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Friend or Foe: The United States Military Bases in Okinawa South Korea and the Philippines

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Running Title: Analysis of the U.S. Bases in Asia

Friend or Foe:

The United States Military Bases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines

By

Caochong Zeng

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of the requirements for
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ABSTRACT

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Pax Americana has been not only established by the policy-makers in Washington, but also sustained by the global presence of G.I.s. Until 2015, 150,560 U.S. military personnel were stationed in over 150 countries, with Japan, the Middle East, and Germany hosting the most American soldiers. To accommodate American troops overseas, U.S. military installations have also been constructed on foreign lands to achieve regional stability and to implement the U.S. grand strategy.

The co-existence of the American military and the local society, however, has been problematic – social, economic, and environmental conflicts between bases and locals have plagued the relationship. Criminal jurisdiction over American soldiers, military prostitution, compromised sovereignty, and leakages of contaminants have been among the major triggers of anti-base sentiments by locals since last century. The governments of the United States and host nations have also played critical roles in reshaping base policies based on the consideration of national/local interests. Therefore, the overseas distribution of G.I.s and military facilities is constantly changing; some camps have been totally removed, while others have been fortified.

My study focuses on local problems caused by the American military presence in Asia: the Okinawa prefecture of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines. Conflicts mentioned above are examined, and fundamental, multi-faceted reasons behind the problems are proposed. At the end of the research, a recommendation for the United States and the host governments is made regarding the base policy within the next few decades, based on the projections for Washington's role in regional politics of Asia in the near future.

Chapter One: Introduction

Since Washington's departure from Isolationism after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, the U.S. military has been carrying another obligation to defend the territories of American allies around the world. Symbolized by the stationing of troops and the construction of installations, the American military presence overseas has grown along with the realization of *Pax Americana*, a Latin term for the relative global stability under the American hegemony. GIs have been deployed to many U.S. bases in foreign lands to assist with allies' inadequate national defense against regional enemies, facilitate the stability of certain areas, and even to help with the management of natural crises. According to a recent report conducted by *Time*, 150,560 U.S. military personnel have been stationed in over 150 countries by 2015, with Japan, the Middle East, and Germany the three nations/regions that have hosted the most American soldiers (Zorthian & Jones). Given the absence of any serious confrontation among major powers since the end of WWII, the stability-focused intent of the U.S. bases has been effective, and Washington's military engagement overseas has seemingly prevented potential major confrontations among the members of the global community.

At the micro-level, however, problems appear and persist. The relationship between U.S. military in allied countries and the local societies has been uneven since the establishment of the bases. Social, economic, and environmental conflicts between the American soldiers and the residents have aggravated dissatisfaction among the local public, negatively impacting military-civilian relations tie. In the host nations, many of which have security partnerships with the United States, criminal jurisdiction over GIs, military prostitution, compromised sovereignty, and the pollution due to the bases have been among the most popular triggers of the anti-base sentiments embraced by citizens of the host nations. Various approaches, from public demonstrations to

lobbying, have been employed to vent their antagonism toward the harm done by the foreign military presence and to defend their welfare from the stationed U.S. military.

Fundamental causes of the emergence and continuation of local base-related issues are the central subject of my study. In the following analysis, I argue that, bearing most of the costs of the U.S. military presence, the residents have perceived GIs as their foe, while their governments consider the U.S. military their friend since national security is promoted by its help. It has been the American troops' contrasting influences on the population and the host governments, and the resulted discrepancy between the two entities' perception of GIs that causes the local issues observed in my research.

The base-related local conflicts in the host nations should never be considered insignificant to Washington's global defense strategy, since they matter to the overseas existence of U.S. bases, the host nations' domestic stability, and the theoretical sustainability of the basing system. In the past, the consistent pressure from an irritated population has forced the withdrawal of U.S. military bases, and illustrated a complicated role of the U.S. in the intense conflict between the host governments and their people. Additionally, the issues should not be regarded as only the reactions of the public – the United States and the host governments have also played critical roles in the base politics. Instead of hiding the local friction caused by the stationed American troops from the spotlight, Washington needs to learn from the historical lessons to examine the pitfalls in its overseas base system, and to improve the military-civil relationship at local level. A revisit of the base problems is also necessary for the host governments, as their proper participation in the handling of the conflicts is required and expected.

In the following research, the U.S. military bases and their local issues in the Okinawa prefecture of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines are the three cases chosen to study the fundamental causes of the conflicts between the U.S. military presence in foreign territories and the residents, and their resistance. The choice was made based on the increasing importance of the stability in Asia, and Washington's necessity to maintain its control of the balance of power in the region, with the backdrop of the continuous military and economic expansion of the People's Republic of China toward its Southeast Asian neighbors. My analysis includes the brief history of the nation/region and the U.S. military involvement in the three political entities, as well as the evolution, strategic significance, and the current condition of the bases, and most importantly, the shared types of base-related local issues in the three regions: criminal jurisdiction, military prostitution, environmental damage, and economic dependence.

This part of the American foreign policy has been previously explored by scholars focusing on U.S.-Asia relations, international law, women's rights, etc., and my research is largely built upon the works of Dr. Anni P. Baker at Wheaton College, Dr. Alexander Cooley at Barnard College, Dr. Yuko Kawato at the Asia Centre, a Paris-based think tank, and Dr. Andrew Yeo at the Catholic University of America. In her *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence*, Dr. Baker surveys the origin and the general development of American troops in foreign lands, with specific case study of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines. Contributing to the background section of each case study, the book lays out the growth of the American camps since their establishment, the historical conflicts related the bases and the public anti-base responses, as well as Washington and local governments' roles in the base politics (Baker). Dr. Cooley, in his *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, introduces the concept of the base

politics and the ways the three players – the locals, the host governments, and the United States – have been interacting with each other. He also proposed a research methodology of dissecting every base-related local issue from the aspect of each player to further understand the tension and communications between the three layers of each base-related problem and to eventually determine the fundamental cause of the tension (Cooley). In Dr. Kawato's *Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia: Persuasion and Its Limits*, the cases of Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines are studied. She emphasizes the details of the collective anti-base activities in the chosen regions and the responses of the United States and the host governments; she also examined the failure and success of the public activism against the U.S. military presence in the three chosen regions in a chronological manner. In her argument, the internal disunity and inconsistency of the grassroots campaigns and the absence of mutual trust between the policy-makers and the public resulted in the locals' inability to remove the American military facilities in Okinawa and South Korea (Kawato). The security consensus between the host governments and the United States is introduced by Dr. Yeo in his *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* in his analysis of the base politics. He argues that the host governments' and Washington's understanding regarding the multi-faceted significance of the U.S. bases should be one of the major determinants of the fate of the American military overseas. A strong, dedicated, bilateral belief in the bases' benefits to the host nation's national defense and regional stability overrules the possibility of military withdrawal, while either side's tepid interest in having bases as a helper to its interests gives an opportunity for social resistance to achieve its goal (Yeo).

The analysis of the three cases is initiated with the surveys of each, including the region's history, the development of the bases, the significance of the U.S. military existence, and the

description of the conflicts and the ensuing public responses. I begin with Okinawa, then South Korea, and finally the Philippines. The three cases are categorized into two types of military presence: currently active and already withdrawn. Within the first category, Okinawa is examined before South Korea because American troops first arrived on the Japanese island earlier in April 1945 than in South Korea in September of the same year. In the chapter of Okinawa, jurisdiction over GIs who committed crimes, the bases' harms to the local environment, and the local economic dependence on the bases are included as the prominent local issues; residents' reactions, such as anti-base protests and campaigns to demonstrate their intolerance of the U.S. military presence, are described as well. In the chapter of South Korea, criminal jurisdiction, military prostitution in camptowns, and environmental damages are viewed as the direct triggers of local resistance, which in general demanded security treaty revision and corrected behaviors of American troops. In the chapter of the Philippines, military-civilian conflicts based on criminal jurisdiction and military prostitution are analyzed; nationalist demonstrations, organized campaign coalition, and anti-treaty movements are surveyed in a chronological order. Then, an analysis chapter follows, synthesizing the provided information regarding the issues and arguing for my discovery of their causes. Within the conclusion chapter, a brief policy memorandum is attached for the host governments and the United States to deal with the hostility within the military-civil relationship, given the current context of increasing regional security tension due to China's military empowerment and sovereignty claims over controversial maritime territories in Asia.

Chapter Two: Okinawa

Generously endowed with breath-taking beaches, flourishing forests, and other natural attractions, Okinawa Island was born an ideal getaway destination. Around 400 miles away from Taiwan, the east coast of China, and the rest of Japan, this tiny pearl with an area of 0.6% of the total area of Japan also seems remote and insignificant (Lutz, 2009)– after all, what else could be expected from the island besides its stunning existence? Simply zooming in a bit closer on Okinawa on Google Maps, however, unveils its most surprising characteristic.

This island on the rim of the East China Sea is a host to the majority of the United States military facilities based in Japan. Three main military bases, the Kadena Air Base at the southern end, the Futenma Air Station at the center, and the Northern Training Area, take up one fifth of the narrow island along its middle, pushing the Okinawan municipal districts to the margin. The massive land occupation is only one aspect of the U.S. military's multidimensional presence in Okinawa. The U.S. military aircraft have the highest priority for using the air space, while civil flights have to abide by regulations designed to create more military navigation freedom. Shallow sea areas surrounding the island are also closed to fishing, an important component of the Okinawan economy, and reserved exclusively for military uses like bombing practices (Baker, 2004). The island 1.3 million locals currently inhabit is not alone supporting the U.S. military facilities; the Japanese government in Tokyo also financially contributes to base maintenance and operations on a yearly basis. The annual supporting fund, the “Omoiyari Yosan,” covering the salary of on-site Japanese workers, utilities, and the construction of base buildings and recreational facilities, reached \$4.1 billion in 2006, which made Japan the U.S. military's most generous partner, compared with others under similar bilateral contracts (Lutz, 2009).

Such a bizarre yet lasting association between U.S. military forces and Okinawa naturally arouses curiosity: how did these two entities with nearly 8,000 miles in between ever meet back in history? This unlikely relationship was initiated when American soldiers arrived in Okinawa seventy-one years ago to further dismantle the Japanese Empire's defensive garrisons outside its main territory. As Japan's advantage on the WWII Pacific battlefield gradually decayed, the United States adopted the strategy of conquering Japanese military outposts on nearby islands to penetrate deeper into the heart of the Empire. One crucial component of the military plan, the Battle of Okinawa ended up with the Allies' conquest of the island and huge casualties and losses on both sides; at the same time, the Japanese Empire's aggressive expansion in the Asia Pacific region could not be sustained. What happened later was no secret: the Japanese emperor declared his nation's submission, concluding Japan's imperialist expansion in Asia. While Japan withdrew its troops from all over Asia and people who survived the Japanese brutality cheered, Uncle Sam didn't rush back home. Okinawa, with Japan's main territory up in the north, soon was officially occupied by American soldiers and came under Washington's administration (McCormack & Norimatsu, p90).

Taking over Japan's territories was another tactical step taken by Washington, and military control over the tiny island of Okinawa after WWII played a critical role. After the triumph over Nazism worldwide, the United States resumed its rivalry with the Soviet Union, and kept an eye on the Japanese nationalism. The United States proposed an economic empowerment plan to a defeated Japan, and returned its territory after the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952 (McCormack & Norimatsu, p91). They were designed to form a robust anti-communism barrier in Asia and reduce Japan's incentive for expansion through people's improved living standard. But for the remote Okinawa Island, only the U.S. military forces stationed on it were strengthened.

Established along with the Peace Treaty, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Washington and Tokyo officially acknowledged and formalized the military presence on the island. The previous military government was replaced by the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, an authority that granted U.S. military officers more liberty to handle both military and municipal operations of the island. Catherine Lutz states in her *Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts*, that Washington's investment in Okinawa as an American overseas military transfer station/launch pad indeed paid off, when almost one million American soldiers were deployed from the continental territory first to the bases in Okinawa, then to the battlefields in Vietnam and Korea during the Cold War (Lutz, p104). The United States' military arm has thus been extended further into Asia through the custody of Okinawa Island.

Accommodating the majority of the U.S. military facilities in Japan, the island of Okinawa nowadays remains a crucial U.S. overseas outpost. Separated into three main geographical parts, the military establishment consists of thirty-two installations serving four branches of the U.S. Armed Forces: four are affiliated to the Army, seven the Air Force, seven the Navy, and fourteen the Marine Corps. The size and the location of each installation varies based on not only its function, but also its affiliation. The three noticeable clusters of facilities near Kunigami District, Kin Town, and Kadena Town, however, are not geographically allocated on the island based on the military branches (Congressional Research Service); instead, they operate as one entity and share each other's resources. Rather than solely being the storage space for soldiers and weapons, the Okinawa military existence is multi-functional: there are various facilities for training, communications, storage, recreation, and housing. According to a report by the Congressional Research Service in 2016, nearly 26,500 military personnel, with some Department of Defense civilian employees and dependents,

are currently either working on the island or patrolling Okinawa on the nearby seas. (Congressional Research Service) Within the barbed wire fences is an independent world where the personnel's basic needs can be provided.




Figure 1 (Lostumbo)

I. Strategic Significance of A Militarized Okinawa

Washington did not stay on and painstakingly transform the island of Okinawa just for the show. Taking Naha City, the capital of Okinawa, as the epicenter and drawing a circle with a radius of 1,000 nautical miles, one cannot miss all the capital cities included within it: Taipei is 350 nautical miles away, Seoul 670, Pyongyang 770, Manila 790, Tokyo 830, and Beijing 990. Okinawa's geographical centrality has been of strategic importance and security advantage, universally appreciated by military analysts and international relations scholars for its great two-fold contributions to military economies – fewer resources consumed on the trip to the site, and shorter time needed to put armed forces into action.

The United States needs the GIs and military constructions on Okinawa firstly for its global strategic blueprint. After decades of relation-building, deep engagement, and multi-lateral

interaction in the Asia Pacific region, Washington cannot afford to risk the region's stability, which has grown to be a part of its interest. Any substantial clashing among regional players is going to cost the United States both militarily and economically. To its allies in Asia, Washington's regional presence is mandatory. The current close partnership the U.S. Armed Forces has built with Japan and other Asian allies binds Washington to a military response to invasions, and requires its immediate assistance in conflicts. An Asia absent of blunt confrontation, however, can save the troubles above for Washington.

It is imperative and responsible for the United States to maintain regional security by complying with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security through the maintenance of the Okinawan bases. Military tensions must be handled to make sure that no aggressor emerges from either U.S. allies or potential allies.

History has proved the strategic effectiveness of a U.S. equipped Okinawa Island. During the Cold War when the Soviet Union was basking in its heyday of expansionism, the American forces stationed in Okinawa and the main territory of Japan played influential roles in checking its potential eastward annexation of Japan's northern islands. During the first Taiwanese presidential election in 1996, the People's Republic conducted missile tests targeting the nearby seas of Taiwan in order to prevent its official separation from China (Baker, 2004). The following plan of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to land on the island as soon as an unwanted election result came out, however, was thwarted by the arrival of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and more importantly, the well-equipped American military stationed in Okinawa and other surrounding islands along the First Island Chain. The necessity of the Okinawan bases becomes more obvious in the regional context, as the PLA Navy increases its patrol frequency in the South China Sea and the East China Sea,

where the People's Republic has serious territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries and Japan respectively. Military drills with Russia and Beijing's active construction of ports, military facilities, and even runways on disputed islands are touching the nerves of the U.S. Asian allies. With American armed forces only 270 nautical miles away from the East China Sea and 980 from the South China Sea (Lutz, p103), however, China will have to do some careful calculation before exercising maritime aggression toward Southeast Asian nations.

Besides all the mentioned functions of a militarized Okinawa, the military based on the island is also a part of Washington's precautions against a revival of Japanese militarism (Lutz, p104), an unspoken intention of the systematic deployment and stationing mechanism entailed in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

All the historical and contemporary examples above, demonstrating the necessity of U.S. military based in Okinawa for Washington's regional strategy, show Okinawa's significance in the United States' blueprint. The reason why this island of only 877 square meters is so strategically indispensable is that it allows the United States to effectively deter threats in the Asia Pacific region.

Successful deterrence is composed of two factors: the ability and the will to implement it (Lostumbo). The three bases situated in Okinawa, operated by the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, have the ability to carry out and assist with the deterrence. The Marine Corps and military aircraft departing from Okinawa are able to deploy much faster than from, for example, the San Diego base. Additionally, in Chalmers A. Johnson's book, *Okinawa: Cold War Island*, Okinawa has the capacity to serve as a supply station during long-distance operations to help with resource replenishment and technical maintenance (Johnson, p44). Commonly criticized for its "neo-colonialism," the United States has been actively deploying soldiers to Japan and other countries

ever since WWII (Johnson, p44). Such criticism, however, also indicates Washington's great capacity of deploying soldiers and deterring potential enemies far from the U.S. mainland.

A militarized Okinawa is not designed to be the frontier of the U.S. military in a serious confrontation (Hein & Selden, p200). How well can U.S. bases in Okinawa protect themselves from an attack? As Joseph S. Nye pointed out, the self-defense ability of the camps on the island should be fortified, as Chinese missile technology has advanced greatly in recent years to be capable of targeting a wider area and more specific entity (Congressional Research Service). Once the PLA Rocket Force attacks the defense-oriented bases in Okinawa, their contribution to the effect of deterrence is only going to decline.

Preventing regional powers from unwanted behaviors is only one aspect of Washington's mission to maintain security in the Asia Pacific region. Besides assuring allies of the United States' military qualifications and readiness, humanitarian support for natural crises, adds the image of a caring friend to the mighty posture of Uncle Sam. The armed forces stationed on the island of Okinawa, again, utilized its proximity to accelerate the United States' response to unexpected disasters by rapidly transferring needed resources and medical and military personnel to the affected areas.

In March 2011, the Tohoku Earthquake hit the northeastern coast of Japan. The most powerful earthquake in the recorded history of Japan, it caused a devastating tsunami which brought havoc. Around 16,000 people died, 1.3 million houses were damaged, and the nuclear plant in Fukushima exploded and melted. The U.S. Forces Japan, a subordinate command of the U.S. Pacific Command based in Japan, built up the "Operation Tomodachi" humanitarian assisting program the day after the earthquake. According to a *Japan Times* article in 2012, 24,000 U.S. military service

personnel participated, along with 189 aircraft, and 24 naval ships (Johnston). The Okinawa bases facilitated the humanitarian assistance by serving as both a transfer station for flights from the mainland and a human resource pool. On March 13, one U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker, a military aerial refueling aircraft, arrived at Misawa Air Base in Okinawa. It transferred from the United States the first wave of workers who took charge of humanitarian relief, and used Okinawa as a midway station trips to the main island of Japan. On the same day, over fifty civil engineers who previously worked at the Kadena Air Base left for the affected area to assist with recovery actions (Brown).

Two years after the earthquake in Japan, Typhoon Yolanda landed in the Philippines. The deadliest typhoon on record there, it took 6,300 lives in the Philippines, displaced 4.1 million people, and destroyed 1.1 million houses (United States of America, USAID). Despite having any self-owned military bases in the Philippines, the United States still managed to put nearby facilities like those in Okinawa to use for humanitarian assistance. Thirteen thousand and four hundred military personnel from the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force were sent to the rescue, and sixty-six aircraft participated to support the afflicted areas. A bigger contribution was made by the facilities in Okinawa this time. Right after Typhoon Yolanda moved on from the Philippines, twelve V-22 Ospreys aircraft from Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 and 265 were deployed from the Futenma Air Station to assist with supply delivery (Robson).

From a geopolitical perspective, an American military presence in Okinawa also efficiently serves regional interests in East Asia. An area enjoying fast socioeconomic development in the recent decades while still plagued by historical enmity among the countries, contemporary East Asia needs to avoid aggressive hegemony, something achieved by a balanced distribution of the military power

among regional players with a moderate presence of U.S. forces. The uneasy page of last century has not been totally flipped over for China, Japan, and other East Asian nations, and the deep mutual distrust caused by the Japanese aggression had not vanished to give way to potential multi-lateral, cooperation-oriented organizations like the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the military forces of East Asian countries even treat each other as their top security concerns. Without any concrete regional amity, a Chinese, Japanese, or Korean unipolarity with no third-party moderation might trigger uncheckable extreme reactions.

Besides the lasting mistrust, the victim mentality shared by Beijing and Tokyo and their ongoing island dispute in the East China Sea have made the two governments hyper-vigilant. On one side, often perceiving itself to be the primary target of China's military exercises, Japan is extremely sensitive to a hypothetical Chinese military superiority, and willing to take actions against its emergence. On the other side, benefiting from the recent development in military technology, China has obtained more military advantages than Japan, a country banned from collective defense.

Given such hostility in the region, the American military existence in Okinawa serves as a stabilizer to help East Asia reach a balance of power and "non-violent hostility" between Beijing and Tokyo. The armed forces on the island of Okinawa are the sensible deterrent. As mentioned before, the military capacity of the militarized Okinawa and its geographical proximity to either country discourage both sides from adopting extreme military actions that would lead to substantial losses. Any attack on Japan would be met with the retaliation of both Japan and the U.S., a team that absolutely overpowers China. For Japan, any invasion plan is only going to be checked by the U.S., who has huge stake at the region's stability, which best served by the never equal equation of the military power of the three parties.

II. The Historical Players of the Base Politics of Okinawa

Three players in the politics of the military bases on the island of Okinawa – the federal government of the United States, the central government of Japan, and island residents – emerged from the Okinawan history that was constantly shaped by powers coming from outside. The intertwined trilateral relationship has been defining the context within which the bases triggered conflicts took place on this 466 square miles stripe of land, and was the root of all those tensions.

There are four time periods and milestones that shaped Okinawa's past: the formation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, annexation by Japan, the Battle of Okinawa, and the reversion of the island. An independent monarchy with its capital in Okinawa, the Ryukyu Kingdom from 1429 to 1879 was the “good old days” in the collective memory of Okinawan people because of the distinctive linguistic and cultural system, the far-reaching maritime trade success, and peaceful diplomatic connections with its neighbors that characterized that era (Hein & Selden, p230). Okinawa's first face off with a threatening foreign power happened as this Kingdom lost its autonomy, when it was first forced to be governed by the Satsuma domain of the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1609, and then was annexed as a vassal state of Japan in the Meiji Era in the late nineteenth century (Hein & Selden, p231). Japan's gradual yet forcible takeover of Okinawa imposed drastic social changes on the island locals, who were suddenly turned into strangers on a strange land. They became the barbarians who lived in the foreign and remote territory of the Empire of Japan. The governance they enjoyed eventually collapsed, as the name Ryukyu was officially replaced by Okinawa in 1879, and the last Ryukyuan king was ordered to relocate to Tokyo. A collective desire to restore Okinawa's independence simmered on the island after the annexation, but a pre-WWII Japan was too powerful

to defeat, particularly when Beijing, the only possible helper to locals' independence movement, ceded its regional authority to Tokyo. The annexation was not reversible, nor was the local grudge.

The Battle of Okinawa between the United States and the Japanese Empire brought the island to the second turning point in its history. Due to their complicated identity, local people in Okinawa were situated in a miserable position in the bloody fight – with neither side having Okinawan's back. Not Japanese citizens, locals were not meant to be protected, but sacrificed by the Japanese military for the purpose of prolonging the eventual attack of Tokyo. A quarter of Okinawa's residents died in the Battle, and a majority of their deaths was caused by their fellow countrymen (Lutz, p249). The American military failed to leave a positive impression on Okinawans, as GIs were also interested in the island for military reasons. After landing in Okinawa in 1945, U.S. military limited locals from freely use their land. After the United States' victory in Okinawa, 90% of the land of Yomitan Village, right next to what is now Kadena Air Base, were confiscated by the U.S. army for military purpose, and the Base was actually built upon several hamlets where the previous residents were relocated. In Laura Hein and Mark Seldon's *Islands of Discontent*, eight out of twenty-two previous residents living in Ginowan City were ordered to make more room for military facilities construction by moving to other neighborhoods on the island (Hein & Selden, p238). Mandatory relocation was not the only sacrifice made by Okinawan people; their spiritual practices were also tramped by the U.S. governance of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands. Due to the land confiscation, many of the shrines where local deities were worshiped were enclosed the military restricted areas, leaving Okinawans with very limited choices as to where to practice their religions (Hein & Selden, p239). Raised in a culture that paid great respect to natural deities and ancestors, Okinawans found the United States' intervention unacceptable but unstoppable. However, this was

only the opening act of the problematic relationship between residents on the island and their American neighbors and occupiers.

The termination of the U.S. military occupation and the following reversion of Okinawa Island in 1972 set the tone for the later cooperative interaction between the governments of Japan and the United States. Returning the jurisdiction of the island to Japan, the United States kept its military in Okinawa to abide by the bilateral security treaty. The island's reversion worked like a "bargaining chip," as Alexander Cooley metaphorizes in *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, in the negotiation between Washington and Tokyo (Cooley, p141) – the former, giving up its comprehensive control of Okinawa, was granted more liberty in building up and maintaining its bases on the island; the latter, however, was further prevented from intervening in the operations and development of American military facilities, even though Okinawa had been officially a part of Japanese territory. The invisible yet strict limits on Japan and its need of the American military's protection made Japan tend to abide by the Peace Treaty and cave in to the unchecked expansion of the military bases, even though the sacrifices made by Okinawan people were acknowledged by the central government (Cooley, p143). The understanding of this particular psychology of Tokyo helps explain its insensitivity and inaction regarding Okinawans who need to be backed up by the authority in Tokyo.

III. Issues

The central governmental in Tokyo did not stop paying attention to Okinawa, even though the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960 addressed the island country's primary defense concerns. The entanglement between the U.S. military bases and the island residents in the local social, environmental, and economic conflicts, as well as the increasingly

controversial presence of the foreign military on the island, has kept testing the relationship among local people, the prefectural authority, the host government, and the United States.

Military Violence

Military violence committed by American soldiers toward women and children in Okinawa has been among the most direct causes of the increase in the tension between local people and the U.S. military on the island, or in general, the United States government. Since the U.S. armed forces landed in Okinawa in 1945, local women and girls have been targeted by some GIs who were stationed in the camps. The gender-based crimes, many of which were sexual violence, included abduction, gang rape, attempted rape, and murder (Lutz, p260). Those who were practitioners in the local sex industry faced a higher chance of putting their lives in danger – from 1960s to 1970s, three to four female sex workers were strangled to death annually, and more were nearly strangled to death more than once (Lutz, p260). Children, young girls particularly, suffered the physical danger from American troops. For instance, during the Fourth of July weekend in 2005, two girls under eleven were molested by a GI living off-base. A greater concern of both local residents and the global community, as Lutz stated in *The Bases of Empire*, is that the life-threatening, psychologically traumatic crimes mentioned above were only “the tip of the iceberg,” since many victims were reluctant to disclose their experiences or even report the crimes to local police stations. Therefore, as Lutz writes in the same book, the exact number of cases from the very beginning of the United States’ arrival on the island is not available (Lutz, p261).

Frequently harassed by the stationed troops, residents of Okinawa were still shocked in September, 1995, when a twelve-year-old local schoolgirl was first kidnapped, then raped and murdered by three U.S. servicemen stationed at Camp Hansen near Kin Town. On the fourth of

the month, Navy seaman Marcus Gill and Marines Kendrick Ledet and Rodrico Harp rented a van and roamed around the streets near their camp in search of ways to kill time. Planning to go to a local brothel for personal leisure, however, they found themselves with no money, and felt that the sex with prostitutes “no fun” (Baker, p134). Recorded in Anni P. Baker’s *American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence*, the little girl had just returned from notebook shopping that night, and was spotted by the three soldiers on her way home. In public, she was grabbed and thrown into the van by Gill; her eyes and mouth were tightly taped to keep her from shouting for help, and her limbs were also tied together. They drove to a beach, and the American soldiers took turns raping her at the back seat of the van. Traumatized mentally and physically, the schoolgirl was left on the beach after the three rapists finished, and called her parents when she eventually made it to a nearby home (Baker, p134).

The accumulated anger of the Okinawan public suddenly burst after the news release. Two women right groups, the Okinawan Women Act against Military and Violence (OWAMV) and the League of Okinawan Women’s Group (*Okifuren*) took the lead in demonstrations by publicly voicing their consternation and indignation toward the behavior of the criminals. Sit-ins were soon organized by other local political and social activism groups, including labor unions, to form a stronger anti-base coalition (Yeo, p75). Outside a main United States Forces Japan (USFJ) installation, thousands of locals gathered for weeks with banners to condemn the atrocity committed by the three soldiers and demanded an immediate removal of all the U.S. military bases from Okinawa (Baker, p136). Notably, some of the local political parties and municipal assemblies also participated in the demonstration and expressed their serious concern regarding the rape incident.

The collective displeasure was not only pronounced, but also multi-dimensional. The locals' apprehension and demands were publicized through the rallies. Okinawans were once again facing a precarious situation in which they could be easily victimized by American soldiers at their neighboring bases. But more importantly, Okinawans were anxious that their long passive cooperation with foreign powers, such as the United States and Japan, had been so taken for granted that their voices were no longer heard and their interests were totally absent from any consideration regarding policy making (Yeo, p77). The rape incident in 1995, therefore, became a perfect time and incident to prove to the high-level decision makers, that residents of Okinawa were entitled to have a say in the internal affairs on their island. Besides the call for the total removal of the military facilities, the three servicemen were asked to be transferred as soon as possible from their custody within American bases to the local judiciary. Also, given that they committed the crime on the Japanese territory, the public also insisted on the application of Japanese law codes, instead of American ones, at the trial of the criminals. Demonstrators also demanded that the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under Article VI of the Treaty between the two countries, guaranteeing U.S. soldiers in Japan extraterritoriality to be revised. Viewing such an exemption from jurisdiction of local law as an umbrella over servicemen who committed felonies, the island residents longed for the legal justice, which had been presented by the bilateral pacts in the eyes of Okinawans (Yeo, p78).

The strategy adopted by the people of Okinawa to raise both Tokyo and Washington's attention was successful. Public apologies were soon released after the incident from the United States – Lt. General Richard B. Myers, Commander of the USFJ admitted that the rape incident brought shame to everyone in the U.S. military uniform (Baker, p137). Prime Minister Tomiichi

Murayama, a defender of the American military presence on the island, also responded to the rape incident by declaring his intention to reduce the number of military facilities in Okinawa. With some pro-base politicians in Tokyo criticizing Prime Minister Murayama for deflecting from his previous stance on the necessity of the bases, however, almost every politician in Japan, no matter how pro-base he/she used to be, would feel required to voice their condemnation on the conducts of the soldiers and the whole American military presence on the island that was partially responsible for the schoolgirl's tragedy (Baker, p140). These vocal responses and/or promises, intended to mitigate the island-wide anger, were expected by the demonstrators to be realized. Some of them were gradually implemented in later years, but the statements made by both Tokyo and Washington after the incident only signaled the start of anti-base movements in larger scales.

Environmental Damage

Cherishing the serene and intact nature on the island, the local residents in Okinawa have traditionally always put their living environment as top priority, connecting it with deities of the local religious belief (Hein & Selden, p238), and they have sought to maintain the original condition of the ecology. They did not give up the attempt, even when the United States military stationed on the island began to destroy the previously disturbed local environment with chemicals, sewage, noise, unexpected collisions, etc.

The environmental damages caused by the American military presence in Okinawa began since GIs landed to fight against Japan in WWII. When the Battle of Okinawa ended and the military transited into a post-war mode, eight Okinawan people died from arsenic poisoning due to base pollution on Iheya Island, a Japanese territory very close to Okinawa, in 1947. Recorded in a 2009 report titled "Overcoming American Military Base Pollution in Asia: Japan, Okinawa,

Philippines,” oil leaks and spills also frequently caused significant damage to the nearby seas, the water supply on the island, and the ecosystem that Okinawan locals had been protective of after the reversion of the island to Japan in 1972 (Masafumi & Kiminori & Ken'ichi). Decades later, the contamination in the previously U.S. occupied land also started to be publically noticed – in 2002, high levels of lead and hexavalent chromium were discovered in soil in Chatan Town, which was previously part of Camp Kuwae; in 2013, over twenty barrels of defoliants, believed to be planned to be used during the Vietnam War, were unearthed in Okinawa City, and more buried barrels were immediately found by the municipal authority (Mitchell). Besides the harm done to natural resources, the frequent military exercises held at the two air bases located in the middle of neighborhoods also brought threats like accidental aircraft crashes to those who lived just a barbed wire fence away from the military facilities. In 1959, an F-100 jet took off from Kadena Air Base for its training session, but was tragically destroyed by the malfunctioning of its engine. The oil tank exploded, and the aircraft crashed into an elementary school nearby the base, with a death toll of seventeen local residents, including 11 students at the school (Martini, p77).

For an underdeveloped region like Okinawa, fertile and healthy soil can be very crucial to livelihood of local residents because of its reliance on an economy that heavily depends on agriculture. Unfortunately, the American military presence gradually caused land degradation, which negatively influenced the growth of plantations. In the Central Training Area situated in the northern part of the island, a large quantity of weaponry shells was burned in the 70s for unknown purpose. The fire reduced the forest coverage on the island and caused soil erosion, both of which generated great difficulties for local plant life. What makes the case worse for Okinawan people is

that unexploded ordinance still remaining in the burned area, directly discouraging the island residents from utilizing the piece of land to grow crops and vegetables.

For Kensaku Nakamoto and his fellow island residents, the troubles caused by the American military presence is also acoustic. The owner of a local automobile shop in Kadena Town where the Base was located, Mr. Nakamoto has been living in the neighborhood for over forty years, and his growth was accompanied by the long period of operations of the various varieties of aircrafts based at the Base. According to the Al Jazeera report in 2015, not only his family, but also the rest of his community had to put up with the annoying by-product of maneuvering: excessive noise from 7am to 10pm (Letman). Noise-triggered illness started to spread among Okinawan people – those 110- to 120-decibel blasts of aircraft engines made local residents anxious, nervous, and prevented sleep; the health of senior citizens with heart diseases was also put under greater threat in such a noisy environment (McCormack & Norimatsu, p173).

Washington, however, was insensitive toward the afflicted population on the island. There has been no public apology nor modification of the operation schedule by the American military on the island related to the environmental damage and the physical and mental impact it had so far on local residents. The contaminated land where military installations used to be situated was not regarded by USFJ as their obligation to clean up, since according to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Tokyo and Washington, the United States is not responsible for cleaning up the occupied territories (Mitchell). Instead, Tokyo has been providing financial support to clean up the mess left behind, while protecting the U.S. military from public condemnation for its irresponsibility. In 2002, the central government of Japan spent 84 million yen to dispose of on its own the barrels containing tar-like material discovered under Mihama in Chatan City (Masafumi). Additionally, the

Okinawa Prefecture Environmental Council responded in June 2006 regarding the land where weapons were buried: “As long as the current SOFA remains in effect, there can only be symbolic meaning, no practical consequence, in making the US military the target of direct regulations... (Kunitoshi)” As Satoko Oka Norimatsu argues in her co-authored book *Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States* with Gavan McCormack, a professor at the Australian National University, the Japanese government seemed to pay more attention to the Pentagon’s interests than to those of Okinawan citizens, and failed to apply the Japanese environmental law codes on the environmental misconducts of the U.S. military (Norimatsu, p174).

Lawsuits replaced public demonstrations as the main weapon used by local residents to fight back since the 90s. Bearing the excessive operating noise no more, around one thousand residents in Okinawa turned themselves into plaintiffs and took the military bases to the local court for the first time in 1982. Eighteen years later, creating a “mammoth suit (McCormack & Norimatsu, p173),” over five thousand Okinawans gathered to propose a second suit against the noise-generating American troops. Eventually, in 2011, the central government Japan was targeted by local people in Okinawa – according to *Resistant Islands*, around 22,000 people who lived near Kadena Air Base and could not tolerate the noise any more filed a suit against Tokyo for its inactiveness. A nighttime flight ban and financial compensation for “disturbed sleep, physical (hearing) disorders, and psychological disorders” were requested by this largest plaintiff group in Japanese judicial history. In the book co-authored by Norimatsu and McCormack, they pointed out that the unconstitutional violation of Okinawan residents’ right to sleep was the major reason that mobilized every “one in three of the residents of Kadena City” (McCormack & Norimatsu, p174) to go to court, since it is the very basic right of the local population who has suffered the burden of the military installations.

Once a prosperous regional trading epicenter back in its Ryukyu era, Okinawa Island since the late 1990s has been heavily dependent on its agriculture, aquaculture, and tourism, all of which are industries that are subject to the maintenance of natural resources. The Battle of Okinawa and the locals' compromise to external powers left Okinawa with little capacity and capital to develop a more advanced economy. The peaceful multilateral relationships between the island and its neighbors were buried in the history, the advanced fishing and planting industries are no longer needed by overseas markets, and the safe natural resources were contaminated by the bases.

After its victory in the Battle of Okinawa, the United States military not only took control of the island municipality, but also the local economy. During the 1950s when the local people tried to rebuild from the ruins on the island, most of them found they had nothing to start with economically - destroyed fields, bombed infrastructure, and forcibly confiscated houses pushed Okinawans to seek employment at the U.S. military facilities to help with the construction of the installations with very limited amount of payment (Junkerman). The unilateral governance by the American military authority on the island, after the United States takeover of Okinawa, took the local residents for granted as labor to expand the military presence. The anti-base sentiment was popular among the afflicted local population, but given that their livelihood was in the hand of the U.S. military, the residents in Okinawa chose to continue the suffering in exchange for a better living standard.

Entering the 2000s, the historical problem has not gone away, but has been intensified. In the municipal regions where the camps are located, their revenues heavily rely on the operations of the bases. As the military bases further integrate into the daily life of Okinawan people, business and services satiating the needs of the military personnel also grow. Restaurants, small shops, real estate

companies, bars, salons, and other entertainment services gradually came into existence. But the fact that GIs are the main customers of the businesses increased Okinawa's economic dependence on them, while decreasing the incentive or the methodology to explore other independent revenue sources. For instance, in 2008, Kadena Town, Ginoza Village, and Kin Town, all regions surrounding Kadena Air Base, were very reliant on the revenue from the base: 40% for Kadena Town, 35% for Ginoza Village, and 35% for Kin Town. Those towns/villages ran into hardship when scheduling the budget for the following year, since without any revenue from the Base, they were just too financially weak to stand on their own (Sebata, p5).

The municipal districts on the island of Okinawa, accommodating the needs of the U.S. bases, have been suffering from a high unemployment rate, even though people are getting paid for lending their land to the American bases. Rising from 3% when the island was officially returned to Japan, the average unemployment rate of Okinawa reached 7.4% in 2008, which was almost two times of that of the nation. In Kadena Town, Nago City, Yomitan Village, and Kin Town, unemployment rates were even higher in 2005: 17.5%, 12.5%, 12.4%, and 12.1% respectively. The income from renting lands to the U.S. military is actually the main source to support many local people's life. Like social insurance, the rent revenue given to those who gave up their land to the American military promises them of livable lives, if not well-off ones. With the easy income, people found it unnecessary to seek other employment to sustain their families; therefore, an occupation became unnecessary. Such a theory can be better proved, if the unemployment rates are examined across the municipalities on the island. In Takao Sebata's study in 2015, "Host Nation Support Economic Benefit for Japan? - A Case of Okinawa," he discovers that there were seventeen villages and towns whose unemployment rates were higher than the average, and thirteen of them are where

the U.S. bases are hosted. At the end of his article, Sebata concludes that “it is obvious that USFJ and bases prevent Okinawa from becoming prosperous” (Sebata, p.10).

IV. Conclusion

In Okinawa, the most prominent local issues related to the U.S. military presence on the island have been jurisdiction over American troops who committed crimes to innocent Okinawan civilians, the physical and mental disturbance caused by the bases’ chemical leakages and noise, and part of the local population’s dependence on the U.S. bases to sustain their life due to the economic stagnation of the prefecture. The public responses to the conflicts between the American military and the Okinawan society were derived largely on the United States’ perceived continuation of a foreign, top-down intervention of the islanders’ autonomy. The popular demand by the locals has been from the removal of the U.S. military bases from the island to the restoration of the compromised sovereignty, but the central government in Tokyo would not usually stand with Okinawans, given its strong need of the U.S. national defense assistance; the prefectural government of Okinawa, however, had supported its people and their demands of the U.S. military presence. Okinawa’s peculiar base politics with four players in the arena is different from that of the cases of South Korea and the Philippines, but a similar degree of sensitivity to external authority over Okinawans and their homeland is found in the other two countries as well. What Washington faces in the remote Japanese island is a firm local rejection to be compromised.

Chapter Three: The Republic of Korea

At the epicenter of the lasting turbulence after the collapse of the regional hierarchy in East Asia in the nineteenth century, the Korean Peninsula shared a tragic history of intrusions and occupations with Okinawa. One of the previous tributaries to the Qing Dynasty, Korea first fell victim to the colonization by the Japanese Empire from 1910 through 1945, then to the forcible geographical and political division designed by the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) across the 38th parallel was not the only relic left to remind people of the overseas powers that tangled against each other in the Peninsula; over twenty thousand American troops, residing nowadays all around the Republic of Korea, also show the extension of regional conflicts and foreign involvement.

Back in 1945 when WWII had just concluded, Washington did not have major plan of nation-building for Korea besides protecting its fair share of the Peninsula according to the agreement of the Yalta Conference from (Baker, p152) the post-war expansion of Moscow. Stalin rapidly established a satellite communist state in North Korea as soon as the War ended, while the United States was busy dealing the Japanese and European affairs, and deployed some troops from Okinawa to occupy the rest of the Peninsula and bring the territory under its military administration. The American occupation of South Korea was initiated by the hasty establishment of the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) in September 8, 1945 under Lt. General John R. Hodge's leadership, after the American troops' arrival in Incheon. In her book, *American Soldiers Overseas*, Baker describes the occupation as a symbolic gesture (Baker p154), instead of a practical one, to prevent the ideological imbalance in the Peninsula and East Asia. When they landed in Korea, the GIs and their leader "had no mandate, no preparation, and no knowledge of the country"

(Baker p152), and only the mission to take over the southern half of the Peninsula from Japan. The lack of knowledge of Korean politics and the intention of building a strong ally soon dragged the Military Government into the local troubles generated by the Japanese occupation. According to Baker's observation in *American Soldiers Overseas*, former Japanese bureaucrats were recruited by Lt. General Hodge to advise the operations of the fledgling authority, since no better candidates in South Korea could be found to support the U.S. military (Baker, p155). The local public was resentful of the new regime's clampdown on progressive organizations, in the same way as they were toward the similar oppressive acts of the previous Japanese rulers. Another problematic heritage of the Japanese occupation was the brothel system, which was kept by the Military Government (Baker, p153). American soldiers' increasing patronization of prostitutes, reaching a peak in 1946, directly led to their corrupted public image in South Korea (Baker, p191). In 1949, the last U.S. troops left South Korea due to the financial burden and the operational hardship of the Military Government, leaving the country to take care of its own defense (Martini, p213).

North Korea's unexpected invasion southward one year later brought Uncle Sam back in the Korean Peninsula. The unprepared American armed forces came from Japan to the rescue of Seoul (Baker, p155), but this time, they came with the commitment to contain the expansion of communism in Asia. The Korean War, engaging the United States and major regional players, not only defined the Asian theater of the Cold War, but also gave birth to the lasting presence of the American military in South Korea. According to data from the CNN Library, in this three-year military confrontation, 36,574 American soldiers died and 103,284 were wounded, while 137,899 South Korean soldiers died and 450,742 were injured (Cable News Network). In 1953, when the Korean War ended with a fragile ceasefire between the north and the south, the U.S. troops

stationed in the Republic of Korea were officially confirmed by the signature of a Mutual Defense Treaty between Seoul and Washington as the United States Forces in Korea with the goal of preventing similar attacks from Pyongyang in the future. The geographical distribution of the American camps emphasized their defensive intent, as most of were constructed along the northern border of the Republic of Korea. The headquarters of the American military installations was situated on the Yongsan base in the suburb of Seoul.

The current U.S. bases in South Korea are less concentrated along the DMZ area after the recent realignment (Lostumbo). As shown in the figure below, the military installations were spread to the four corners of the country, with the capital region still the focus of the greatest concentration of troops. With a population of 28,500 since 2015, the military installations in South Korea are slightly more populous than their counterparts in Okinawa (Lostumbo). The combination of military services in South Korea differs from that in Okinawa as well. Unlike the high concentration of Marines and Navy camps on the Japanese island, U.S. military in South Korea consists mainly of U.S. Army personnel numbering 13,850 in 2015. The only Naval camp in South Korea, the Chinhae base, is located near Busan with only ninety servicemen, according to a 2015 report by the RAND Corporation (Lostumbo). The contrast between the military bases distribution and their population of military personnel in Okinawa and South Korea naturally makes people wonder about the differed significance of the bases in the two locations.




Figure 2 (Lostumbo)



Figure 3 (Lostumbo)

I. Strategic Significance of the U.S. Bases in South Korea

The United States' military installations in South Korea are strategically crucial because they symbolize the American deterrence power in the region and United States' readiness to react to potential crises. Limited by the U.S. military stationed in South Korea, Pyongyang must be more careful when it adopts aggressive acts to avoid backfire; thus, the U.S. military presence would partially stabilize the region. There are four ways that the U.S. camps in South Korea contribute to Washington's strategic interests in Asia. Effective deterrence, which has been mentioned above, is the first one – a short distance to the target is always a valuable benefit. The geographical convenience of the Korean Peninsula has long been discovered by the foreign powers trying to possess it to achieve further geopolitical goals. The Japanese Empire wanted to annex it to go deeper into Manchuria in 1910, and the Soviet Union attempted to turn the Peninsula into one of its allies to eradicate any space for the growth of the U.S. alliance in East Asia beyond the Sea of Japan in 1945. Today, offensive ballistic weapons from the American bases in South Korea, facilitated by their proximity to North Korea, China, and Russia (shown in Figure 2), are able to pose a direct

threat to all three countries that may pose danger to the national security of the Republic of Korea (Lostumbo).

The second strategic contribution of the American troops in South Korea is their participation in the joint military exercises between Seoul and Washington. Such bilateral drills, despite of their peaceful appearances, have actually worked to prevent Pyongyang from randomly demonstrating assertiveness in the Yellow Sea. Similar to those on the island of Okinawa, the U.S. bases in South Korea also help with military transportation during both warfare and peace time, even though such an assistance only serves as a minor feature of the American military presence (Lostumbo).

Lastly, the ultimate purpose of stationing GIs in South Korea is to enable Washington to rapidly react to a war between Seoul and Pyongyang to curb the latter's aggression before the interests of the former are largely compromised. The United States and the Republic of Korea's great concern over a sudden attack from the north is their security consensus, and the DPRK is the shared enemy that strategically unites the two countries. The necessity of the American military presence in South Korea for national defense purpose is also a consensus the Korean government has with its people. According to the Asan Daily Poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2013, 76.9% of the total population who took the survey thought that the stationing of the USFK should be continued, and 59.7% of them considered the American military existence in South Korea as improving the security of the nation (Woo). Unlike the USFK, the USFJ in Okinawa does not have one single prime target like North Korea (to South Korea; instead, the American military installations on the island have been serving Washington's general interests in East Asia.

Anti-Americanism within the public has existed in the Republic of Korea ever since the arrival of the U.S. military in 1945, even before Washington decided to permanently station soldiers in South Korea. For many Koreans, the United States was far from a model of freedom and democracy, and more like an accomplice of the repressive right-wing Korean government before 1987, when the democratic transition eventually took place. In the April Revolution in 1960 and the Kwangju Uprising in 1980, the U.S. military's cooperation with the dictatorial governance of Syngman Rhee and Chun Doo-hwan respectively exacerbated the Korean public's distrust of GIs. However, people's antagonism toward the United States did not necessarily mean that they felt the same way about the American military presence in their country. According to Andrew Yeo's *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, little was known regarding the collective sentiment toward the U.S. bases in South Korea before the collapse of military authoritarianism in 1987, partially due to the lasting governmental repression of public demonstrations against any American entity and the generally perceived necessity of the U.S. forces in the country (Yeo p129). As the voices of people began to be appreciated by the authorities after the real democratization of South Korea, however, the public image of the USFK deteriorated due to the misconduct of the stationed GIs and the military bases.

II. Issues

Military Violence

Like Okinawa, South Korea had its own brutal rape and murder incident, which ignited collective anger toward the military bases. On October 28, 1992, a 26-year-old local prostitute called Kum-i Yun was brutally murdered in a cruel way near Camp Casey in the city of Dongbucheon. She was found with an umbrella in her anus, a glass bottle in her vagina, and laundry detergent spread

over her dead body. The murderer was Kenneth L. Markle, an American private serving in the 2nd Infantry Division of the Camp. An article from the November 23, 1992 edition of the *Stars & Stripes* said that Private Markle was first arrested by Korean police when he returned to the site where he killed the prostitute, and then handed over to the local American military authorities based on the signed bilateral agreement (*Stars & Stripes*).

College students were the first activist group to express their demand that Private Markle be confined by the Korean judiciary rather than directly handed to the U.S. military administration in South Korea. Camp Humphreys near the city of Pyeongtaek was temporarily closed on November 27, 1992 due to a protest held by over 300 students (Lea). Student protests also broke out at Kwangju Air Base, even though only a few American soldiers were stationed there. Four college students from Seoul National University also demanded an apology from the U.S. military for the gruesome deed committed by Markle and staged hunger strikes. Some of the students' demands were realized – the commander of the criminal's division and the USFK both made public apologies, but the request for a pretrial confinement of Markle was declined by the Korean government and the USFK, stating that the designed process described in the bilateral agreement must be performed (*Stars & Stripes*). Markle was not convicted until the next year by a panel consisting of three Korean judges, and he was sentenced to life in prison, but angry students called for execution, chanted “Yankee go home” in the courtroom, and waved banners outside. A *Stars & Stripes* article from the April 15, 1993 edition also indicated the existence of “anti-American sentiment among Koreans who demand[ed] the withdrawal” of the entire USFK (*Stars & Stripes*).

Eight years after the death of Kum-I Yun, another sexual crime was committed against a Korean woman who worked in the “grey area” of the red-light district. Songhi Kim, a 32-year-old

bar waitress, was beaten to death by Spc. Christopher McCarthy in central Seoul in February, 2000. What was special this time was that the criminal escaped from custody in the U.S. military installation. Even though he was sentenced to eight years in a Korean prison, the Korean public was very concerned that the criminal custody regulations in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between Washington and Seoul were effective in punishing GIs who had committed serious crimes. At the same time, the antagonist sentiment against the United States and the public demand for the revision of the SOFA rose rapidly (Steinberg, p288).

The deaths of Kum-i Yun and Songhi Kim and the trial process of Kenneth Markle and Christopher McCarthy unveiled the two main social issues caused by the American military existence in South Korea: one is the commonly perceived flaw of criminal custody rules included in the SOFA, the other is GIs' historical patronization of local military prostitution. Like Okinawans who asked for the local trial of American soldiers who committed crimes against local people outside military bases, Korean protest groups have been attempting to fight for an equal status of South Korea within the framework of the current SOFA since the early 1990s (Kawato, p100). In her book, *Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia*, Yuko Kawato pointed out that the first is the often-lenient treatment of on-duty American military personnel when Koreans were the victims of the crime, while the second one is the Korean authorities' inability to detain the GI suspects until the end of judicial proceedings. A year after the death of Kum-i Yun, protest groups formed a permanent national platform, the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, to carry out the mission to advocate for the revision of the SOFA (Kawato, p102). Civil organizations holding similar beliefs were gradually formed after the murder of the prostitute in 1992, and they adopted

various approaches to engage policymakers from both governments in the revision of the Agreement, such as office visits, letters to officials, press conferences, and public demonstrations. But as Kawato points out in her book, little outcome was obtained through their endeavors.

Kawato listed several reasons for the Korean and American policymakers' refusal to revise. In their views, the SOFA is a fair treaty between two sovereign states, the United States and the Republic of Korea, while a fundamental revision of the Agreement would ruin the "the balance of the needs of the two states." For the American side, GIs who committed crimes are handed to the appropriate Korean agency when the time is appropriate, and no bias has been allowed during the trial of the criminals (Kawato P102-103). Those protest groups against misconduct on the American bases in South Korea, however, were suspected of having financial and ideological links to Pyongyang to undermine the alliance between Washington and Seoul, based on Kawato's interviews with many American and Korean officials. Even though no solid evidence could be provided by the officials Kawato interviewed, she pointed out in her book that the anti-base civil organizations' persuasion approach has failed to work on the policy-makers in South Korea and the United States, and the two parties that have been ironically criticizing each other for harming the national interest.

Military Prostitution

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, American military personnel's involvement in local military prostitution in Korea is another noteworthy conflict between GIs and the Korean public, which could be traced back to the birth time of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea in 1945. When the Korean War brought the United States back to the Korean Peninsula, the great population of refugees, war orphans, and widows after the warfare left American troops stationed in South Korea with an opportunity to easily turn many of them into potential sex

workers to satiate the personal needs of the soldiers (Baker, p156). Besides the participation of former practitioners in the sex industry, recruiters from the U.S. military also went down to severely destructed countryside and rural areas to hire young girls into the group of military sex workers, usually with the appealing promises of employments with decent status and incomes (Baker, p156). In the 1950s, the towns adjacent to the U.S. military camps, or *kijichon*, began to be formed and publically acknowledged, and were populated with trapped young women who found it financially impossible to escape from the exploitation from the owners of bars at where they worked, and themselves morally bankrupt to be received by their traditional families due to their profession (Baker, p156). The military prostitution with a clear target on the American troops was why each of the *kijichons* was born, or in the words of a former GI who was stationed in South Korea, "... it was a town built on prostitution" (Moon, p18). The Itaewon area, where Yun Geum-I was gruesomely tortured and killed by the American Private, and Dongducheon, where five U.S. military bases are situated, are two most famous camptowns and homes of the Korean military prostitution industry.

The significance of GIs' historically close tie with military prostitution in the Republic of Korea, according to Baker, is that the way the sexual patronage had played out is a crucial factor in shaping the Korean perception of the American existence in the Peninsula (Baker, p156). Beyond that, such a controversial relationship has also served as a magnifier which makes the base politics among the United States, the Blue House (the ROK government), and the Korean public clearly presented. A major sudden explosion of collective anger against GIs with their connections with local prostitutes has been lacking; instead, gradual civic engagements and the voices from previous military prostitutes reveal the dark side of the issue behind the bilateral ban on sex trade among the American soldiers stationed in South Korea nowadays.

Both Washington and Seoul were ambivalent until the twenty-first century in their attitude toward American soldiers' frequenting *kijichons* next to their camps for sexual pleasure. Rooted in its traditionally negative perspective of the prostitution industry, the Blue House started with prevention but ended up with regulation before the total prohibition; the Pentagon had never pronounced its actual permission of GIs' merriment-making, but had constantly assisted the Korean government with the regulations of the industry until its renewal of the anti-prostitution plan regarding U.S. overseas military installations in the 2000s.

With the intention to deal with the rampant situation of military prostitution in *kijichons*, Park Chung-hee, the president-to-be at the time, proposed the Prostitution Prevention Law in 1961. This law code theoretically intended to penalize both the sex workers and the customers in the industry, but treated the former targets with harsher punishments. The busted prostitutes would be summoned to courts, held for detention and/or imprisoning, and eventually sent to vocational training, while their male patrons were only fined with a sum of money (Moon, p41). The Law in 1961 regarded military prostitutes as the origin of the problem, but Katharine Moon believes that it was exactly the origin that delayed its implementation to six years later – a total shutdown of the prospering industry highly relevant to the future of the security partnership between the United States and the Republic of Korea would not be diplomatically ideal (Moon, p42). The very next year, the Blue House's prevent strategy was softened into regulations. The combined effort of the Ministries of Justice, Social Welfare, and Interior set up 104 special districts, where prostitution was permitted. Interestingly, when the number of the special districts rose from 104 to 145 in 1964, eighty-nine of them were concentrated in one province accommodating the biggest population of

American troops in the country. Given the vicinity to their potential customers, the 13,000 sex workers in the designated areas had a targeted group: the GIs (Moon, p42).

The Korean authority provided solid reasons for its transition of policy. Firstly, the practitioners in the sex industry could be better protected from the exploitation of pimps in those government-approved regions, thanks to closer governmental supervision. The more vital intention of the Park administration was to effectively prevent major public health crisis, such as the uncontrolled transmission of venereal diseases (VD), from happening (Moon, p42). The strategy of regulations was realized bit by bit in the early-mid 1960s. Several steps were required to be followed by sex workers to acquire their legitimate identification documents to conduct business with American soldiers. First of all, an official registration should be done at local police stations. Practitioners must have a VD card stating their healthy physical condition after their first gynecological and blood examinations at local VD clinic, and a routine of physical checks was needed at their own costs. The ID document and the VD card must be carried around for random investigations. Such a law enforcement was performed by the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Moon, p18). A post-war South Korea was still struggling with its national economy during the 70s, when the contribution of American military camps was even greatly appreciated and depended on by Seoul. Because of its side-effect of earning foreign exchange from GIs, military prostitution was publicly encouraged by the then Minister of Education of the ROK; the immorality of the sex workers suddenly became “the sincerity of girls who have contributed to their fatherland’s economic development” (Moon, p43).

A 1990 study conducted by Cho Hyong and Chang Pilhwa, two prominent scholars of Korean women, concisely concludes the general attitude held by the legislative branch of the Korean

government from 1948 to 1980 toward local military prostitution – it is a “necessary evil” which must be separated from domestic prostitution when put into policy consideration (Moon, p43). The Korean National Assembly’s tepid embrace of the external purpose of the sex industry, according to Cho and Chang, was based on both national defense and economic reasons (Moon, p43). Moon’s observation of fundamental drives of the Korean government to be tolerant and even encouraging toward the American military forces’ patronage of local prostitutes should also be examined. In her *Sex Among Allies*, Moon concludes that besides the extra amount of money earned by Korean sex workers from GIs, it was out of the officials and Korean people’s logic, that prostitutes must be present to shield “respectable” ladies from the dangerous American soldiers – sex workers were more than welcome to view themselves as sacrifices for the national interest (Baker, p157). Moon also further explains the diplomatic function of a robust military prostitution industry during the special era of the American military withdrawal from Asia under the Nixon administration. Deeply concerned by the potential massive departure of American troops from the Korean Peninsula and the following imperative threat from Pyongyang, Seoul attempted to utilize sex workers as “personal ambassadors” to keep the American military existence within South Korea to defend it from “undesirable foreign influence” (Moon, p39). Therefore, the combination of social, economic, and security considerations eventually made the Blue House spared the industry. At the same time, however, the governmental pragmatic goodwill had already buried the seeds of perpetual harm in the heart of those who were urged to compromise their flesh for their fatherland.

The government of the Republic of Korea has never been a single player in the drama with the country’s sex industry; as a dominant power particularly at the very beginning of the Republic, the United States also had many say in the solution search for a proper relationship between its

soldiers with physical needs and the local sex workers right at the door of the soldiers' home. In 1947 when Washington still had absolute control of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, licensed prostitutes were experimentally banned from conducting any sexual trade with GIs, but the trial soon failed to be effective due to the maturity and development of the supply and demand relationship between soldiers and the local prostitutes (Moon, p47). But the United States did not stop shaping the industry to benefit its operations in South Korea.

The five-year Camptown Cleanup Campaign from 1971 to 1976 was regarded as the most significant and influential joint effort of Washington and Seoul to set the naturally disordered prostitution industry in kijichons up in the most beneficial way for the diplomatic and security alliance. The SOFA Joint Committee consisting of high-level officials from both countries worked as the task force of the Campaign, which was a "top-down" implementation of the executive orders. This very movement, besides the broad intention to "[maintain] military discipline and morale" (Moon, p58), targeted the advancement of civil-military relations among the camps and surrounding communities through environmental improvement. The sanitation condition of both the streets and the residents of kijichons was under consideration. During the 70s, what was more fearful than the bleak and deprived image of those camptowns was the wild spread of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) between both parties of the sex business in kijichons. Colonel Henry A. Essex, the Surgeon of the EUSA, pointed out that the peak of the STD transmission was caused by the reduction of American soldiers in the Peninsula under the influence of the Nixon Doctrine, which emphasizes less physical responsibilities from the United States' end to assist the national security of its allies (History). In order to maintain their business and incomes after the partial withdrawal of American troops, Korean prostitutes had to move to new locations where GIs were concentrated.

Many of the mobilized sex workers did not re-register in the new area, and the previous supervision of regulation over the sex workers was damaged by the frequent movement of the prostitutes, many of whom might carry VDs.

The results of the Campaign were satisfactory for both governments. The infrastructure constructions funded by Washington in the shantytowns of kijichons, such as road and public facilities, upgraded the residents' living standard, and the explosion of STDs was put under control with the strengthened registration and physical examination system assisted by the medical personnel and financial support from the United States, just like how it helped South Korea with the VD examination in the 60s with medics (Moon, p78).

With the two governments' indirectly permissive and from time to time encouraging attitude in the past toward military prostitution, as Kawato stated in her *Protest Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia*, the sacrificed women in camptowns had never been the priority for the non-governmental organizations or other types of collective voices with strong focuses on the misbehaviors conducted by American troops (Kawato, p123). It is only when the twenty-first century arrived that non-violent engagements and former practitioners in the sex industry patronized by American military began to reveal the history of local sex workers whose human rights were severely infringed.

Civic engagement against military prostitution jointly but indirectly supported by the governments of the United States and South Korea gradually emerged in the mid-1980s. Women who worked in camptowns' sex industry were the main group for the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like My Sister's Place, Saewoomtuh, and Magdalena House. Internally, they provided counseling sessions for those women whose personal safety was often at the edge of the

cliff; externally, they advocated for the human rights for the prostitutes who were the victim of foreign dominance (Kawato, p122). There were several themes that these civilian groups believed in to guide their daily services: first of all, they considered the American military abuse of Korean women as a vestige of imperialism, which should be eradicated; otherwise, South Korea would still exist as an American colony; secondly, they took the tragic situation of the Korean prostitutes as an symbolization of the oppressed Korean public under the dominance of the United States (Kawato, p122), which was similar to the way Okinawan protestors view the twelve-year-old schoolgirl and themselves under the suppression of the military existence on the island. Instead of adopting public demonstrations, these NGOs preferred constant dialogues with both the Korean and American officials to realize their ultimate goals for the welfare of the sexual victims in the past, even though it has been a mutual consensus between the two countries nowadays, that antiprostitution is one of the foundations of the bilateral security alliance (Kawato, p123) and the history of permissive attitude toward military prostitution for a more effective partnership has been in the past. Besides the required revision of the SOFA regarding its custody rules, these civilian groups also publicly demanded several responsibilities from the Blue House and the USFK. Firstly, social welfare programs must be established for prostitutes working in kijichons. Then, the sex workers in camptowns must be exempted from “government-sponsored STD examinations;” instead, there should be HIV/AIDS tests for American troops, since Korean prostitutes cannot be the only source of diseases. And lastly, GIs are supposed to be educated on sexual violence to refrain tragedy like Yun Geum-i from happening (Kawato, p123).

Entering the new century, previous sex workers serving the American soldiers now ask for their compensations from the Korean government (Evans). According to these senior citizens living

in very underprivileged situations, they demand more social welfare like housing benefits from the government since their past professional experience with prostitution could not secure their latter half of lives, and even though they were not forced by Seoul to enter the industry, they were still disturbed by the fact that the government encouraged the development of brothels in kijichons and “hopped around from one club to another and taught [them] how to deal with G.I.s” (Park). But their endeavor has not been very fruitful, since the society does not view them as forced victim of the military prostitution industry, and the government would only provide support for current sex worker, according to the Anti-Prostitution Act in South Korea.

Environmental Damage

The USFK’s environmental damage in the areas around its military bases was also among the local issues caused by the American military presence on the Peninsula, but they did not attract much public attention until civilian engagements became legitimate under the umbrella of the fledgling Korean democracy. Korean society was first aware of the American military camps’ destruction of its natural resources in the 1990s – reports based on American military whistleblowers’ inside information and the daily experiences of residents who lived nearby the U.S. military bases came out from media to Korean people (Han & Bae, p127). The hallmark of the beginning of the Korean public response to the American military’s environmental damages, a joint research project was conducted by Green Korea United and the National Countermeasure Commission for the Return of Our Land from U.S. Bases, two environmentalist non-governmental organizations, in 1996 to survey the destructions that had been done by the American military over ten years. According to the project’s results, there were at least twenty-three environment-damaging incidents

during the studied period of time, and the levels of contamination of the water and soil around the military camps were above the limits set by the Korean government.

Disturbed by the reality of the polluted nature, neither the Korean public nor the Blue House has started to send out a focused signal to stand against the contamination caused by the American troops. In their “Reality Revealed: U.S. Military Bases, Environmental Impact, and Civil Society in South Korea,” Heejin Han and Yooil Bae argue that the absence of a commonly held, fierce antagonism in Korea against those who polluted the natural resources of the country was caused by the low environmental consciousness of both the public and the government officials, and environment protection’s low priority on Seoul’s governance agenda, compared with those of domestic economic development and national security (Han & Bae, p127). But when South Korea greatly promoted its economy to be one of the Four Asian Tigers through industrialization in the late 1990s, its people started to pay attention to what the GIs were doing to their environment. The 2001 oil spill incident at the U.S. Army Garrison Camp Long near Wonju, for instance, was among a few publicized pollution incidents that touched Korean people’s nerves. Based on a joint investigation between the Korean and American governments afterwards, 200 gallons of jet fuel were leaked due to the damage of the oil supply pipe under the camp, and 72,118 square feet of nearby soil was contaminated.

Various Korean civilian groups have been going back to the history to tracking the USFK-caused environmental incidents in South Korea to the current days. On its website, the National Campaign for Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea published a list of seventeen major pollution incidents conducted by the U.S. military personnel within a seventeen-year duration from 1998 through 2015, which comprehensively records the several types of contamination taking place

around the military bases. Oil spills and leaks, consisting eight of the seventeen cases, were the most common accidents with great potential of adulterating the water source and soil for farming. Illegal disposal of poisonous chemical materials was also on the list. Similar to the American installations in Okinawa, constant noise produced by the daily operations of the U.S. military bases was also among the environmental concerns of the Korean public. (Han and Bae, P127) What is more disturbing for the Korean society is that an increasing frequency of environment-damaging incidents since the 2000s was found by Green United Korea in one of its reports in 2008 – every year there was an average of 8.8 cases of environment-destroying accidents caused by the USFK, and that number increase for almost twice of that from 1990 to 1999 (Green United Korea).

Tolerating other local issues caused by the American military presence in the country, however, the Korean government has been also supporting the public voice and working with non-governmental organizations to deal with USFK on the very issue of the U.S. camps' impact on the nature. The cooperation between the Korean government and civic groups can be found in three typical environmental incidents at the U.S. military installations. (Han and Bae, Kawato) In 2001, polluted water was found around Noksapyeong Station near Yongsan Garrison, which is the headquarters of the U.S. military in the Republic of Korea. The damage of outdated tanks under the military base and the resulted oil spill were believed to be the reasons of the contamination, and over 126,648 square feet of land around the Station was impacted by a type of jet fuel exclusively used by the USFK. According to the research of the Seoul Metropolitan City authority at that time, the soil and the water within the polluted land contained a high degree of poisonous chemicals, such as toluene, benzene, and xylene (Han & Bae, p228). The local government immediately demanded an investigation of the contamination caused by the U.S. military, but USFK did not

respond to the request. It was not until 2013 that the USFK was eventually forced to sit down with a joint panel of Korean governmental officials and environment experts to discuss the severity of the pollution and the possibility of an internal investigation on the camps; “whether there is going to be any ‘remedial measure’ from the United States’ end to be performed to recover the polluted areas” was not yet a topic included in the discussion, even after the combined pressure from the head of the Seoul Metropolitan City and environmentalist NGOs (Han & Bae, p229). The similar oil spill case in 2008 at Camp Kim adjacent to Yongsan Garrison was also included in the 2013 discussion between the two countries under the pressure of intensified criticism from both Korean officials and activist groups (Han & Bae, p229).

The alliance between the Korean government and civilian organizations was illustrated more clearly during the bilateral negotiation regarding the solutions to the underground disposal of toxic chemicals at Camp Carroll back in the late 1970s. The historical misbehavior from the United States, divulged by a former staff members at the Camp in 2011, put the “Korean team” of the public and the officials together via the speculated relationship between the disposed 13,750 gallons of defoliants and the high likelihood of cancer among the residents living near the military installation (Han and Bae, p225). Taking a similar but intensified approach after the whistle was blown, the central government’s ministries, the local authority, and environmentalist non-governmental organizations allied to demand a response from the USFK regarding the pollution incident about thirty years ago. A joint investigation was initiated under much pressure from the Korean side on June 2, 2011, but USFK refused to conduct the investigations on both the water and the soil at the same time, while the Korean Ministry of Environment constantly asked for both to be performed simultaneously. Even though the joint investigation in the end did not yield the expected results for

the Korean government and civic groups, research on the high rate of cancer in the region near Camp Carroll was carried out by the Korean Ministry of Environment without any American assistance to further explore the potential harm of the polluted natural resources to local people in 2012. At the same time, residents and the civilian groups that were previously involved in the negotiation with the USFK kept questioning the validity and credibility of the on-site investigation performed by the American military. The lament of a local resident precisely described the mentality of both the government and the public regarding the USFK's uncooperativeness: "Who in the world lets the accused do the investigation?"

The United States actually showed some dedication to environment protection. Kawato, in her *Protest Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia*, records the actions taken by the United States since the 1990s to demonstrate its concern over the local environment and its obedience to local law codes, particularly those that are relevant to nature conservation. Richard Cheney, former Secretary of Defense under the first Bush presidency, stated in 1989 that there "is no excuse for ignoring the environment" while abiding by the security treaty with the Republic of Korea (Durant). Kawato believes that, during the 1990s, the environmental awareness of the American military in South Korea was actually raised because of the guidance from the Pentagon. After the enlightening era of Korean people's realization of the importance of their nature, the USFK still maintained the same level of commitment to local environment protection; the Korean public found it inadequate, but the very perspective represented by environmentalist civic groups has failed to persuade the USFK to be more willing to follow their suggestions. Two main reasons are mentioned in Kawato's book. Firstly, the American military overseas has been adhering its environmental policy to remedy "known, imminent, and substantial endangerment to human health and safety," and did not regard

their damages to the local environment as violations of such a policy (Kawato, p288); secondly, USFK has never been cooperative in cleaning up the areas where camps used to be located because it has no obligation to restore the land, based on Article IV of the SOFA treaty between the two governments. A discrepancy between the public expectation of the responsibilities of the U.S. military and the USFK's narrow interpretation of the bilateral agreement gave birth to the conflict between the Korean society and the American military on the environmental issues.

III. Conclusion

Facing severe national defense challenge of Pyongyang, Korean people would like to appreciate the critical contribution of USFK to their national defense, and thus have adopted a neutralized request to balance the various costs they have suffered from the foreign military presence, and the security benefits they enjoy. In South Korea, criminal jurisdiction over American military personnel who committed crimes outside the bases and the environmental impacts due to the bases' chemical leakages, like those in Okinawa, have also been the predominant local issues in which the Korean public, the host government in Seoul, and the United States have major roles; however, military prostitution and the prosperity of the sex business in *kijichons* rises to be a more noticeable base-related issue. Koreans in general have been rendering a less vehement response to the costs of the U.S. military bases, which could be observed through both smaller population of participants in the demonstrations (compared to that in Okinawa) and the less antagonist collective demands of, for instance, the correction of GIs' behaviors and the revision of the SOFA instead of asking the stationed troops to depart South Korea. The security consensus between South Korea and the United States has played a protection over the lifespan of the military bases.

Chapter Four: The Republic of the Philippines

The prime era of the Spanish colonialism in the Philippines faded away after its defeat in the Spanish-American War in 1898, and the archipelago was ceded to the United States, a global powerhouse to-be at the time. Like the acts adopted by Washington when it engaged in the affairs of Okinawa and South Korea, American military government was soon established (Yeo, p39). Desperately longing for independence, Filipinos were so disappointed to find their homeland transferred to the United States, another perceived Western colonizer. The poor governance of the U.S. military administration and the rising nationalism against the American custody of the Philippines led to the breakout of the military confrontations between locals and American troops immediately after the withdrawal of Spain (Randolph). The Filipinos failed to win their freedom after three years of the Philippine-American War, but their persistence through various rebellions and guerrilla wars later forced the United States to face the fact that, Philippine independence could not be further delayed (Escalante). The Philippine Independence Act was enacted in 1934 to make a promise, that as an American colony, the Philippines was going to be transformed into an independent nation after a ten-year transition to ensure the successful local adaptation of the American political system – it meant that, given the additional two years for preparation, the Archipelago would be free in 1946 (Congress).

Hostility between the Philippines and the United States was replaced by alliance during the Japanese occupation era from 1942 through 1945. Without major resistance from the unprepared Filipino and American troops, the Imperial Army annexed the Philippines soon after its attack on Pearl Harbor. Local guerilla groups including the Nation's Army Against the Japanese Soldiers (the Hukbalahap, or the “Huks”) led the most effective fights against Japanese troops, thanks to the

forests and the mountainous topography of the islands (Baker, p111). Unable to directly contribute to the warfare, the United States secretly reinforced the guerilla groups through financial and supply support transported from surrounding American military facilities in Australia and Okinawa (Dexter). Yeo points out in his *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests* the sentiment General MacArthur and the American people felt about the defeat in the Philippines to Japanese – the loss of the war and the humiliation of the Bataan Death March in 1942, in which 60,000 to 80,000 American and Philippine prisoners of war were forced by Japanese to walk over 100 kilometers in three months to their concentration camp, kept reminding Americans to win the Philippines back for the death of their fellow countrymen (Yeo, p41). Arthur I. Cyr and Spencer Tucker state in their “*Collaboration*” collected in *World War II: The Essential Reference Guide*, that the alliance between the Philippines and the United States was trusted by local people (Cyr; Tucker), because of not only Washington’s guarantee of independence years ago, but also Japan’s cruel exploitation of the colonized population – men were required to perform unbearable punitive works, while women were forced to serve as prostitutes at brothels to “comfort” the Japanese soldiers (McMullen).

One year after the United States’ recapture of the Philippines, the Republic of the Philippines was officially recognized by Washington as an independent country in 1946 as promised. A Treaty of General Relations was soon signed by the two sovereign states on July 4 in the same year, and it entails a specific clause regarding the previously stationed U.S. military facilities in the Philippines. The first sentence of Article I writes:

“The United States of America agrees to withdraw and surrender, and does hereby withdraw and surrender, all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty existing and exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and the people of the Philippine Islands,

except the use of such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, as the United States of America, by agreement with the Republic of the Philippines, may deem necessary to retain for the mutual protection of the United States of America and of the Republic of the Philippines”. (United Nations Treaty Series)

This clause indicates that it had been mutually understood that it would be legitimate for Washington to maintain its absolute control of American soldiers and military installations scattered around the Archipelago; in the later section of the Treaty, such an arrangement is explained to function “for the mutual protection of the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines” (United Nations Treaty Series).

Such a qualification in the Treaty, however, was not Washington’s first step to secure its existing military bases in the Philippines. In her *American Soldiers Overseas*, Baker mentioned that the collection of islands surrounded by the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean had been designated by the United States as a prime location for base establishment even before the Philippines was won back from the Japanese Empire, and a collaboration intention was heard from Manila as well (Baker, p.113). In 1945, President Sergio Osmena of Commonwealth of the Philippines (the legitimate regime before the independence, which evolved into the Republic of the Philippines) granted the United States the exclusive right to station soldiers in its existing camps on the islands; in exchange, reconstruction aid was demanded from Washington to advance the domestic development of the fledgling Republic (Baker, p.113).

The major U.S. military installations in the Republic of the Philippines were developed upon either the Spanish military facilities acquired during the Spanish-American War, or those which were constructed by the United States after the War. The minor ones around them were later built to support the increasing material needs of those multi-functional camps. The U.S. Naval Base Subic

Bay, located in Olangapo, and Clark Air Base on Luzon Island are two most well-known American military camps in the Philippines, and each of them represents a separate category of origin.

The Subic Bay Base under the U.S. military's administration grew out of the naval facilities left by the Spanish regime. In 1885, Arsenal de Olangapo, the original base designed by the Spanish Navy, was constructed. Besides the establishment of the base, artillery was added at the east and west ends of the base and Grande Island across the bay. Thirteen years after the construction, the U.S. Navy seized Arsenal de Olangapo without receiving substantial resistance from the enemy – the troops stationed in the Spanish garrisons did make much effort to fight against the U.S. invasion (Baker, p.128). The ultimate surrender of the Spanish soldiers marked the end of the Spanish control over the naval base, and ushered in its American era. During World War II, the U.S. Congress assisted the Subic Bay Base with funds to strengthen the stationed troops' capacity to defend the colony from the Japanese expansionism. At the same time, additional soldiers were deployed to the Base from Shanghai to reinforce the soldier population. Unfortunately, all of this support failed to prevent the invasion of Japanese troops into Southeast Asia. The sovereignty of the Subic Bay Base was again transferred to Japan when most U.S. armed forces were captured or killed in the Philippines, and anti-aircraft artilleries and automatic weapons were installed to better secure the critical Base. (Baker, p.128) Washington returned as owner of the Subic Bay Base when the Japanese occupation era ended and the Philippines was about to be nominally liberated from colonialism in 1945. Since then, the Base was transformed into a host station of submarines and motor torpedo boats – a naval supply depot was constructed in 1945 and the Naval Air Station Cubi Point 1951 (Baker, p.128).

Clark Air Base has more American origin. The prototype of the base, Fort Stotsenburg, was among the group of garrisons that were built by Americans in the Philippines during and after the Spanish-American War (Baker, p.112), but the maintenance of its military capabilities has not been the priority since that War ended, which provided a vulnerable target for the Imperial Air Force of Japan. A group of American aircraft were stationed together at Clark Field, which was a part of Fort Stotsenburg (Baker, p.112), but without receiving any emergency warning, most of them were destroyed by the Japanese raid nine hours after its attack on Pearl Harbor, before they could be transported to a safe place. The eradication of Japanese troops in the Philippines and the independence of the former American colony led to a “building boom” on the Base – both military facilities and infrastructures were improved. Barracks and operational and storage buildings were erected, while non-military facilities, including postal offices, outdoor movie theaters, a golf course, and cafeterias were also constructed (Baker, p.113). Clark Air Base gradually grew into its full size.

Containing the reference to the United States’ right to keep its military installations in the Philippines and its authority over those camps in the Treaty of General Relations, the specific Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States was signed in March, 1947 (RPUSMBA). Within the Agreement, detailed rules regarding both parties’ responsibilities and rights are included, and as Baker states in her book, they gave “the U.S. forces extremely favorable terms at a small and easily bearable cost” (Baker, p.114). According to the first settled version of the Agreement, Washington had to pay no rent for its utilization of Philippine land as military installations, and the period of use was ninety-nine years. In the appendix of the Agreement, twenty-three American military facilities are included as the locations where the Agreement would apply to, which means that 250,000 hectares of Philippine territory were given

free for almost a century (Simbulan, p.23). Clark Air Base serves the U.S. Air Force, and the Subic Bay Base serves the U.S. Navy; even though the Army did not stay in the Philippines, the other twenty-one installations fall into the hands of either USAF or USN. The U.S. government's extraterritorial jurisdiction over the camps, as discussed in the United States - Japan Status of Forces Agreement and the United States - South Korea Status of Forces Agreement, was also mentioned in the MBA with the Philippines. American military personnel who needs to be tried for his/her crimes in the Philippines were most likely to fall under American military jurisdiction. Additionally, those Filipino citizens who threaten the security of the bases or commit base-related crimes also fall under American military jurisdiction (Berry, p.56).

But the Agreement was edited in the following decades after the signature, and its evolution accompanied the development of relations between Manila and Washington. In Yeo's *Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests*, he concludes that from 1947 through 1991, there were at least forty amendments created, targeting the Philippines' unequal status in the Agreement (Simbulan, p.23). All these added articles changed the Agreement, which originally greatly favored the United States, to diminish the leverage of Washington over base-related affairs and answer increasing demands from Manila to protect its national interests. The 1956 Garcia-Bendetsen conference between Philippine Vice-President Carlos Garcia and U.S. Under Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen further discussed the issue of jurisdiction in the U.S. bases, but failed to reach an accord; however, Washington began to recognize Manila's sovereignty over the territories occupied by bases. In 1959, the City of Olongapo, which was then an American territory adjacent to the Subic Bay Base, was officially turned over to administration of the Philippine government (Baker, p.133). At the very end of the presidency of Diosdado Macapagal in 1964, Article XIII of the Agreement was

discussed and revised in favor of the Philippines: the United States would have to renounce exclusive jurisdiction over the on-base offenses, and a criminal jurisdiction committee consisting of personnel from both governments would jointly try the criminals. One of the most crucial amendments to the Agreement, the Ramos-Rusk Agreement, signed in 1966 under the Marcos administration, reduced the ninety-nine-year tenure of the United States' rent-free utilization of the Philippine territories to twenty-five years, which laid the foundation for the intense debate in 1991 regarding the continuation of the American military presence in the Philippines (Berry, p.23). In 1979, the Romulo-Murphy Exchange of Notes between Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Richard Murphy brought the nominal control of the American military bases back to the Philippines. Manila symbolically took back the authority over the U.S. military existence also through the establishment of a Philippine base commander at each base, flying the national flag of the Philippines separately in the bases along with the Stars and Stripes, and the Philippine government's new obligation to take care of the security along the bases' perimeter (Berry, p.23). Furthermore, during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, Washington even agreed to provide \$500 million in security assistance over a period of five years from 1979 through 1984 (Berry, p.23).

Behind the symbolic concession of the United States were the evolving presidencies of an independent Philippines after 1946. Considering the governance of President Ferdinand Marcos as a watershed, we can view the history of the Philippines – U.S. engagement in the base issue in three periods: pre-Marcos (1946 – 1965), Marcos (1965 – 1986), and post-Marcos (1986 – 1991). The first five Philippine administrations before the election of Ferdinand Marcos shared several characteristics in their interactions with the United States and the approach of governance (Kawato,

p.130). Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos P. Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal, during their presidencies, all relied on the United States as a donor and frequently requested economic assistance to fulfill their plans for domestic economy; meanwhile, under their governance, the Philippines was a loyal ally of the United States in the combat against the expansion of communism in Asia, and the ideology of anti-communism had been the priority of the Philippine governments (Kawato, p.131). Besides their stable diplomatic relationship with Washington in both functional and ideological ways, the five presidents before Marcos in general abided by the Constitution of, and contributed to the democracy of the young, independent Republic, and improved the living standard of Filipinos through effective infrastructure building and other productive policies.

The twenty-one-year presidency of Ferdinand Marcos stands out from those of his counterparts in the past and the future because of not only the surprising longevity of his government, but also the negative impacts he had on the country. He was a dictator who enacted Martial Law from 1972 to 1981 to silence social unrest, a human rights violator who practiced cruel methods of oppression targeting dissent, and a politician who tramped the Philippine democracy by cheating in the elections and revised the Constitution to make his re-election possible (Rivett). However, Marcos maintained the traditional anti-communism, pro-American stance, thus ensuring a strong ideological alliance with the United States. The Marcos administration experienced five U.S. presidents, and had active interactions with three of them, which gradually helped Washington confirm the Philippines as a military and ideological partner.

The base issue in the Philippines was critical for the Johnson administration due to the indispensable contributions the American bases on the Islands could provide to assist in fighting

the Vietnam War. To praise the cooperation of the Marcos government regarding the military support, \$80,000,000 aids were sent to the Philippines after the Vietnam War. Even though President Johnson did not feel proud of Marcos' Martial Law and his dictatorial governance, he did not cut off the financial aid (Baker, p.116). Compared to predecessor, President Jimmy Carter was definitely more disturbed by the Philippine tyrant's poor human rights record (Baker, p.117). From 1977 through 1981, Marcos was asked to improve human rights in his country before any renegotiation related to the bases. Even though Baker made it clear that Marcos did not substantially achieve the human rights improvement required by Carter, the dictator's request for a smaller physical American military presence in the country and financial assistance was satisfied (Baker, p.117). During the Carter administration, the occupied area by both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Base was reduced, while some minor supporting military facilities were totally eradicated, and 100,000 acres of land was returned to the Philippines (Baker, p.117). President Reagan was the last American leader whose presidency overlapped with that of Ferdinand Marcos, but because these two presidents shared strong sentiment against communism and Reagan's tough position against the communist world led by the Soviet Union, the ideological bond between Manila and Washington was very prominent from 1981 to 1985 (Baker, p.118). Such a strengthened alliance, however, was perceived by the Philippine public as the U.S. cooperation with the dictator. The assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., one of the major political rivals of Ferdinand Marcos, in 1983 brought public anger toward the government-led oppression to a peak, and the Reagan administration's inactivity and tolerance of Marcos' tyranny gradually reduced the Filipino public's loyalty and connection to the United States and the American troops in the Philippines who represented the United States. After the assassination of Aquino, demonstrations were held in front of the U.S. Embassy in Manila

to protest the evil “collaboration” of the two countries (Baker, p.121). The fleeing of Marcos to Hawaii and all his failed attempts to stay in power before the departure successfully aggregated the public anti-America and anti-base sentiments, and the new Aquino government, elected by popular demand, and its promise to renegotiate the compensation package for the U.S. military bases also encouraged the sentiment (Baker, P121). Four years after the collapse of the Marcos government, the U.S. military was officially out of the Philippines.

The complete withdrawal of American troops in 1991 was actually prompted by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, an active volcano on the east side of the Luzon Island. On June 15, 1991, the volcano, about ten miles west of Clark Air Base, started to erupt, generating avalanches of hot ash and gas and a cloud of volcanic ash (USGS). After the eruption, the Base was covered by a thick layer of the ash; the torrential rains that followed turned the ash into mud, which eventually made the Base “inoperable” (Baker, p.128). Clark Air Base was officially given up by the U.S. military in mid-July in the same year due to the difficulty of renovation.

The Subic Bay Base was also on the verge of being removed. When the United States proposed a cut in the use fee for the Naval Base from \$360 million to \$203 million, the Philippine Senate refused the proposal and cast a final vote on the continuation of the American military bases in the country, and a simple majority of 12-11 formally ended a four-hundred-year era of foreign military stationed in the Philippines (Oberdorfer).

I. Good Old Days, Current Relevance, and Strategic Significance

Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Base, at the prime time of the American military presence in the Philippines, were the largest U.S. overseas military posts. With a total population of 38,550, including 15,500 military personnel, the two bases served multiple purposes – maritime logistic

support, staging area provision, fueling, facility repairing, soldiers training, military communications, ammunition and supply storing, and rest & recreation (Yeo, p.39). The two main bases also had their own specific assignments. The Subic Bay Base served as the prime port, training, and logistic hub for the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet and the land base for the strike force of the Seventh Fleet. Clark Air Base functioned as the home to the U.S. Thirteenth Air Force, which was the “tactical arm of the USAF in the West Pacific and Indian Ocean,” and the staging point for the strategic airlifts in the Indian Ocean (Yeo, p.39).

Even though the forced departure from the Philippines made the U.S. armed forces lose absolute control of strategically critical military posts, the close tie between the two countries based on mutual need kept American troops still relevant to the territory of the Philippines. Eight years after the Philippine Senate’s vote in 1991, the Republic of the Philippines – United States Visiting Force Agreement (VFA) was signed to make the regional navigation of the American military more convenient. According to the Agreement (Chan Robles), American troops would be allowed in the Philippines temporarily with Manila’s acknowledgement, and again, they are protected under American jurisdiction. The Agreement also paved the way for the annual military exercises jointly held by the United States and the Philippines. Recorded in a report conducted in 2007 by Focus on the Global South, a transnational alternative policy group headquartered in Bangkok, the frequency of the joint exercises inflated greatly after the VFA signature in 1999, and since 2002, about seventeen to twenty-four exercises took place annually. In 2006, both governments announced that thirty-seven exercises would be jointly held throughout the year (Docena). A Philippine participant in the VFA commission revealed Manila’s mindset on welcoming GIs back: the stability of the seas surrounding the Philippines requires U.S. protection (Gutierrez & France-Presse). Washington also

had been giving positive responses. From 2001 through 2007, U.S. warships had frequented various docks along the coasts of the Philippines, according to the same Focus on the Global South report – Subic Bay was visited twenty times, Manila five times, Leyte Island three times, and one-time visits were evenly distributed around the country (Docena).

In 2012, the Philippine government voluntarily welcomed American troops to use the Subic Bay out of fear of expanding Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta stated that U.S. troops, ships and aircraft could employ the old bases, as long as there was Manila's permission (Tritten). A report by *Sidney Morning Herald* in 2012 also showed that Manila seemed prepared to semi-permanently host American ships, Marines, and aircrafts at the Subic Bay Base (Murdoch).

At the end of the Obama administration in 2016, an agreement was signed by the governments to partially solidify the security aspect of the U.S. President's "Pivot to Asia" grand strategy. Through the agreement, American military troops would be permanently stationed in five military posts in the Philippines: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Air Base, Fort Magsaysay, Lumbia Air Base, and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base. "Permanent logistics facilities [would also be constructed] to support rotational deployments [in the Asia-Pacific Command]," said a U.S. official (Tilghman).

U.S. Senator Alfred J. Beveridge in 1990 concluded the strategic exclusiveness of the collection of Philippine Islands and the necessity of American military existence on them: "The Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East. Lines of navigation from our ports to the Orient and Australia; from the Isthmian Canal to Asia; from all Oriental ports to Australia, converge at and separate from the Philippines. They are a self-supporting, dividend-paying fleet, permanently

anchored at a spot selected by the strategy of Providence commanding the Pacific” (Schirmer and Shalom, P704-711). But the Archipelago are also exclusive in other strategic regards.

The Republic of the Philippines is special among the regional U.S. allies, even though there seem to be alternatives to host U.S. military (Docena). Hosting U.S. military installations, Indonesia would be unlikely to allow more American military existence on its islands, given its government’s criticism of Washington’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. As one of the most loyal partners of the United States, however, Australia is too remote to host potential bases for rapid reaction to emergencies in Southeast Asia; plus, certain types of vessels are not technically able to pass through Torres Straits between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Singapore has a very convenient location for regional security navigation, but its small size limits large-scale operations. Malaysia should not be further considered since it has declared never to allow American troops to be stationed in the Malacca strait. The most pro-China member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand might not be a trustworthy partner, even though its military facilities are accessible to Washington. Vietnam, the neighbor of Thailand, has also refused US request for access (Docena).

The unique military capacities of the Philippine bases, particularly Subic Bay Naval Station, that have been formed through the years are another reason it would be hard for the United States to let them go. In his book, Yeo mentions the indispensability of the naval supply depot at Subic Bay, pointing out that it served as “a logistics hub for all naval forces between Hawaii and the Persian Gulf” (Yeo, p.39). A House of Representatives document shows that Subic Bay is one of the two rare, natural, deep-water ports in the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean that are capable of supporting U.S. aircraft carriers and air wing support facilities (United States Congress). The natural gift is just too precious to be easily given away.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford Jr. also concluded about the value of the major U.S. camps in the Philippines in 1991 during a testimony, that “no single site would be capable of assimilating all the functions that are presently conducted in the Philippines” (United States Congress). He definitely had a point – the combination of the convenient geographical location, the inherent support of military actions, and the decades of development upon the installations and the country are exactly why the islands mean so much for Washington and its regional, even global strategy.

II. Issues

American troops had no honeymoon with Philippine people after their arrival. After the 1898 Spanish-American War on the Philippine islands, locals soon found the desired independence nonexistent, and the United States to be the replacement for the defeated Spanish colonizers (Baker). The collapse of Spanish domination encouraged Philippine nationalism and woke up the public’s awareness for the necessity of independence. These two emerging public sentiments have been working as the fundamental drives of the major public responses of Filipinos to the American military presence in the Republic of the Philippines (Baker, p.120). From the signature on the Military Bases Agreement in 1946 through the departure of GIs forty-five years later, the Philippine people’s active engagement in politics gradually became one of the critical determinants capable of shaping Manila’s policy-making (Lutz, p.145), even though the development of a Philippine civil society was once severely and intentionally deterred by the national leadership. Therefore, the conflicts between American bases and Philippine society in the post-American occupation era began to be further exposed through the articulated challenges from the public to test the security partnership between Washington and Manila.

Nationalist politicians and leftist groups, according to the chapter on the anti-base protests in the Philippines in Kawato's *Protests against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia*, took the initiative to call the original version of the Agreement into question from the end of WWII to the mid-1960s. Their concerns were targeting on the MBA's inequality between the two countries, since the treaty favored the U.S. military over the Philippines (Baker, p.114). A shut-down of the American military installations in the Philippines, however, was not among the goals of the activists, who acknowledged the contribution of the U.S. military to the national defense of the fledgling Republic through those overseas posts. Their endeavor did not go very far, for the nationalists and leftists succeeded neither in mobilizing the generally pro-America and pro-base public, nor inserting themselves in the policy-making process (Kawato, p.129).

The First Wave

The first major wave of collective response in the Philippines to the American military existence emerged at the very end of the Macapagal administration in late 1964 and early 1965. The time was highly sensitive for the nation, since the protests took place right before the general presidential election, in which incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal and his Nacionalista rival Ferdinand Marcos were competing for the presidency. Two incidents involving American military personnel and local people triggered the public anger. On November 25, 1964, a sixteen-year-old Filipino was shot and killed by U.S. Airman Larry Cole within the Crow Valley Gunnery Range affiliated to Clark Air Base. The Range, designated by the U.S. Air Force and the Philippine Air Force for strafing and bombing practice, was among the restricted areas that were off-limit to unauthorized Philippine civilians. But financially challenged locals used to enter region for scrap metal and empty ammunition shell to use as additional sources of income (Kawato, p.128), and the

victim might be doing the same work. When he fired the bullet at the local, Cole was off-duty and “hunting for birds,” even though it was part of his on-duty responsibilities to guard the range. The other incident took place at Subic Bay Base on December 13, in which another local Filipino was killed by two marines on sentry duty. Based on the information provided by the marines, the victim was shot because his boat was approaching the restricted area of ammunition storage (Kawato, p.128).

The rage of the public and particularly students and professors was suddenly lit. On December 27, 1964, around two thousand Philippines gathered in Angeles City, where Clark Air Base was situated, to protest the crimes the U.S. soldiers committed against Philippine civilians (Kawato, p.129). An article of the *Chicago Tribune* on the same day reported that the organizers of the protest requested U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to “recall ‘ugly Americans’ from the Philippines and to compensate the families of the two dead Filipinos” (*Chicago Tribune*). After a month, around one thousand students and faculty members of the University of the Philippines demonstrated in front of the U.S. Embassy in Manila on January 22, 1965; only three days later, another demonstration was held with five thousand participants again in front of the Embassy (Kawato, p129). The public anger and demands were delivered through the placards raised by angry protesters heading to the U.S. Embassy – emphatic languages, such as “Remove all bases,” “Revise bases treaty,” and “Americans, are you friend or foe?” were written on the boards, and according to the reports of the *Manila Times*, a cardboard Uncle Sam with the label “U.S. imperialism” was also burned by protesters in front of the Embassy (Kawato, p.129).

The Military Bases Agreement, and particularly its provision regarding the U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Philippines, was the main target of the series of public demonstrations in the Philippines since, in the eyes of those who took to the streets, the treaty had

greatly violated the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines and served as an extension of Washington's neo-colonialism (Kawato, p129). With a specific goal, some of the protesters galvanized by the two deaths of their fellow countrymen in 1964 demanded an immediate renegotiation of the Agreement to grant Manila exclusive jurisdiction over crimes involving American military personnel and Philippine civilian victims regardless of duty status and location of crimes, while others went one step further to request an abrogation of the Agreement and the withdrawal of American troops in the Philippines (Kawato, p130). Kawato argues that this collection of anti-base protests as a historical progress in the anti-base movement in the Philippines, since they were among the first wave of mass-based public demonstrations directly against the presence of American troops since the establishment of the Republic in 1946 (Kawato, p.130).

But the two normative arguments of the vehement public feedback, one concerning the Philippines' disadvantage under the criminal jurisdiction provisions inscribed in the Military Bases Agreement, the other concerning the threatened national dignity, failed to persuade President Macapagal to close the U.S. bases. Besides his ideology-based support of the American military presence in his country, Macapagal was afraid that the vacuum left by the departure of American troops was going to be filled by domestic communist groups; plus, Macapagal's observation of the Philippine nationalism was recorded in his autobiography, *From Nipa Hut to Presidential Palace*: "I have always felt that nationalism that does not extend to chauvinism is a dynamic force in the building of a prosperous and great nation. Nationalism is, however, not to be shouted as a slogan from the rooftops" (Macapagal, p.89). The credibility of the protestors was also questioned by the policy makers in Manila: the leftist groups, who participated in the anti-base/anti-imperialism movement were suspected by the Macapagal administration of being inspired by communism. As

the general election approaching, however, Macapagal was forced to manage the criminal jurisdiction issues, since the administration's inaction to social complaints would not benefit his possibility of being re-elected, and the pressure from both concentrated protests and the legislative branch of the government pushed for a change in the base policy (Matsumiya, p.68). The report conducted by the Philippine Secretary of Justice Salvador Mariño during the Macapagal administration further cornered the incumbent president to request an amendment to the Agreement (Matsumiya, p.68). In the published report, Secretary Mariño compared the MBA between the United States and the Philippines to the SOFA between the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, and as Kawato concludes in her book, Mariño found that his country enjoyed fewer jurisdictional rights over Philippines than the NATO countries over their citizens, and Washington grabbed the jurisdiction over Philippines, but not over the NATO countries (Kawato, p.130). Before he was defeated by Marcos in the election, an amendment on criminal jurisdiction was added to the MBA in 1965.

The Second Wave

The second wave of anti-base public response started almost ten years before the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 under the Marcos presidency, and survived, even thrived during Martial Law. From 1972 through 1981 in the Philippines, political protests were prohibited, dissents and critics of the government were imprisoned and tortured, and media like newspaper, radio, and television stations were also shut down, if they were perceived to be critical of Manila (Kawato, p.133). The gradual formation of Marcos' authoritarian regime, along with the United States' tolerance mentioned previously, touched the nerve of conservative nationalists and leftist nationalists, who consisted of professionals in various fields of the society

(Kawato, p.134), and eventually evolved as the most consistent oppositionist to the bases (Yeo, p.41).

The civil organizations generated by professionals, college students, workers, peasants and businessmen for self-interests promotion from mid-1960s to early 1970s paved the way for the establishment of the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism, a nationwide nationalist campaign, in February, 1967. After this busy period of group forming and the fermentation of national dignity, a collection of nationalist public demonstrations, named the First Quarter Storm afterwards, was held by college students, workers, intellectuals and peasants in the national capital against the Marcos' authoritarian governance and the U.S. neo-colonialism. On February 18, 1970, around five thousand militant activists at first gathered at Plaza Miranda, the center of Philippine political discourse in Manila, and then marched toward the U.S. Embassy (Kawato, p.131). Described as a "wanton vandalism" in Jose Lacaba's *Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm & Related Events*, the protestors basically trashed the Embassy, and rocks were employed by the activists to destroy its lobby (Lacaba, p.20, p.157). Eight days later, the U.S. Embassy was visited again by the Movement for a Democratic Philippines militants, who started their protesting march from the Sunken Garden in Manila. Lacaba recorded in his book, that the activists once again stoned the Embassy, and even fought against the policemen (Lacaba, p11-45, 157-178).

Political societies were not discouraged by Martial Law – opposition leadership from different industries in the Philippines still resorted to civil engagement to stand against the U.S. bases. The Workers Party (*Lapiang Manggagawa*) and the Free Association of Peasants (*Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka*) were respectively founded by the labor sector and farmers, and priests and nuns also participated in the anti-Marcos and anti-base movement by condemning the social degradation in the camptowns, including prostitution, STDs, drug use, and alcoholism (Kawato,

p133). Strongly influenced by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), college students became an indispensable part of the movement, and nationalist groups like the National Youth (*Kabataang Makabayan*) were established (Kawato, p,133). Even under Martial Law, they still held protests in addition to the more discreet approach of society forming. For instance, in January, 1979, three hundred and fifty university students, hailing from thirty schools in the Metro Manila area and nearby provinces organized and performed an anti-base campaign in the national capital (Kawato, p.133).

The purpose of the combined public response of civilian groups organizing and public demonstrations in the era of Martial Law was twofold: to eradicate the American military presence and to oppose Marcos' dictatorship. In their books, Roland G. Simbulan and Herbert Docena respectively explained the slightly varied mentality behind leftist nationalists' and conservative nationalists' endeavor. For the political left in the Philippines, American military installations were the agents of the U.S. imperialism ever since the end of WWII and the sites for "counterinsurgency operations and direct and indirect repression against Filipinos," while the Marcos authority served as the puppet of the American neo-colonialism in the Philippines (Simbulan, p.35). Conservative nationalists shared the frontier with their progressive counterpart because they disagreed with the domestic policies of the Marcos administration and disdained Washington's utilization of its support for Marcos to trade for control over the military bases in the Philippines (Docena). However, both parties also shared some common ground - it was mutually acknowledged that Washington supported the dictatorship of Marcos just to secure its military presence (Kawato, p.133), and that the American contribution to the Philippine national defense was no longer necessary due to the

Philippines' absence of external threats, but GIs permanently stationed on the islands would be likely to attract the attack from enemies of Washington (Lutz, p.148).

Not a fan of political pluralism, Ferdinand Marcos unsurprisingly refused to be persuaded by the public voices to terminate the Military Bases Agreement and the American camps. The protesters' credibility was again doubted by the policy maker, only this time the two sides were standing even farther away from each other (Kawato, p.135). From his end, Marcos did not voluntarily plan any change to his base policy, since his absolute control of the policy-making mechanism and the intended lack of opinions guaranteed no opposition to his decisions. The Carter administration, however, still granted the Philippines six symbolic concessions at the end of the 1979 negotiation regarding the treaty, to assist with the building of Marcos' pro-nationalism public image to win him more support – for Washington, it was a strategic rebalance between its bases interest in the Philippines and the stability of the Marcos regime, which still partially depended on popularity (Kawato, p.136). Thus, a win-win deal was made between Manila and Washington: the Philippines shall have more criminal jurisdiction over the American military personnel-involved cases, the security around the U.S. bases would be taken care by the Philippines, the MBA would be reviewed every five years, a nominal Philippine commander with limited power would be assigned to each base, the Philippine sovereignty over the American military installations was confirmed, and to the excitement of the nationalists in the Philippines, their national flag would be flying separately at bases (Kawato, p.131).

The Third Wave

The last wave of public response to the American military presence appeared at the bases' twilight in 1990 and 1991, during the Philippine American Cooperation Talks (PACT) regarding

the continuation of the bases. Under “Cory” Aquino’s presidency, the Philippine Senate has been empowered by the 1987 amended Constitution to have greater leverage in base politics, since any new treaty between Washington and Manila requires the Senate’s approval by a two-third majority, instead of a simple majority (Yeo, p.50). The bigger role of the Senate later determined the future path of the country’s security partnership with the United States.

The Military Bases Agreement between the United States and the Philippines was going to officially expire on September 16, 1991; before the expiration date, it would be the Philippine Senate’s responsibility to vote on an ultimate decision. But in a Philippines of post-Marcos age, the restoration of civil society had allowed people’s organizations to further impact policy making in Manila. The Anti-Treaty Movement (ATM), a broad coalition consisting of nongovernmental organizations, people’s groups, student groups, religious societies, and other traditionally anti-base organizations which had been fighting for the eradication of the American military presence, was gradually emerging nationwide as the treaty negotiation process was about to start since late 1990. Organized by the left activists in the National Democratic Front and based on the activism platforms years ago, the ATM attracted a very diverse collection of supporters, including individual political and community leaders, peace and environmental advocates, female rights activists, college students, religious leaders, scholars, and labor rights activists (Yeo, p.51).

The Movement did not adopt the conventional approach to take their abstract demand to streets, but first narrowed down the goal of “anti-base” to “anti-Treaty” to concentrate energy to prevent the continuance of American troops stationed in the Philippines. In Yeo’s interview with Lidy Nacpil, a leftist Philippine economist and activist who previously participated in the student movement during Marcos’ presidency, Nacpil stated that “to frustrate the extension of the life of the

bases, this Treaty [had to] be junked” (Nacpil), and the defeat of the Treaty equaled a defeat for the bases (Yeo, p.52).

After the target was specified, the Movement took a hybrid strategy of lobbying political elites and mobilizing the masses, while strictly following the government’s base policy-making process, even amid a noticeably growing public sentiment for the continuation of the American military in the Philippines. According to the *Social Weather Report Survey, 1987-1991* conducted by the Social Weather Station, until July 1991, forty-four percent of respondents supported the continuation of American military bases, and less than ten percent of them opted for immediate withdrawal of the U.S. military (Miranda). The first step of the Movement organizers was to understand the stances of senator on the base issue, target on those who might swing, and maintain support from those who would definitely object to the extension (Yeo, p.53). The knowledge of senators’ potential votes was gathered through the informal survey held by Senate President Jovito Salonga on February 21, 1991 to assess their opinions; to the Movement’s advantage, most the group were against the bases (Yeo, p.54).

As Yeo put in his book, the ATM then succeeded in “[penetrating] the state.” Three members of the Manila establishment were actively engaged in the advocacy for the Movement to broaden its credibility. Senator Wigberto “Bobby” Tañada, who inherited the anti-base spiritual legacy from his father, assisted the Movement with the update of inside information of the Senate (Simbulan), according to Simbulan, the previous senior political consultant to the Senator; Senator Juan Ponce Enrile and Senator Joseph Estrada then helped boost the popularity and the credibility of the anti-base coalition by publicly advocating for the Movement (Yeo, p.57). In fact, besides the special contribution of the three senators, the general participation of the part of the senators in the ATM

also delivered a message to the public, that it is an unprecedented civil engagement in the Philippine politics that went beyond leftism (Tañada).

The Movement's mass action task force was initiated on March 16, 1991. ATM leaders travelled around various regions of the country, holding presentations and developing forums to inform people on the necessity of the withdrawal of the American troops, and of Philippine citizens' interests related to it. Different types of literature, including pamphlets and primers, were also spread by affiliated anti-base groups like the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). Beyond the national tour information distribution, the Movement also held anti-base rallies in Manila and provinces on Luzon Island to raise the public awareness about bases. At the same time, the Aquino government was going through the procedure of formally signing a New Treaty in Manila. Since the submission of New Treaty for Senate Ratification on April 1, the Movement's lobbying and mass action intensified, and it lasted until voting day. In September, Senate President Jovito Salonga cast the last ballot against the extension of the existing U.S. military base in the Philippines, and a 12-11 margin in the Philippines Senate eventually ended the forty-four years of American military presence in the country. The Anti-Base Movement's contribution to the anti-base camp's final triumph was immense – as the Philippine Secretary General Socorro Diokno commented in an interview: “If there were no loud, critical voices against bases, the Treaty may have just passed quietly without much debate. The fact that there was a vocal anti-base faction opened up a real debate on the bases issue” (Diokno).

Military Prostitution

Military prostitution was a less mentioned local issue caused by the arrival of GIs in the Philippines, compared to Okinawa and South Korea (Moon). Similar to its legal status in other Asian

allies of the United States, prostitution was illegal in the Philippines, but in Olongapo, Barrio Barretto, Subic City, and Angeles City, where major U.S. military installations were situated, there were exceptions. In Olongapo alone, there were around three hundred and thirty bars and joints in which sexual services were provided by “hospitality woman,” a euphemism for prostitutes (Sturdevan and Stoltzfus, p45). Around 15,000 to 17,000 sex workers resided in the cities mentioned above, with ninety percent of them female (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p.45). The prostitutes were also supervised by a registration system called the Social Hygiene Clinic, which was under a joint management of Olongapo City and the U.S. Navy, and a process of physical check similar to that in the Korean camptowns was also established in the Philippines (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p45).

There had been several major difficulties for those “hospitality women.” The first one is the inaccessibility of regular abortions (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p.46). The social pressure of Catholicism-based culture makes abortion a case beyond physical pain, but also a spiritually sinful act. Therefore, a society with such a belief deep-rooted in itself has very limited options for those who would like abortion operations. Plus, a *holit* massage performed in very hygiene-questionable clinics was the common approach adopted by sex workers to get rid of their undeveloped babies, but such an approach has never been verified to have no negative impact on women (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p.46). The military prostitution ID system designed for the practitioners actually worked against them. A night-off card and an ID passbook must be with the women anytime they were with American male; otherwise, they were very likely to be arrested for “streetwalking,” which was not permitted by the administration, or they might be fined for operating independently from their affiliated bar owners (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p.47). Another problem with the workflow of the practitioners was that they must rely on the arrival of the U.S. servicemen in the Philippines to have

income - their income could be very unstable. When a flight did not stay long enough, or no ship had arrived for a while, sex workers in the camptowns would be in debt to the bar owners, and they must pay the debt first when the customers returned to camps to possibly have leisure time in camptowns. A cycle of poverty was generated (Sturdevan & Stoltzfus, p.47), and the youth of the “hospitality women” were worn out on it. However, there was an absence of vocal domestic advocacy for the unfortunate lives of the military prostitutes in the Philippines, and in Baker’s book, she assumed that the social conservatism of the prominent religious groups in the Philippines only encouraged the initiative to care the immoral sins committed by the women, instead of the bitter treatment and isolation they had (Baker).

III. Conclusion

The public responses to the conflicts between the American military and the Philippine society concentrated very much on the burgeoning nationalism and the Philippines as a genuinely independent country. The collective hostility against the U.S. troops and the government-led Agreement was triggered almost every time when friction occurred, and the anger eventually led to the drive to remove GIs from the country. A similar high degree of resentment can be perceived in the case of Okinawa, but is less common among the U.S. camps in South Korea. In the end, the persistent engagement of the Philippine public to force GIs out of their territory was finally fulfilled with assistance from nature. There is a valuable lesson for Washington to learn from its troop withdrawal from the Philippines.

Chapter Five: Analysis

The case studies on the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines survey the historical contexts, current development, strategic significance, and particularly a variety of local issues involving the American military stationed in the selected Asian regions. In the following analysis of the presented information above, I dig deeper into the fundamental reason for the local problems of the stationed U.S. troops in the Asian regions, which is the contrasting acknowledgment, between local people and the host governments, of the American military presence due to the differed impacts U.S. troops have on the two groups. The two contrasting perceptions of the U.S. military – one as the foe who makes residents sacrifice for the costs, the other as the friend who contributes to the national defense – are the United States’ identity crisis in the three allies in Asia. Historical anti-base public responses in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines are summarized first to demonstrate the two types of hosts respectively played by the locals and their governments: one as the taker of the troubles made by GIs, the other as the beneficiary of the American “guests.” Then, I answer the question of how the resulted contrasting perceptions of the U.S. military is going to continue the base-related local issues from three perspectives of the local people, the host governments, and the United States.

I. The General Pattern of Public Responses

Local people’s collective responses were dichotomized – the public chose to reply to the issues through either protest or resistance or silent suffering. In Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, people reacted to the unnatural deaths of local civilians caused by American soldiers and the local judiciary’s inability or unwillingness to immediately try and sentence the military criminals with unconcealed anger. Public demonstrations were held near the bases, the U.S. Embassy, and on the

streets to memorialize the lives of the twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl, the sex worker in the *kijichon*, and the two Filipinos, to condemn GI brutality and disregard for locals' lives, and to demand the local trials of those with local blood on their hands. The public antagonism against the military bases was generated in the neighborhoods surrounding Kadena Air Base, Yongsan Camp, and Clark Air Base (Baker, p.130), when residents could not stand decades of noise produced by aircraft exercises, or the contaminated water and soil near the military installations that would soon move or had been deserted by the U.S. military. Lawsuits against the American bases were filed in Okinawa, and compensation for the clean-up process was publicly requested by both non-governmental organizations and local governments from the United States.

On other disturbing issues, however, local people decided to be the takers of the troubles. Military prostitution had been a common phenomenon in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, but there have been no major demonstrations or movements organized to fight for the rights of sex workers who sustained their lives through providing services to American soldiers frequenting the camptowns. The population of military sex workers was too large to be ignored, and their financial and cultural dilemmas often prevented them from pursuing a decent profession. Due to the bleak employment situation in the three regions in Asia when GIs were originally stationed, many locals had to financially rely on the U.S. camps (Baker). Instead of wishing the bases to be removed like many of their fellow countrymen, the local employees in the camps did not favor the departure of GIs (Kawato), since the stationed American soldiers were the exclusive source of their income.

The cultural conservatism and the low moral tolerance of the sex industry in Asia contributed to the collective silence on the issue of military prostitution, since the moral concerns

often prevented protesting and advocating for the rights of the females who did not “value” themselves much and used their bodies to make a profit. When the death of Yun Geum-I stimulated the Korean public’s indignation over the cruelty of Private Markle, she was mourned not as a waitress who was murdered in her work, but as another Korean woman victimized by GI crime – her professional identity was intentionally concealed, since it would harm the public support for the sovereignty-oriented protests.

II. How the Contrasting Perceptions of the U.S. Military Prolong the Conflicts?

As Alexander Cooley states in his *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*, three players participate in base politics: local people, the host state’s government, and the United States (Cooley, p.15). Each of the three players contributes to one aspect of the underlying reasons for the continuous existence of the military-civil issues, if the resulted perceptions by the public and the host governments of the American military are still not as much unified as possible.

Locals

The attempted integration of the U.S bases’ dual identity as invaders and protectors in the three Asian regions is largely undermined by the fact that the local public is naturally uncomfortable with foreign military stationed in their land, let alone welcoming those who harmed the residents. Local people of the host states suffered not only from physical harms, but also from sacrificed nationalism and sovereignty, which are highly appreciated and cherished by them. Their resistance against the “trouble maker” image of the U.S. bases and defense of their pride as the ultimate owner of the lands also intensify the conflicts around base issues.

Okinawans' response to the existing American military bases does not differ much from the hostile reactions to the previous Japanese occupiers; the anti-base protests and movements in Okinawa have also shared the spirit and philosophy of the local resistance to the Japanese occupation. Despite very different contexts and types of threat, local people have demonstrated the same stance, which is to oppose any external intervention on the island. Okinawan people do not detest the U.S. bases particularly – they just hate intruders, and try to kick them out. In this case, what the U.S. military has encountered is the local refusal to be a party to conspiracy between Tokyo and Washington, two political entities vying for control over the island residents.

The remote Japanese island's long history of occupation has shaped Okinawans' distinctive self-identification, which partially contributes to their strongly provincial, ethno-orientated defense mechanism against external intervention. Local people's steadfast adherence to their unique identity as Okinawans (rather than Japanese) was obviously illustrated in a 2005 survey conducted by Lim John Chuan-tiong, an Associate Professor at the University of the Ryukyus regarding Okinawans' self-identification. Forty percent of Okinawan respondents identified as "Okinawan," 21% as "Japanese," and 36% as "Both Japanese and Okinawan" (Lim). As mentioned in the background section of the case study of Okinawa, the island residents are very proud and protective of their cultural heritage and natural resources, mainly because both are regarded as the ancestral that which requires observation and preservation. A mentality of independence characterizes the local people in Okinawa, since a strong belief that Okinawans would thrive in local environment can be perceived. Such a psychology naturally makes whoever violates the locals' pristine environment their enemy. Given hundreds of years of occupation, Okinawan people already have had enough with the colonization of the island, and are desperate for autonomy. Therefore, U.S. soldiers' crimes and

criminal jurisdiction, environmental damages, and military prostitution became not only the issues considered disruptive by the public, but also the reminder of the collective history of humiliation. There is only one approach to get rid of the physical and mental disturbance of the American military presence: to eradicate the bases.

The anti-base movement in South Korea symbolizes the sentiment of the new democratic Republic after dictatorial military governance by Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee. The unequal provisions in the SOFA and misconduct of American troops in South Korea have been the targets of the anti-base groups and protests, only a minority of which possessed the intention of overthrowing the U.S. bases in the country (Kawato). Contemporary Korean nationalism after the Roh Tae-woo administration, interpreted by Victor Cha, has been characterized by active civic engagement in politics (Steinberg, p116). Civilian gatherings for various causes have been a demonstration of the new democratic, civil Korean society, where contrasting opinions, even those criticizing the U.S., are not banned from the public, but encouraged instead. Cha also stated that such a development in the maturity of the Korean civil society was partially critical for Korean people to prove to themselves that they now have flipped the page of authoritarianism (Steinberg, p.116) and their ideological superiority over the neighbor in the north.

The new Korean nationalism is not in major conflict with the existence of the military bases per se, and there has a generally pro-America and pro-base public opinion in South Korea (Steinberg, p.129) since the collapse of Park's authoritarian era. With the organizations and protesters holding a "base out" opinion being a minority (Steinberg, p.117), NGOs like the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S., which intend to "correct the behaviors of GIs" and advocate for the

revision of the SOFA to rebalance the status of Seoul and Washington in the Agreement have been the majority voices in the recent anti-base movements.

In contrast to the Korean public's reserved demand for treaty revision and behavior corrections, the Philippine people demanded sovereign independence from Washington. After the establishment of a modern Philippine democracy in 1946, determined anti-base organizations and protesters in the country attacked the American military presence in the Philippines twice when they found the bases were in the way of the healthy development of an independent Philippine democratic political system, before all GIs eventually departed in 1991.

The first wave of anti-base movement followed the two civilian deaths in 1964. On November 25 and December 13, a sixteen-year-old Filipino and a local civilian were killed by U.S. military personnel. Similar to Okinawan locals' reaction to the rape of the twelve-year-old schoolgirl, Philippines considered their fellow Filipino countrymen's deaths as Washington's uncontrolled trampling on their national pride; the two incidents at the end of 1964 also revived the Philippine people's unforgettable memory of the hundred-of-year colonial era (Baker, p.113), when Spanish colonizers were able to freely mistreat and exploit the locals. The indignant public vehemently condemned the overly extensive U.S. jurisdiction in the Philippines, and demanded the removal of bases and revision of the Military Bases Agreement, since the treaty did not effectively discourage American soldiers from committing such misconduct against the residents, and its continuation would only further physically harm locals near the military installations and undermine Manila's absolute authority over its territory.

The second wave of campaigns targeted the United States and its bases as the accomplices of Ferdinand Marcos, the notorious dictator of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. Giving birth to the

rampant corruption within the bureaucracy, brutal repression of dissent, martial law, and the election fraud, Marcos was then, and still is considered the destroyer of the growing democracy and rule of law in the Republic of the Philippines. The nationalist Philippine public was irritated and disappointed by Washington's toleration and even support of the dictatorship during the Carter and Reagan administrations through their inaction toward the human right violations in the Philippines, financial assistance to the non-achieving Marcos regime (Sudjic), and the strengthened security partnership based on the shared anti-communist ideology. The United States gradually lost public favor, and was no longer regarded as a democracy-promoting friend of the Philippine public, but as an accomplice of the dictator. The political partnership between the United States and the Marcos administration turned bases into targets of the public who resented the undemocratic way Marcos ruled the country. For the United States, its military bases in the Philippines were connected to Marcos' authoritarianism, a political burden detested by Philippine people. The United States was placed on a moral low ground, and ironically became the obstacle to the civil society development in the Philippines.

One premise I discovered about the public antagonism above is that the host nations' citizens were, are, and will be the only proactive advocates against the foreign military installations, since they are the most direct victims of the base-related issues in my studied cases. Additionally, a focused, strong public demand for the removal of the military presence would pose a detrimental attack on U.S. military's image as a supportive friend of the host governments.

The Host Governments

Supposed to be the broker between the angry citizens and the stationed U.S. military, the host governments have their own hardship. National security, as one aspect of governance that

directly relates to a country's survival, is naturally prioritized by the host governments; thus, with the appealing military assistance in front of the policy-makers, they would find it too hard not to stand with the United States, a friend of security.

Such a mentality of the host governments contributes to the clashes around the military installations – the host governments were ready to sacrifice the interests of the citizens in exchange for the United States' protection, particularly when their citizens' voices do not matter in the country's authoritarian politics. In the historical contexts of the three cases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, it was the local people who bore the military bases' impacts, but they had limited, or none capacity to engage in the policy-making process. In the case of Okinawa, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese central government in Tokyo has been marginalizing Okinawan residents due to mainland Japan's historical biases against Okinawans' distinctive self-identification. Besides, the prefectural government in Okinawa has no negotiating power over foreign policy (Hein & Selden, p.229), little say in Tokyo's policy-making mechanisms, and in the base issue, limited capacity to even dictate its own. In the case of South Korea, the signature of the SOFA was during the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in 1966, who allowed no civilian engagement in politics. National security and the camaraderie with the United States, in Park's mindset, were above the collective demands of the public (Steinberg, p.44). In the case of the Philippines, when the MBA was originally signed, the fledgling Republic was in great need of national defense support from the United States (Steinberg, p.267); thus, any opinion from citizens was put aside to secure the safety of the country. Through the host governments' accommodation of the U.S. military at the price of the public welfare, the double-sided image of the bases as a supporter (of the governments) and an enemy (of the local people) continues to diverge.

Local people's interests were ignored by their governments in specific issues. Through the bilateral security treaties, extensive jurisdiction over American soldiers and even the locals who were considered to threaten the security of the U.S. bases was given to Washington by the Roxas administration of the Philippines, for instance. The United States was also exempted from the responsibility to restore the natural environment of the previously used lands in host nations, which might have been seriously contaminated and affected the locals' health. With prostitution illegal in the countries, the Korean and Philippine governments constructed the registration and personal health maintenance system for the sex workers serving the U.S. service members through cooperation with the U.S. military in the camptowns. Military prostitutes were even encouraged by Korean officials during the Reagan administration to act as charismatic "personal ambassadors" to prevent GIs from departing (Kawato, p.153). The philosophy behind the state-sponsored prostitution is simple: to convince GIs to stay and better protect South Korea from external threats. The theory of trading the interests of those with no political power for national interests was commonly practiced by host nations.

Being brokers who balance the conflicting identities of the American bases is difficult for the host governments also because they make policy-decision open to impact from civil society; therefore, the growing pluralism of policy opinion undermines the supposedly coherent pro-base stance of the host governments. An authority that appreciates and reasonably depends on public opinion is in fact a potential key to base removal, since the citizens' resistance, preferences, and suggestions would be effectively integrated into the decision-making process. Additionally, political pluralism among the leadership – diverse stances on issues among political elites – is also required for successful lobbying, since a group of high-level leaders who sincerely share views with the activists would be a

great leverage in the bargaining for civilian organizations. The Philippines during the Marcos presidency/dictatorship was an example to show how the policy-making process can be shut off for other players in politics. As anti-base protests and groups gathered, their demands that Marcos reconsider the status of the American military presence in the Philippines failed (Kawato, p134), since the dictator closed the door to all those who possessed different opinions other than his. The situation for anti-base activist groups was greatly improved during the Corazon Aquino administration after 1986. Campaign organizers were granted the privilege to lobby policy makers, namely the Philippine senators, and even engage those who originally objected to the continuation of the bases in the anti-base campaign to amplify the influence. In the end of the story, a slim victory was secured, and GIs were out.

The United States

The last factor in the “identity crisis” of the U.S. military presence in the three regions is the United States itself. Its attempted construction of a coherent image of itself as a reliable, daunting friend fails because of the actual harms it did to the locals and its real position largely as a “friend with benefits” to the host governments.

The wrongdoings committed by the U.S. military overseas in the three host nations exacerbated the military-civil relationship. Under the premise of the original security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the United States had extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). According to the U.S.-Japan and U.S. Korea SOFA and the R.P.-U.S. MBA, Americans have jurisdiction if American military personnel was “acting in official duty,” or if the victim was another American. Other privileges for U.S. service members who committed crimes in the host nations are also included in the treaties. Since the SOFAs and the MBA exempt most American military

personnel from local visa and passport regulations, criminals can be actually transferred back to the United States before Japanese trials. Additionally, if a suspected GI is not captured outside of a base by the Japanese authorities, it is the American military judiciary's right to retain custody until the criminal is officially indicted in a Japanese court. Since U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction and local jurisdiction over base-related criminals are a zero-sum game – one expands while the other shrinks, the limits of the host states' legal power over crimes committed against their citizens on their territories naturally irritates local people. The United States' careless and utilitarian attitude toward the welfare of local people also makes it hard for the public to believe that they actually needed to even compromise to trade for the security provided by the United States. The land previously polluted by the U.S. military, the tolerance of soldiers' patronizing of local prostitution, and the contribution to the host governments and the United States' joint encouragement of military prostitution in South Korea and the Philippines (Kawato, p.220) all indicate Washington's intentional ignorance of its local impacts and the consequences of the bases' operations.

The security partnerships between the United States and its regional allies are the major incentive for the host governments to compromise its citizens' welfare and oftentimes submit to Washington's demands. But a weak, outdated consensus on the need of defense assistance would strip the benefits off from this material-based relationship. People need to realize that while locals can be formidable challengers to the foreign military presence, and the United States can be a powerful patron in base politics, the governments of host nations have the final call on the bases' fate, and it is their security partnership with the United States that explains why the host nations usually value those American military installations very much. The U.S. overseas military bases are born out of consensus that there are mutual needs and benefits to have them situated in the host

nations. The support of the host nations' national defense and the maintenance of regional stability, early discussed in the strategic importance of each case study, are usually the common ground. However, such a consensus does not hold forever; once it does not work for the interests of either party, the security partnership became single-sided; lacking the "security rationale for maintaining U.S. bases" (Yeo, p.61), the governments of the host states are also likely to stop their political support and financial investments.

Prior to the expiration day of the MBA in 1991, the necessity of the continuation of the overseas bases in the Philippines was questioned by one argument circulating in Manila, that the absence of major external threats against the Philippines due to the collapse of the Soviet Union should invalidate the existence of the American bases, since a foreign military was no longer required to defend the country (Yeo, p.61). Such a theory seemed to be solid, since President Corazon Aquino did not desperately seek any alternative to keep the bases from being removed. Different stories unfolded in Okinawa and South Korea – even though the Soviet Union's threats also disappeared after 1991, Tokyo and Seoul still required substantial military support from Washington. Japan was still confined to maintaining a self-defense army against its rivals to the west; South Korea was still operated under the Armistice with North Korea, and was under direct military threat from Pyongyang. Both countries had the defensive need for American military protection, while the United States also had strategic reasons for station troops near China and North Korea to enable rapid reaction to regional crisis. Even today, GIs stationed in South Korea and Japan are still relevant to the two countries' security partnership with the United States. In contrast to the Philippine example, the gradually strengthened consensus in the cases of Okinawa and South Korea fortified the host states' intention to keep the U.S. military presence, largely because Washington's help is

wanted more than ever – the camaraderie between Seoul and Washington is in a prime time under the regional tension.

Decoding the United States' balance between being a public enemy and being a security partner, I discover that the “identity crisis” of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines is the root of the lasting conflicts in military-civilian relations, and predict that Washington's continuous attempts to be local-friendly and failure to do so are going to keep confirming its image of the “foe” of the public, but not endangering the existence of the bases in Okinawa and South Korea.

Analysis

The case studies on the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines survey the historical contexts, current development, strategic significance, and particularly a variety of local issues involving the American military stationed in the selected Asian regions. In the following analysis of the presented information above, I dig deeper into the fundamental reason for the local problems of the stationed U.S. troops in the Asian regions, which is the contrasting acknowledgment, between local people and the host governments, of the American military presence due to the differed impacts U.S. troops have on the two groups. The two contrasting perceptions of the U.S. military – one as the foe who makes residents sacrifice for the costs, the other as the friend who contributes to the national defense – are the United States’ identity crisis in the three allies in Asia. Historical anti-base public responses in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines are summarized first to demonstrate the two types of hosts respectively played by the locals and their governments: one as the taker of the troubles made by GIs, the other as the beneficiary of the American “guests.” Then, I answer the question of how the resulted contrasting perceptions of the U.S. military is going to continue the base-related local issues from three perspectives of the local people, the host governments, and the United States.

The general pattern of public response

Local people’s collective responses were dichotomized – the public chose to reply to the issues through either protest or resistance or silent suffering. In Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, people reacted to the unnatural deaths of local civilians caused by American soldiers and the local judiciary’s inability or unwillingness to immediately try and sentence the military criminals with unconcealed anger. Public demonstrations were held near the bases, the U.S. Embassy, and on the

streets to memorialize the lives of the twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl, the sex worker in the *kijichon*, and the two Filipinos, to condemn GI brutality and disregard for locals' lives, and to demand the local trials of those with local blood on their hands. The public antagonism against the military bases was generated in the neighborhoods surrounding Kadena Air Base, Yongsan Camp, and Clark Air Base (Baker, p.130), when residents could not stand decades of noise produced by aircraft exercises, or the contaminated water and soil near the military installations that would soon move or had been deserted by the U.S. military. Lawsuits against the American bases were filed in Okinawa, and compensation for the clean-up process was publicly requested by both non-governmental organizations and local governments from the United States.

On other disturbing issues, however, local people decided to be the takers of the troubles. Military prostitution had been a common phenomenon in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, but there have been no major demonstrations or movements organized to fight for the rights of sex workers who sustained their lives through providing services to American soldiers frequenting the camptowns. The population of military sex workers was too large to be ignored, and their financial and cultural dilemmas often prevented them from pursuing a decent profession. Due to the bleak employment situation in the three regions in Asia when GIs were originally stationed, many locals had to financially rely on the U.S. camps (Baker). Instead of wishing the bases to be removed like many of their fellow countrymen, the local employees in the camps did not favor the departure of GIs (Kawato), since the stationed American soldiers were the exclusive source of their income.

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Locals

The attempted integration of the U.S bases’ dual identity as invaders and protectors in the three Asian regions is largely undermined by the fact that the local public is naturally uncomfortable with foreign military stationed in their land, let alone welcoming those who harmed the residents. Local people of the host states suffered not only from physical harms, but also from sacrificed nationalism and sovereignty, which are highly appreciated and cherished by them. Their resistance against the “trouble maker” image of the U.S. bases and defense of their pride as the ultimate owner of the lands also intensify the conflicts around base issues.

Okinawans' response to the existing American military bases does not differ much from the hostile reactions to the previous Japanese occupiers; the anti-base protests and movements in Okinawa have also shared the spirit and philosophy of the local resistance to the Japanese occupation. Despite very different contexts and types of threat, local people have demonstrated the same stance, which is to oppose any external intervention on the island. Okinawan people do not detest the U.S. bases particularly – they just hate intruders, and try to kick them out. In this case, what the U.S. military has encountered is the local refusal to be a party to conspiracy between Tokyo and Washington, two political entities vying for control over the island residents.

The remote Japanese island's long history of occupation has shaped Okinawans' distinctive self-identification, which partially contributes to their strongly provincial, ethno-orientated defense mechanism against external intervention. Local people's steadfast adherence to their unique identity as Okinawans (rather than Japanese) was obviously illustrated in a 2005 survey conducted by Lim John Chuan-tiong, an Associate Professor at the University of the Ryukyus regarding Okinawans' self-identification. Forty percent of Okinawan respondents identified as "Okinawan," 21% as "Japanese," and 36% as "Both Japanese and Okinawan" (Lim). As mentioned in the background section of the case study of Okinawa, the island residents are very proud and protective of their cultural heritage and natural resources, mainly because both are regarded as the ancestral that which requires observation and preservation. A mentality of independence characterizes the local people in Okinawa, since a strong belief that Okinawans would thrive in local environment can be perceived. Such a psychology naturally makes whoever violates the locals' pristine environment their enemy. Given hundreds of years of occupation, Okinawan people already have had enough with the colonization of the island, and are desperate for autonomy. Therefore, U.S. soldiers' crimes and

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revision of the SOFA to rebalance the status of Seoul and Washington in the Agreement have been the majority voices in the recent anti-base movements.

In contrast to the Korean public's reserved demand for treaty revision and behavior corrections, the Philippine people demanded sovereign independence from Washington. After the establishment of a modern Philippine democracy in 1946, determined anti-base organizations and protesters in the country attacked the American military presence in the Philippines twice when they found the bases were in the way of the healthy development of an independent Philippine democratic political system, before all GIs eventually departed in 1991.

The first wave of anti-base movement followed the two civilian deaths in 1964. On November 25 and December 13, a sixteen-year-old Filipino and a local civilian were killed by U.S. military personnel. Similar to Okinawan locals' reaction to the rape of the twelve-year-old schoolgirl, Philippines considered their fellow Filipino countrymen's deaths as Washington's uncontrolled trampling on their national pride; the two incidents at the end of 1964 also revived the Philippine people's unforgettable memory of the hundred-of-year colonial era (Baker, p.113), when Spanish colonizers were able to freely mistreat and exploit the locals. The indignant public vehemently condemned the overly extensive U.S. jurisdiction in the Philippines, and demanded the removal of bases and revision of the Military Bases Agreement, since the treaty did not effectively discourage American soldiers from committing such misconduct against the residents, and its continuation would only further physically harm locals near the military installations and undermine Manila's absolute authority over its territory.

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rampant corruption within the bureaucracy, brutal repression of dissent, martial law, and the election fraud, Marcos was then, and still is considered the destroyer of the growing democracy and rule of law in the Republic of the Philippines. The nationalist Philippine public was irritated and disappointed by Washington's toleration and even support of the dictatorship during the Carter and Reagan administrations through their inaction toward the human right violations in the Philippines, financial assistance to the non-achieving Marcos regime (Sudjic), and the strengthened security partnership based on the shared anti-communist ideology. The United States gradually lost public favor, and was no longer regarded as a democracy-promoting friend of the Philippine public, but as an accomplice of the dictator. The political partnership between the United States and the Marcos administration turned bases into targets of the public who resented the undemocratic way Marcos ruled the country. For the United States, its military bases in the Philippines were connected to Marcos' authoritarianism, a political burden detested by Philippine people. The United States was placed on a moral low ground, and ironically became the obstacle to the civil society development in the Philippines.

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Supposed to be the broker between the angry citizens and the stationed U.S. military, the host governments have their own hardship. National security, as one aspect of governance that

directly relates to a country's survival, is naturally prioritized by the host governments; thus, with the appealing military assistance in front of the policy-makers, they would find it too hard not to stand with the United States, a friend of security.

Such a mentality of the host governments contributes to the clashes around the military installations – the host governments were ready to sacrifice the interests of the citizens in exchange for the United States' protection, particularly when their citizens' voices do not matter in the country's authoritarian politics. In the historical contexts of the three cases in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, it was the local people who bore the military bases' impacts, but they had limited, or none capacity to engage in the policy-making process. In the case of Okinawa, as mentioned earlier, the Japanese central government in Tokyo has been marginalizing Okinawan residents due to mainland Japan's historical biases against Okinawans' distinctive self-identification. Besides, the prefectural government in Okinawa has no negotiating power over foreign policy (Hein & Selden, p.229), little say in Tokyo's policy-making mechanisms, and in the base issue, limited capacity to even dictate its own. In the case of South Korea, the signature of the SOFA was during the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in 1966, who allowed no civilian engagement in politics. National security and the camaraderie with the United States, in Park's mindset, were above the collective demands of the public (Steinberg, p.44). In the case of the Philippines, when the MBA was originally signed, the fledgling Republic was in great need of national defense support from the United States (Steinberg, p.267); thus, any opinion from citizens was put aside to secure the safety of the country. Through the host governments' accommodation of the U.S. military at the price of the public welfare, the double-sided image of the bases as a supporter (of the governments) and an enemy (of the local people) continues to diverge.

Local people's interests were ignored by their governments in specific issues. Through the bilateral security treaties, extensive jurisdiction over American soldiers and even the locals who were considered to threaten the security of the U.S. bases was given to Washington by the Roxas administration of the Philippines, for instance. The United States was also exempted from the responsibility to restore the natural environment of the previously used lands in host nations, which might have been seriously contaminated and affected the locals' health. With prostitution illegal in the countries, the Korean and Philippine governments constructed the registration and personal health maintenance system for the sex workers serving the U.S. service members through cooperation with the U.S. military in the camptowns. Military prostitutes were even encouraged by Korean officials during the Reagan administration to act as charismatic "personal ambassadors" to prevent GIs from departing (Kawato, p.153). The philosophy behind the state-sponsored prostitution is simple: to convince GIs to stay and better protect South Korea from external threats. The theory of trading the interests of those with no political power for national interests was commonly practiced by host nations.

Being brokers who balance the conflicting identities of the American bases is difficult for the host governments also because they make policy-decision open to impact from civil society; therefore, the growing pluralism of policy opinion undermines the supposedly coherent pro-base stance of the host governments. An authority that appreciates and reasonably depends on public opinion is in fact a potential key to base removal, since the citizens' resistance, preferences, and suggestions would be effectively integrated into the decision-making process. Additionally, political pluralism among the leadership – diverse stances on issues among political elites – is also required for successful lobbying, since a group of high-level leaders who sincerely share views with the activists would be a

great leverage in the bargaining for civilian organizations. The Philippines during the Marcos presidency/dictatorship was an example to show how the policy-making process can be shut off for other players in politics. As anti-base protests and groups gathered, their demands that Marcos reconsider the status of the American military presence in the Philippines failed (Kawato, p134), since the dictator closed the door to all those who possessed different opinions other than his. The situation for anti-base activist groups was greatly improved during the Corazon Aquino administration after 1986. Campaign organizers were granted the privilege to lobby policy makers, namely the Philippine senators, and even engage those who originally objected to the continuation of the bases in the anti-base campaign to amplify the influence. In the end of the story, a slim victory was secured, and GIs were out.

U.S.

The last factor in the “identity crisis” of the U.S. military presence in the three regions is the United States itself. Its attempted construction of a coherent image of itself as a reliable, daunting friend fails because of the actual harms it did to the locals and its real position largely as a “friend with benefits” to the host governments.

The wrongdoings committed by the U.S. military overseas in the three host nations exacerbated the military-civil relationship. Under the premise of the original security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the United States had extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ). According to the U.S.-Japan and U.S. Korea SOFA and the R.P.-U.S. MBA, Americans have jurisdiction if American military personnel was “acting in official duty,” or if the victim was another American. Other privileges for U.S. service members who committed crimes in the host nations are also included in the treaties. Since the SOFAs and the MBA exempt most American military

personnel from local visa and passport regulations, criminals can be actually transferred back to the United States before Japanese trials. Additionally, if a suspected GI is not captured outside of a base by the Japanese authorities, it is the American military judiciary's right to retain custody until the criminal is officially indicted in a Japanese court. Since U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction and local jurisdiction over base-related criminals are a zero-sum game – one expands while the other shrinks, the limits of the host states' legal power over crimes committed against their citizens on their territories naturally irritates local people. The United States' careless and utilitarian attitude toward the welfare of local people also makes it hard for the public to believe that they actually needed to even compromise to trade for the security provided by the United States. The land previously polluted by the U.S. military, the tolerance of soldiers' patronizing of local prostitution, and the contribution to the host governments and the United States' joint encouragement of military prostitution in South Korea and the Philippines (Kawato, p.220) all indicate Washington's intentional ignorance of its local impacts and the consequences of the bases' operations.

The security partnerships between the United States and its regional allies are the major incentive for the host governments to compromise its citizens' welfare and oftentimes submit to Washington's demands. But a weak, outdated consensus on the need of defense assistance would strip the benefits off from this material-based relationship. People need to realize that while locals can be formidable challengers to the foreign military presence, and the United States can be a powerful patron in base politics, the governments of host nations have the final call on the bases' fate, and it is their security partnership with the United States that explains why the host nations usually value those American military installations very much. The U.S. overseas military bases are born out of consensus that there are mutual needs and benefits to have them situated in the host

nations. The support of the host nations' national defense and the maintenance of regional stability, early discussed in the strategic importance of each case study, are usually the common ground. However, such a consensus does not hold forever; once it does not work for the interests of either party, the security partnership became single-sided; lacking the "security rationale for maintaining U.S. bases" (Yeo, p.61), the governments of the host states are also likely to stop their political support and financial investments.

Prior to the expiration day of the MBA in 1991, the necessity of the continuation of the overseas bases in the Philippines was questioned by one argument circulating in Manila, that the absence of major external threats against the Philippines due to the collapse of the Soviet Union should invalidate the existence of the American bases, since a foreign military was no longer required to defend the country (Yeo, p.61). Such a theory seemed to be solid, since President Corazon Aquino did not desperately seek any alternative to keep the bases from being removed. Different stories unfolded in Okinawa and South Korea – even though the Soviet Union's threats also disappeared after 1991, Tokyo and Seoul still required substantial military support from Washington. Japan was still confined to maintaining a self-defense army against its rivals to the west; South Korea was still operated under the Armistice with North Korea, and was under direct military threat from Pyongyang. Both countries had the defensive need for American military protection, while the United States also had strategic reasons for station troops near China and North Korea to enable rapid reaction to regional crisis. Even today, GIs stationed in South Korea and Japan are still relevant to the two countries' security partnership with the United States. In contrast to the Philippine example, the gradually strengthened consensus in the cases of Okinawa and South Korea fortified the host states' intention to keep the U.S. military presence, largely because Washington's help is

wanted more than ever – the camaraderie between Seoul and Washington is in a prime time under the regional tension.

Decoding the United States' balance between being a public enemy and being a security partner, I discover that the “identity crisis” of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines is the root of the lasting conflicts in military-civilian relations, and predict that Washington's continuous attempts to be local-friendly and failure to do so are going to keep confirming its image of the “foe” of the public, but not endangering the existence of the bases in Okinawa and South Korea.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

The base-related local issues and the social responses in Okinawa, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines share characteristics – the three regions where GIs have been stationed have similar types of problems caused by the U.S. military bases, and the local citizens have been straightforward about their attitudes toward the military presence, and transformed the dissatisfaction into actual collective behaviors to redirect the military-civil relationship to a more equal one, or even to an end. Jurisdiction over the American military personnel who committed crimes outside the bases, military prostitution and the sex industry in camptowns, and negative impacts on the local natural environmental and residents' life have/had all been present in the three regions. From the locals' end, protests against the guilty American soldiers' brutality on innocent residents, including females and young children, had been held throughout the existence of the U.S. bases; local civilian campaigns targeting the military misconducts and other harms caused by American troops had also been organized gradually, even during the times when local citizens in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines were in a very suppressed or marginalized political environment to express their opposition to the host governments and Washington.

Given the differed contexts of the three regions, the different roles played by the host governments in handling the conflicts, the distinctive regional historical backdrops, and the ultimate demands of local people, however, the public's endeavor ended up with contrasting results, from the constant failure to persuade to the total removal of the bases. Historically colonized for so long, the Okinawan and Philippine people prioritized their autonomy very much over the U.S. defense assistance to their countries, and their nationalism/provincialism was sensitive enough to be triggered whenever they sense physical or mental violations from GIs. With a daunting enemy at

their northern border, however, Korean people, who also experienced a revival of nationalism since the gradual democratization, chosen to recognize more of the protection by the stationed American troops and partially compromise the public welfare for security. Such differences resulted in two present statuses of the U.S. military presence in the three regions – the camps in Okinawa and South Korea are still prominent, while the ones in the Philippines were removed in 1991.

To facilitate with the moderation of the military-civil relationship in the host nations and minimize the impacts of base-related issues on the U.S. military presence, I would like to make several policy recommendations to both the United States and the host governments. As Kawato states in her book, although the U.S. military in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines has or had been in change of its size, locations, or stationed military population over the years, due to anti-base public resistances and locals' demands, Washington has never substantially rearranged its base policy in the three regions (Kawato, p.175). There is an untried policy possibility between symbolic concessions, such as returning territorial sovereignty to the host country and flying the host nation's flag separately at the bases, and a total abandonment of the bases. Given the previously mentioned local issues and confrontations in the U.S. allies in Asia and the regional security risks emerging in recent years, if the United States still intends to extend the lifespan of its military installations in Asia, substantial revisions to the base policy from Washington's end, with the host governments' contribution, are required.

East and Southeast Asia have been the targeted regions for former U.S. President Obama's "rebalance" grand strategy to switch Washington's security focus from the Middle East states to the west side of the Pacific Rim. The Trump administration's decision on whether to inherit the defense policy guideline from the previous presidency, however, is not going to change the fact of the growing

military threats in the region. The historical hotspots have only been exacerbated recently. The frequency of Pyongyang's ballistic missile launches and the success of its nuclear tests has made Seoul increasingly uneasy and demand deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. The territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea is still effective in fanning the antagonism between Beijing and Tokyo, which has been reflected by both sides' reinforced patrolling near the controversial, uninhabited islands. In the South China Sea, even though the similar territorial dispute over the scattered islands between China and its southern neighbors has been downgraded since the transition of the Philippine government in 2016, the unsettled territorial control remains a trigger for potential military conflicts. Besides the danger of North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons, China is rapid rise as the key military player in Asia serves to underscore the risks and the fundamental pressure on the national security of Japan, Taiwan, and other American allies in Southeast Asia, and the overseas defense of the United States.

A peaceful, stable Asia under the U.S. military's supervision has been the ideal expectation of both Washington and its allies in the region, but the general policy transition in the executive branch of the U.S. government regarding the American role overseas since the 2016 election, combined with the regional threats and the local anti-base sentiment above, is going to give the established U.S. overseas basing system in Asia a test. A joint effort from both the base policy-makers United States and the host governments is required.

The security consensus must be proactively strengthened by the United States, but reevaluated by the host governments. As I conclude in the analysis, the mutual defense needs are the foundation of the U.S. military bases in foreign lands, so the promotion of the benefits brought

by the American military presence in the host countries would never be too much. Washington is supposed to delineate the surrounding dangers for the political elites of the Asian allies, as well as convincing them of the U.S. Armed Force as an effective supplement to their insufficient national defense against potential clashes. What should be learned by the United States in the lesson of the Philippines is that the policy-makers in the host nations do not necessarily share perspectives with each other on the American bases, and Washington needs to be in active communication with those who are in doubt of the necessity of the foreign military existence before “state penetration” like the one implemented by the Philippine anti-base civilian groups in 1991 takes place. In other words, it is the obligation of the United States to keep its friends on its side. For the host governments, while the United States is likely to propagandize its camps, they must be very certain of the needed amount of military assistance to achieve their national defense. The consensus should be reviewed and negotiated regularly with Washington to confirm that the host nations are not going to pay for any surplus of GIs who are of no help to the protection of citizens and national interests, but serve instead as a possible source of public anger. In fact, given President Trump’s advocacy for less U.S. support for the defense of allies around the world, there is a lower possibility that the host governments are going to face an overwhelming request to station troops from Washington in the near future.

Reshaping the public discourse about the U.S. military presence is another mission requiring the cooperation from the United States and the host governments. Across the three case studies in Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines, one of the shared characteristics is that those military facilities and soldiers were regarded as the representatives of America in foreign lands who revived the collective antagonism against the United States. Even though the bases symbolize the American

involvement in the local politics, the commonly perceived notion that the U.S. bases are exclusively for American interests (Cooley, p.251) must be altered, not only because it contributes to the active public engagement in the anti-base campaigns, but also because it does not reflect a comprehensive understanding of the mutual importance of the bases among the local population. Both the host governments and Washington should benefit from the stationed GIs, based on the security consensus. To make the public realize the United States' partial contribution to their protection, Washington needs to communicate with the host governments regarding the need to present a more positive image of the U.S. military in the host nations' territories through government-led public relations rebuilding. As a less trusted foreign political entity for the locals, the United States is not going to be easily trusted, if it decides to present the new description of the bases' significance; however, the legitimacy of the host governments would be more trusted to guide the angry citizens to the necessity of the American military existence in their homeland.

In general, there are several things that must be done in order to enable the U.S. government to sustainably maintain its military presence in Asia: picturing the possible threats for the security partners, offering them deals of defense against looming dangers, and directing the reconstruction of the bases' public perception. From the end of the host governments, they have to examine the geopolitical situation they currently are and will be in, reevaluate and negotiate Washington's offers based on their actual needs, and help their population comprehend the dual benefits of the "annoying" American military presence. Achieving the tasks above would guarantee more reality-based common ground for the security partnerships between the U.S. and the host nations, and a more base-friendly local environment to support the longevity of the American bases.

There are also some nation-specific options to improve the military-civil situation in Okinawa and the Philippines, even though they all have their own liabilities. Relocation of the military bases to less controversial areas adjacent to their current locations would be a reasonable approach for Okinawa and the Philippines (if new bases are to be possibly established) to pacify the local antagonism to the U.S. military. With the U.S. military being moved from their territory, Okinawan people would be able to more likely to enjoy their autonomy (under Tokyo's administration) without the intervention of GIs, since their long-cherished aspiration would be finally achieved. The logic also applies to Philippine people, who have been waiting for their absolute sovereignty for too long. But two major potential drawbacks of the relation strategy would be the limited capacity of the relocated military bases and their discounted defense function. The locations of the U.S. bases around the world were chosen for their optimal balance of geographic advantage and the capacity of accommodating enough military facilities; moving the bases to other less favorable islands may lead to a longer distance to the hotspots in the region, where crises potentially erupt, or a forced reduction of the number of military installations and stationed troops. Additionally, since the U.S. bases are not solely maintained by Washington, their relocation also requires considerable financial support from the host governments with taxpayers' money. The legislative branches of the Japanese and the Philippine governments may not easily share the view with the executive leaders, who usually tend to cooperate with the United States.

With a militarily and economically expanding China in Asia, the U.S. allies in the region, along with the United States, have already started to panic about Beijing's assertive acts in the maritime disputes in the South and East China Sea, which are supported by the growing capacity of the People's Liberation Army Navy and Air Force through modernization. The significance of the

stationed U.S. military in Japan and South Korea are only going to be further appreciated by the public and their governments; for the case of the Philippines, in my view, the worry about a Chinese dominance replacing an American one are still going to make the current leadership realize the need for more defense assistance from Washington, no matter how anti-west and nationalist it is. With the mentioned policy suggestions above based on my discovery of the base-relate conflicts' fundamental roots, the American supremacy and the relative stability in Asia are less likely to be shaken.

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