and her sister Um Aaliyah, mother of six, are a typical example of the struggles refugees face daily. Now living outside of Zaatari camp, their families fled from a village near Homs together in February of 2013. Their other sister, Miriam, and her husband, died in a bombing of Homs, leaving their eight children orphans. While their husbands are relatively well educated, both of them were arrested in May of 2015 for working in the city of Mafraq without a residency permit. Um Fadi and Um Aaliyah are now responsible for feeding twenty-three children, the youngest of which is four months old. The two matriarchs were able to survive for a few months by sheparding goats and selling their milk and cheese, but eventually this was not enough to feed twenty –five children, and as winter approached, they surrendered themselves to living in the camps in October 2015²⁵⁵.

While Syrian refugees could live outside the refugee camps in the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis, citizenship policies already in place prevented Syrians from working legally. Banned from working, Syrians spent the first few years of the refugee crisis working in black market jobs, typically only making one Jordanian Dinar a day, which isn't enough to buy a liter of water. If caught with illegal workers, Jordanian employers risk a fine or being taken to court but with Syrians — many of whom were professionals back home and who accept longer hours and half the pay of Jordanians — the benefits to business owners easily outweigh the costs. From 2012-2013, the inside of

²⁵⁵ Interviews with Um Fadi & Um Aaliyah November 2014 – December 2015

the refugee camps had a thriving smuggling sector, from sneaking in cigarettes to cell phones.

The Jordanian black market also thrives on the sexual abuse of women and young girls. Some women refugees are highly vulnerable to exploitation by pimps or traffickers, particularly since a significant number fled without their husbands – sometimes with their children – and have little or no source of income. Women forced into prostitution or a bought marriage are ostracized and blamed for their situation outright – and many men in the refugee camps believe women engage in their own sexual slavery due to promiscuity²⁵⁶. The sexual exploitation of women in refugee camps has led the UNHCR to create a full time “Sexual and Gender Based Violence” committee in each camp in late 2013²⁵⁷. The Head of Security of the Zaatari camp stated in 2015 that he saw no evidence of prostitution taking place²⁵⁸.

Jordan’s unemployment skyrocketed to 25% in 2013 from 12% in 2014, making even illegal jobs an important commodity amongst native Jordanians. "It's very difficult for the government to start issuing Syrians work permits when lots of Jordanians don't have a job. So for now there aren't many other options other than to just to look the other way” says Timothy Hartman, youth coordinator at the UNHCR²⁵⁹. In 2014, Jordan began tamping down on illegal work in Jordan, arresting Syrians who worked without a work permit and detaining them in “Cyber City”, a recreational - facility – turned detention center in the city of Ramtha.

²⁵⁶ Jabbar, S. A., & Zaza, H. I. (2014). Impact of conflict in Syria on Syrian children at the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan. *Early child development and care*, 184(9-10), 1507-1530.

²⁵⁷ Jordan Needs Assessment. UNHCR Regional Refugee Response Portal; January 2014.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Saleh Abu-Saleh; United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Peacekeeping Operations Jordan. December 18 2015.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Timothy Hartman. United Nations High Commission on Refugees. January 2015

Syrians were able to live in Jordanian cities until October 2014, after which a regulation by the MoI corralled every Syrian refugee into three UNHCR camps, Zaatari, Azraq, and the Cyber City Detention Center. A statement of the regulation released by the Ministry of Interior states that the movement of refugees from the urban environment to the camps was to decrease the elevated crime rates in cities²⁶⁰. Since then, it has been illegal for Syrian refugees to live outside of the three refugee camps, and a Syrian caught “outside” is transported to a prison inside the camp²⁶¹. An exception to this rule are Syrian refugees with Jordanian relatives who can “sponsor” them out of the camps, or, in the exceptionally rare cases, have resettled in a Western country²⁶². Depending on the case, Syrians in Ramtha are refouled – deported back to Syria against their will²⁶³. Otherwise, registration to the UNHCR camp is the same as committing yourself to a life without a real home or future²⁶⁴.

The restrictions on freedom of movement are worse than the Palestinian refugees, even of 1967, had ever experienced. It has created a culture of anxiety and fear both in the camps and the urban environment. This is especially true for undocumented Syrian refugees, who are constant risk of imprisonment or refoulement. Unlike the refugees in the camps, undocumented refugees lack any basic resources the UNHCR can give – food, water, and shelter²⁶⁵. Despite that, more than half of Syrian refugees in Jordan choose sneak into Jordan illegally than head to the camps²⁶⁶. By remaining undocumented, these

²⁶⁰ Ministry of Interior Regulation 53(A). Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

²⁶¹ Jordan Regional Development Plan 2014.

²⁶² Jordan Needs Assessment 2015. United Nations High Commission on Refugees

²⁶³ Achilli, L. (2015). *Syrian refugees in Jordan: a reality check*.

²⁶⁴ Kader, S. (2015) Interviews with Syrian Refugees. November 2014 – December 2015.

²⁶⁵ Jordan Regional Development Plan 2015.

²⁶⁶ Jordan Needs Assessment 2015. United Nations High Commission on Refugees

refugees can move from city to city in search of work, or can try to flee the Middle East altogether, and head to Europe if they procure enough funds. This freedom is prized by many undocumented Syrian refugees, some of which would “rather stay in Syria than live in a prison [the refugee camps]”. Many documented refugees have also chosen to sneak out of the camps for the same reason, risking all of their savings and their lives to be smuggled out by a bailer, Jordanians who have made a career out of smuggling refugees in and out of the camps²⁶⁷.

Education

Ali is an eighteen-year-old boy from the Sab' Abar, a small city in the Homs governate of Syria. He is the oldest of five siblings. After his parents were killed in Syria by Bashar Al-Assad's forces, he and his siblings fled to Jordan with another family. In 2011, Ali had been accepted to study at University of Freiburg (Germany) as an engineer. He postponed his studies in order to be with his family during the war, and once he and his siblings fled, knew he had to stay in Jordan and take care of his siblings. Though his siblings never left Zaatari camp, he would sneak out to work as a car mechanic in order to provide for his siblings, saying that this is “closest thing to an engineer I will probably become”²⁶⁸.

Over 55% of the registered Syrian refugees are under the age of 18²⁶⁹. Prior to the refugee crisis, Syria's public education was one of the best in the Arab world. Syria's universities were the oldest in the Arab world, and were a testament to the old advancements of Arab history and culture. Syria had the only medical school where medical education and other science programs were taught completely in Arabic, not

²⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Achilli, L. (2015)

²⁶⁸ Kader, S. (2015) Interviews with Syrian Refugees. November 2014 – December 2015.

²⁶⁹ Jordan Needs Assessment 2015. United Nations High Commission on Refugees

English, as a way of honoring the medical and scientific advancements of Islam’s golden age²⁷⁰. Syrian children are bright, ambitious, and eager for opportunity.

It is incredibly important that any refugee group is given access to consistent, quality education within its host nation. Along a similarly exclusionist vein, Syrian children are unable to access the Jordanian public school system unless their parents can pay the residency fees²⁷¹. Syrian university students are unable to enroll in Jordanian universities without residency permits as well as “proof of enrollment” from their old universities²⁷², a form of documentation most Syrian refugees don’t have.

UN agencies as well as several NGOs have coordinated educational services for children within the camps. UNICEF runs informal education programs within the camps that closely model Syria’s educational framework: in this way, should Syrians ever return home, they can continue their education with a similar curriculum²⁷³. There are approximately 6 informal schools in Zaatari, a camp spanning an eight - mile radius in which there is absolutely no transportation for refugees other than their feet (and maybe a bike).

Despite the United Nations efforts, UNHCR and UNICEF face challenges in engaging students (and their families) into attendance. Safety is a large concern for students attending informal schools. The 2015 Educational Needs Assessment survey conducted by the UNHCR and UNICEF amongst 24,000 students in Zaatari camp shows that more than 92% of students have faced verbal, physical, and sexual harassment on

²⁷⁰ Nagamia, H. F. (2010). History of Islamic Medicine. *Journal of the Islamic Medical Association of North America*, 28(3).

²⁷¹ UNICEF (2015) Access to Education for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordan Host Communities. Joint Education Needs Assessment Report, Education Sector Working Group

²⁷² *Ibid*, UNICEF (2015)

²⁷³ *Ibid*, UNICEF (2015)

their walk to school²⁷⁴. Bullying from other students (39%), and long distances to the education center (67%) are other significant reasons students do not attend school. Students in higher age brackets (Grades 7-12) cite the need to work as the most important reason forgo attendance.

These issues preventing attendance are exacerbated amongst the girls of Zaatari. There is a disproportionate number of young girls in Zaatari who do not attend school. While the UNHCR estimates that 73% of male students from grades 1-6 have at least registered for school at one point (though attendance is another matter entirely) only 42% of female students were even registered to attend classes by their parents²⁷⁵. Furthermore 8% of young girls aged 5-18 had never received any sort of education, compared to 6% of males. Many young girls were uneager to start school believing they “would not be able to learn”.

Even once children decide to attend school, UNICEF and other NGOs struggle to retain students. The most common reason for boys aged 6-11 for dropping out of school was “that the school was too far away (54%). Overcrowding (25%) and the class shifts at inappropriate times (14%) were also important factors. Young girls aged 6-11 also cited distance from the school as the main factor for dropping out, but at a much higher rate than their male counterparts (71%). Bullying and harassment was subsequently the second most common reason young girls dropped out (63%)²⁷⁶. It is estimated that the age bracket 30% of children have not attended school (either formal or informal) in more than two years.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, UNICEF (2015)

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, UNICEF (2015)

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, UNICEF (2015)

The pervasive mood in the camp is boredom. Without access to consistent education, either because of distance or safety, refugees spend their days only attempting to survive. Youth centers created by UNHCR face the same problems that informal schools see – distance and safety. Boys and girls in the age 12-17 bracket are the least likely demographic to continue their education in the camps, though they are most likely to have already had some degree of formal education in Syria. This age bracket cites the “need to work” and “take care of their family” (82%) as two most important reasons for avoiding school and similar minded youth groups. In this bracket, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 42% of men and 51% of females in this age bracket have not attended school at all since arriving in Jordan. Once the Syrians actually return to their homes, the majority of them will be years behind in their education.

Without the UNHCR and UNICEF, the educational prospects of Syrian children would have been much, much worse. But to say that informal education is enough for these children is a denial of their right to education. Despite the barriers that prevent them from accessing education, these children desperately want to attend school, want to succeed, and want to support their families and friends. To prevent them from doing so because of restrictive policies or through factors like distance is a disservice to them, and an intellectual loss for us.

Healthcare

Mohamad Al-Kasaas is a forty – two-year-old husband and father of three, from the city of Homs in northern Syria. While a businessman in Syria, he struggled to pay for medications – for hypertension and diabetes – during the first two years of the Syrian conflict. While he originally intended to stay in Syria for the duration of the conflict, in February of 2014, his apartment complex was bombed, killing one of his children and

leaving his four-year-old daughter life-threateningly injured. With his wife and remaining child, he carried his daughter, Leena, 280 miles to the Jordanian – Syrian border. The journey took more than a month; the family had to stop constantly to preserve their strength and attempt to stabilize Leena’s injuries.

By the time they reached Jordan, Leena’s leg was covered in necrotic (dying) tissue. Mohamad himself was in incredibly poor health, not having taken any beta-blockers in months for hypertension, his blood sugar dangerously low after forgoing food so Leena and his other surviving child, Rami, could eat. Leena’s leg was amputated above the knee – it had been past the point of saving for weeks. Shortly after arriving, Mohamad fell into hypoglycemic shock and needed to be hospitalized for three days. In July of 2015, Mohamad was unable to get a prescription for his specific formula of beta – blockers (which treated his hypertension), after it was removed from the updated “essential medications list” approved by the World Health Organization. Mohamad – Al Kasaas died of a heart attack in Al-Zaatari camp on September 24, 2015²⁷⁷.

The story of Mohamad Al-Kasaas is heartbreakingly typical for a Syrian refugee. In both the camps and the urban environment, Syrians are unable to access essential healthcare services that they need to keep them alive. For every treatment of chronic illness like Mohamad’s hypertension, or a traumatic procedure like the amputation of Leena’s legs, there are hundreds more that go without care because of Jordanian health policies.

Exclusionist healthcare policies began in 1967, when Palestinian refugees began to be banned from public Jordanian high schools. From 2011-2014, international pressure

²⁷⁷ Kader, S. (2015) Interviews with Syrian Refugees. November 2014 – December 2015.

from the United States and the United Nations kept Jordanian public hospitals open. A blanket donation from the UN was used to cover the Syrians healthcare costs, to that registered Syrian refugees could use their healthcare services for free. However, undocumented refugees could never use any of these healthcare services, much like refouled Jordanians of Palestinian origin had no access to clinics or hospitals. This population is incredibly vulnerable and subject to the worst morbidities. Without medications for their chronic illnesses, these diseases lead to life threatening exacerbations.

While emergency cases were handled by third party NGOs along the Syrian border, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Caritas, and the International Rescue Committee, Jordanian public hospitals treated Syrians for their chronic illnesses. Syrians poured into Jordan's hospital systems by the hundreds of thousands, overflowed Jordan's weak healthcare infrastructure, and increased the wait times for Jordanians to receive their care by approximately 6 hours²⁷⁸. In an expected move intended to garner Jordanian support, the Ministry of Health removed hospital privileges for registered Syrian refugees in December of 2015²⁷⁹. UNHCR's reliance on Jordanian public hospitals left its own healthcare services underdeveloped, and only a few NGOs were left to provide healthcare to more than 600,000 refugees. Unlike UNRWA, who's clinical system is organized and completely in-house, the UNHCR was unprepared for the public hospitals to retract their services.

²⁷⁸ Interview with Dr. Musa Ajlouni, Philadelphia University, December 2015.

²⁷⁹ Ministry of Health Regulation 71(b). Translated by Dr. Youssef Rababa

With the advent of public health, epidemiological studies and more advanced surveying techniques, the UNHCR and WHO have amassed massive amounts of healthcare data.

The retraction of healthcare services from the Syrians has created an enormous gap between primary and secondary care. Doctors from Caritas can easily identify that a patient with coronary artery disease needs an angiogram, but there is no way for that refugee to get the angiogram done without Jordanian public hospitals. Similarly, diseases that indiscriminately befall the world – such as cancer, have no ways to be treated without access to chemotherapy and radiation²⁸⁰.

However, in any situation where hundreds of thousands of people are crammed into a tiny space, infectious and communicable diseases are large concerns; a fact unchanged since the Palestinian refugee crisis of 1948. Tuberculosis, Hepatitis A, and Polio are the three most significant communicable diseases requiring medical attention²⁸¹. Of these three, tuberculosis composed more than 64% of all communicable disease diagnoses, followed by diarrhea and urinary tract infections. Alarming, polio, a disease which had been eradicated in Jordan since the 1980s, has seen a recurrence amongst Syrian refugees, with 24 cases diagnosed since 2013²⁸².

Disease prevalence for heart disease and diabetes are similar to the Jordanian population²⁸³. A health access survey conducted by the UNHCR in 2014 showed that hypertension prevalence was the highest, followed by diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases, arthritis, and other cardiovascular diseases. 26% of the survey takers stated they

²⁸⁰ UNHCR Health Needs Assessment January 2015.

²⁸¹ UNHCR Health Needs Assessment January 2015.

²⁸² UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014.

²⁸³ UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014.

did not receive care for their illnesses. A follow-up survey conducted in 2015 showed that while the disease prevalence remained the same, 64% of these refugees could not gain treatment for their conditions, a significant ($p < 0.002$) increase from 2014²⁸⁴.

While it is too early to determine how severely the denial of healthcare will affect morbidity and mortality, it is clear that the retraction of healthcare services from the Syrians has created an enormous gap between primary and secondary care. Doctors from Caritas can easily identify that a patient with coronary artery disease needs an angiogram, but there is no way for that refugee to get the angiogram done without Jordanian public hospitals. Similarly, diseases that indiscriminately befall the world – such as cancer, have no ways to be treated without access to chemotherapy and radiation.

Mohamad Al-Kasaas shared with me in an interview that "the health of his family is all that matters". Though he was referring to his daughter at the time, his death could have been avoided had he had consistent access to medication upon his arrival in Jordan. Hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, are all treatable, each of these chronic illnesses that is plaguing the Syrian population can easily be managed with a prescription drug regimens and lifestyle management. To be unable to provide these services to people who desperately need them out of fear, or economic necessity, is a crime against each Syrian refugee who needlessly suffers.

²⁸⁴ UNHCR Health Access Survey, March 2014.

Conclusion

In April 2015, Jordan closed its all border crossings and refused to take in any more Syrian refugees. King Abdullah II released a statement stating that “the number of Syrian refugees had exceeded Jordan’s capacity to respond”. For years, “Jordan has carried the brunt of the burden, and we simply cannot continue this way anymore”²⁸⁵. Almost one year later, more than 16,000 Syrians have amassed along the border, in the midst of the fighting, and unable to get to safety simply because they aren’t allowed in. Any refugee that attempts to enter Jordan from April 2015 on will be an illegal refugee; and as an illegal refugee, completely denied his or her rights necessary to survival. These refugees have no access to food, water, shelter, or healthcare, let alone education or the opportunity to work. The United Nations has urged Jordan to reopen its borders, but the Kingdom of Jordan has not budged. It allows members of the UNHCR and MSF to travel across the border to provide services, but will not allow Syrians to enter.

The history of Jordan’s relationship with refugees is fascinating, due to the complexity that arose with beginning with inclusive policies. In 1948, Jordan created a “haven for refugees” that followed them well into every wave of Arab refugee, even if Jordanians didn’t want to. Lebanon or Syria, who had refused refugees outright, had a comparatively simple (if unjust) relationship with refugees. The Jordanian State (and by extension, the Hashemite regime) was now tasked with not only maintaining support for

²⁸⁵ Syria conflict: Jordanians 'at boiling point' over refugees - BBC News. (n.d.). Retrieved March 10, 2016, from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35462698>

its rule not only within Jordan, but in the international community. The refugees, hardly their own political actor, were then shunted back and forth as a political object to be used for the Hashemites' gain, given rights and services when it was convenient, corralled into fenced camps when Jordanians no longer wanted their presence.

Of course, a large contributor to the complexity surrounding the fate of Palestinian refugees is the large standing involvement of the international community. While there is a level of blame which should be placed on the other states in the U.N. and western world for not protecting a Palestinian's "right to return", the U.N. also should also be acknowledged for the services it has provided to Palestinian refugees consistently since 1948. Without assistance from UNRWA, the lives of the Palestinian refugees would be astronomically worse off today. However, due to the involvement of the international community, specifically economically, the interests of the most powerful donors overshadow those of the refugees. The United States' influence on Jordan has even surpassed the internal power of the three Jordanian Kings.

The use of refugees as political weight has been clear since 1948. The analysis of the influences behind King Abdullah I's policies show that refugee inclusion is little more than a product of the King's own expansionist visions. Palestinian integration was a side-effect of the West Bank's annexation, not a measure of Jordanian goodwill. King Abdullah I benefited both economically and socially by offering the Palestinians citizenship. With their citizenship, he not only doubled his territory, but gained a sizable population of Arabs wealthier and better educated than their East Bank neighbors. Whatever the motivations for King Abdullah I's inclusive (or expansionist policies), those policies set the template for a permanent, if mostly uneasy, relationship with

refugees. Palestinian or Syrian alike. That short lived period created an expectation that Jordan will take on refugees to this day.

As soon as the motivations changed, so did refugees access to work, education, and healthcare. The treatment of refugees in Jordan is intimately tied to Jordan's economic and sociopolitical climate; for better or worse. This has been true ever since the first refugee crisis in 1948, and holds true as Jordan attempts to completely bar any further Syrians from entering Jordan. The next wave of Palestinian refugees which arrived in 1967, were victims to policies intended to protect the Hashemite reign from struggling Jordanians. Whilst refugees of 1948 were offered citizenship and could theoretically participate in Jordanian life, refugees of 1967 were never given that chance.

Though the Jordanian state may be ruled by heavy handed monarchy, the Jordanian population has a surprising level of influence in determining how Palestinians are treated. As soon as enough Jordanians voice rise in discontent, whether it be because of their own worsening economic standing or wait times at a clinic because of refugee overflow, the Jordanian government responds. This is especially true of Jordanian tribal leaders, who the Hashemites depend on for their military strength. By the time the Palestinian refugees of 1967 arrived at Jordan's door, they were entering a Jordan charged with tension between native Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The economic benefits that the annexation should have brought had worn off within a matter of months, and was replaced with economic reality of absorbing 750,000 refugees in need of shelter, food, and services.

With rising enmity between Jordanians of Palestinians the setting for exclusionist policies was already in place. Because the Palestinian refugees of 1967 did not bring any

of the economic benefits that followed the refugees of 1948, they were not welcomed as citizens but as another *Nakbe*, an economic catastrophe. By this point, the Hashemite regime had placed the need to maintain the security of the crown over the rights of Palestinians, whether they be the Palestinians attempting to assimilate or refugees who hold out for return.

International pressure and participation in Jordan adds another layer of complexity to Jordan's "refugee population". With the involvement of the international community, question of the refugees is not only a threat to Jordan's economic viability, but of the Jordanian State's own sovereignty. Exclusive Jordanian policies are framed within the public opinion of the time, and the security of the Hashemite regime is a key motivator in these exclusive decisions. Foreign economic aid to the state of Jordan is allocated to building strength rather than hospitals, especially not hospitals that help refugees.

Here, we see the power of the United States', not only as Jordan's main economic benefactor but as a hegemonic power. Ever since 1950, the United States has kept the Jordanians and Hashemites afloat, whether it be through direct foreign aid or as the largest donor to the United Nations, but these gifts come at a price. Jordan, that slim, almost insignificant piece of desert, is central to the Arab world, and a region of uneasy quiet. It is crucial to the United States that Jordan remain strong and in US control, even when Jordanian sovereignty is threatened not only by its loud, violent, unstable neighbors, but by its own citizens, native Jordanian and Jordanian of Palestinian origin alike.

Jordan was not always a security interest to the United States, and the services provided to the Palestinian exodus of 1948 existed in a world of post WWII compassion. But today, Palestinian refugees and Syrians suffer in the name of the United States' interests and the Hashemites' perpetual insecurity. Money that can be spent on healthcare is spent on the military. Aid and relief are intended to secure King Hussein's position as a client king, not to provide for stateless.

The United States has enough sway over Jordan's Kings; that if the United States was truly interested in the refugees' rights or well – being, the United States could persuade Jordan to provide. But the relationship between Jordan and the United States is an alliance of convenience. Threats to the security, sovereignty, and autocracy of Hashemite rule are threats to United States' interests. Threats to United States' security interests are threats to Jordan's economic and political viability. When Palestinian nationalism became a provable threat after Black September, the United States was unsurprisingly silent as King Hussein denied Palestinians their rights to healthcare and education one by one.

What makes Jordan's relationship with refugees even more complicated are the processes through which exclusion is implemented. Rather than defined in explicit policies, a refugee's access to services was snatched by nebulous ministry regulations that could change in a day. The Jordanian state uses clear and restricting definitions of citizenship to not only categorize refugees as “the other” but keeps refugees in a limbo of statelessness, with no way to create better lives for themselves or their children. One law, Additional Law No. 56, does not refer to refugees a single time, yet that document is the backing of countless regulations which denied Palestinians the ability to go to public

schools and universities, to receive treatment at a hospital, or even live outside of a refugee camp.

With each new political insecurity, regulations either through the Ministries of Interior, Education, and Health, get more restrictive. By using the treatment of the Palestinians as a precedent, Syrians face an even greater dearth of resources and a consistent denial of their rights. As of April 2015, even the right to live without fear of violence was taken away when Jordan closed its borders.

This thesis analyzed the motivations behind Jordan's exclusionist policies, but with more than 1.4 million Syrian and 2.5 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, there need to be solutions that advocate for the refugees' rights and well-being. The UNHCR advocates three permanent solutions for refugees, repatriation, resettlement or integration, but without significant action none of these solutions will ever come to fruition. International pressure on Jordan to open its doors again is a start, but as analysis has shown, still remains secondary to its own economic standing. Economic donations to the state of Jordan, while great, will likely do little to stimulate the economy in the face of regional instability. The Jordanian military is more likely to see windfalls of donations than the average Jordanian. Continued support and funding of United Nations Agencies is needed to ensure that refugees are receiving services to keep them alive. International pressure should be applied not to just open borders, but lift its restrictive regulations. Refugees cannot be stuck in "permanent temporariness". Where international pressure needs to be applied is at the ministry level, so that Syrians and Palestinians can use the UN vouchers available to attend schools, to work. Both Syrians and Palestinians deserve a "permanent solution", that will allow them to rebuild a life worth living.

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